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
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
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
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GREAT COMMANDERS

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GENERAL SHERMAN

BY

GENERAL MANNING F. FORCE



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PREFACE.

GENERAL SHERMAN was the most picturesque figure in the civil war. His character was absolutely pure and spotless. He had a vigorous and penetrating intellect, prompt and clear in comprehension and in decision. While steadfast in his opinions, he was subordinate in conduct; he held to his judgment in issue against President Lincoln, but yielded as unquestioning obedience to McClelland as to Grant. He was an omnivorous reader, and was a storehouse of felicitous anecdote. His cheerful disposition and inexhaustible fund of conversation made him always a delightful companion. Frank as a child and outspoken in his likes and dislikes, Sherman was often engaged in controversy.

The war filled only a few years of his life, but comprised most of his activity and achievements. Accordingly, his biography naturally groups itself into these parts—before, during, and after the war, and so it is written in the following pages. The effort in this narrative has been to give in the simplest form a statement of the facts without comment. The completion of the publication of the First Series of the War Records gives opportunity for a fair approximation to a correct statement.

Exacting occupation and loss of energy, consequent upon a temporary partial failure of health, caused delay in the preparation of this little book, and, with the approval of the editor, I asked General J. D. Cox to write the period from the expedition to Meridian to the setting out upon the march to the sea, and the entire period subsequent to the review in Washington at the close of the war. As for the first of these two periods, he not only can say, *Omnia quae vidi et pars fui*, but he had already gone over it in his previous publications. For the second, his intimate acquaintance with the public affairs, as well as with General Sherman, gave him special qualification. General Cox kindly gave prompt consent, and so, as often happens, an apparent evil resulted in good fortune.

M. F. FORCE.

December, 1898.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER	PAGE
I.—ANTE BELLUM	I
II.—THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR	21
III.—THE BATTLE OF SHILOH	36
IV.—FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS	78
V.—THE MISSISSIPPI MOVEMENT	98
VI.—VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN	117
VII.—CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN	151
VIII.—MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI	187
IX.—CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA	204
X.—CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER—DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARCH TO THE SEA	225
✓ XI.—THE MARCH TO THE SEA	243
✓ XII.—THE CAROLINAS	265
XIII.—THE END OF THE WAR	293
XIV.—POST BELLUM	311

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

	FACING PAGE
Portrait of General Sherman	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Engraved on steel by Charles Schlecht, from a photograph by Napoleon Sarony taken in 1887.	
Sherman and his corps commanders	204
From a photograph, taken in 1865, by Matthew Brady.	
Mr. Lincoln's Atlanta letter	224
The Peacemakers	295
From a painting by George P. A. Healy.	
Tomb of General Sherman in St. Louis cemetery	347

LIST OF MAPS.

Battlefield of Shiloh	36
The Vicksburg campaign	117
The Atlanta campaign:	
No. I.	206
No. II.	219
No. III.	232
Atlanta to Savannah, Ga.	243
Savannah to Columbia, S. C.	288
Columbia to Raleigh, N. C.	295

GENERAL SHERMAN.

CHAPTER I.

ANTE BELLUM.

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN came from brainy stock. His brother Charles, his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather were judges; Roger Sherman, signer of the Declaration of Independence, William M. Evarts, Senator and Judge Hoar were collateral kindred. All were descended from Edmond Sherman, who emigrated from Dedham, Essex County, England, and was in Boston with three sons before 1636. Taylor Sherman, born in 1758 and died in 1815, great-great-great-grandson of Edmond Sherman, was lawyer and judge in Norwalk, Conn. He received two sections of land in Ohio as compensation for his services as one of the commissioners who settled the title and boundaries of the Fire Lands in the Connecticut Western Reserve in Ohio.

Charles Robert, son of Taylor Sherman, was admitted to the bar in Norwalk, married there Mary Hoyt, migrated to Ohio, and settled in Lancaster in 1811, being then twenty-one years old. He was held in high esteem, and was appointed judge of the Supreme Court of the State in 1821, and remained on the bench till his death, in 1829. He conceived a great admiration for Tecumseh, who figured conspicuously in Ohio in the War of 1812, and when his third son was born, February

8, 1820, gave him the name William Tecumseh. He died poor, but left to his large family of children the rich inheritance of a good name. The widowed mother was unable to care for them, but friends gladly took to their homes and adopted the children of Judge Sherman. William Tecumseh was adopted by a neighbor and friend of his father, Thomas Ewing.

Lancaster lay amid a stretch of fertile lands by the winding river, almost under the rocky eminence of Mount Pleasant. When Sherman was a boy the original pioneers who planted their cabins there in the trackless forest had barely passed away. It was a small town; its population in 1846 was only 2,120. But it had a notable society—notable for ability, character, and graceful hospitality. The central figure was Thomas Ewing. He was a man of powerful frame and majestic bearing. He was in youth a noted athlete. He could jump higher, leap farther, and run faster than any competitor, and was famed for being the only man who could throw an axe over the courthouse. His mind was as vigorous as his body. He was recognized as the master intellect in Ohio. The State sent him several times to the national Senate, and he was a member of the Cabinet under President Harrison and President Taylor. Politics never weaned him from his devotion to law. In the first cases that he tried he excited surprise, and won reputation by discovering unexpected points which determined the cases in his favor. Daniel Webster in his last days often associated Mr. Ewing with him in important cases. After Webster's death, Ewing was the leader of the American bar. James G. Blaine said of him: "He was a grand and massive man, almost without peers. With no little familiarity and acquaintance with the leading men of the day, I can truly say I never met one who impressed me so profoundly."

The lawyers of Lancaster, competing with him in almost every case, were kept continually on their mettle; and the bar of this little country town comprised, besides Mr. Ewing and Judge Sherman, Hocking Hunter, recognized as one of the most accurate and soundest lawyers in the State, and Henry Stanbery, whose reputation was national, who became Attorney-General of the United States, as well as others, also able, though less known. Governor Medill, who filled with distinction many important offices, both State and national, lived in Lancaster after 1832. Young Sherman was fortunate to grow up under the care of good teachers, and more fortunate in having the unconscious training of daily contact with choice spirits.

In the spring of 1836 he was appointed a cadet at West Point. Mr. Ewing being then in the Senate, young Sherman made a visit to the capital on his way to the academy. Leaving Lancaster in May, three days' travel by day and night brought him to Cumberland, Md. Though the railroad was then running to Cumberland, he drove thence to Washington. Jackson was then President. The Senate sat in the little chamber now occupied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Martin Van Buren, Vice-President, presided. Clay, Calhoun, and Webster towered above their fellow-senators. But among them, besides Mr. Ewing, were Silas Wright, the strongest man New York has sent to Washington; Benton, the indomitable man from Missouri; Cass; Preston, of South Carolina, esteemed the most elegant orator in the Senate; Willie P. Mangum, of North Carolina; and Berrien, of Georgia. John Quincy Adams added luster to the House of Representatives. A week spent in daily contact with these leaders was a course of intellectual training.

Though fragmentary railways had quickened travel, it was still a two days' journey from Wash-

ington to New York. The route was by railroad to Baltimore, by steamboat thence to Havre de Grace or Elkton, then by railroad across to the Delaware River, and by steamboat up the river to Philadelphia. There the traveler rested for the night. Next morning the journey was resumed by steamboat up the Delaware to Bordentown, by railroad across New Jersey to Amboy, and by steamboat to New York. Sherman traveled by this route, stopping to visit friends in Philadelphia and New York, and reached West Point June 12th. There were one hundred and forty cadets in the class, of whom only forty-two graduated. Among his classmates were George H. Thomas, Stewart Van Vliet, George W. Getty, Richard S. Ewell, William Hays, Bushrod R. Johnson, and Thomas Jordan, who survived to take active part in the civil war.

His letters written at the academy breathe the same childlike and yet manly frankness which characterized him always: "Bill is very much elated at the idea of getting free of West Point next June. He does not intend remaining in the army more than one year, then to resign, and study law probably. No doubt you admire his choice, but, to speak plainly and candidly, I would rather be a blacksmith. Indeed, the nearer we come to that dreadful epoch, graduation day, the higher opinion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer of the United States army, and the more confirmed in the wish of spending my life in the service of my country. Think of that! The church bugle has just blown, and in a moment I must put on my side arms and march to church to listen to a two-hours' sermon, with its twenty divisions and twenty-one subdivisions; . . . but I believe it is a general fact that what people are compelled to do they dislike. I fear I have a difficult part to act for the next three years, because I am almost confident that your father's wishes and intentions will clash

with my inclinations. In the first place, I think he wishes me to strive and graduate in the engineer corps. This I can't do. Next, to resign and become a civil engineer. . . . While I propose and intend to go into the infantry, be stationed in the far West, out of reach of what is termed civilization, and there remain as long as possible.

"You no doubt are not only firmly impressed but absolutely certain that General Harrison will be our next President. For my part, though, of course, but a 'superficial observer,' I do not think there is the least hope of such a change, since his friends have thought proper to envelop his name with log cabins, gingerbread, hard cider, and such humbugging, the sole object of which plainly is to deceive and mislead his ignorant and prejudiced though honest fellow-citizens, while his qualifications, his honesty, his merits and services are merely alluded to."

He graduated in June, 1840, sixth in his class, and was appointed second lieutenant in the Third Artillery. In the autumn he reported to his regiment in Florida, where his time was mainly spent in fishing and hunting, diversified with occasional expeditions to capture parties of Seminole Indians. In November, 1841, he was promoted first lieutenant. Here he wrote: "We hear that the new Secretary of War intends proposing to the next Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the Western service. As you are at Washington, I presume you can learn whether it is so or not, for I should like to go in such a regiment if stationed in the far West; not that I am in the least displeased with my present berth, but when the regiment goes North it will, in all likelihood, be stationed in the vicinity of some city—from which God spare me!" In another letter he writes: "If you have any regard for my feelings, don't say the word 'insinuation' again. You may abuse me as much as you

please, but I'd prefer of the two to be accused of telling a direct falsehood than stating anything evasively or underhand, and if I have ever been guilty of such a thing, it was unintentionally."

In March, 1842, he moved with his company to Fort Morgan, at the entrance to the Bay of Mobile, and in June the garrison sailed in a brig to Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor. He remained there till 1846, and became at home with the charming society of Charleston. In the summer of 1843 he made a visit to Lancaster, Ohio, and became engaged to Ellen, daughter of Mr. Ewing. Returning to his post at Fort Moultrie, he went by stage to Portsmouth, on the Ohio; thence by boat to Cincinnati; thence by boat to St. Louis; then down the Mississippi to New Orleans; by boat across Lake Pontchartrain to Mobile, and up the Alabama River to Montgomery; thence partly by stage, but mainly by rail, to Savannah, and then by sea to Charleston harbor. The journey took six weeks; two weeks and a half were spent in visits to the cities, and three and a half weeks were spent in actual travel night and day.

While at Fort Moultrie he was not idle or given wholly to society. He wrote to a son of Mr. Ewing: "Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas such as your father has at home, and, as a knowledge of geography in its minutest details is essential to a true military education, idle time necessarily spent here might be properly devoted to it. I wish, therefore, you would procure for me the best geography and atlas (not school) extant."

In June, 1844, he wrote: "Since my return I have not been running about in the city or the island as heretofore, but have endeavored to interest myself in Blackstone, which, with the assistance of Bouvier's Dictionary, I find no difficulty in understanding. I have read all four volumes, Starkie on Evidence, and other books semilegal and semi-

historical, and would be obliged to you if you would give me a list of such books as you were required to read, not including your local or State law. I intend to read the second and third volumes of Blackstone again, also Kent's Commentaries, which seem, as far as I am capable of judging, to be the basis of the common-law practice. This course of study I have adopted from feeling the want of it in the duties to which I was lately assigned." Later he wrote: "I have no idea of making the law a profession—by no means; but, as an officer of the army, it is my duty and interest to be prepared for any situation that fortune or luck may offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, and not for professional practice."

In February, 1844, he was relieved from duty on court-martial to report to Colonel Churchill, at Marietta, Ga., and aid in taking evidence in cases of claims against the Government. While at Marietta he made frequent visits to Kenesaw Mountain. On the same duty he traveled on horseback to the Etowah River, Alatoona, Rome, Wills Valley, Sand Mountain, and Raccoon Range to Bellefonte, Ala., and returned by Rome, Alatoona, and Marietta to Atlanta, making unconsciously a preparatory reconnaissance for his Atlanta campaign.

In 1846, when war with Mexico was impending, he received a regular recruiting detail, and reported at New York on the 1st of May. He was assigned early in May to station at Pittsburg, with a subrendezvous at Zanesville, Ohio, which was conveniently near to his friends at Lancaster. The news of General Taylor's first battles in Texas inflamed him with desire to be ordered to the field. He received at Pittsburg at 8 p. m. an order transferring him to Company F, then under orders for California. Working all night, he made out his money accounts and property returns, and next morning left them, with the cash balance and cloth-

ing and other property and receipts to be signed by his successor, in the hands of the physician of the recruiting depot, and set out at once on his journey to New York. Company F was filled up to one hundred and thirteen enlisted men and five officers. They embarked on the storeship Lexington, with six months' provisions and with six months' pay drawn in advance, and set sail on the 14th of July. The soldiers did the work on deck, were drilled whenever the weather permitted, were carefully supervised in their health and cleanliness, and on arriving at Monterey, Cal., after a voyage of one hundred and ninety-eight days, every man was able to march to post with all his equipments.

California was extensive, but thinly inhabited. About a score of little towns and settlements, small aggregations of one-story adobe houses; a few remaining missions, each with a colony of Indian converts attached; and ranches sparsely scattered in spots favored with water, comprised the population. Commodore Sloat, and afterward Commodore Stockton, of the navy; General Kearny, with two companies of United States dragoons; Colonel Frémont, with a battalion of volunteers; and Colonel Cook, with a regiment of volunteers, made the conquest and suppressed an insurrection. California was quiet, while Scott and Taylor with their commands were winning glory on the borders of the Gulf of Mexico.

Company F arrived at Monterey early in January, 1847. With six months' rations, and gristmill, sawmill, and other stores, and twenty-eight thousand dollars in money, and with Sherman for acting quartermaster and commissary, they were soon in quarters on the hill just west of the town. When appropriate staff officers arrived, Sherman was relieved of these temporary duties, and served as aid to General Kearny. In the absence of more serious occupation, a dispute had arisen as to who

held supreme command in California. Commodore Stockton claimed it as successor to Commodore Sloat, who was the first to take possession for the United States. General Kearny claimed it as the senior military officer in the Territory. Colonel Frémont claimed it as *protégé* of Senator Benton, a prominent and influential politician. This absurd contention lasted till Kearny and Frémont went East at the end of May, and Colonel R. B. Mason, who had arrived, in undisputed command on land, while Commodore Biddle, arriving, had like undisputed authority afloat.

Colonel Mason appointed Sherman his assistant adjutant general, and soon found him useful. When Commodore Sloat took possession of California he issued a proclamation declaring the inhabitants to be American citizens, and calling upon them to elect officers. The little town of Sonora, made up mostly of immigrants from the United States, thereupon elected Mr. Nash, one of their number, *alcalde*. General Kearny, holding that California was simply conquered territory—Mexican still though conquered—and was held and controlled by military power until its status should be determined by competent authority, appointed Mr. Boggs *alcalde*, and ordered Nash to turn the office over to him. Colonel Mason, soon after succeeding to command, received a letter from Boggs stating that Nash claimed that a military commander had no right to eject him from a civil office. Colonel Mason wrote to the captain of a company stationed at Sonora, directing him to notify Nash to vacate and turn over his books, papers, and accounts to Boggs, and, in case of refusal, to compel compliance by force. The captain replied that the settlers were greatly excited, and supported Nash in his refusal, and further stated on his own account that he was an officer of volunteers soon to be mustered out, and, as he ex-

pected to remain in Sonora as a permanent settler, he asked to be excused from enforcing the order. The legitimacy of military authority was directly put in issue. Scanty as were Colonel Mason's resources, he proposed at once to peremptorily compel obedience. Sherman requested him to put the matter into his hands, and promised success.

Receiving permission, he left Monterey, accompanied by a single private soldier, and traveled on horseback to Yerba Buena, where San Francisco now stands. Commodore Biddle listened with great interest to Sherman's statement of the matter, and gave him a boat, manned by a midshipman and eight men, and allowed one of his lieutenants to go in company. They sailed up the bay, reached the mouth of Sonora Creek by dark, and a landing on the creek near the town by midnight. Next evening Nash was seized while at supper, hurried into the boat, taken down the bay to the flagship, and put into the hands of the commodore. Sherman returned overland to Monterey, while Nash was sent around by water. Nash was released by Colonel Mason upon his promise to make no attempt to regain his office. Boggs entered upon his duties without opposition, and there was no further attempt to dispute the authority of the military in the enemy's country in time of war.

In the spring of 1848 workmen putting up a sawmill for Captain Sutter at Coloma, on the American fork of the Sacramento River, found particles of gold in the earth. The discovery could not be kept secret. People, dropping other pursuits, thronged to the valley of American fork. The gravel beds by the river teemed with their camps and resounded with the ceaseless rattle of their rockers. Sherman's restless activity persuaded Colonel Mason that it was his duty to make a personal inspection of the "diggings" before

sending a report of the discovery of gold to the Government at Washington.

News came in the early summer of the termination of the war. The only remaining volunteer regiment was mustered out, and swarmed to the gold fields. The only troops left were a company of dragoons and one battery. Colonel Mason prevented their desertion in mass by giving liberal furloughs, and thus giving every soldier in turn a chance at the mines. Men at the placers gathered in gold sometimes a hundred dollars in a day; sometimes more. Prices of labor and commodities became extravagant. Day laborers received sixteen dollars per day; domestics could not be hired for less than three hundred dollars per month. Colonel Mason authorized officers to draw rations in kind, and by clubbing together and waiting on themselves they could live. In the autumn Sherman, with two other officers, camped out near Coloma, and contributed the capital to a store. Each received a profit of fifteen hundred dollars, which enabled them to live through the winter.

On the 23d of February, 1849, General Persifor F. Smith arrived. Two regiments and a battalion came to re-enforce the two companies. The Pacific coast was made a military division, comprising the two departments of California and Oregon. Colonel Mason was relieved, and Sherman was appointed acting adjutant general of the division, and served as such until Major Joseph Hooker, the regularly assigned adjutant general of the division, arrived. Sherman was then appointed by General Smith aid-de-camp.

The news of the discovery of gold spread, and grew in magnitude as it spread. Immigrants poured in by land and by sea from all quarters of the globe. Some halted to build up towns and thrive by trade. The little village by the mission of Yerba Buena

expanded into the city of San Francisco, and on Sutter's ranch by the river sprang up the city of Sacramento. In the rush to the mines all other employments were abandoned and all engagements broken. General Sherman says in his Memoirs that six hundred abandoned vessels lay and rotted at their moorings in front of San Francisco, and that the regular steam packets on arriving anchored alongside of a man-of-war to retain their crews till the time for their return. In the excessive throng some were unable to find employment in mining, and others were unable to do the work. Under the stress of circumstances, men who had been merchants and capitalists earned their bread as laborers and hostlers, and Harvard graduates eked out a living by serving as hotel waiters and cooks for miners' messes. The camps of Americans organized communities, adopted laws, and established tribunals to enforce them. The rules defining mining rights evolved by them, and supplemented later by the miners in Colorado, were adopted substantially by Congress and enacted into a statute.

General Smith and some of his staff had brought their families to California, with a retinue of servants. The attendants, white and colored, vanished as soon as the ship touched land. After a vain effort to keep house without any assistance and a hopeless struggle to live there upon officers' pay, the families returned to their old homes. Army officers were in request as surveyors and engineers, and General Smith encouraged them to accept employment. Sherman obtained a two months' leave, and used the time so profitably in laying out town sites and surveying and platting ranches that he records he returned to duty with a net profit of six thousand dollars from his two months' work. On the 1st of January, 1850, he sailed with dispatches from General Smith to General Scott, and deliv-

ered them in person to the general in New York at the end of the month.

Lieutenant Sherman reported to General Scott, who then had his headquarters in New York, and was warmly received. After a few days he proceeded to Washington, where he was very cordially received by General Zachary Taylor, then President. Mr. Ewing was Secretary of the Interior, and lived in the house across the avenue from the War Department, afterward occupied by Montgomery Blair. Lieutenant Sherman obtained a six months' leave of absence, and, after a visit to his friends in Ohio, returned to Washington, and on May 1st married Miss Ellen Boyle Ewing, to whom he had become engaged in his visit to Ohio in the autumn of 1843. Miss Ewing was a notable figure in Washington. She inherited from her father a stately presence, vigorous intellect, and resolute character; from her mother, benignity and devout religious faith. She was admired by men and loved by friends of her own sex. Some lamented that she bestowed her hand upon an unknown lieutenant—unknown to them. All that was distinguished in Washington gathered at the wedding—the President and Cabinet, the diplomatic corps, the army and navy; Clay, Webster, and Corwin, and their compeers, and the justices of the Supreme Court. They little dreamed that the unknown lieutenant was to achieve a fame that would outshine the most noted of their number.

The President, General Taylor, was taken ill on the 4th of July, and died a few days after. His indomitable courage, simple ways, and purity of character had endeared him to the people, and his direct honesty, good sense, firmness, and patriotism had inspired confidence in his administration in the troubles which were already making themselves felt. His death was a shock to the nation. Lieutenant Sherman acted as an aid-de-camp at the

funeral. He reported for duty at St. Louis in September, and found among the officers there Swords and Van Vliet, who were afterward prominent quartermasters in the war of the rebellion, and Buell, Hancock, Andrew J. Smith, and Bragg.

An act was passed by Congress providing for the appointment of four additional captains in the commissary department, and Sherman was appointed one of the four. There being some irregularity in the office of the commissary stationed at New Orleans, he was relieved and Sherman was appointed in his place. He went to New Orleans in September, 1852, and in the following winter the house of Lucas and Symonds, of St. Louis, proposed to establish a bank in San Francisco under the name of Lucas, Turner and Company, in which Sherman was to be a partner. He obtained a six months' leave of absence and embarked for San Francisco in March, 1853. Competent assistants were employed to have charge of the details and routine business, and Major Turner, of St. Louis, remained as manager. Sherman showed such aptitude for the business that he resigned from the army, and in November Turner returned to the East, leaving Sherman the responsible manager of the bank. In mastering and managing this new occupation he displayed his characteristic traits of character. He was quick and clear in his grasp of facts and principles, prompt in judgment, resolute and energetic in action, and cool in emergencies. With all his nervous and vivacious temperament, he was a prudent, conservative, and safe man of business.

The speculator Meigs, who enjoyed unlimited credit and was a large borrower, was indebted in a considerable sum. Sherman conceived a distrust of him, and, against the opinion of his cashier and the judgment of other bankers, insisted upon the settlement of two thirds of his debt and additional

security for the remainder. When the crash came and Meigs fled, leaving unsettled debts to the amount of nearly one million dollars, many of his creditors were ruined, while Sherman's loss was trifling. In February, 1855, a run upon the bank of Page, Bacon and Company, by far the largest house in San Francisco, caused the bank to close its doors and fail. The people in a panic rushed to all the banks, drawing out their deposits till nearly all closed. Sherman, apprehending trouble, had strengthened his funds, and when the crash came acted with such prompt vigor that the run upon his bank spent its force without causing any disturbance or delay in paying over his counter every demand made upon it. While the city was strewn with financial wrecks, the bank of Lucas, Turner and Company weathered the storm without injury, and gained increased credit by the ordeal.

The abundance of gold, the recklessness of the miners, and the absence of established government drew many gamblers and desperadoes to California. When regular government was established, corruption in elections was believed to result in putting into office men who were in league with the criminal class, and who screened them from punishment. In May, 1856, James King, an editor who advocated law and order, and fearlessly assailed the gamblers and their allies, and who was one of the most popular men in San Francisco, was deliberately murdered in broad day in a public street in the heart of the city. The murderer at once gave himself up to the sheriff. This last straw aroused the people. A large number, embracing many of the best men in the city, organized themselves into a Vigilance Committee, a secret organization, to purge the community independently of the officers of the law. The first step proposed was to rescue the murderer of King from the friendly custody of the sheriff and dispose of him.

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Sherman had no hesitation as to his course. He was clear that it was the duty of every citizen to aid in having the law enforced by the officers of the law, and that the assumption of citizens to form themselves into an unauthorized body for the punishment of criminals independent of the law and its officers was a menace to the State. The governor, who was earnest in having Casey, the murderer, punished by due course of law, consulted freely with Sherman, and appointed him major general of militia for the district embracing San Francisco. Sherman found enough citizens of his way of thinking to form several companies, and was promised by General Wool, the commander of the military department, a supply of arms and ammunition. This preparation was at the point of success when General Wool withdrew his promise, and, all other arms being already in the possession of the Vigilance Committee, Sherman's movement fell to the ground, and the State was powerless. Casey was taken from the jail and hanged. Some other dangerous characters were made away with, and the rest were banished. The city was purged, order established, and a feeling of security restored. The Vigilance Committee became a permanent institution, and still exists. It has several times since been called into action, but only in great emergencies, and has always restricted its activity to the occasion which called it out.

Sherman held that, great as the immediate benefit was, the same good would have been obtained if the same combined energy had been used to stimulate and strengthen the constituted machinery of government, without sapping its authority. And who can tell how much the success of the California Vigilance Committee and the approbation that it received has encouraged and stimulated the Ku-klux of the South, the White Caps of the North,

and lynching parties and insurrectionary labor unions throughout the land.

The feverish prosperity of California had passed its climax. The influx of population, with the attendant competition in all branches of business and employment, put an end to inordinate profits. The shrinkage and readjustment which ensued was accompanied by failures, bankruptcies, and withdrawal of foreign capital. Acting on the suggestion of Sherman, the home office determined to close out their San Francisco business and withdraw the means employed in it. In May, 1857, the San Francisco house ceased business, and transferred undrawn deposits to other banks. Sherman returned to the East, leaving one of the firm to collect outstanding credits and dispose of real estate.

Lucas and Company (as the house was called) still availed themselves of his services, and gave him employment. He and a partner were appointed agents in New York of the St. Louis firm. He had been in business barely a month when, on the 21st of August, the Ohio Life and Trust Company, in Cincinnati, failed. It was the most important financial corporation in the West, and was esteemed safe as the Bank of England. The shock to credit spread in waves that soon covered the West, and then extended to the Eastern States. It spread to and over Europe, and through Persia and India to China and Japan. The world was girdled with financial wrecks. Sherman's firm had not contracted debts, but Lucas and Company, in St. Louis, unable to turn securities into money fast enough, failed. The business of the New York agency was wound up, and Sherman took the moneys and assets to St. Louis.

Declining to make another venture in business, he entered into partnership with his brother-in-law, Thomas Ewing, Jr., afterward chief justice of the Supreme Court of Kansas, and conspicuous in the

war of the rebellion, but then practicing law at Leavenworth, Kas. In the spring of 1859 he left the firm to open and improve a farm upon a tract of land in Kansas owned by Thomas Ewing, Sr. But the yearning for military life, probably never extinguished, returned. He wrote in June to his friend Don Carlos Buell, then on duty with Secretary-of-War Floyd, asking if there was any chance of his being appointed a paymaster in the army. Buell replied, advising him to apply for the place of superintendent of a military school which was about to be opened in Louisiana. He made application by letter, receiving prompt notice in July that he had been elected superintendent, with request to report in Louisiana as soon as possible.

In the autumn he reported to the Governor of Louisiana, and was cordially welcomed by him and by all who were interested in the undertaking. He found on the grounds of the institution, near Alexandria, a large building, but not so much as a chair or table in it. Setting energetically to work, he succeeded in having the building furnished and equipped, a full corps of professors appointed, courses of study and rules of government adopted, and on the 1st of January the academy opened with a good attendance of cadets. The Legislature made liberal appropriations. The governor took personal interest in the institution, and the first term closed at the end of July with general approbation. In the summer vacation Sherman went to Washington to solicit from the War Department arms for his academy. Louisiana had already received more than its quota from the General Government, but Secretary Floyd approved with alacrity a requisition for two hundred muskets and accouterments, and promptly forwarded them.

The school opened on the 1st of November with a largely increased number of cadets. Abraham Lincoln was elected President the same month.

The whole country was seething with the discussion of slavery, and the secession of the Southern States from the Union was openly advocated. Sherman did not vote at the election, and avoided political discussion. But when it was necessary to speak he gave his opinion frankly, and did not hesitate to say that secession was treason and was war. President Buchanan, in his message to Congress in December, said that no State had the right under the Constitution or otherwise to secede from the Union; but that if a State should wrongfully determine to secede, neither the President nor Congress could interfere by force to prevent the accomplishment of the purpose and stay the dissolution of the Union. In the same month South Carolina seceded. Other States followed. In December the Governor of Louisiana seized the unguarded forts on the Mississippi, and on the 10th of January, by an overwhelming force, compelled the surrender of the arsenal at Baton Rouge. The time had arrived when every one had to take his side. Sherman wrote to the governor on the 10th of January, 1860:

SIR: As I occupy a quasi military position under the laws of the State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of this seminary was inserted in marble over the main door: "By the liberality of the General Government of the United States. The Union—*esto perpetua*." Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that event, I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war belonging to the State, or advise me what disposition to make of them. And furthermore, as president of the Board of Supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent the moment the State determines to secede, for on no earthly account will I do any act or think

any thought hostile to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States.

With great respect, your obedient servant

W. T. SHERMAN, *Superintendent.*

The governor accepted the resignation with regret and with warm expressions of friendship and esteem. The Board of Supervisors passed resolutions of regret at his leaving and thanks for his past service. Every one spoke kindly and regretfully. While he was settling his accounts and turning over property, Bragg, Beauregard, and other officers of the army were abandoning the service of the United States, and General Twiggs, on duty in Texas, surrendered all the troops in the State, comprising a large part of the regular army, together with all the military posts, their armament, and all Government stores to an improvised colonel of militia.

CHAPTER II.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

SHERMAN, while disapproving of the institution of slavery, opposing its spread, and objecting to some of its features, was not excited over its continuance within existing limits, and objected to interference with it within those limits. But he was intensely loyal to the United States and the maintenance of the Union; was shocked and pained at the desertion of his brother officers from their flag; was outraged at the seizure of Government forts and buildings and stores; and was bewildered by the apparent acquiescence of the Government at Washington. While the South was seething with excitement, breaking away from the Union, seizing the forts and other public buildings and property of the United States, forming a new nation, erecting a new government, and preparing for war, Sherman was arranging his affairs, settling up his accounts, and turning over the property belonging to the seminary. He was again adrift, without employment, and left New Orleans about the 1st of March to rejoin his family and find means of supporting them. He thankfully accepted the office of president of a street railway company at St. Louis, offered to him through the influence of his friends in that city.

The people of the North were slow in attaining to a realizing sense of the state of affairs in the South. They knew little of war, and were incredulous of its near presence. To Sherman this seemed

the apathy of indifference. Upon the request of his brother, then in the House of Representatives, he went to Washington, and with him called on the President. When in the conversation Sherman said that the people of the South were preparing for war, Lincoln replied, "I guess we'll manage to keep house." Sherman said no more, and soon left. The two men, who did not yet know each other, parted—Lincoln, troubled undoubtedly by the statement, but veiling his feeling with a flash of levity; Sherman, disappointed, disheartened, depressed, angry.

He entered upon his duty as president of the railway company on the 1st of April. A few days later he was asked to accept the office of chief clerk of the War Department, with promise of early promotion to assistant secretary of war. He had just entered upon his new engagement, and had not yet recovered from the effect of what he considered a rebuff in Washington, and declined.

Beauregard opened fire upon Fort Sumter on the 12th of April. This was act of open war upon the United States, and the loyal nation, roused like a strong man from his slumber, sprang to its feet. On the 15th the President called for seventy-five thousand volunteers to serve three months, and then added ten regiments to the regular army. A force of Virginia troops seized upon Harper's Ferry. A Massachusetts regiment, responding promptly to the President's call, was attacked while passing through Baltimore. Travel upon both the roads leading to Washington was stopped, and the capital was cut off from all communication with the North and West. The blockade lasted till General Butler landed at Annapolis and opened the way to the city.

Sherman, notwithstanding his signal proof of loyalty, found his friends becoming troubled about him, and undoubtedly became dissatisfied with his

position. On the 8th of May he wrote to the Secretary of War: "I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for three months, because I can not throw my family upon the cold charity of the world. But for the three years' call made by the President an officer can prepare his command and do good service. I will not volunteer as a soldier, because, rightfully or wrongfully, I feel unwilling to take a mere private's place, and, having for many years lived in Louisiana and California, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place. Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most service."

On the 14th of May Sherman was appointed colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry in the regular army, and, on reporting at Washington, was assigned to duty with Lieutenant-General Scott. As soon as the road to Washington was opened troops from the North and West poured in. Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania sent organized and drilled regiments. Most of the troops were men who enlisted full of ardor, but wholly without military instruction. They came to march to victory and return home in triumph before the end of their enlistment. The Governor of Rhode Island came as colonel of one of his regiments. The Seventh New York camped on Mr. Stone's place, with wall tents for privates as well as officers, and comforted by a shipload of special supplies. When the troops with their multifarious baggage were moved across the river and organized into brigades and divisions, Sherman was assigned to command a brigade of four New York and one Wisconsin regiments, with a regular battery attached, being the Third Brigade of Tyler's division.

It is an easy matter to make paper organizations, but it is slow work to make actual soldiers. The people, thoughtless of the want of preparation, ignorant of the need of preparation, persisted in the demand for an onward movement, till General Scott, in July, ordered General McDowell, with the force about Washington, to advance and attack General Beauregard in his position on Bull Run, while General Patterson, of Pennsylvania, with a large command in the Shenandoah Valley, should watch and hold there General Joseph E. Johnston, and prevent his marching to aid Beauregard.

Sherman went up to visit his brother, John Sherman, who was a volunteer aid-de-camp to General Patterson. George H. Thomas was there, commanding a brigade in Patterson's army. The Shermans and Thomas, being in a room together, discussed the possibilities of the war. W. T. Sherman and Thomas spread a map of the United States upon the floor, and, kneeling down, tracing campaigns, designated Richmond, Nashville, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Atlanta as vital points to be taken. In their service it so happened that they, one or both, were immediately concerned in the capture of all of these but Richmond, and in repulsing attempted recapture of two of them.

McDowell moved out from the camps on the 16th of July, and on the 17th had his force in hand at Centerville. On the 18th, in a reconnoissance in force to Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Run, Sherman for the first time heard artillery in actual conflict. At 2 A. M. the army marched out to battle. General McDowell, with the great part of his command, made a detour to the right to gain the left of Beauregard before crossing Bull Run. He crossed easily, and was successful at first in driving the enemy. But Johnston had succeeded in eluding Patterson, and had already joined Beauregard. The Confederate left, which had gradually fallen back,

was largely re-enforced, and made a stand in a favorable position on the edge of a commanding plateau. Successive portions of the national line made successive assaults, but failed to drive the enemy from his position. No longer incited by success, and not held together by the cohesion of discipline, the irregular line broke in places, and streams of fugitives poured to the rear. By 3 P. M. the battle was lost.

Tyler's division was left near Bull Run, in the neighborhood of the Stone Bridge, to guard against any attempt of the enemy to cross there and deliver a counter-attack. The sound of McDowell's attack could be heard advancing till about noon. The roar of battle then became stationary. General Tyler then sent Sherman with his brigade to support. Crossing by a ford which he had discovered, he marched toward the sound of the guns, and reported to General McDowell on the field. It was his place to march to attack over ground swept by artillery and musketry. He put in his regiments successively, one at a time, and each in turn, after a gallant advance, broke and retired. About half past three the brigade crumbled. Many men had left the field. The loss in killed and wounded was severe. Sherman formed what was left into as good a square against cavalry as could be formed under the circumstances, and retreated across the Stone Bridge, and followed the panic rout to Centerville. There he gathered enough of each regiment to put them into bivouac in regimental lines. In obedience to an order given by General Tyler, he resumed the retreat at midnight, and reached his camp near the defenses of Washington about noon next day. Here he at once rendered the important service of making the guards at the aqueduct and neighboring ferries strong enough to stem the multitudinous rout and turn the demoralized fugitives back to their camps. Of General McDowell's total loss of

481 killed and 1,111 wounded, Sherman's brigade lost 111 killed and 205 wounded.

When the news spread through the land that, instead of the expected victory, the National troops were defeated and had returned to Washington in disorder, the first feeling was bitter disappointment and mortification. Then came a general recognition of the fact that war was a more serious matter than had been supposed, and then came the fixed resolve to carry the war through to successful issue, whatever might be the cost in toil or money or sacrifice. The soldiers were roused from their dream of easy conquest. Excepting men who had served in the Mexican War and some members of uniformed regiments in the older States, we were so profoundly ignorant of military matters that we were not aware that we were ignorant. It was commonly supposed that a knowledge of company drill made a man a soldier. It was now perceived that men who would carry on war must learn the business of war, as a man must learn any business if he would succeed in it. They set to work to learn through instruction and by practice the ways of marching, camping, picket duty, reconnoitering, skirmishing, and fighting battles; the repair and building of roads and bridges; the collection, transportation, and distribution of supplies; the function and conduct of courts-martial; the multifarious paper business of reports, returns, and correspondence; and, above all, the necessity for discipline and prompt, unquestioning obedience of orders. It was not easy for citizens of a republic, who know no superior but the law, to constrain themselves to obey a man without asking why. But when they discovered that military law is part of the law of the land; that military officers are officers of the law, and obedience to their authority is obedience to the law, it became easy to obey without lowering their self-respect. And as the war continued they

found that their own safety depended upon the enforcement of discipline, and that an unorganized mob of men differs from the same men transformed into a disciplined army, just as a pile of iron ore differs from the same ore smelted and wrought into a working engine.

Immediately after Bull Run Sherman found his command scattered, restless, disorderly, and, to some extent, mutinous. He had made considerable progress in the training of his men when, on the 17th of May, he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers, and was, August 24th, assigned to duty under Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, commander of the Department of the Cumberland. George H. Thomas, by the same order, received the same appointment and assignment.

All the States south of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were in open insurrection and war against the United States. Maryland was safe; Missouri was reasonably safe; Kentucky was quivering between insurrection and loyalty. Sympathy with the South was common, especially among men having property and among the young men. But among the men of stanch loyalty were the names of Clay, Crittenden, Breckenridge, Anderson, Hamilton Pope, Guthrie, Speed, Harlan, Rousseau, Goodloe, Woolford, Landrum, and other well-known families. Among mechanics and men of moderate means loyalty to the National Government prevailed. Affinity of institutions allied Kentucky to the South, but the spirit of Henry Clay and John J. Crittenden bound a large part of the population by stronger tie to the United States.

Governor Beriah McGoffin called the Legislature into extra session in January, 1861, and recommended to it the convening of a sovereignty State convention, the purchase of arms, and the mobilization of the State militia. He did not succeed in having any of these measures adopted. When the

governor issued his call, a great meeting of laboring men was held in Louisville, which declared, without qualification, in favor of remaining in the Union and of sustaining the Government, and issued an address to the workingmen of the country as the class particularly concerned in the preservation of the Union. At an election held shortly afterward in Louisville to fill a vacancy in the Legislature, the new party secured the election of an uncompromising Union man, and in April elected another such mayor of the city.

When President Lincoln issued his call for troops after the firing upon Fort Sumter, Governor McGoffin called the Legislature again into session to force the State out of the Union and into the Confederacy. Thereupon the Union Club, a secret society, was formed in Louisville to bring earnest Unionists together, and numbered six thousand members. This society was instrumental in the raising of two regiments and a battery of municipal troops, or home guards, which under the law were subject, not to the governor, but only to the mayor. The object of the society being secured before the summer was over, and its existence being no longer necessary, it died out in the autumn.

When the Legislature, convened in April by the governor, met, it passed a joint resolution declaring Kentucky neutral in the war. This was not a surrender, and was not a compromise, so much as a truce. It prevented secession for the present, and enabled parties to ripen their plans. Subsequently, at the same session, laws were passed providing for the purchase of arms to be distributed to the militia, not by the governor, but by a board of Union men; to provide for the raising of home guards for local defense; and requiring the enlisted men, as well as the officers of the militia, to take an oath of allegiance to the United States as well as to the State of Kentucky.

The Legislature adjourned about the close of May. A special election of members of Congress was held in June, and nine of the ten members elected were pronounced Union men. A new Legislature was elected in August, and three fourths of the members elected were Union men. Recruiting soldiers for the National Government became open through the State, and General Buckner moved his Confederate recruiting camp across the State line into Tennessee. Squads of recruits united and were formed into regiments, which rendezvoused at Camp Dick Robinson, south of the Kentucky River, forming a brigade under the command of General William Nelson.

General Sherman and General Thomas reported to General Anderson in Cincinnati on the 1st of September at the house of Lars Anderson, where they met a group of trusty Kentucky gentlemen assembled for advice and consultation. A Confederate force under General Zollicoffer, near Cumberland Gap, another under General Buckner, near Clarksville, and a third under General Pillow, on the Mississippi River, were just beyond the State line in Tennessee waiting for the decision of Kentucky, while General Anderson had under his command Nelson's brigade and a recruiting force under General Rousseau in Indiana, across the river from Louisville. Sherman was sent to solicit re-enforcements. He found Governor Morton, of Indiana, busy raising regiments, which as fast as they were mustered in were assigned to the Army of the Potomac, then commanded by General McClellan. At Springfield he found the Governor of Illinois equally busy raising regiments, which were ordered from Washington to report to McClellan or else to General Frémont, who commanded in Missouri. He went to St. Louis, and succeeded in obtaining audience of General Frémont through the intervention of an old California friend, who

was in some capacity on General Frémont's staff. Here again he met refusal, General Frémont saying he must first drive the enemy out of Missouri, and he could not give aid to other fields until this should be accomplished. Sherman returned to Louisville.

On the 3d of September General Pillow advanced into Kentucky by an order of General Polk, and seized Hickman and Columbus. On the 6th General Grant entered Kentucky and occupied Paducah. There was much correspondence by telegraph and otherwise between the Confederate authorities, civil and military, as to whether or not General Polk's breach of the neutrality of Kentucky was a justifiable act of necessity. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, acquiesced, and the troops remained in possession of Columbus. On the 12th of September the Legislature of Kentucky passed a joint resolution requiring the governor to order the Confederate troops to leave the State. President Davis appointed General A. S. Johnston to the command of all the forces in Tennessee. General Johnston assumed command, and on the 17th sent General Buckner to Bowling Green, Ky. General Zollicoffer advanced his force to Cumberland Ford a few days earlier. The dream of neutrality was ended.

When Buckner moved to Bowling Green a detachment pushed forward and burned a railroad bridge within thirty miles of Louisville. The news reached Louisville at night. General Anderson sent General Sherman across the river, and in an hour Rousseau had his men, one thousand, in line. The Home Guard of Louisville, under command of Hamilton Pope, volunteered, and at midnight, on a train secured by Mr. James Guthrie, General Sherman moved to the front with his extemporized command. It was ascertained that Buckner was not advancing. Sherman placed his troops upon

Muldraugh's Hill. Troops began to arrive, and by the 1st of October Sherman had there the equivalent of two brigades.

General Anderson, worn out in his enfeebled health by the anxieties of the situation, relinquished command on the 8th of October, and Sherman, by seniority, assumed command. But in assuming command he wrote to the War Department, as he had stated orally to the President in Washington, that he wished to hold a subordinate command, and was assured that General Buell, then on his way from California, would, on arriving, relieve him. General Thomas superseded General Nelson at Camp Dick Robinson. General A. McD. McCook was put in command of the force pushed forward from Muldraugh's Hill to Nolin Creek. The entire force under Sherman's command was eighteen thousand men. He was confronted by more than double that number, and Johnston could at any time force his way to the Ohio River. Sherman was anxious, and with his impetuous frankness did not fail to express his anxiety.

On the evening of the 16th of October Secretary-of-War Simon Cameron, with Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, accompanied by some friends, arrived at Louisville on their return to Washington from St. Louis, and had an interview with General Sherman. General T. J. Wood and Mr. Guthrie were present. Sherman gave to the Secretary a full statement of the political condition of Kentucky, the probability of recruiting troops from the inhabitants, the force already in the field and its distribution, the numbers and position of the enemy, and pointed out the scanty means at hand to defend a line extending from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, and the ease with which the enemy could select his route and penetrate to the Ohio before any adequate force could be concentrated to oppose him. According to Adjutant-General Thom-

as, "on being asked the question what force he deemed necessary, he promptly replied two hundred thousand men." According to the statement of General T. J. Wood, written August 24, 1866: "For the purpose of expelling the rebels from Kentucky, General Sherman said that at least sixty thousand soldiers were necessary. . . . General Sherman expressed the opinion that to carry on the war to the Gulf of Mexico and destroy all armed opposition to the Government in the entire Mississippi Valley at least two hundred thousand troops were absolutely requisite." General Sherman says his remark was: "I argued that for the purpose of defense we should have sixty thousand men at once, and for offense would need two hundred thousand before we were done." While this estimate was largely in excess of what was commonly supposed to be sufficient, subsequent experience showed that his judgment was correct. But newspapers getting news of it, spoke of his insane demand, and then called him insane, and demanded his release from command. It was the fate of Cassandra, treated with contumely by the people for giving true but unwelcome warning.

Secretary Cameron ordered by telegraph re-enforcements and arms, and Sherman diligently organized his command, watched the enemy, and made dispositions to resist any advance. General McClellan required from him daily reports, and such as are published are model reports, full of information, succinct and clear in statement, and sagacious in suggestion. General Buell arrived and assumed command on the 15th of November, and General Sherman was ordered to report for duty to General H. W. Halleck, commanding the Department of the Missouri.

General Sherman, on reporting at St. Louis, was ordered on the 23d of November to visit the different stations and inspect troops, camps, equip-

ment, supplies, and transportation and routes for supplies. He reported on the 27th that he had ordered the whole force from Lexington forward to check the advancing enemy. This order was countermanded by General Halleck on the same day. Sherman telegraphed on the 28th that he had ordered Pope's and Turner's divisions to advance. On the same day General Halleck telegraphed that Mrs. Sherman was in St. Louis, and directed Sherman to return to the city at once. On the 2d of December Halleck wrote to General McClellan: "As stated in a former communication, General W. T. Sherman, on reporting here for duty, was ordered to inspect troops (three divisions at Sedalia and vicinity), and if, in the absence of General Pope, he deemed there was danger of an immediate attack, he was authorized to assume command. He did so, and commenced the movement of the troops in a manner which I did not approve and countermanded. I also received information from officers there that General Sherman was completely 'stampeded,' and was stampeding the army. I therefore yesterday gave him a leave of absence for twenty days to visit his family in Ohio. I am satisfied that General Sherman's physical and mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as to render him for the present entirely unfit for duty. Perhaps a few weeks' rest may restore him. I am satisfied that in his present condition it would be dangerous to give him a command here."

General Sherman being greatly annoyed and Mrs. Sherman distressed at the newspaper discussion of his alleged insanity, he asked for a twenty days' leave of absence, and made a visit to Lancaster. He wrote from Lancaster to General Halleck on December 12th:

"I believe you will be frank enough to answer me if you deem the steps I took at Sedalia as evidence of a want of mind. They may have been

the result of an excess of caution on my part, but I do think the troops were too much strung out, and should be concentrated, with more men left along to guard the track. The animals, cattle especially, will be much exposed this winter. I set a much higher danger on the acts of unfriendly inhabitants than most officers do, because I have lived in Missouri and the South, and know that in their individual characters they will do more acts of hostility than Northern farmers or people could bring themselves to perpetrate. In my judgment, Price's army in the aggregate is less to be feared than when in scattered bands.

"I write to you because a Cincinnati paper, whose reporter I imprisoned in Louisville for visiting our camps after I had forbidden him leave to go, has announced that I am insane, and alleges as a reason that my acts at Sedalia were so mad that subordinate officers refused to obey. I know of no order that I gave that was not obeyed, except General Pope's to advance his division to Sedalia, which order was countermanded by you, and the fact communicated to me. These newspapers have us in their power, and can destroy us as they please, and this one can destroy my usefulness by depriving me of the confidence of officers and men. I will be in St. Louis next week, and will be guided by your commands and judgment."

General Halleck wrote on the 17th of December to P. B. Ewing, who had written to him inclosing some newspaper clippings: "I hope General Sherman will not let these squibs trouble him in the least. They can do him no serious injury. When the general came here his health was much broken by long and severe labor, and his nervous system somewhat shaken by continuous excitement and responsibility. Those who saw him here may have drawn wrong inferences from his broken-down appearance and rather imprudent remarks, but no

one who was personally acquainted with him thought anything was the matter with him except a want of rest. I have no doubt but that the quiet of home will in a short time enable him to resume his duties and silence all these scandalous and slanderous attacks."

On the 18th Halleck wrote in answer to Sherman's letter of the 12th: "Your movement of troops was not countermanded by me because I thought it an unwise one in itself, but because I was not then ready for it. I had better information of Price's movements than you had, and I had no apprehension of an attack. I intended to concentrate the forces on that line, but I wished the movement delayed until I could determine on a better position. After receiving Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson's report, I made precisely the location you had ordered. I was desirous at the time not to prevent the advance of Price by any movement on our part, hoping that he would move on Lexington; but finding that he had determined to remain at Osceola for some time at least, I made the movement you proposed."

On returning to St. Louis, Sherman was assigned to command the camp of instruction and post at Benton Barracks, and was, on the 13th of February, directed to proceed at once to Paducah, Ky., and on the 14th was assigned to command the district of Cairo.

CHAPTER III.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

GENERAL HALLECK now began his advance down the Mississippi and up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. General Curtis, with about ten thousand men in southwest Missouri, was advanced into Arkansas, where, in battle at Pea Ridge, on the 7th and 8th of March, he routed and dispersed the greatly superior forces of Price and McCullough, united under the command of Van Dorn. General Grant, after much importunity, finally succeeded in obtaining, on the 30th of January, permission and order from General Halleck to proceed up the Tennessee and attack Fort Henry. The next day he moved on transports, accompanied by Commodore Foote with his fleet, and on the 6th of February the fort, after a short but destructive bombardment, surrendered to the fleet. On the 11th Commodore Foote sailed down the river to return up the Cumberland, and Grant moved by land next day to Fort Donelson. The fort surrendered on the morning of the 16th. On the 18th General Halleck pointed out to General Pope the situation of Madrid Bend, and directed him to organize an expedition to reduce this apparently impregnable bar to passage down the Mississippi.

Upon the surrender of Fort Donelson the Confederate Government ordered the evacuation of Columbus, on the Mississippi, and General A. S. Johnston withdrew from Bowling Green and re-



treated through Nashville to Murfreesboro. General Buell occupied Nashville. General Halleck immediately began preparation for further advance up the Tennessee. On the 1st of March he dispatched to Sherman at Paducah, to be forwarded to Grant: "Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move your column up the Tennessee River. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the railroad connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river without serious opposition. Avoid any general engagements with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a serious battle. This should be strongly impressed on the officers selected for expeditions from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some very discreet officer, should be selected for such commands."

On the 4th of March Halleck telegraphed to General Grant: "You will place Major-General Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and position of your command?" On the 15th of March he reported to the adjutant general of the army: "In accordance with your instructions of the 10th instant, I report General Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville without any authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation that General Grant did this from good intentions, and from a desire to subserve the public interests.

"Not being advised of General Buell's movements, and learning that General Buell had ordered

Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant and a part of his general officers numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of the orders issued by General Grant before his departure, and probably, under the circumstances, were unavoidable.

"General Grant has made the proper explanations, and has been directed to resume his command in the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy though mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nashville and leaving his command, I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of military subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from the failure of colonels to report to him on their arrival and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied." In all subsequent orders referring to movements the injunction to avoid getting into a serious engagement was repeated.

General Grant remained at Fort Henry in quasi arrest while the troops of his district were assembling, under the command of General Smith, for the expedition up the Tennessee, and forwarded re-enforcements after the expedition had sailed. General Sherman, on arriving at Paducah, was busy forwarding troops, supplies, and dispatches, and in organizing a division for his own command. He left Paducah March 10th, and Smith, with five divisions—McClelland's, Hurlbut's, Lewis Wallace's, Sherman's, and his own, commanded by W. H. L. Wallace—arrived at Savannah on the 13th.

By order of General Smith, General Sherman sailed with his division up the river to Yellow Creek on the 14th to send out a force to break the

railroad, if that could be done without bringing on a serious engagement. Before starting he suggested to General Smith that another division be sent to Pittsburg Landing to await there his return. A heavy rain, flooding the country, had swollen the streams and submerged the roads, so that the attempt was ineffectual, and he dropped down the river to Pittsburg Landing on the 15th, where he found Hurlbut's division still on their boats. Sherman landed his division on the 16th to make a reconnoissance in force, and reported to General Smith, on the 17th, that Hurlbut's division would be landed that day. General Grant reported to General Halleck on the 18th: "I arrived here last evening, and found that General Sherman and Hurlbut's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially debarked; General Wallace, at Crump's Landing, six miles below, same side of the river; General McClelland's division at this place encamped; and General Smith's, with unattached regiments on board transports, also here. I immediately ordered all troops, except McClelland's command, to Pittsburg, and to debark there at once and discharge the steamers, to report at Paducah for further orders. . . . I shall go to-morrow to Crump's Landing and Pittsburg, and if I think any change of position for any of the troops needed I will make the change. Having full faith, however, in the judgment of General Smith, who located the present points of debarkation, I do not expect any change will be made."

On the 26th of March General B. M. Prentiss reported for duty, and was assigned to command the unattached troops at Pittsburg Landing and others as they should arrive, and to organize them into a division, to be called the Sixth. Hickenlooper's battery, that arrived on the 5th of April, and regiments that arrived on the 5th and 6th, reported to Prentiss, and fought in his command on the 6th.

On the 26th of March Pittsburg Landing was made a military post, and General C. F. Smith, senior officer, was assigned to the command. On the 31st Grant changed district headquarters by order from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing, leaving an office at Savannah, but did not move his personal quarters to the landing till after April 6th.

On the 11th of March General McClellan, having taken command of the Army of the Potomac in the field, was relieved from command of all military departments except the Potomac, and the two departments under the command of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that of General Buell as lay west of the meridian of Knoxville, were consolidated as the Department of the Mississippi, under the command of General Halleck. For some time Halleck had been urging Buell to join him at Savannah; now, on the 16th of March, he ordered Buell to move his forces as rapidly as possible to Savannah.

The road from Memphis to Chattanooga gave through railroad communication between the Mississippi and the East. A parallel line from Vicksburg through Jackson, Miss., was not continuous, there being a gap from Selma to Montgomery, in Alabama. The Memphis road was intersected at Corinth by the road from Mobile to Columbus, Ky., and at Grand Junction by the New Orleans, Jackson and Northern. General Johnston determined to gather his forces at Corinth to save that important line of communication, and strive to achieve a victory there by which he could regain the territory lost in Tennessee and Kentucky. Summoning thither Bragg from Florida, Polk and Beauregard from Mississippi and West Tennessee, and new levies supplied by the governors of the Southern States, and moving thither the force gathered at Murfreesboro, he assembled at Corinth by the beginning of April something over fifty thou-

sand effectives. This number probably included officers as well as armed men, though later in the war the Confederate reports of effectives included only armed enlisted men. Among the officers, besides Beauregard, Bragg, and Polk, were Hardee, Cheatham, and Cleburne.

General Grant had six divisions: Lewis Wallace at Crump's Landing was encamped, one brigade at the landing, one at Stony Lonesome, two miles out from the landing, and the third at Adamsville, three miles beyond Stony Lonesome. The other divisions were at Pittsburg Landing, five miles farther up the river. The camping ground was bounded on the east by the Tennessee, on the north by Snake Creek, and on the northwest and west by Owl Creek, an affluent of Snake Creek. All these were bordered by precipitous bluff banks. The western portion of the south front was protected by a small affluent of Owl Creek, called by different names—Oak, Rea, and Shiloh Creek—and in some of the reports called Owl Creek. The eastern portion of the south front was covered by Locust Creek, which empties into Lick Creek near the river. A line of well-constructed earthworks along this front would have been impregnable against assault at that stage of the war. General Halleck, while he does not appear to have ordered the erection of defensive works, sent forward intrenching tools, and supposed that the position was fortified. McPherson, the only engineer officer, by direction laid out a line for intrenchment. This was back from the creeks, inconvenient for water supply, and would require the front line of camps—Sherman and Prentiss—to move their camps. As the place was to be held only until General Halleck should come to the front and begin the forward movement, such work seemed to be a waste of labor. And it was felt that a large portion of troops, new regiments of men fresh from

their farms and workshops, who had come to the field to do deeds of war, would be disconcerted and discouraged if they were set to work digging, and were directed to fence themselves in from attack by the foe, whom they expected to march against and overcome. It was only after they found the value of earthworks by actual experience that the volunteers willingly performed the labor of erecting them. So, instead of fortifying the ground, the time was spent in giving the men instruction and practice in drill.

The divisions of Sherman and Prentiss occupied the front. One of Sherman's brigades, Stuart's, formed the extreme left of the line, being close to the river and facing Locust Creek. His other three brigades formed the right of the line—McDowell, on a ridge overlooking the bridge by which the road to Purdy crossed Owl Creek; Buckland, to the front and left of McDowell, and separated from him by a ravine, and a little back from the valley of Oak Creek, which stream there wound through a morass tangled with thickets and decayed fallen timber. Two of Hildebrand's regiments extended Buckland's line up along the bank of Oak Creek, while his third regiment, Appler's, was apart, some hundred yards to the left, by a spring which was the source of one branch of Oak Creek. The right of Prentiss was a full half mile to the front of Sherman's left, and hidden from view; his left was a greater distance to the front and right of Stuart's right, but in sight from it. McClermand was to the rear and left of Sherman; Hurlbut, a mile out from the landing, across the Corinth road; and W. H. L. Wallace on the plateau at the angle between the river and Snake Creek.

Neither General Grant nor his subordinates had any apprehension of being attacked in this position by Johnston's army. It was proposed to put General Buell into camp at Hamburg, several

miles up the river, on his arrival. Reconnoitering parties, always cramped by instructions not to bring on an engagement, reported the presence of parties of the enemy's cavalry on the roads. General Buckland, on Thursday, April 3d, by direction of General Sherman, marched his brigade out three miles, and thence sent out small parties. Nothing was found but small detachments of hostile cavalry. Taylor's cavalry had gone out at midnight by Sherman's order, and, halting till daybreak when four miles out toward Corinth, advanced until they struck the enemy's cavalry pickets and captured one of them. General Chalmers, by a dispatch dated "Headquarters Advance," reported this attack upon the pickets of his cavalry. Friday, the 4th, Clauton's Confederate cavalry swooped down on Buckland's picket line and captured and carried off a lieutenant and six men. Two companies of infantry were sent out in pursuit. Later Colonel Buckland followed with three more companies, and charged upon a large party of cavalry which had surrounded one of the missing companies and drove it. A battalion of cavalry sent by General Sherman then came up and drove the enemy till they came in full view and under the fire of a line of infantry and artillery. Colonel Buckland reported, "We ascertained the enemy was in force." Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, reported "three or four pieces of artillery, at least two regiments of infantry, and a large cavalry force." General Sherman reported that he inferred the force was a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of artillery, sent to a point on the ridge road, about five miles in advance of his camp, forwarded from a considerable force at Pea Ridge or Monterey. General Grant reported to General Halleck that there were "three pieces of artillery and cavalry and infantry. How much can not, of course, be estimated. I

have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." General Hardee reported: "Camp near Mickey's, April 4, 1862. The cavalry and infantry of the enemy attacked Colonel Clanton's regiment, which was posted, as I before informed you, about five hundred or six hundred yards in advance of my lines. Colonel Clanton retired, and the enemy's cavalry followed until they came near our infantry and artillery, when they were gallantly repulsed with slight loss." In his subsequent full report he states that Mickey's was sixteen miles from Corinth and eight from Pittsburg Landing; that he arrived there in the morning of the 4th; that it was General Cleburne's command that was attacked; and that they bivouacked there for the night. Saturday, General Grant changed the assignment of the cavalry, and the regiments moved to their new positions. Otherwise the National camp was quiet. The pickets of the Seventy-seventh Ohio noticed rabbits and squirrels in great numbers coming from the woods in front and passing through their line. Buckland's pickets observed cavalry to the front, and Sherman being advised, and having no cavalry to send out, ordered the pickets to be strengthened and to be vigilant. Prentiss sent out a party in the afternoon which advanced three miles obliquely in advance of his front, and returned without having seen anything.

General Johnston selected forty thousand of his effectives for attack upon Grant. This force was organized into three corps, commanded respectively by Generals Hardee, Bragg, and Polk, and a reserve under General Breckenridge. General Beauregard had no corps, but was second in general command. Hardee's corps comprised Hindman's division and a separate brigade, commanded by Cleburne. Bragg's corps was composed of two di-

visions—Ruggles and Withers. Polk's corps also was constituted of two divisions—Clark's and Cheatham's. The reserve embraced three brigades, commanded respectively by General Bowen and Colonels Trabue and Statham. General Johnston, receiving information in the night of Wednesday, April 2d, that Buell was advancing rapidly toward the Tennessee, moved out from his camp at Corinth Thursday afternoon. General Hardee, having the advance, reached Mickey's, eight miles from Pittsburg Landing, Friday morning, was encountered there by General Buckland's detachment, bivouacked there that afternoon, and moved into position and deployed about 10 A. M. Saturday. The remaining troops struggled along through inadequate roads made miry by rain, impeded by mud and by misunderstandings, and finally reached their respective positions about 4 P. M. The attack intended to be made at eight o'clock Saturday morning was postponed to daybreak Sunday. As the long columns were all day sweeping through the forest, stretching into long parallel lines, the squirrels and rabbits, startled from their homes, scudding past the National pickets, were the only messengers who brought news of the movement to the national camp.

At 3 A. M. Sunday, the 6th, three companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, of Peabody's brigade of Prentiss's division, moved out to the front, and about half past five o'clock encountered the enemy's cavalry and forced them back to a line of infantry concealed behind a fence. A sharp engagement ensued, and then the party withdrew. Major Hardcastle, of the Third Mississippi, reports that on the night of the 5th, being sent out to picket the front of Wood's brigade, he deployed his battalion a quarter of a mile to the front of the brigade, and posted small parties one hundred and two hundred yards farther to the front, cavalry

videttes being advanced still farther to the front; that about dawn the videttes fired on an advancing force and retired. The infantry posts successively did the same, and a sharp engagement followed, which lasted an hour, in which he lost four killed and twenty wounded before the attacking party withdrew, and, seeing his brigade form in line at half past six o'clock, he fell back and took his place in line. The three companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, returning to camp, met Colonel Moore with five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri half a mile out from the brigade camp, who dispatched the wounded to camp, retained the others, and sent for the remainder of his regiment. When his other five companies arrived, he marched by the flank about three hundred yards to the north-west corner of a cotton field, which was the See farm, and there came under fire.

General Johnston, instead of placing his corps one in the center and the others in wings or reserve, formed each corps in line of regiments doubled on the center at intervals that permitted them to deploy into line before going into action. Hardee's corps, so deployed, with the addition of Gladden's brigade extending his right, made a front of two miles. Bragg's corps formed in like manner one thousand yards in the rear of Hardee, Polk in the rear of Bragg's left, and Breckenridge in rear of Bragg's right.

It is impossible to reconcile the discrepant statements as to distance and time. But it is reasonably certain that the distance between Hardee's line and Prentiss's camp was three miles or more, and that Johnston's army was not in motion before six o'clock. As the long lines pressed forward through forest, over ground broken by ridges and ravines, the rate of advance was determined by the rate of the slowest portion, and at times the second line would overtake the first. Batteries had to

swerve from their direct course to find practicable passage. It was impossible for brigades to maintain the prescribed intervals or preserve the general alignment. About seven o'clock Shaver's brigade struck the Twenty-fifth Missouri in See's cotton field, and recoiled from a heavy fire delivered from a rising ground in the field. Colonel Moore, re-enforced by the remainder of the Twenty-first, fell back behind a ridge, which shielded his men, and stubbornly held his ground. As Johnston's army advanced, his line of skirmishers met the National pickets, who fell back fighting. The line of sputtering fire along the front, by its continuance and increasing nearness, was heard in the National camp, and aroused surmise and speculation in some, excited uneasiness in others. When the infantry engagement (for Shaver's battery had been detached from him) resounded, the whole camp was startled. Prentiss marched his division out a quarter of a mile from his camp. Colonel Moore, falling back to his left and rear, connected with Prentiss and formed the right of the line. Gladden's brigade attacked. General Gladden was killed, and his command fell back in confusion, carrying with it the two right regiments of Shaver's brigade. Chalmers's brigade came up with Jackson in reserve, and the attack was renewed with such vigor that Prentiss's entire division gave way, but rallied just in front of their camp. After another fierce contest the division gave way, fell back through the camp, and retreated in disorder to rally on the summit of rising ground half a mile in rear of their camp.

Meanwhile the battle had joined along the front of two miles. General Bragg says in his report that, after encountering the National pickets and brushing them away, "in about one mile more we encountered him in strong force along almost the entire line. His batteries were posted on emi-

nences, with strong infantry supports. Finding the first line now unequal to the work before it, being weakened by extension and necessarily broken by the nature of the ground, I ordered my whole force to move up steadily and promptly to its support. From this time—about 7.30 o'clock—until night the battle raged with little intermission." Colonel Thompson, aid-de-camp to General Beauregard, in his report to the general says: "At 6.30 o'clock I brought an order from you to General Breckenridge, who commanded the reserve, that he must hurry up his troops, as General Polk was moving forward, which was promptly delivered and promptly obeyed. About 7.30 o'clock I rode forward with Colonel Jordan to the front to ascertain how the battle was going. There I learned from General Johnston that General Hardee's line was within half a mile of the enemy's camps. About ten o'clock you moved forward with your staff and halted within about half a mile of their camps, at which time our troops were reported to be in full possession of the enemy's camps."

A squadron of Georgia cavalry felt along the National picket line Saturday. General Buckland strengthened his pickets Saturday night, and General Sherman ordered the Seventy-seventh Ohio of Hildebrand's brigade to go out early Sunday morning to See's farm. General Buckland was wakeful through the night, and, receiving word while at breakfast Sunday morning that his pickets were attacked in force, had the long roll sounded, formed his brigade in line, and reported to General Sherman. The division was soon formed. The Fifty-third Ohio was on the left. Four guns of Waterhouse's battery on its right, the other two guns advanced a hundred yards to the front, beyond Oak Creek; Hildebrand to its right; Taylor's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Barrett (Captain Taylor serving as chief of artillery of the

division), on rising ground, commanding the front of both Hildebrand and Buckland, Buckland forming the right of the line, McDowell being to the right and rear of Buckland on a separate ridge, overlooking Owl Creek, where it was crossed by a bridge, and having Behr's battery with him.

General Cleburne's brigade, forming the left of Hardee's corps, impeded by crossing ravines and ridges through woods, and by the obstinate resistance of the National pickets, reached the farther side of Oak Creek about eight o'clock. General Patton Anderson's brigade was in reserve and two hundred and seventy yards in rear of the other two brigades of Ruggles's division, which were one thousand yards in rear of Hardee. General Anderson speaks of the difficulty of the ground and the persistence of the National skirmish line, but in the inequalities of the advance he pushed into the front line of Ruggles's division, and then into Hardee's line, on Cleburne's right, and in front of Hildebrand's brigade.

The muskets of the Forty-third Illinois of McClernand's division being still, Sunday morning, loaded since Friday evening, permission was obtained to proceed to the front and fire them off. Distant report of firearms was heard, and was reported to General McClernand. He sent word to Colonel Reardon, commanding the Third Brigade, to form his command. Colonel Reardon, being ill in bed, sent word to Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third Illinois, to assume command. The colonel of the Forty-ninth refused to believe that the distant firing was from the enemy, and delayed calling out his regiment. The brigade was finally formed and, moving forward, took position on the left of Sherman's division, sending a skirmish line out to the front. Colonel Marsh, of the Twentieth Illinois, commanding the Second Brigade, heard firing off to the front. This continuing some time,

being, in fact, the musketry engagement between General Shaver and the Missouri regiments, ordered his regimental commanders to be in readiness to form. And soon, in pursuance of order received, he advanced and formed on the left of the Third Brigade. About eight o'clock the First Brigade was ordered to form on the left of the Second with three regiments, and detach the fourth regiment to the right of the Second Brigade.

Wood's brigade of Hardee's corps, containing six regiments and two battalions, pressed forward against McClernand. Gibson's brigade of Bragg's corps, filling the interval between Wood and Patton Anderson, confronted the Fifty-third Ohio and the right of McClernand. A part of Russell's brigade of Polk's corps acted on the right of Wood against McClernand's left, and was soon supported by Bushrod Johnson's brigade of the same corps.

General Hurlbut, receiving word about half past seven o'clock from General Sherman that he was attacked, directed General Veatch to form his brigade and march to General Sherman's line. Veatch had just gone when word came from General Prentiss asking for aid. Forming his two remaining brigades, Williams's and Lauman's, he advanced, and met Prentiss's command falling back in disorder. Continuing his advance to the south of the peach orchard, he met the enemy and came under fire a little after nine o'clock. General Prentiss rallied and reformed his command and formed in line, his left joining Hurlbut's right. General W. H. L. Wallace, commanding Smith's division, moved from his camp at nine o'clock. General McArthur, having sent one regiment—Thirteenth Missouri—to General Sherman and two regiments to guard the bridge over Snake Creek, where the road to Crump's Landing crossed, advanced with his two remaining regiments to General Hurlbut's left and extended Hurlbut's line toward the river.

Wallace took his two other brigades to the aid of Prentiss, resting his left on Prentiss's right. The right of Wallace's line rested fixed all day on the edge of a broad and deep ravine, filled with woods and dense thickets, which served as an impassable barrier, dividing the National line into two portions. Wallace's right rested against it all day, McClernand's left touched and skirted it, but these two divisions were at no time in touch with each other. Colonel Stuart, at his isolated camp of three regiments, received word at about half past seven o'clock from General Prentiss that the enemy was in force in his front. Shortly after Stuart's pickets sent in word that a force was advancing on the Bark road. Before long a battery was seen going into position on the heights beyond Locust Creek, eleven hundred yards distant. Stuart formed his brigade in front of his camp, facing south, a quarter of a mile to the front and left of Hurlbut's left.

In consequence of the formation of A. S. Johnston's three corps into three long parallel lines, and also owing to the broken and wooded ground over which they advanced, the front line, by the time it delivered its attack, was pierced in places by portions of the other two lines; the brigades of some divisions were separated from each other by portions of other commands pushed between, and even some brigades were severed, the different regiments being sent to re-enforce different portions of the line. In the course of the battle division and brigade commanders received orders directly from General Johnston, General Beauregard, and all the corps commanders. All orders were obeyed with alacrity and without question, except some in front of the Hornet's Nest, in the eager desire to press forward to victory.

Before nine o'clock the whole of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions, as well as Prentiss's, was fully engaged. Colonel Thompson, aid-de-camp

to General Beauregard, in his report, made immediately after the battle, states, "From eight to half past eight o'clock the cannonading was very heavy along the whole line." Hildebrand was attacked about eight o'clock. B. R. Johnson's brigade came under artillery fire at half past eight o'clock, and about fifteen minutes later made attack upon the left brigade, Hare's, of McClernand's division.

The little stream which flowed through the valley or ravine bordering the front of Sherman's camp was fed by springs, and, spreading over the loamy bottom, turned it into a marsh. Being obstructed by fallen timber and clumps of undergrowth, it was a serious impediment to troops advancing across it under fire. Bushrod Johnson's brigade was broken in wading through the mud of the valley, and his battery was taken over with great difficulty. When the crossing was effected, two of the regiments were missing, and it was learned, after inquiry by the brigade commander, that they had been detached by order of General Bragg. Advancing with his battery and his three remaining regiments, he fell upon Hare's brigade, the left of McClernand's line, just after it had got into position. After a sharp conflict, Johnson's command broke and fell back. He renewed the attack, with the same result. He tried in vain to move his men forward again. His battery lost its commander and half the men, and all the guns were silenced but one. Johnson himself was wounded, and then drew what was left of his command out of fire.

Wood's brigade fell upon McClernand's second brigade, commanded by Colonel Marsh, with a furious onset and deadly fire. When Marsh had lost five field officers and many company officers killed and wounded, his command became disorganized and fell back in disorder. Marsh rallied and reformed them about two hundred yards in

the rear. Wood wheeled his brigade to the left, against the flank of McClernand's right brigade, commanded by Colonel Reardon, who refused his left and confronted Wood. Meanwhile Colonel Preston Smith, assuming command of Johnson's brigade, regained the two detached regiments and reformed his command; then joining A. P. Stewart's brigade, which had just come to the front, they fell upon Hare's brigade, and compelled it to fall back to the line formed by Colonel Marsh.

The three regiments of Russell's brigade struggled with difficulty through the swamp and briers of the little valley, under a destructive fire from Waterhouse's battery, and as they began to ascend the farther slope the Fifty-third poured additional volleys, which they could not endure, and they fell back through the swamp. After they were rallied, reassembled, and formed, another attempt was made, with the same result. Then Colonel Appler called out to his men to fall back and save themselves. The Fifty-third, hearing the command, and not knowing what danger threatened, fled to the rear in confusion. The adjutant, E. C. Dawes, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, rallied the regiment and returned with it to its post. Colonel Appler returned and again gave the order, "Fall back and save yourselves!" Two companies remained firm and attached themselves, with Adjutant Dawes, to the Seventeenth Illinois. The remaining eight companies drifted to the rear, and, becoming separated from their colonel, took position near the landing, and afterward returned to the front with the lieutenant colonel.

Patton Anderson, reaching for Hildebrand's brigade lower down the little valley, found it a greater obstacle than it offered to the troops on his right. Barrett's battery, crowning the bluff on the farther side, nearly on a line with the left of Anderson's brigade, poured merciless volleys upon

the unresisting battalions toiling through the morass and thickets. Fragments of regiments, advancing as they emerged and reached solid ground, charged up the slope gallantly, but without cohesion and without impetus, and were swept back by the fire of the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh Ohio. Hildebrand repelled two such assaults upon these two regiments before the Fifty-third Ohio finally gave way.

Buckland's brigade was on the bluff overlooking the little stream near its junction with Owl Creek. The little valley there was wider, the morass deeper, and fallen timber massed the tangle of vines and briars. Barrett's battery swept its whole front, and a projecting spur near the right of the line served as a bastion, whence a company enfiladed the assaulting enemy. General Cleburne, with his large brigade and Trigg's battery, constituting the extreme left of the Confederate army, was brought by its position to the front of Buckland. Trigg's battery did not descend into the valley, but in an artillery duel with Barrett's battery was soon silenced and withdrawn. Cleburne's regiments pertinaciously forced their way over and through the obstacles, but, separated and broken, the concentric fire from front and both flanks rolled them back at every essay. Cleburne rode from one wing to another to encourage his dashing but disrupted battalions, only to impel his ranks to fresh slaughter. The Sixth Mississippi, having lost three hundred killed and wounded, including both field officers, out of an aggregate of four hundred and twenty-five, withdrew and took no subsequent part in the battle. The Second Tennessee, having its colonel severely and its major mortally wounded and its ranks sorely thinned, withdrew from the field for the rest of the day. The Twenty-third Tennessee drifted to another part of the field. In the rush which ensued when Sherman drew his

division back Cleburne was separated from his command until, at 2 P. M., he found his remaining three regiments halted under the brow of an abrupt hill. Of the twenty-seven hundred and fifty muskets which he carried into the assault on Sherman Sunday morning, he was able to assemble only eight hundred for the contest on Monday.

When the Fifty-third Ohio broke, Colonel Raith's brigade was exposed on both flanks, and was ordered by General McClelland to fall back and join his other brigades. Sherman had tenaciously held his line two hours; but now, ten o'clock, the enemy having passed to his rear, ordered it to fall back and form on the Purdy road. When Waterhouse had traversed half the distance he halted and went into action, trying to stem the pursuit by firing at short range; but the tumultuous rush overran his battery and captured three guns, while he barely escaped with the other three. Hildebrand's two remaining regiments were thrown into disorder and partly dispersed. He served as a volunteer on General McClelland's staff the rest of the day, while Major Fearing and the greater part of the Seventy-seventh and a portion of the Fifty-seventh formed on the Purdy road, on the left of the Thirteenth Missouri, which was incorporated into Sherman's command during the rest of the battle. Buckland withdrew in order, covering his wagons, which retired before him. McDowell, who had not yet been attacked or disturbed, moved along the Purdy road, which passed through his camp, to the position assigned. McDowell's wagon train proceeded along the road, and his battery (Behr's), galloping to its place, interfered with the formation of the line. Captain Behr being quickly killed, his men scampered off with their caissons, leaving a break in the line. Sherman drew his maimed division back to the left and rear, connecting with McClelland's right, and

these two commanders operated together during the rest of the day.

Sherman and McClelland together kept a coherent line through the day. There were charges and countercharges, repulses alternately on both sides. Confederate charges were sometimes repulsed with serious loss. At one time the national line, surging back with a great impulse, regained half a mile of lost ground, and reoccupied a greater part of McClelland's camp. A rally, a re-enforced mass, an impetuous countercharge, checked the national divisions, and pushed them back farther than before. The Confederate columns were continually re-enforced by brigades or regiments coming to the front from the second and third lines and the reserve corps, while Lewis Wallace expected on one flank, and Nelson expected on the other, failed to appear, and the National line was thinning, crumbling, contracting. About 4.30 P. M. what was left of the two divisions was on the east side of Tillman or Brier Creek, on the ground where they rested for the night, so far back from the woods that the force which they had engaged passed between and so around to the rear of Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace. But the weary battalions were still fresh enough to promptly repulse with disastrous loss an attack made by Pond's brigade, the closing operation of the day on that part of the field.

In falling back from the position taken on the Purdy road, McDowell's brigade was separated from the rest of the division by the Confederate troops pouring through the gap made by the defection of Behr's battery. By prompt and rapid use of one gun that remained manned he saved his brigade from being surrounded and wholly cut off. In falling back through woods and tents, and over ridges and ravines, the Fortieth Illinois became separated, was attacked by and repelled a

Confederate regiment, found its way to the rear of McClernand's division, and remained there for the night. Trabue's brigade, brought forward from the reserve corps after a regiment and two battalions of infantry and two batteries and a squadron of cavalry had been detached from it to aid some other hard-pressed brigade, was reduced to four regiments. At about half past twelve o'clock Trabue found McDowell's two regiments in line within the edge of timber bordering a field. As he moved into position to attack the Forty-sixth Ohio promptly opened fire. A destructive fight at close quarters ensued. McDowell was re-enforced by the Forty-sixth Illinois from Veatch's brigade; Trabue, by General A. P. Stewart, with part of his brigade and a portion of Patton Anderson's brigade. McDowell was forced to give way. The Forty-sixth Ohio was completely dispersed, and did not reassemble till after the battle. The Sixth Iowa, commanded by Captain Williams, retired to the artillery near the landing. In the hour and a half that this contest lasted, the Forty-sixth Ohio lost thirty-seven killed and one hundred and eighty-five wounded; the Sixth Iowa lost fifty-two killed and ninety-four wounded. Of Trabue's reported casualties in the two days—eight hundred and forty-four—the much greater portion happened in this engagement.

Bouton's brigade, which had just arrived and had not been assigned, and the Fifty-third Ohio were ordered by General Sherman's assistant adjutant general and his chief of artillery to leave the landing and aid McAllister's battery in repelling the final attack on Sherman and McClernand. Pond's brigade was ordered by General Hardee to advance and silence the batteries. He proceeded north along the bottom of the ravine of Tillman's or Brier Creek, then to the east up a lateral ravine to take the batteries on the flank. When he drew

near the batteries withdrew, and the supporting infantry poured in such a destructive fire that Pond's brigade precipitately withdrew, the Eighteenth Louisiana, the advance regiment, leaving two hundred and seven dead and wounded in the ravine. That ended the battle for the day on that part of the field.

When Prentiss fell back through his camp and rallied and reformed behind Hurlbut, Chalmers made an ineffective attack, which must have been on General Hurlbut's right, and was by order recalled and sent to the extreme right of the Confederate army. Delaying half an hour for a guide, then marching south and crossing Locust Creek before proceeding toward the river, he finally reached high land, facing Stuart's camp. Some skirmishers, whom Stuart had sent across Locust Creek, fired into the Fifty-second Tennessee, and threw it into such disorder that General Chalmers was able to rally only two companies, and sent the remainder of the regiment to the rear, where it remained during the rest of the battle. As Chalmers crossed Locust Creek with his remaining five regiments and Gage's battery, his right being on the river bluff, Stuart fell back behind his camp, across a ravine, and took position on a wooded ridge with a field in front, his command being reduced to two regiments by the defection of the Seventy-first Ohio. The Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Illinois on the one side, and Chalmers's brigade and Gage's battery on the other, fired at each other across this open field until Chalmers's ammunition was exhausted. After his ammunition was replenished he found Stuart posted on another ridge farther to the rear. Another stubborn fight ensued, and when Stuart retired again Chalmers found himself near and then mingled with the surge of troops that rolled up to envelop the rear of Prentiss and Wallace.

Jackson's brigade was in rear of and was not engaged with Gladden and Chalmers in the attack upon Prentiss, but joined them after Prentiss had broken and retired, and was ordered to follow Chalmers to the extreme right. With his four regiments and Girardy's battery, he formed on the left of Chalmers on the south side of Locust Creek. Crossing this "deep and almost impassable ravine," as Jackson calls it, he fell upon General McArthur and his two regiments. In a series of obstinate struggles McArthur, forced successively from position after position, only to seize new vantage where he could renew the fight, was eventually obliged to retire with Stuart to the north bank of the ravine near the landing, and join the force gathering there to make a final stand.

Gladden's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Adams, after resting some time in Prentiss's camp, moved to the right and attacked Hurlbut, whose line was then advanced beyond the peach orchard and along the south side of the large field. A shell exploded amid the Thirteenth Ohio Battery; officers and men abandoned their guns and fled. The remainder of the division was steady, and, after a sharp struggle, Adams drew his command off, and Hurlbut shifted his line back to the north side of the field behind the fence. Two regiments—the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky—were left along the west side of the field. General Cheatham, having sent Bushrod Johnson's brigade to the front of McClernand's, was ordered by General Beauregard to go with his other brigade to the extreme right of the battle and go in where he found the fighting hottest. About ten o'clock he reached the south side of the field and engaged Hurlbut, firing across the field. When General Breckenridge arrived with Bowen and Statham's brigades, and formed on Cheatham's right, Cheatham was ordered to charge. His men advanced

steadily under a galling fire till they had crossed half of the field, when the Kentucky regiments, rising upon their flank, poured in an unexpected enfilading fire, which shattered their ranks and drove them from the field in confusion.

General Johnston was resolved to break the National left and push forward and interpose between General Grant and the river. He had now massed twenty-eight regiments and six batteries against the twelve regiments and two batteries of Hurlbut, McArthur, and Stuart. Hurlbut's men, replenishing their exhausted cartridge boxes and caissons, steadily repelled every assault. His right kept connected with Prentiss, but, as Stuart and McArthur were gradually forced back, his left swung back to keep in contact with them, and he had to weaken his right to fill and strengthen his attenuated left. At half past two o'clock General Johnston, personally leading the Forty-fifth Tennessee to a charge against the Forty-first Illinois, which Breckenridge was unable to induce it to make, received a wound from which he quickly bled to death. General Bragg, who had been sending successive commands in fruitless charges against Prentiss and Wallace, hearing of the death of A. S. Johnston, repaired to that portion of the field, where he "found a strong force, consisting of three parts without a common head—Brigadier-General Breckenridge, with his reserve division pressing the enemy; Brigadier-General Withers, with his splendid division greatly exhausted and taking a temporary rest; and Major-General Cheatham, with his division of Major-General Polk's corps to their left and rear." This was toward four o'clock. He assembled all into a coherent body and advanced against the exhausted defenders. At about half past four o'clock General Hurlbut notified Prentiss he would have to let go and retire. Sullenly withdrawing, he made one vain effort to form and

renew the fight. He then fell back behind the deep ravine running into the river just above the landing. Colonel Webster, of General Grant's staff, had here gathered nearly fifty guns and planted them along the crest of ground. Hurlbut added what was left of his two fighting batteries, and proceeded at once to organize the regiments and detachments and unorganized men into a force to support the batteries. He estimated the number of men so ranged in ranks at about four thousand. The remnants of his brigades were deployed in order, their right resting on the left of the artillery. Other detachments were gathered up and placed in continuation of the line to the left, and a battery was stationed still farther to the left, near the river, protected by the backwater which there covered the bottom of the ravine, but without other support.

Several of Prentiss's regiments were irretrievably broken by passing through their camp, at 9 A. M., and drifted to the rear. Two were placed in reserve to Hurlbut. The remaining five filled the space between Hurlbut's right and the main Corinth road. They lay down in a sunken road, or an old road washed and gullied by rain, making a natural trench. Wallace's two brigades, or ten regiments, extended from the road to the great, densely crowded ravine, filled with tangled growth, and lay on the ground. Hickenlooper, with four guns of his battery, two having been left on the field of action because all their horses were killed, was posted by Prentiss at the Corinth road, which led directly to the landing. The line was slightly refused on both sides, leaving Hickenlooper at the apex of a salient. The land to the front fell away by a gentle slope, and was partially covered by dense and matted thickets. An assailing force, struggling upward through the thickets, could see only the battery, but was exposed not alone to its fire, but also to the fire of six thousand invisible in-

fantry. General Grant, having just visited Sherman a little before his line gave way and sent word to Lewis Wallace to come to the field, visited Prentiss and W. H. Wallace, approved their dispositions, and charged them to hold this ground at all hazards to the last extremity. Colonel Webster established lines of ordnance wagons to supply the fighting troops, and through the day of constant firing on this ground the store of ammunition was continually replenished as soon as it was exhausted.

After several desultory attacks had been repulsed Colonel Randall L. Gibson was ordered to carry the position with his Louisiana brigade about noon. The regiments struggled through the entanglement of thickets and approached undisturbed till they were near the battery, when a sheet of flame poured from the whole length of the National line, and the assailants who were able broke in confusion and hastened out of reach of the fire. The brigade was assembled and again charged, and again rolled back in fragments. A third trial was made, with the same result. A stinging order from General Bragg sent the discouraged regiments the fourth time up the slope, to be hurled back the fourth time. General Hindman made a gallant assault, and met with a sore repulse. When he was wounded, A. P. Stewart took his place and made a persistent attack with his brigade and two of Pond's regiments, and finally drew off his command, as he says, for a supply of ammunition. Shortly after 2 P. M. Shaver's brigade made a sturdy effort and failed, and renewed and failed again. General Bragg, then hearing of General A. S. Johnston's death, moved around to the extreme right, near the river, and there was a lull in front of the Hornet's Nest for an hour. About four o'clock General Ruggles ordered Patton Anderson to make the attempt with his brigade. Veteranized by its experience in Sherman's front in

the morning and its success in subsequent engagements, the brigade marched boldly to the encounter. Before long its shattered fragments came streaming back, driven by the resistless fire which they provoked.

General Ruggles dispatched his staff to gather in all the batteries they could find. He succeeded in planting eleven batteries in line. General Polk massed behind them all the serviceable infantry that he could find. Hickenlooper withdrew his four guns, falling back along the road toward the landing till he reached the Hamburg and Savannah road, then turning to the left upon it, found himself with General Sherman, near the intersection of the Hamburg and Savannah road with the road from the landing to Purdy. By five o'clock Bragg, with his composite command following Hurlbut, was arriving in rear of Prentiss. About the same time Hardee, with an aggregate of disconnected brigades, was rounding the impassable wood which protected W. H. L. Wallace's right, and was reaching his rear. And at the same time Polk ordered forward his massed infantry against the front of Wallace and Prentiss, after a bombardment by Ruggles's batteries. Wallace ordered his division to cut their way out through the forces closing upon their rear. He was killed while leading them. Five of his regiments, accompanied by portions of Prentiss's command, fought their way through and reached the landing. The rest were caught and surrounded by the closing together of the masses. Prentiss bent his left wing around till his command formed an elongated ellipse open at one end, two lines back to back, joined at one end by a sharp curve. The conflict was desperate and sanguinary. It became a useless slaughter, and Prentiss surrendered. The Fourteenth Iowa, of Wallace's division, was the last to surrender. Colonel Shaw compared watches with his captor, and noted

that the time was a quarter to six o'clock. About twenty-two hundred surrendered. The battle was ended for the day.

The meeting of the forces under Bragg and Hardee covered the river bluffs with a tumultuous and elated multitude. The gunboats began to throw large shells into their midst, and there was a scurrying to find shelter in hollows and moving out of range. But General Bragg proposed to push the advantage to a finish. He ordered his division commanders to form and charge upon the long line of guns and the force assembled by Hurlbut on the farther side of the deep ravine. Ruggles set about to collect his scattered regiments. Withers found of Gladden's brigade only a colonel and two hundred and twenty-four men, and let them alone. Chalmers's brigade, with Gage's battery, was quickly ready. The men of Jackson's brigade were filling their empty cartridge boxes, but quit and formed at command. Gage's battery, halting on the hither side of the ravine, undertook to engage the National batteries on the farther side, but was quickly silenced and dismantled, and withdrew to the rear, where it remained out of the fight during the battle of the next day.

Chalmers and Jackson descended into the ravine and reached the farther side, but the roar of the massed artillery, the shells from the gunboats, which had moved to the mouth of the ravine, and the fire of Hurlbut's infantry prevented the audacious brigades from ascending the steep bank. Jackson's men, without ammunition, refused to make the attempt. Chalmers's men made some abortive attempts to charge up the slope. General Beauregard, receiving a dispatch that General Buell was not marching toward Pittsburg Landing, but was aiming for Florence, and feeling confident of early victory in the morning, sent staff officers to recall the exhausted and hungry troops

to quarters for the night. The order was given directly to division, brigade, and even regimental commanders. Jackson's brigade withdrew, and so scattered that he did not see any one or part of any one of his regiments the next day. Chalmers did not receive the order, but soon finding that he was alone and waging an idle contest, followed Jackson.

General Nelson, of General Buell's army, was ferried across the river with two regiments of Ammen's brigade, while Chalmers's men, who could not be induced to charge up the slope of the ravine, were still firing. The Thirty-sixth Indiana was marched out in front of Chalmers's front, and the Sixth Ohio in support. The Thirty-sixth had two men killed and one wounded. The whole of Nelson's division was on the ground by nine o'clock, and bivouacked in line a few hundred yards in front of Hurlbut's men. Late in the night General Crittenden arrived with his division, and formed on the right of Nelson. After Chalmers had withdrawn and all firing had ceased the head of Lewis Wallace's division reached the bridge across Snake Creek. It was dark before the last regiment, the Twentieth Ohio, reached the bridge. The division bivouacked on the eastern slope of the ravine of Brier or Tillman's Creek. General Sherman formed on the road leading to the landing, his right being near its intersection with the road on which Wallace arrived, and so having Wallace to his right and rear. Buckland with his regiment was on the right, and Colonel Cockerill's was next. Colonel Buckland's third regiment, the Forty-eighth Ohio, was detained for the night at the landing, where it had gone for ammunition. Next to Buckland was Colonel Hildebrand, with the Seventy-seventh Ohio and a part of the Fifty-seventh. His third regiment, the Fifty-third Ohio, bivouacked to the rear, in front of the camp of the

Second Iowa. The Sixth Iowa, of McDowell's brigade, spent the night at the landing, commanded by Captain Walden. The regiments of McClernand's division gathered together, but not formed in their brigades, extended from Sherman's left to Hurlbut's camp. Hurlbut's aggregation of commands and detachments extended from McClernand to the landing. The men slept in ranks on the ground, without fires and in a heavy rain. The Confederates occupied the camps of McClernand, Sherman, and Prentiss for the most part, while many slept on the ground without shelter. General Cheatham, with a portion of each of his brigades, withdrew to the camp of Saturday night, and Colonel Pond, with his battery and all of the regiments of his brigade but one, bivouacked, in company with Wharton's Texas rangers, on the west side of Brier or Tillman's Creek, opposite Lewis Wallace. The formation of corps had disappeared. No complete division bivouacked in a body. It does not appear that there was a single brigade, excepting one in Breckenridge's corps, that held all its regiments together. Beauregard's encampment of Sunday night was an aggregation of disintegrated commands.

With the first dawn Monday morning, the 7th, Colonel Pond to his dismay found that the troops had fallen back in the night, leaving him exposed alone a mile from support, and separated only by the ravine from the National line, which lay four hundred yards to his front. He made the battery (Ketchum's) open fire while he drew off his infantry and the Texas cavalry. Wallace's batteries engaged Ketchum, and the battle was resumed.

General Nelson about six o'clock marched out south, along the Hamburg road. He proceeded more than a mile before he began to come upon fragmentary detachments of the enemy. Near Stuart's camp he came upon a force which General

Withers had gathered up and organized, partly of battered brigades, partly of disconnected regiments thrown into improvised brigades with temporary commanders. After a sharp engagement he fell back to the north side of the peach orchard, his line crossing the Hamburg road and being at right angles to it. Crittenden's division connected with Nelson's right. McCook put Rousseau's brigade on the right of Crittenden, but facing to the left. Kirk's brigade was placed to the rear of Rousseau's right. When W. H. Gibson's brigade arrived later in the forenoon, a portion of it was placed on the right, extending it to the wooded ravine separating General Buell's command from Grant's. Buell's line when formed was almost identical with the line of Wallace, Prentiss, Hurlbut, and McArthur at eleven o'clock Sunday morning.

Lewis Wallace, sweeping around by Owl Creek, formed the right of Grant's attack. Sherman, assembling Buckland's brigade, Stuart with two of his regiments and the Thirteenth Missouri in line, and Hildebrand with his Seventy-seventh and part of the Fifty-seventh Ohio in reserve, was next to Wallace. The Fortieth Illinois followed McCook, and formed on the left of his line when he parted from Crittenden. A detachment of the Sixth Iowa marched in reserve to McCook. The Fifty-third Ohio, commanded by the lieutenant colonel, served with McClernand. McClernand, marching directly to his camp, came there upon the left of Sherman. Hurlbut's first brigade, much attenuated, formed on the left of McClernand's line, and constituted part of it. Colonel Veatch marched in reserve to General McCook's division till McCook parted from Crittenden, and then by General McCook's order formed on his left, extending his line. Colonel Tuttle took command of what was left of W. H. L. Wallace's division, and moved in reserve to General Buell, where he was joined by Colonel Crocker

with three regiments of McClelland's division. He sent the Second Iowa to General Nelson when there was a break in his line; the Seventh Iowa to General Crittenden to aid in a charge upon a battery; the Thirteenth later in the day joined General McCook; and the Eighth and Eighteenth Illinois formed on the left of Crittenden's line when he parted from Nelson. General Bragg commanded the Confederate left, Hardee on the right, and Polk and Breckenridge between the two. There was no definite boundary of commands, and some brigades and some separate regiments received direct commands from each of them in succession. General Beauregard took his station near Shiloh church. The most compact body of troops was there in the beginning of the day, and through the combat commands that were forced to give way retired toward that point.

General Lewis Wallace, marching along the upland bordering Owl Creek after the retreat of Pond's brigade and battery, had an encounter with Wharton's Texas cavalry and forced it back, and then, after an engagement with Trabue's brigade, forced it south of the Purdy road. Patton Anderson coming up, engaged Wallace's first brigade, while the second and third continued the contest with Trabue. Sherman moved out to McClelland's camp and waited till he heard beyond the intervening woods the advance of Buell's troops against the yielding enemy. Moving forward with Buckland and Stuart, he joined Wallace's left, and, after some preliminary skirmishes with detachments, came upon the consolidated force under Beauregard's immediate command, and plunged into the raging fight. McClelland, moving directly from his bivouac to his camp, brushing before him some batteries and their supports, joined the left of Sherman. While the conflict raged McCook's division, in ranks well aligned, was seen

advancing beyond the point of the woods, with well-ordered impetuosity pressing back their stubborn foes. Sherman, McClernand, and Wallace mention in their reports the impression made on them by the steady push of the drilled and disciplined division.

Nelson in his march the day before from Savannah to the shore opposite Pittsburg Landing, over a miry road through a swamp overflowed by high water, had been obliged to leave his artillery behind. When he advanced again he was so annoyed by the enemy's battery that Mendenhall's battery was sent to him from Crittenden's division. This quickly silenced the antagonist. Hazen, rushing forward with his brigade, captured the guns and drove the infantry supports. Bowen's brigade coming up, dashed unexpectedly upon Hazen's men, disordered by the pursuit, and they fell back in confusion, leaving a gap in Nelson's line. His separated brigades were in danger of crumbling when Terrill's regular battery, coming up at a gallop, pushed out to the skirmish line to get a good position, and silenced and crippled Bowen's battery. Nelson fell back. Terrill retired his guns by prolonges; having them in battery at every halt without wheeling, he kept the pursuers at bay with volleys of canister. Nelson rallied his command and again advanced, overcoming stubborn resistance. At about two o'clock he was in Stuart's camp, and the enemy finally withdrew from his front. He turned to the west, and advancing beyond Crittenden's front, Mendenhall's battery took in reverse and drove away a battery which had blocked Crittenden's advance. Crittenden swung his left forward, and Terrill, going farther to the front, took in reverse a battery which was harassing McCook, and upon his silencing that McCook advanced. General Crittenden maintained his position through the day, not being ordered by Gen-

eral Buell to advance, and being unwilling to leave the flank of Nelson exposed. But he was engaged with troops stationed in the dense thicket, which filled a wet hollow along the base of the slope in his front and in the woods beyond. Portions of his command made charges into the thickets and the woods, and retired and charged again. When Mendenhall silenced the battery in the woods, it was captured by a charge, and the enemy disappeared from Crittenden's front.

McCook, with his two brigades, Rousseau and Kirk, moved forward to a more commanding position. Facing to the west, he was in front of the Confederate center. He sustained and repelled vigorous assaults till W. H. Gibson's brigade arrived. Then moving forward, adding the Fifteenth Michigan to Rousseau's brigade, and as he let go from Crittenden annexing Veatch's three regiments to his left, he pushed back his assailants till he passed by the intervening woods. Then reaching McClernand's camp, he came into view of Grant's troops, and then into contact with them. Grant pressing to the south, and Buell pressing to the west, had bent back the wings of the Confederate army and compressed it into a compact mass. A score of batteries and about half as many divisions of infantry fought with a desperation which surpassed any previous conflict on the field. A fierce charge upon McCook by all the force that could be massed in his front was met, sustained, overcome, and hurled back. As the baffled line retired, General Grant, gathering up two regiments—the First Ohio and another—personally directing them, launched them in a charge which shattered the last defensive line. At the same time General Beauregard, taking the flags of two regiments, called upon the men to follow him in a charge. Just then Colonel Whittlesey, of the Twentieth Ohio, directed Thurber's battery to

sweep his front with rapid volleys. Beauregard's men would not follow him. His aid-de-camp, Colonel Thompson, remonstrated against any further attempt to prolong the contest. The retreat had begun on the right nearly two hours before, and, posting a brigade and a battery to hold the ground, the general led off what was left of his army. T. J. Wood's division of Buell's army, which had just arrived, followed a short distance, and the battle was over.

No battle of the war has excited more controversy than the battle of Shiloh. The discussion about surprise is a dispute about words. Nothing can be added to the accuracy of the statement made by General Rawlins in his address to the Society of the Army of the Tennessee at the meeting in Cincinnati in 1866: "We did not expect to be attacked in force that morning, and were surprised that we were; but we had sufficient notice before the shock came to be under arms and ready to meet it." General Johnston marched his army out from Corinth, and on Saturday deliberately put it into camp, arranged in lines of attack, within a few miles of the National picket line, without any one in the National camp having a suspicion of that fact, though there were some who were satisfied there was a large force in front. But as for the foolish story of the assailing force breaking into the camps while the men were yet in bed, it is enough to say that the records show beyond any chance of controversy, and the Confederate reports show more plainly than those of General Grant's army, that no camp was entered before nine o'clock, and, excepting Prentiss's, none was entered before ten o'clock; and, further, that no camp was entered before a serious engagement in which the assailants suffered repulse before prevailing. It is from the Confederate reports that we learn also that the retiring pickets fought stubbornly as they

fell back, and, wherever opportunity was afforded by the formation of the ground or by dense growth, they made a stand and held the following skirmishers at bay.

The numbers engaged can not be given positively. The accepted numbers are: Under General Grant, Sunday, thirty-two or thirty-three thousand; brought by Lewis Wallace, five thousand; brought by General Buell, twenty thousand; and the number of combatants brought into battle on the Confederate side about forty thousand.

The casualties, according to the last revision of the War Department, were: In the Army of the Tennessee, killed, fifteen hundred and thirteen; wounded, six thousand six hundred and one; captured and missing, two thousand eight hundred and thirty; total, ten thousand nine hundred and forty-four. In the Army of the Ohio, killed, two hundred and forty-one; wounded, eighteen hundred and seven; captured and missing, fifty-five. Aggregate killed, seventeen hundred and fifty-four; wounded, eight thousand four hundred and eight; captured and missing, two thousand eight hundred and eighty-five; total, thirteen thousand and forty-seven. The Confederate loss is given as follows: Killed, seventeen hundred and twenty-eight; wounded, eight thousand and twelve; missing, nine hundred and fifty-nine; total, ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. It is agreed that many of the reported missing were, in fact, dead or wounded. In one instance this is obvious. In his report of Colonel Pond's disastrous charge Sunday afternoon, Colonel Mouton, of the Eighteenth Louisiana, says, "Here two hundred and seven officers and men fell either dead or wounded," while in the reported list of casualties for the entire two days the statement for that regiment is: Killed, thirteen; wounded, eighty; missing, one hundred and eighteen. General Grant says in his

Century article, and repeats in his autobiography, of the Confederate report: "This estimate must be incorrect. We buried by actual count more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field." Sherman's division lost three hundred and twenty-five killed, twelve hundred and seventy-seven wounded, and two hundred and ninety-nine missing; total, nineteen hundred and one.

General Lewis Wallace's tardy appearance on the field has been the subject of much controversy. General Grant, on his way from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing Sunday morning, stopped at Crump's Landing, found General Wallace there on a steamboat awaiting him, ordered Wallace to have his command ready to march, and was informed that the troops were already under arms. General Grant, on reaching Pittsburg and going out to the front, gave or sent to Captain Baxter a verbal order for Wallace to move, which order Captain Baxter wrote out before starting. He took a steamboat to Crump's, and, finding that Wallace had taken his first brigade out to the camp of his second brigade, two miles from the river, rode out thither and repeated the order to Wallace, at the same time handing him the writing. Captain Baxter arrived at eleven o'clock or a little later; the two brigades had dinner at half past eleven, and Wallace started at twelve by the Savannah and Corinth road. This road, passing through the camp of the second brigade, intersected the Pittsburg Landing and Purdy road near the camp of General Sherman's first brigade, his extreme right. General Grant, becoming anxious, sent Captain Rowley at one o'clock to hasten Wallace. Going to the camp of the second brigade, and learning there Wallace's route, he overtook him at half past

two o'clock. General Wallace fixes the place as on the Purdy road, near the crossing of Owl Creek, close to McDowell's camp, more than a mile directly in rear of the force which was pressing Sherman and McClernand toward the river. Wallace countermarched his column and found a little crossroad which led to the river road, and on which he was overtaken at half past three by Colonel Rawlins and Captain McPherson, of Grant's staff, who were very impatient at the delay. The head of the division reached the bridge over Snake Creek after sunset, about seven o'clock, having marched fifteen miles, and bivouacked on the eastern slope of the valley of Brier or Tillman Creek.

The contention has been that Wallace was in fault (1) in taking the outer road when he was expressly ordered to take the river road; (2) in countermarching his column instead of facing to the rear and marching left in front; (3) in lagging on the way when utmost speed was an obvious imperative necessity. (1) The order was to advance and support the right of the line. Three of General Grant's staff say that the order was to advance by the river road. General Wallace and six of his officers, who heard and read the order, say that no road was named. If there were no testimony, the antecedent probability would be that no road was mentioned. For in ordering Wallace to march up from Crump's Landing Grant would not think of any road but the one from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing, and naturally would not think of naming the road. Whatever the fact was, certainly Wallace and his officers understood that no road was mentioned, and thereupon, being at the second brigade camp, two miles from the river, they naturally took the Savannah and Corinth road, which was the direct road to Sherman's right, and was the road by which Wallace had sent letters to Sherman. (2) It was a mistake to lose time by

a countermarch, instead of simply facing to the rear, when time was so precious. (3) It is difficult to fix the route of Wallace's march with the evidence now attainable, including the provisional charts of the Shiloh Battlefield Commission. Progress over the deep and slippery mud of the river bottom, being the last part of the journey, was so toilsome that the field officers of the rear regiment dismounted and let exhausted men who fell out of the ranks take turns in riding. The charge or intimation that Wallace willfully lingered sounds strange indeed to those who remember that this was the same Wallace who retrieved the disaster on the right at Fort Donelson, opened the battle Monday morning at Shiloh, and with a small force, by desperate fighting, delayed Early a vital day in his march on to Washington.

General Bragg said some time after the battle, and it has been repeated by many, that the fire of the gunboats Sunday evening was noisy but harmless. The reports of brigade and regimental commanders made at the time quite generally mention being ordered to move out of range of the gunboat fire; some specify the loss so suffered. Some examples of these reports are as follows: General Clark, commanding a division, says that at the close of the day he was about to aid in following up the National troops, but was checked by the fire of the gunboats. General Gibson says he was ordered to retire his brigade from the fire of the gunboats, in which movement considerable disorder ensued. General Patton Anderson took his brigade into a hollow for shelter, in moving from which he lost several killed and many wounded. Colonel John C. Moore, Second Texas, reports that two of his men were mortally wounded by a shell. Captain Poole, commanding a Florida battalion, says: "One or two of my command were either killed or mortally wounded while under this fire." General S. A. M. Wood, coming under the fire

of the gunboats, "pressed forward to a position most secure from the shelling," in which position he had ten killed and many wounded by the shells. General Trabue says: "We endured a most terrific cannonade and shelling from the enemy's gunboats. My command, however, had seen too much hard fighting to be alarmed, and the Fourth Kentucky stood firm, while some of our troops to the front fell back through their lines in confusion. In Company D of this regiment I lost at this place eleven men, and Lieutenant Keller, of the Fifth Regiment, was wounded." Colonel Venable, of the Fifth Tennessee, says that the gunboat fire was unbearable, killing and wounding several of his men.

There has been much controversy as to the responsibility for establishing the troops on the west bank of the river, and for the position of the camps. Sherman, receiving from General Smith, in the forenoon of March 14th, an order to go on the expedition to Yellow Creek, wrote to him: "I would suggest as a precautionary measure, after I pass up the river with one gunboat and my division, that the other gunboat and one division—say Hurlbut's or Wallace's—move up to Pittsburg Landing and there await my return. . . . If the force at Corinth be already large, Cheatham may remain at or near Pittsburg Landing and embarrass our return." Returning to Pittsburg Landing on the 16th, he wrote to General Smith's assistant adjutant general on the 17th: "I will be governed by your orders of yesterday to occupy Pittsburg strongly." On the same day Sherman made an order that "General Hurlbut will disembark and establish his camp on a line perpendicular to the road about a mile from the river." Sherman's division did not move out to occupy the ground which he had designated for it till the 19th, and, as two of his brigades temporarily occupied the ground designated by him to Hurlbut, the latter did not move till the 20th.

General Grant, being reinstated, arrived at Savannah the evening of the 17th, and next day sent thence to Pittsburg Landing all the steamboats, to debark there all the troops on them, including Smith's division, and return at once to Paducah. General Smith being in command at Pittsburg Landing, Sherman on the 20th wrote to General Lauman, temporarily in command of Hurlbut's division: "General Smith is on the Hiawatha unwell, and requests that I should give the necessary directions for camping the troops as they arrive. I direct that you select a line parallel to the river, or nearly so, about one mile distant from the river, and encamp them by brigades, so that they can promptly form into line of battle and move out as such by the road leading into the interior."

On the 18th General Grant wrote to General Halleck from Savannah: "I arrived here last evening, and found that Generals Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially debarked; General Wallace at Crump's Landing, six miles below, same side of the river; General McClelland's division at this place encamped; and General Smith's division, with unattached regiments, on board transports also here. . . . I shall go to-morrow to Crump's Landing and Pittsburg, and if I think any change of position for any of the troops needed I will make the change. Having full faith, however, in the judgment of General Smith, who selected the present points of debarkation, I do not expect any change will be made. There are no intermediate points where a steamer can land at the present stage of water." General Smith ordered the occupation of Pittsburg Landing and Crump's Landing; General Sherman, under authority from General Smith, selected there the camp grounds of Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions. General Grant, as well as Smith and Sherman, approved such occupation and selection.

CHAPTER IV.

FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS.

TUESDAY morning, April 8th, General Sherman, with the brigades of Buckland and Hildebrand, all the regiments being present and ranks well filled, and accompanied by the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, went out by order of General Grant to examine the roads. General T. J. Wood, of General Buell's army, went out by another road with two brigades of his division. Four or five miles out the Confederate cavalry by a sudden charge stampeded the Seventy-seventh Ohio, but was in turn driven back and followed up more than a mile. General Sherman found much property and stores, wagons and gun carriages, and a hospital camp, but did not penetrate to or gain knowledge of Breckenridge's camp at Mickey's, where he remained until Thursday.

It is agreed on both sides that the reported number of missing includes many killed and wounded. This is especially true of the Confederate reports, as they could not be verified by inspection of the field of battle. The number of men buried there within a few days must have been quite four thousand, and this number was rapidly increased by ensuing deaths. About five hundred horses were interred. Constant rains saturated the soil. The earth, the streams, the air, were filled with poison. The hospitals were moved out beyond the old picket line, and the camps were transferred beyond the hospitals. The entire territory

of the battlefield was uninhabited except by a small force at the landing and the Twentieth Ohio on a spur overlooking the crossing of Owl Creek, near the site of the old camp of Sherman's first brigade.

Immediately after the battle General Halleck ordered General Pope to abandon the expedition against Fort Pillow and proceed up the Tennessee, called strenuously upon the Government for reinforcements, and went himself to Pittsburg Landing to take command in person. General Halleck reached the landing April 11th; General Pope reported to him there April 21st, and was ordered to disembark his command at Hamburg Landing. The force collected under Halleck amounted to one hundred thousand men, and was organized with right, center, left, and reserve. The Army of the Mississippi constituted the left. The Army of the Ohio, except General Thomas's division, formed the center. Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions, with two new divisions commanded by Generals Davies and McKean, made up of the remains of the divisions of Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace, filled up by newly arrived regiments, together with Thomas's division, commanded by General T. W. Sherman, composed the right, under the command of General Thomas. General McClelland had the reserve, being his own and Lewis Wallace's divisions. General Pope divided his command into two wings, commanded respectively by General Rosecrans and Schuyler Hamilton. General Grant was second in command to the collective army, without any specific command. Of the officers subordinate to General Halleck, nine were already, or afterward became, army commanders—Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Buell, Pope, Thomas, Rosecrans, McPherson, and Logan. General Beauregard, re-enforced immediately after his return to Corinth by Van Dorn and Price with a force containing seventeen thousand effectives,

summoned from Arkansas after their disastrous defeat at Pea Ridge by Curtis, and by all the troops and new levies which the Confederate Government could raise, mustered an army of one hundred and twelve thousand men on the rolls on the 28th of May, while by reason of sickness, caused by "bad food, neglect of police duty, inaction, and labor, and especially the water, insufficient and charged with magnesia and rotten limestone," the effective total was reduced to fifty-two thousand seven hundred and six.

General Buell states that the average distance of the National lines from Corinth was fifteen miles. The soft ground from the camps to the landing was cut and churned by trains into a morass almost impassable for saddle horses and a despair to wagon teams. The army was absorbed in the problem of getting supplies to the front, and paralyzed by the order reiterated by General Halleck to avoid being drawn into a general engagement. The Confederate outposts and patrols covered the country up to the National picket line.

On the 27th of April General Pope moved about five miles out from the river. Next day a reconnoitering party discovered that Monterey was held in force by the enemy. On the 29th an expedition commanded by General Stanley found Monterey evacuated; destroyed the tents and stores left behind, followed General Anderson some miles south to the farther side of a creek, and returned to camp. On the 2d and 3d of May General Buell crossed Lick Creek and advanced to within twelve miles of Corinth. On the 4th General Thomas moved and intrenched. On the 7th Buell and Thomas made another advance and intrenched. General Pope sent a reconnoissance to Farmington on the 3d of May, leading to a sharp engagement, which resulted in the enemy being driven with loss into Corinth, and next day moved his command to a

strong position within five miles of Corinth. On the 9th of May two of his brigades had a hot encounter with a large force near Farmington, but were recalled to camp to avoid the necessity for a general engagement. The army advanced, moving, halting, intrenching, and remaining in position while building roads and bridges for another advance. General Sherman, on the extreme right, in some well-planned movements, executed with spirit, carried successively several commanding positions. On the evening of the 17th Buell and Pope advanced to a road running parallel with the enemy's works, and two miles distant from them, and intrenched. Two creeks, a marshy valley, and thick woods intervened between this line and Beauregard's works. Every day some force skirmished forward and fortified, until by the 28th some points were so held within one thousand yards of them.

General Beauregard made an order on the 26th preparing for evacuation, and began moving his sick and his stores. His troops left on the night of the 29th. The field batteries marched a mile to the rear on the various roads at sunset. The heavy guns were taken out from the fortifications at 8 P. M. and loaded upon cars. Besides the traveled roads, numerous ways had been cut through the woods, and by means of all the infantry, moving out at 10 P. M., quickly evacuated the place. The rear guard followed at midnight, and the cavalry pickets remained on post until morning. Locomotives whistled at times through the night, and the troops remaining cheered, as if welcoming arriving re-enforcements. But little of value was left undestroyed. The smoke and explosions toward morning of stores set on fire and abandoned excited suspicion in the besiegers, and by seven o'clock Corinth was entered by parties from the right, center, and left.

As soon as it was ascertained that Corinth was

abandoned, General Pope started in pursuit. Beauregard halted at Baldwin, nine miles south of Booneville. Preparation was completed, and a detailed order was issued on the 5th of June for attack on the next day, but was countermanded by General Halleck by telegraph. Beauregard resumed his retreat on the 7th, and went into camp at Tupelo; the pursuing force returned to camps in the neighborhood of Corinth. General Halleck's march of fourteen miles in twenty-five days seemed more like the practice of a military school than an actual campaign. Officers and men learned much of discipline, making of reports and returns, picket duty, and the construction of earthworks, roads, and bridges. They became soldiers in fact as well as in name. And the capture of Corinth, permanently depriving the Confederacy of the route to the east from Memphis to Chattanooga, confining communication to the southern route by Vicksburg, Meridian, and Mobile, isolated Memphis and determined its fall. Fort Pillow was abandoned on the 1st of June. The Confederate fleet was annihilated in an engagement with the national gunboats and rams in front of Memphis on the 6th, and on the same day the detachment left by General Pope with the fleet entered Memphis and took possession.

General Pope telegraphed to General Halleck on June 3d: "The roads for miles are full of stragglers from the enemy. Not less than ten thousand men are thus scattered about who will come in within a day or two." On the 8th he reported: "They have lost by desertion of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas regiments near twenty thousand men since they left Corinth." General Buell reported on the 9th: "The loss of the enemy in the retreat has undoubtedly been very great from disasters, sickness, etc. The deserters all estimate at from twenty to thirty thousand." General

Halleck, on receiving General Pope's first report, dispatched to the Secretary of War: "General Pope with forty thousand men is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured." This was understood to mean that Pope had captured ten thousand armed men. Secretary Stanton telegraphed it as such to every State, and it was published in the newspapers all over the country. It was soon known that the number of men captured was inconsiderable, and Pope suffered in public opinion, being believed to have made a statement which he never made or authorized or contemplated.

General Grant, reprimanded and put in quasi arrest after the capture of Fort Donelson, and deprived of active command and ignored after the battle of Shiloh, was entirely disheartened, and found the situation unbearable. He obtained leave of absence and resolved to get away. General Sherman, hearing of it, went immediately to him, and, telling first his own experience, remonstrated so earnestly and effectively that Grant reconsidered his purpose and remained.

General Halleck had about Corinth over one hundred thousand men present for duty, besides Mitchell's division of sixty-five hundred marching toward Chattanooga, all ably officered, elated with success, and ready to undertake any enterprise. General Beauregard had in cantonment at Tupelo less than sixty thousand effectives, dispirited by repeated loss and successive retreats, and encumbered by eighteen thousand sick. If Halleck had followed up with his army, embracing Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Pope, Buell, Thomas, Rosecrans, McPherson, and Logan, Beauregard would have given battle and been crushed and destroyed, or would have continued his retreat until his army

melted away, scattered and dissipated. But a vigorous protracted pursuit of a defeated army was the last lesson learned in the war, and Halleck was the person least ready to undertake to learn the lesson. At that time, when the South was straining every nerve to recuperate and re-enforce its debilitated corps, and in the early summer months, the most favorable season for a campaign, the very worst thing that could be done with the National army was to keep it idle in camp. And that is what General Halleck did.

But on the 3d of June McClelland with his own and Lewis Wallace's division was ordered to Bolivar and Jackson, and, a little later, Wallace's division was sent to Arkansas; on the 9th Sherman with his own and Hurlbut's divisions was sent along the railroad toward Memphis; and Buell with his army, including Thomas and his division, was ordered to advance along the railroad to Chattanooga. Pope was called East to serve in Virginia, leaving his command to Rosecrans, and then two of the divisions were sent to Buell, leaving three with Rosecrans. On the 18th of July Halleck went to Washington to take command of the armies of the United States.

Meanwhile after a thorough inspection, together with an investigation, had been made into the condition of the Confederate troops at Tupelo by order of President Davis, General Beauregard was relieved and General Bragg was appointed in his place. Bragg was a very able soldier, sagacious, prompt, resolute, and a rigid disciplinarian. But he was unpopular, and had few intimate acquaintances. He was reserved, positive, and uncompromising in disposition, and abrupt and brusque in manner. It has been said, however, that he was not unpopular with the rank and file, and was so with the superior officers because he was as imperious to them as he was to enlisted men. He

quickly improved the health, tone, and discipline of the army at Tupelo, and on the 22d of July he rapidly moved by rail about thirty-five thousand of the troops via Mobile to Chattanooga. After securing re-enforcements, he started about the middle of August for the Ohio River, and General Buell, who was still toiling, repairing railroad, and rebuilding bridges from Corinth toward Chattanooga, was obliged to quit this work and march with all possible diligence to save Cincinnati and Louisville from capture.

General Grant was left in command of the troops in West Tennessee, about forty-two thousand for duty. The Memphis and Chattanooga Railroad, running along his front two hundred miles, was ruined beyond repair by any resources at his command between Chewalla and Grand Junction, and exposed to incessant raids throughout its whole extent, and could not be used. Communication between Memphis and Corinth was through Jackson, a railroad intersection far to the rear. General Bragg left about sixteen thousand men, under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, guarding the Mississippi River, and about the same number under General Price at Tupelo. Van Dorn was skillful and enterprising; Price was a pertinacious fighter.

The position of the small posts along the railroad became so precarious that in August all west of Grand Junction were withdrawn by General Sherman to Memphis; the post at Grand Junction was withdrawn to Bolivar, and by the middle of September all detachments to the eastward of Corinth retired to that point, except that Colonel Murphy remained with his regiment at Iuka to protect the shipment thence of the depot of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance supplies. At the end of August General Armstrong with two brigades of cavalry, numbering four thousand men, ad-

vanced into Tennessee. Colonel Leggett, with two regiments of infantry, two guns, and four companies of cavalry, met them five miles from Bolivar, and opposed them so audaciously that Armstrong, having suffered considerable loss, withdrew from the field after a contest of seven hours. General Armstrong came upon Colonel Dennis marching on Britton's Lane with two regiments, two guns, and two companies of cavalry; Colonel Dennis took position on a wooded hill commanding the lane. General Armstrong made repeated charges upon the hill, suffering repulse each time, and finally withdrew, leaving one hundred and sixty-nine killed and many wounded on the field. He returned to Mississippi after doing some trifling injury to the railroad. Colonel Leggett and Colonel Dennis, as well as Colonel Crocker, commander of the post at Bolivar, were promoted to the rank of brigadier general for their success.

General Grant was anxiously watching for indications of the design of the enemy, and by the 11th of September became satisfied that an attack would be made on Corinth by Van Dorn and Price. He at once had the garrisons of Tuscumbia and Iuka called into Corinth, the troops at Bolivar moved to Corinth, and a force transferred from Memphis to Bolivar. Price and Van Dorn, in fact, proposed to capture Corinth and force Grant back into Kentucky, but Van Dorn was not ready. General Price occupied Iuka, which Colonel Murphy abandoned without making any attempt to destroy the great store of supplies remaining there. Confident that he could retake Iuka and get back to Corinth before Van Dorn could appear before it, Grant dispatched Rosecrans to approach Iuka from the south, occupying both of the roads running from the town to the south, while Ord with another column should reach the town from the northwest. Ord was in place on time. Rosecrans,

delayed at first by difficulties in the road, made up by forced marching, so that late in the afternoon of the 19th his advance division, Hamilton's, encountered one of Price's divisions, Little's, within two miles of Iuka. A fierce fight ensued. Hamilton lost one fourth of his command in killed and wounded—seven hundred out of twenty-eight hundred. Price reported eighty-six killed and four hundred and eight wounded; while Rosecrans's provost marshal certified that he had buried two hundred and sixty-five of Price's men who were found dead on the field of battle, and a hundred and twenty more, being a portion of the wounded whom Price had left behind and who died in hospital. In the course of the night Rosecrans advised Grant, who was with Ord, of the engagement, and of his intention to attack Price in the morning. When morning came it was discovered that the bird had flown. Rosecrans had occupied only one of the roads, and Price had moved out through the night by the other and was already beyond pursuit. The troops immediately moved back to their respective quarters at Corinth, Jackson, and Bolivar.

General Price, reaching Baldwin on the 23d, reported by letter to Van Dorn at Holly Springs. Five days later they joined forces at Ripley, numbering together twenty-three thousand muskets. Van Dorn assumed command, and, moving next day, reached Pocahontas on the 1st of October, and was near Corinth on the 2d. On the morning of the 3d Van Dorn advanced, skirmishing with the National outposts, and at ten o'clock came upon Rosecrans's four divisions in line about two miles in advance of the works recently constructed on the outskirts of the town. Attack was made with vigor, and was met with equal courage. A hot engagement ensued, which lasted without intermission through the day. When it ceased, at nearly

6 P. M., the National troops were within the new works, and the assailants were halted a few hundred yards from them.

Assault upon the works was made at nine o'clock next morning. The assault was made with great determination. The National line was pierced, and Battery Powell was carried, but after a hand-to-hand fight the assailants were driven out and the redoubt reoccupied. Later Fort Robinett was entered. After a conflict of fury and desperation it too was regained, and the temporary captors—what was left of them—withdrew in disorder. Farther to the National left a portion of Maury's division of Price's corps overcame Davies's division and forced their way into the town. There they were subjected to fire in front and both flanks, with artillery and musketry, and retired with heavy loss. The attack on Corinth had been planned with skill and delivered with special gallantry. It had been met with indomitable resolution and had failed. By noon General Van Dorn with his Confederates had left the field and was in full retreat, spending the night at Chewalla.

The National loss was three hundred and fifteen killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two missing; total, twenty-three hundred and fifty-nine. The Confederate returns make their loss five hundred and five killed, twenty-one hundred and fifty wounded, twenty-one hundred and eighty-three missing; total, forty-eight hundred and thirty-eight. General Rosecrans's medical director reported that after the battle fourteen hundred and twenty-three Confederate soldiers were buried on the field. Among the killed were Brigadier-General Hackleman and Colonel Kirby Smith, of the Forty-third Ohio, a young officer of the regular army of most brilliant promise. On the Confederate side, Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas, a notably gal-

lant officer, was killed in the bloody struggle within Fort Robinett.

General Rosecrans, from consideration of the fatigue of his command, decided not to begin pursuit till next morning. General McPherson, who arrived at Corinth in the afternoon, was ordered to lead in the pursuit in the morning. General Ord, who had been sent by General Grant with his own division and General Hurlbut's to intercept the expected retreat of Van Dorn, arrived at the north bank of the Hatchie, at the bridge near Pocahontas, on the morning of the 4th. On the morning of the 5th Van Dorn left Chewalla and marched to Pocahontas. His advance obtained possession of the bridge. Ord drove them from it, and, following closely, gained the other bank. He attacked with spirit the more numerous but fatigued and somewhat disordered Confederate force, and repelled them from the bridge. Van Dorn turned south, found another crossing six miles below, where he took his command over the river in the night and then continued to Holly Springs. Rosecrans left Corinth the morning of the 5th, and only reached Chewalla that night. He joined Hurlbut next day, Ord being wounded, and traveled as far as Ripley over the road by which Van Dorn had escaped. The Confederate force in Mississippi was too much crippled by these repeated disasters to think of resuming the offensive. President Davis sent Lieutenant-General Pemberton to take command, and his active command was largely re-enforced by returned prisoners of war and new levies. Grant, relieved from apprehension of attack, immediately began to project plans for invading Mississippi.

General Sherman, while engaged in his strictly military functions, keeping advised of the position of General Van Dorn and ascertaining his plans, and carrying on the erection of Fort Pickering,

was also occupied with the more trying task of regulating the civil administration of Memphis. Arriving there in July, he found all civil administration suspended and the population disloyal. He restored the mayor to his office, defining with precision his jurisdiction and authority; suggested the re-establishment of courts, prescribing what jurisdiction they should exercise, and stating in what cases the military would aid in the enforcement of civic authority. He permitted the publication of newspapers, but defined the manner in which the publication should be conducted. He regulated in great detail the manner in which the use of land and houses belonging to disloyal persons should be appropriated. He corresponded with the Secretary of the Treasury, combating the policy of the Government in permitting dealers to purchase cotton from within the enemy's lines. In all these communications his grasp of the subject in hand and his directness and precision of statement are very notable. His argument to the Secretary of the Treasury as a statement of the military question was unanswerable; the Government could not deny that, but avoided it by consideration of the pressing need of some means of paying the obligations of the United States to Europe.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENN., *July 27, 1862.*

JOHN PARK, *Mayor of Memphis, Present.*

SIR: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civil law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to restore them to their proper use—viz., the protection of life, liberty, and property. Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, and necessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior to the civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it. Civil courts and executive officers should still exist and perform duties,

without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass into disrespect—an end to be avoided. I am glad to find in Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence, but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neither the time nor the inclination to interfere with. Among these, first in importance is the maintenance of order, peace, and quiet within the jurisdiction of Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strong provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding public property held or claimed by the United States, and for the arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guard ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. This should be done by the city police. I understand that the city police is too weak in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and I therefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps to increase this force to a number which, in their judgment, day and night can enforce your ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order, so that any change in our military dispositions will not have a tendency to leave your people unguarded. I am willing to instruct the provost guard to assist the police force when any combination is made too strong for them to overcome, but the city police should be strong enough for any probable contingency. The cost of maintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon all citizens equitably.

I am not willing, nor do I think it good policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to the State and county, as you recommend; for these would have to be refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on all interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper municipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of your police force and for raising the necessary means for their support and maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of the tax. Of course I can not suggest how this tax should be laid, but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real estate, and personal property, including money and merchandise. All who are protected should share the expenses in proportion to the interests involved.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENN., August 11, 1862.

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

SIR: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion of the cotton question. I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to listen to trifles. This is no trifle: when one nation is at war with another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other; then the rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most unfortunately, the war in which we are now engaged has been complicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other are *not* enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, this mistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to be misled by it. The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on the proper rule that all in the South *are* enemies of all in the North; and not only are they unfriendly, but all who can procure arms now bear them as organized regiments or as guerrillas. There is not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight of the flagstaff without being shot or captured. It so happened that these people had cotton, and, whenever they apprehended our large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the belief that, of course, we would seize it and convert it to our use. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it. It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged government, and was therefore lost to their people; and could have been, without injustice, taken by us and sent away, either as absolute prize of war or for future compensation. But the commercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents would buy a pound of cotton behind our army, that four cents would take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold. The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire when here they discovered that salt, bacon, powder, firearms, percussion caps, etc., were worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, this traffic was not only permitted but encouraged. Before we in the interior could know it hundreds, yea thousands, of barrels of salt and millions of dollars had been disbursed, and I have no doubt that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved their armies in mass, and from ten to twenty thousand fresh arms and a due supply of cartridges have also been got, I am equally satisfied. As soon as I got to Memphis, having seen the effect in the interior, I ordered (only as

to my command) that gold, silver, and Treasury notes were contraband of war, and should not go into the interior, where all were hostile. It is idle to talk about Union men here: many want peace, and fear war and its results, but all prefer a Southern, independent government, and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that was spent for cotton was sent to the seaboard to be exchanged for banknotes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here and are taken in ordinary transactions. I therefore required cotton to be paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end of the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee—viz., the United States quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is being obtained about as fast as by any other process, and yet the enemy receives no "aid or comfort." Under the "gold" rule the country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that trade is to be encouraged and gold paid out, I admit that cotton will be sent in by our own open enemies, who can make better use of gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton.

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my views on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens war because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't employ and feed her own people to send them here, where they can not only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence by moderate labor. We are not bound to furnish her cotton. She has more reason to fight the South for burning that cotton than us for not shipping it. To aid the South on this ground would be hypocrisy which the world would detect at once. Let her make her ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that will counteract in the balance. Of course her motive is to cripple a power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures that threaten even to usurp her history. In twenty more years of prosperity it will require a close calculation to determine whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the continent of America or the isle of Britain. Therefore, finding us in a death struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel to destroy both parts in detail. Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the alliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures in exchange for their cotton. The Southern Confederacy will accept no other mediation, because she knows full well that in *old* England her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in *New* England. France

certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb her equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respectful consideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feel assured the French will not encourage rebellion and secession anywhere as a political doctrine. Certainly all the German states must be our ardent friends, and, in case of European intervention, they could not be kept down.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

On the 24th of October the War Department by order transferred General Rosecrans to supersede General Buell in the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and transmuted the force under General Grant's command into an army corps, entitled Thirteenth Army Corps. The force at that time numbered about forty-eight thousand five hundred men. On the 4th of November General Grant assembled at Grand Junction and La Grange two divisions from Bolivar, under command of General J. B. McPherson, and three divisions from Corinth, under General C. S. Hamilton, preparatory to making an advance into Mississippi. Two weeks later, by order of General Grant, General Sherman met him at Columbus, Ky., and they conferred upon the mode of carrying out the movement, the ultimate object of which, General Grant said, was the capture of Vicksburg. Grant moved south through Holly Springs with the force which he had assembled, Sherman advanced from Memphis with three divisions, and General Steele, with a division from the troops stationed at Helena, Ark., advanced from the Mississippi toward Grenada. Pemberton, finding his rear threatened by Steele, abandoned his fortified line along the Tallahatchie, fell back to Grenada, and took up a new line along the Yallabusha. General Grant reached the Tallahatchie at the railroad crossing on the 1st of December, and General Sherman arrived at a point a few miles west next day, to find the crossings undefended.

On the 8th General Sherman, in obedience to a letter from General Grant, met him at Oxford, and again conferred upon the plan of campaign. After Grant had fully stated his plans, and before Sherman left, Grant sent to General Halleck by telegraph: "General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand men, will land above Vicksburg (up the Yazoo if practicable), and cut the Mississippi road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they cross Black River. I will co-operate from here, my movements depending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha, and when an opportunity occurs make a real attack. After cutting the two roads, General Sherman's movements to secure the end desired will necessarily be left to his judgment. I will occupy this road to Coffeeville."

To this Halleck replied at once, approving the plan, but adding, "The President may insist upon designating a separate commander." Sherman left for Memphis next day, taking with him one division, Morgan L. Smith's, and hastened preparations for the expedition down the Mississippi. The situation in Mississippi was becoming so serious that General Joseph E. Johnston was appointed to supreme command between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, and he hardly reached Chattanooga to confer with General Bragg before Jefferson Davis arrived and accompanied General Johnston to Mississippi, having first ordered Bragg to send re-enforcements, numbering nine thousand men, to Pemberton.

By order of General Bragg, General Forrest, on the 11th of December, left Columbia, Tenn., and, crossing the Tennessee at Clifton on the 14th and 15th by means of an old flatboat, succeeded

in substantially wrecking the railroad and telegraph between Columbus and Humboldt, and eluding or defeating all troops sent to meet him, except in the fight at Parker's Cross Roads, where he was defeated with severe loss by General Sullivan. On the 1st of January he raised the old flatboat, which had been sunk, and recrossed to Clifton.

On the 19th of December, while General Grant's cavalry were absent on an expedition to destroy the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Tupelo, General Van Dorn, having assembled all the cavalry of the Confederate army, started upon a raid upon the roads in General Grant's rear. General Grant advised by telegraph the commanders of posts along the railroad, and ordered them to be prepared to resist attack. Colonel Robert C. Murphy, who had abandoned the stores at Iuka to Price, was commanding at Holly Springs, where the supplies for General Grant for the winter were accumulated. He received the warning, paid no heed to it, gave no information of it to his command, but permitted Van Dorn with his troops to enter and occupy the town, unmolested save by the sporadic, spontaneous fire of some of the men who saw the columns in gray marching by their tents. Van Dorn spent a day burning up the vast stores, and then proceeded to feel the roads at other points—Bolivar, Middleburg, Grand Junction, and Davis's Mills—but was repelled at every attack. Murphy was court-martialed and cashiered. An investigation was made, which brought to light such a taint of treasonable disloyalty in several regiments that other courts-martial followed, more officers were dismissed from the service, and non-commissioned officers were transferred to other regiments and surrounded by more wholesome influences.

General Grant had advanced to the Yoknapatafa River, with Colonel Leggett's brigade at Water Valley as advanced post. Upon learning

of the disaster at Holly Springs, he immediately put the army on short rations and fell back behind the Tallahatchie, leaving Leggett south of the river as rear guard. Part of the force was withdrawn in December to repair the railroad from Memphis to Corinth. McPherson's command remained till General Grant was advised by General Halleck of the repulse of Sherman near Vicksburg, and was ordered to re-enforce the river expedition with all disposable troops at his command.

CHAPTER V.

THE MISSISSIPPI.

GENERAL SHERMAN went energetically to work on reaching Memphis. He organized the new troops sent forward by General McClernand into two divisions, under command of General A. J. Smith and General G. W. Morgan, and added them to the division of M. L. Smith and the division at Helena, commanded by General F. Steele. The fleet of transports arriving on the 19th, he began embarking on the same day. He sailed next day, and, stopping on the way to take up Steele's division, reached Milliken's Bend on the 25th. General Halleck notified General Grant by telegraph on the 18th that the President had appointed General McClernand to command the expedition down the river. General Grant sent copies of the dispatch to both Sherman and McClernand via Columbus, the only telegraph route; but Forrest having just cut the line, the copies never reached their destination.

The fortification of Vicksburg was begun by direction of General Beauregard in April, 1862. After the surrender of New Orleans, General Martin L. Smith, an accomplished engineer officer, was put in charge, and, pushing the work day and night, had six batteries completed with their armament when the advance of Farragut's fleet appeared in the latter part of May. General Williams, commanding the detachment of troops with the fleet, deciding that nothing could be done

against the completed works with his command, Farragut returned, reaching New Orleans about the 1st of June. Here he found urgent orders from the Navy Department to capture Vicksburg, and so clear the Mississippi River. Commodore Farragut arrived before Vicksburg on the 25th of June with his fleet, accompanied by Commodore Porter and his mortar fleet, and carrying General Williams with four thousand men. Commodore Davis arrived at the same time from Memphis with his fleet. General Williams set some twelve hundred negroes to work attempting to cut a canal across the neck of the peninsula opposite Vicksburg. The fleets bombarded with their guns and mortars, and General Williams with his fieldpieces. All the ten batteries originally designed by General Beauregard had now been completed, and their guns on the summit of the lofty bluffs fired composedly on the vessels far below. The damage to the batteries and their defenders was slight; the injury to the fleet was not serious. The 27th of July Farragut sailed down the river and Davis left for Memphis.

On the 26th of December General Sherman, leaving A. J. Smith's division at Milliken's Bend to destroy the railroad leading to the West from Vicksburg, proceeded with the other three divisions thirteen miles up the Yazoo to attack the batteries above Vicksburg and gain the plateau behind the city. The land between the Yazoo at that place and the bluffs which were to be assailed was low, flat, subject to overflow, intersected with ponds, bayous, and morasses, covered with forest, undergrowth, and fallen timber, and under full view throughout from the bluffs. The ground chosen was bordered on the westerly side, on Sherman's right as he faced the enemy, by a large arm of the Yazoo, or a bayou, called Old River; on the left, and about four miles distant, Chickasaw Bayou extended from the Yazoo to the front; while along

the front stretched a chain of ponds, constituting an ancient abandoned bed of the river.

On the 27th and 28th the command advanced to the chain of ponds and reconnoitered. Steele's division was on the left, beyond Chickasaw Bayou; Morgan next, toward the right, separated from Steele by Chickasaw Bayou; on Morgan's right was Morgan L. Smith; and on the extreme right was A. J. Smith, who had rejoined the command the night of the 16th. Steele's route was blocked by a large pond, which communicated at one end with the Yazoo and at the other with Chickasaw Bayou. He was marched back to the Yazoo, ferried down stream, landed, and sent to the front, still forming the extreme left, but now between Chickasaw Bayou and G. W. Morgan. Morgan L. Smith was severely wounded, and General D. Stuart succeeded to the command of the division. The road to Vicksburg in front of A. J. Smith was found to be obstructed by unfordable waterways, from which the bridges had been removed, and by impassable swamps. Morgan used the only pontoon train in the expedition to cross a small pond, supposing it to be the main chain of ponds in front, but, on arriving at the main pond, called "The Lake," he was so fortunate as to find a practicable crossing. A narrow sandbar extended across "The Lake" in front of M. L. Smith's division, but beyond it was a high levee, above which on the slope of the bluff was a battery. A. J. Smith with the greater part of his division was moved up to M. L. Smith's division, now commanded by General David Stuart. The troops bivouacked in the assigned position during the night of the 28th. The enemy's batteries were near the foot of the bluff, from three to five hundred yards from Sherman's line.

About noon of the 20th General Sherman opened with artillery along his line. A. J. Smith's

division on the extreme right made a demonstration out on the Vicksburg road. The Sixth Missouri, of M. L. Smith's division, temporarily commanded by D. Stuart, crossed the narrow sand bar and reached the high levee. Unable to surmount this, and subjected to a vertical fire to which they could make no return, they scooped hollows into the face of the levee and squatted in this constrained shelter until night gave them opportunity to slip back to camp one by one. De Courcy's brigade from Morgan's division and Blair's brigade, together with the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's brigade, made their way through a wilting fire to the Confederate works. Morgan and Steele with the rest of their respective divisions failed to follow, and the crippled brigades, unsupported, made no effective lodgment, and returned with shattered ranks. The assault failed. It was a desperate assault to undertake, but General Sherman thought that if Morgan had heartily supported Blair a lodgment could have been made which would have opened the way for the rest of the force and insured success. General Sherman's loss was nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, of which number one hundred and ninety-one were killed, nine hundred and eighty-two wounded, and seven hundred and fifty-six missing. The loss of Blair's brigade was seven hundred and forty-three. The Confederate loss during the two days of skirmishing and the assault on the 29th was fifty-seven killed, one hundred and twenty wounded, and ten missing.

General Sherman, failing here, determined to attempt an assault at Haines's Bluff, farther up the Yazoo, and on the night of the 30th General Steele was sent with his division and a brigade to make the attack under cover of Porter's fleet. General Sherman was to resume the assault by Chickasaw Bayou when he should hear the guns of Steele's attack. Steele sent word before night that a fog

prevented movement by the boats. Next day word was received that the moon would be shining all night and disclose the landing. Meanwhile it being obvious that the Confederates were receiving reinforcements, General Sherman re-embarked the expedition on the 2d of January, 1863.

He went immediately to the mouth of the river on learning that General McClernand was there. McClernand showed the order of the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President endorsed, appointing him to command the expedition. Sherman turned over the command, made report of what had been done, learned of the loss of Holly Springs and the retreat of Grant, and, by direction of McClernand, brought the transports with the troops to Milliken's Bend. On the 4th of January General McClernand issued his order organizing the expeditionary force into two army corps, the first comprising the divisions of G. W. Morgan and A. J. Smith, and commanded by General Morgan; the second commanded by General Sherman, and comprising the division of Stuart, formerly of M. L. Smith, and that of Steele. On the same day General Sherman called upon General McClernand on his boat and urged that an expedition be sent to capture Fort Hindman, or Arkansas Post, on a bend of the Arkansas, about forty miles from its mouth. They visited the admiral on his boat in the night, and it was finally agreed that McClernand would take the whole of his command and that Porter would go with his fleet.

The fort, a square work with a bastion at each corner, surrounded by a ditch, stood on a bluff at the head of a sharp bend of the Arkansas, and commanded the river with its guns for more than a mile along each arm of the bend. It was armed with seventeen guns and defended by five thousand troops, commanded by General T. J. Church-

ill. It could be approached from the Mississippi either by entering the Arkansas at its mouth, or, by a shorter route, entering the White River at its mouth and passing thence by a cut-off to the Arkansas. The fleet reached the mouth of White River on the 8th; the troops disembarked on the morning of the 10th, about three miles below the fort, and advanced toward it, Sherman having the right and Morgan the left. The opposing troops fell back slowly, halting toward evening in a line with the north face, extending from the northwest bastion to an impassable swamp and bayou. Sherman and Morgan followed, and formed a line extending from the bayou to the river below the fort. General Sherman in person during the night cautiously advanced under cover of timber till he was near enough to hear the hum of voices, with the sound of tearing down wooden buildings, hammering, and other noises indicating the construction of works, and remained listening till the bugle call of reveille in the Confederate camp notified him it was time to withdraw. While McClellan's force was getting into position, Porter moved his fleet close to the fort and opened a fire so heavy and destructive that the garrison could not reply, but could only seek shelter.

Next morning the National line moved forward to about four hundred yards from the fort and the line of infantry intrenchments, about a mile in length, which the Confederates had thrown up in the night. At noon Porter opened with his whole fleet at a few hundred yards' distance; his heavy ordnance plowed deep furrows in the ramparts, broke up the guns, and tore open the bombproofs. The garrison had to take refuge in the ditch of the fort. At the same time the forty-five field-pieces disposed along McClellan's line bombarded the new works thrown up in the night. When they ceased, Sherman's and Morgan's men

sprang forward to the assault, and the Confederate artillery and infantry met them with continuous volleys at short range and over bad ground. When the assaulting line had reached to about one hundred yards of the works, a large white flag and sundry small ones were raised above the works, and a cry ran along the Confederate line, "Run up the white flag, by order of General Churchill!" One of the Confederate brigade commanders refused to stack arms, and held his men to the parapet in position to defend it. He said he had received no order to surrender. Steele's division, facing the front of the parapet, were held halted by Major Hammond, of General Sherman's staff, till General Churchill came up with General Sherman and gave the order to surrender. General Churchill denied having given any previous order to surrender, while Colonel Garland, who surrendered first, told General Churchill that he received the order to surrender from one of General Churchill's staff. The question who first gave the order was never settled.

The Confederates lost about one hundred killed and a greater number wounded; prisoners numbering forty-seven hundred and ninety-one were sent North next day. This number includes an Arkansas regiment which marched into the fort some hours after the surrender, unaware of the fact. The National loss, killed, wounded, and missing, was ten hundred and sixty-one. Seventeen guns, more or less damaged, and a large amount of stores—quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance—was captured. General McClelland remained three days shipping the captured stores and leveling the fort. General McClelland received on the 15th an order from General Grant to return to Milliken's Bend unless he had some object not visible from a distance. The expedition was all at Napoleon by the 17th. General Grant made a visit of

two days and returned to Memphis, and the expedition proceeded to Milliken's Bend.

When the first rumor was heard of a separate expedition down the Mississippi, General Halleck telegraphed in reply to a dispatch of inquiry from General Grant, November 6, 1862: "You have command of all troops sent to your department." General McClelland, on the 8th of January, 1863, while proceeding to Arkansas Post, sent a letter to General Grant, in which he said something about going beyond and co-operating with General Curtis's force in Arkansas. General Grant wrote in reply, ordering him to return to the Mississippi unless he was acting under orders of superior authority. He telegraphed to General Halleck, and received reply: "You are hereby authorized to relieve General McClelland from command of the expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself." An order of the War Department, dated December 18, 1862, directed all the troops in General Grant's command to be organized into four army corps, to be numbered Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, to be commanded respectively by McClelland, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson.

The new organization of the Army of the Tennessee gave to General McClelland the command of the corps which had been Morgan's, with the addition of the troops at Helena. Sherman continued in command of his corps, increased by a brigade commanded by Hugh Ewing. The corps of McPherson comprised the divisions of McArthur, Logan, and Quinby. All the remaining troops in northern Mississippi, West Tennessee, and west Kentucky in General Grant's department composed Hurlbut's command, and were classified as Sixteenth Corps.

The result of General Grant's inquiries during the visit at Napoleon impressed him more clearly

with the difficulty of his undertaking and the necessity for a large and well-equipped force. To attack Vicksburg from the front was impossible. The land north of the city, the low tract between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, was under water. The land to the south was dry, the bluffs of Vicksburg continuing down the river. The only visible chance was to cross the Mississippi below the city and its fortifications, and a canal across the tongue of land in Louisiana running out toward Vicksburg seemed the most available means of getting the army below the city. When Grant so reported in a letter written on the 20th of January, the President and Halleck cordially approved the scheme.

Some years before the war the State of Louisiana began to cut a canal across this peninsula. General Beauregard, in drafting his scheme for the defense of Vicksburg, laid stress upon the erection of batteries placed so as to prevent the construction of such a canal. And General Williams, commanding the land force with Farragut's second expedition, excavated the entire length of the canal, though not to an available depth. When General Grant arrived on the 30th of January, and found the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps at work on a canal beginning in an eddy above the point and ending in an eddy below, where there would be no aid from the river current, he saw the task was hopeless, but allowed the work to continue as giving occupation to the men. Work continued till the 7th of March, when high water broke bounds and flooded the peninsula, making further work, except by dredge boats, impracticable. Soon after the batteries at Warrenton were armed with heavy guns, and reached with their fire the whole length of the canal, and it was definitely abandoned.

Another project was to make a way by means of Lake Providence, an ancient abandoned channel of the Mississippi, and separated from it by

the river levee. A little thread of a stream led from the end of the lake through a forest for six miles, most of the way being obstructed by standing timber, and part of the way being lost in a marsh. But at the end of six miles it connected with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream. Having once reached this point, a boat, by dextrously following the meshes of a network of bayous for two hundred miles, would reach the Mississippi, one hundred and fifty miles below Vicksburg. This work of cleaning out Baxter Bayou, and making a navigable channel from Lake Providence to Bayou Macon, was assigned to General McPherson. On the 18th of March he cut the levee which separated the lake from the river to fill up the little Bayou Baxter, so that proper implements could be floated to accomplish certain work which could be successfully done only by machinery, and reported that the passage would be ready for use by the end of the month. Before that time arrived, however, it had become unnecessary.

The great levee of the Mississippi filled and blocked, nearly opposite Helena, the entrance to a bayou which had been a navigable channel, and had been used as a portion of an inland waterway from Memphis via the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, and the Yazoo Rivers. On the 23d of January the Confederates sent troops to obstruct this channel, which was easily done, as the bayou called Yazoo Pass was narrow and flowed through a thick forest. General Grant, learning of this route, sent Colonel James H. Wilson of his staff to cut through the levee, which was accomplished two days later by exploding a mine. The Confederates constructed a work called Fort Pemberton, filling the space between the Tallahatchie and the Yallahusha, where they approach within five hundred yards of each other, five miles above the point where their junction forms the Yazoo. Levees were cut and

the land in front of the fort flooded, making it inaccessible to infantry.

After vexatious delays, owing to the difficulty of obtaining steamboats small enough to navigate the narrow and tortuous streams, it was the 23d of February by the time that General Ross left Helena with the first detachment; and it was the 2d of March when his battered boats emerged from Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater, ten miles in a direct line from the Mississippi; and the 11th of March when the expedition arrived before Fort Pemberton. After a futile bombardment, the expedition withdrew. General Grant, on receiving report of the actual finding of a navigable waterway to the highland in rear of Vicksburg, ordered General McPherson to gather up his corps from Lake Providence, Memphis, and afloat on transports moving with his whole command as fast as suitable boats could be procured. General Quinby, pushing forward with the first detachment, met Ross retreating, and took him back to participate in another attempt. After a vain search for dry land on which his men could camp, he proposed to march over to the Yallabusha, farther back, cross the Yallabusha on a bridge, and pass down the farther bank to the rear of Fort Pemberton. The boat, returning to Helena for necessary supplies and material, met on the 1st of April a messenger bringing an order for the abandonment of the expedition.

General Sherman received a letter from General Grant on the morning of the 16th of March, stating that he had just returned from a reconnoissance up Steele's Bayou with Admiral Porter, and directing Sherman to have at the landing his pioneer corps and one regiment to cut away trees, and to report in person for further instruction. In an hour General Giles A. Smith with the required detail was at the landing, and General Sherman

took the tug sent for him. After a conference General Grant directed General Sherman to "proceed as nearly as practicable up Steele's Bayou through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with the gunboats there by any route they may take to get into the Yazoo River, for the purpose of determining the feasibility of getting an army through that to the east bank of that river, and at a point from which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg," and added some detailed instructions.

The proposed route by Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek, Rolling Fork, Sun Flower River, and Yazoo River was two hundred miles, and was tortuous beyond description. Up to Deer Creek the thin rim of bordering bank hardly separated it from the expanse of water and swamp, dotted with clumps of dry earth and covered by thick forest and undergrowth. Admiral Porter, with his fleet of five ironclads, four mortar boats, and two tugs, found that the waterway was so narrow that his boats could not turn; some of the bends were so sharp that steering was not practicable, and the bow and stern of the boats had to be controlled by hawsers from the shore; the water in places was so filled with a growing plant that the propellers became clogged and useless, and could be released only by backing and partially unwinding the impediment; overhanging trees swept off smokestacks, pilot houses, and all exposed woodwork; and felled trees floating in the river were such obstructions that the boats were used as rams and butted them against the bank.

General Sherman sent Giles A. Smith's brigade and Kirby Smith's brigade up the Mississippi to Gwin's plantation, where Steele's Bayou, making a bend, approaches within a mile of the Mississippi, and proceeded himself on the 17th with his staff up the bayou. He overtook Porter just as the fleet was emerging from the difficulties of Black

Bayou into the broader stream of Deer Creek, which flowed through land mostly solid and partially occupied by plantations. Sherman continued with Porter a few miles, and returned in a tug loaned to him by the admiral to comply with the admiral's request to have Black Bayou cleared. Setting the Eighth Missouri to work, he sent the two small steamboats which had brought up this regiment and the pioneers back to Gwin's plantation, and brought up Giles A. Smith with two more regiments. During the 19th Porter's heavy guns were heard, and in the night a messenger arrived with a letter from Porter stating that he was blocked and beset, and asking for speedy aid. Sherman immediately sent Giles A. Smith forward with all the force at hand, and proceeded himself in a canoe down stream in the night for re-enforcements. He met one of the steamboats coming up with a second load of soldiers. He filled an empty coal barge with others who were detailed to work on the bayou, and, towing it with a navy tug, returned up stream. When the boats could proceed no farther in the darkness, he landed and marched through canebrake and swamp with the troops, carrying lighted candles, till they reached open land by Deer Creek, and there lay down to rest. Resuming the march at daylight, stimulated by the nearer sound of the navy guns, they hurried on till they met a party of Giles A. Smith's command sent down to prevent the enemy from obstructing the channel in the rear of the gunboats. General Sherman came just in time to encounter a Confederate detachment arriving for that purpose, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove them off.

Admiral Porter, after Sherman left him, had continued pushing slowly up Deer Creek until he arrived, on the 18th, nearly to Rolling Fork, encountering obstacles, but seeing no enemy. On the 19th a field battery opened upon his boats, and

sharpshooters, dispersed everywhere under cover, shot every man on them who appeared outside of shelter. Unable to get his men out to remove obstructions while the enemy sunk a coal boat in rear of the fleet, he thought of blowing up his vessels, but first sent to Sherman for relief. When the relief came the sunk coal boat was removed, and the vessels, backing down stream with slow, toilsome, and aided progress, made thirty miles in three days and escaped the toils. The expedition failed, and was so reported to Grant on the 27th.

These futile efforts demonstrated that the army could not be conveyed across the submerged lowland that lay between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, extending from Vicksburg nearly to Memphis, and that Vicksburg could not be turned by the north. To attack it in front was impossible. It only remained to march overland to the south and find some crossing below, or else to abandon the expedition, return to Memphis, rebuild the railroad, and march down Central Mississippi, keeping his line of communication and supply protected. General Sherman preferred the latter plan. Military authorities generally agree, at least that, considering the great risk of defeat and the disastrous consequences of defeat below Vicksburg, the approach by land from Memphis should have been made in the first place. General Grant, always tenacious of purpose, thought it better to take the risk than demoralize his army and shock the people by confession of failure. And he trusted something to disconcerting the enemy by the boldness of an attack from the south. General Sherman wrote General Grant a letter giving his view. General Grant made no reply, pursued his own plan, and long after the campaign was completed returned the letter without comment. General Sherman, having done his part by giving his views,

supported his chief as loyally and as heartily as if his own suggestion had been accepted.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, *April 8, 1863.*

Colonel J. A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General to General Grant.

SIR: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons which I will not name) that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of a campaign. Unless this be done, there are men who will, in any result falling below the popular standard, claim that *their* advice was unheeded, and that fatal consequence resulted therefrom. My own opinions are:

1. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of the other grand armies of the United States.

2. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Ark., supplies collected there while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White and Madison on the St. Francis River.

3. That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchie rivers as can be gained and fortified, be held, and the main army be transported thither by land and water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

4. That the line of the Yallabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Canton; and lastly, where the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crosses the same river (Big Black). The capture of Vicksburg would result.

5. That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point; this force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg—Haines's Bluff, or Yazoo City.

6. I do not doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) as a military channel to supply an army large enough to operate against Jackson, Miss., or the Black River Bridge; and such a channel will be very vulnerable to a force coming from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a

fleet that should navigate the lower reach of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River.

7. The chief reason for operating *solely* by water was the season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha Rivers. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to hold it and make crops this year.

I make these suggestions with the request that General Grant will read them, and give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer that he should not answer this letter, but merely give it as much or little weight as it deserves. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic support as though conceived by myself. I do not believe that General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson this spring.

I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General*.

General Sherman had trouble again with the newspapers. Thomas W. Knox, correspondent of the New York Herald, accompanied Sherman's expedition to Helena, knowing it was against orders, and published in his correspondence a statement of the organization of the expedition and personal abuse of the general. In conversation he said he had no personal ill will, but that he had tried to break General Sherman down because he was opposed to newspaper men. A court-martial in February found that Knox had willfully disobeyed orders in accompanying the expedition, but the court attached no criminality thereto; found that he had published the organization of the expedition, but also found that he had not thereby given information to the enemy; found that he was guilty of violation of orders of the War Department by publishing correspondence concerning the operations of the army without sanction by the general in command, and sentenced him to be removed beyond the lines of the army, not to return again under pain of imprisonment. On ap-

peal, President Lincoln, on the 20th of March, revoked the sentence so far as to permit Knox to return and to stay if General Grant should consent; otherwise to leave. General Grant, on the 6th of April, refused to give permission unless General Sherman would first consent; and Knox, having made neither retraction nor apology, nor expressed regret, Sherman refused.

General Sherman did not, perhaps, recognize a difference between a government carrying on a war on behalf of a people and a people aroused carrying on a war through the instrumentality of the government. He did not appreciate the craving for information of a people wrought to a fever of enthusiasm. He was military in every fiber. His care was to make his army efficient. He saw that the presence of any non-combatant was, to some extent, an incumbrance, and the presence of a stirrer up of disaffection was a mischief. When clearly satisfied as to what his duty was, no opposition, no fear of consequences, would deter him from performing it. The letters of Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman in this case are characteristic.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, *March 20, 1863.*

Whom it may concern :

Whereas it appears to my satisfaction that Thomas W. Knox, a correspondent of the New York Herald, has been, by the sentence of a court-martial, excluded from the military department under command of Major-General Grant, and also that General Thayer, president of the court-martial which rendered the sentence, and Major-General McClermand, in command of a corps of that department, and many other respectable persons, are of opinion that Mr. Knox's offense was technical rather than willfully wrong, and that the sentence should be revoked; now, therefore, said sentence is hereby so far revoked as to allow Mr. Knox to return to General Grant's headquarters, and to remain if General Grant shall give his express assent, and to again leave the department if General Grant shall refuse such assent.

A. LINCOLN.

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *April 6, 1863.*THOMAS W. KNOX, *Correspondent New York Herald:*

The letter of the President of the United States authorizing you to return to these headquarters, and to remain with my consent, or leave if such consent is withheld, has been shown me. You came here first in positive violation of an order from General Sherman. Because you were not pleased with his treatment of army followers who had violated his order, you attempted to break down his influence with his command and to blast his reputation with the public. You made insinuations against his sanity, and said many things which were untrue, and, so far as your letter had influence, calculated to affect the public service unfavorably. General Sherman is one of the ablest soldiers and purest men in the country. You have attacked him and been sentenced to expulsion from this department for the offense. While I would conform to the slightest wish of the President where it is formed upon a fair representation of both sides of any question, my respect for General Sherman is such that in this case I must decline, unless General Sherman first gives his consent to your remaining.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, *April 8, 1863.**Major-General GRANT :*


DEAR SIR: I received last night the copy of your answer to Mr. Knox's application to reside near your headquarters. I thank you for the manner and substance of that reply. Many regard Knox as unworthy the notice he has received. This is true, but I send you his letter to me and my answer. Observe in his letter to me, sent long before I could have heard the result of his application to you, he makes the assertion that you had no objection, but rather wanted him back, and only as a matter of form required my assent. He regretted a difference between a "portion of the army and the press." The insolence of these fellows is insupportable. I know they are encouraged, but I know human nature well enough, and that they will be the first to turn against their patrons. Mr. Lincoln, of course, fears to incur the enmity of the Herald, but he must rule the Herald or the Herald will rule him; he can take his choice.

I have been foolish and unskillful in drawing on me the shafts of the press. By opposing mob law in California I once before drew down the press, but after the smoke

cleared off, and the people saw where they were drifting to, they admitted I was right. If the press be allowed to run riot and write up and write down at their pleasure, there is an end to a constitutional government in America and anarchy must result. Even now the real people of our country begin to fear and tremble at it, and look to our armies as the anchor of safety, of order, submission to authority, bound together by a real government, and not by the clamor of a demoralized press and crowd of demagogues.

As ever, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN.

TURNING OPERATION
VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN
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CHAPTER VI.

VICKSBURG.

THE plan to attack Vicksburg from the south had no possible chance of success except by first obtaining control of the river below the city and then by veiling in some degree the point of real attack. The Confederates had on the 25th of February in their fleet below, the *Queen of the West*, the most powerful ram on the Mississippi, and the *Indianola*, which had the heaviest armament, both of them captured from the National command. The *Indianola*, captured on the 24th, was sunk near the Mississippi shore, being repaired from the injuries received at the time of capture. Admiral Porter had an imitation monitor constructed—a flatboat covered with a deck, having a slight frame turret with a huge wooden gun projecting from it. Some barrels, placed one above another, made a stack, whence issued smoke from burning wet straw; all was painted black. It was set adrift just before dawn on the morning of the 26th of February. All the batteries along the river poured their hottest fire into the little craft as it seemed to steam leisurely by, contemptuously secure in its own invulnerability. Telegrams were sent down the river and to Richmond, excitedly announcing the passage down stream of a monitor. As it turned the point, the *Queen of the West* was just rounding the bend below, ascending. At the sight of the strange vessel emerging unharmed from the furious cannonade, the *Queen of the West* fled

down stream, joined by her consorts, entered one of the western affluents of the river, and took no further part in the war. The mock monitor was carried by an eddy to the right bank, and, lying there with the stern ashore, seemed to be surveying the Indianola opposite and lower down. Then pushed out by some of General McClelland's men who were bivouacking near by, it was carried by the current directly toward the Indianola. The workmen wrecked the guns and set fire to the hull, and the Confederate fleet vexed the river no more.

About 10 P. M., April 16th, Admiral Porter started with seven gunboats and three loaded transports. The enemy illumined the river with bonfires on both shores. The batteries maintained continuous cannonade, while the passing fleet raked the shore batteries at short range. Every vessel was hit, but little serious damage was done except the loss of one transport and several coal barges. On the 22d of April six transports loaded with supplies, and towing twelve barges, all manned by volunteers from the army, chiefly from Logan's division, passed down, losing only one transport.

Toward the end of March Steele's division of Sherman's corps was sent to the Deer Creek country, about one hundred and fifty miles north of Vicksburg, to subsist his command on the country and destroy what he could not use. On the 9th of April General Pemberton telegraphed to Richmond that Grant's real movement appeared to be through Deer Creek, while there were rumors of a movement across the Mississippi, below Vicksburg, which he did not credit. He was ordered by General Joseph Johnston to send some of his troops to Chattanooga. Toward the end of April, when Grant was about to cross the river, Pemberton directed five thousand men in Vicksburg to be held in readiness to move to Grand Gulf; but, being perplexed by a demonstration which Sher-

man made up the Yazoo against Haines's Bluff, and uncertain which was the real movement and which was the demonstration, he was holding the men in Vicksburg when Grand Gulf was evacuated.

About the middle of April detachments sent from Memphis and La Grange advanced slowly into northwestern Mississippi. The Confederate troops in northern Mississippi concentrated to oppose them. The northeastern portion of the State being left bare, General Grierson, with seventeen hundred cavalry, dashed across the boundary and was destroying railroad far within the State before there was any suspicion of his movement. By rapidly moving from place to place, sending out detachments in diverse directions to destroy special objects, he distracted General Pemberton, who, having but a scanty amount of cavalry, was in constant receipt of messages reporting the presence of National troops at points remote from each other at the same time. He wore out brigades, dispatching and recalling them, and hurrying them to points where they were too late or were never needed. Grierson reached the National force at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May with slight loss, having destroyed much railroad and other property, and withdrawn General Pemberton's attention from Grant at the very time that Grant was pushing for the passage of the Mississippi.

On the 20th of April the first order to march was issued. At that time McClernand's four divisions were assembled near New Carthage; two of McPherson's divisions at Milliken's Bend, with third on the way thither from Lake Providence; two of Sherman's divisions just below Milliken's Bend, and the third, Steele's, in the northern Yazoo country, but under orders to rejoin the corps. Portions of the route lay through saturated ooze, in which wheels sunk to the hub, and which gave no purchase to the struggling teams. In

places doubled teams barely moved a single field-piece, and the way was strewn with fragments of wagons and their contents. A futile effort was made by the fleet on the 29th of April to dismantle the works which crowned the summit of the bluff at Grand Gulf, which was there over one hundred feet high, and the army continued to march to a point opposite Bruinsburg, an imaginary village at the mouth of Bayou Pierre. McClernand began moving his corps across the river at daylight of April 30th, and finished at noon. Four hours were then taken for issue of rations before the march began.

The bottom land at Bruinsburg is but little above high water. The bluff is a hundred feet high. The ascent was by a roadway cut into the bluff. The tenacious soil preserved the perpendicularity of the side walls of the cut, so that the roadway was, in fact, a narrow trench with lofty vertical sides. A small party could have prevented an army from ascending by it. Fortunately no defender was present or near. McClernand's corps, once in motion, advanced with vigor till after midnight, when the advance encountered the enemy within four miles of Port Gibson. After a slight skirmish, the troops lay down to wait for daylight.

Green's brigade (Confederate) was just arriving at Port Gibson when it encountered McClernand's advance. When Tracy's brigade arrived, a little before break of day of the 1st of May, they took position about three miles from Port Gibson, across the two roads into which the road from Bruinsburg forks, Green taking the southern fork and Tracy the northern. The country was a confused jumble of sharp ridges, with deep intervening valleys filled with impenetrable thickets of cane and brush, through which it was difficult for a man to force his way, and over which it was impossible to preserve alignment or formation. General Mc-

McClermand early in the morning led the attack on Green's brigade with Hovey's and Carr's divisions, and sent Osterhaus to assault Tracy. About nine o'clock a persistent charge carried the hill, capturing two guns and four hundred prisoners. Just then Baldwin arrived and posted his brigade advantageously on a ridge a mile in the rear, and Green fell back and joined him. Osterhaus early had a slight success, and was able to make no farther advance. About noon Colonel Cockerell arrived with three regiments, two of which were assigned to Baldwin and one to Tracy. In the afternoon Logan arrived with two brigades, accompanied by Grant and McPherson. Stevenson was sent to McClermand upon his demand for aid, and J. E. Smith was sent to strengthen Osterhaus. The Confederates fought with judgment and gallantry. Forced from one position, they retired to another and continued the conflict. It was sunset before they gave up the field, and dark before Grant entered Port Gibson. The Confederate force was eighty-five hundred; the National army numbered twenty-three thousand. According to the Confederate reports, their loss was four hundred and forty-eight killed and wounded and three hundred and eighty-seven missing. The National loss was eight hundred and fifty killed and wounded and twenty-five missing. General Grant reported five hundred prisoners taken, besides the wounded.

On the morning of the 3d of May General McPherson moved for Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big Black River. At the same time General Bowen, having evacuated Grand Gulf, was pushing for the same point. McPherson arrived in time to drive away a rear guard who were beginning the destruction of the frail bridge over which the Confederate troops had just crossed. Stevenson's division, which had been held in Vicksburg by fear that Sherman's demonstration at Haines's Bluff

was the real attack, had finally reached the ferry, tired and worn, only in time to be ordered to retrace their steps in haste.

While McPherson rested three days at the ferry, and McClernand at Willow Springs, army wagons were sent back for ammunition and captured wagons for rations. Officers' blankets were carried on captured mules, and officers and men slept without tents. Sherman received on the 30th of April an order from Grant to cease his demonstration before Haines's Bluff and follow McPherson, leaving one division to guard trains and supplies. Leaving General Blair to convoy the supply trains when they should be ready, he pushed along the road obstructed by wagons of the Seventeenth Corps, and crossed the river at Grand Gulf on the 7th of May.

According to information received, Pemberton had drawn his detachments into Vicksburg, and General Joe Johnston was assembling a new force at Jackson. On the 7th General McClernand moved by the direct road toward Edwards' Station, on the railroad between Vicksburg and Jackson, to be followed by Sherman, and McPherson proceeded toward Jackson by Utica and Raymond. In the morning of the 12th Logan, having the advance of McPherson's corps, met parties of mounted men, who fell back firing, compelling him to deploy two regiments, one on each side of the road, to push them back. Gregg's brigade, just arrived from Port Hudson, was discovered on the farther side of a small creek supporting two batteries. Both lines advanced. The Eighth Michigan Battery was run forward to the bridge over which the road crossed the creek; the Second Brigade rushed to the creek, using the farther bank as a breastwork, while on its right the Confederates took possession of the creek, using it as a cover against the First Brigade. The Third Brigade, on the right

of the First, crossed the creek and turned the flank of the enemy. Crocker's division beginning to come up, Gregg withdrew his command and retreated. McPherson advanced to Raymond and beyond before going into bivouac for the night. The National loss was sixty-six killed, three hundred and thirty-nine wounded, thirty-seven missing; total, four hundred and forty-two. Of these, four hundred and forty were in Logan's division and two in Crocker's. Gregg's loss, according to his reported statement, was seventy-three killed, two hundred and fifty-one wounded, and one hundred and ninety missing. Randall W. McGavock, colonel of Tenth Tennessee, is mentioned in this statement as mortally wounded. Gregg in his report of the battle says McGavock was killed.

Finding that a force was gathering in Jackson, Grant ordered McPherson to approach Jackson by way of Clinton, and Sherman to march thither through Raymond and Mississippi Springs. General Joseph Johnston, who had just arrived from Chattanooga to take supreme command, learning in the night of the 13th that a force was approaching from Mississippi Springs, in addition to the column approaching from Clinton, put General John Adams in command of the army trains, and directed him to move them out on the road toward Canton. He placed General Gregg in command of the troops who were to hold the National force in check until the trains should be out on the road. Gregg's command comprised his own brigade, commanded by Colonel Farquharson; Gist's brigade, commanded by Colonel Colquit, General Gist being detained east of Pearl River with other troops; Walker's brigade; two field batteries; and Third Kentucky mounted infantry. General Gregg moved Colquit out beyond the fortifications of the city, three miles toward Clinton, and planted his brigade on the summit of rising ground which

sloped down to a swampy hollow. The open ground extended in undulating meadow for a mile to the front. Both his flanks were protected by woods. Farquharson was posted off to the right of Colquit, and Walker in reserve. The Third Kentucky, with a regiment and a battery from Walker's brigade, was sent to guard the road from Mississippi Springs.

Sherman, advancing after a brief conflict, forced his antagonist back into the fortifications; while General Sherman engaged the works in front, Captain Pitman, engineer, and the Ninety-fifth Ohio found an unoccupied space on the flank. Steele's division, rapidly moving to this point, came upon the Confederates from the rear, and took two hundred and fifty prisoners. The rest escaped and joined the trains on the Canton road. McPherson sent Crocker's division against Colquit. The division was deployed at nine o'clock, but a heavy downpour of rain delayed the movement till nearly eleven. Then the deployed line advanced as if on parade, under fire while on rising ground, and pausing in the hollows to close up gaps made by casualties and dress the line. When the steady approach neared the works, Colquit drew out his command, and, falling back, was joined by Walker. Farquharson, being already north of the Clinton road, marched across the country to the Canton road, and all retreated with the wagon train seven miles to the north. Sherman's loss was six killed, twenty-two wounded, and four missing; McPherson's, thirty-six killed, two hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three missing. The casualties in Gist's brigade, as reported by Colonel Colquit, were seventeen killed, sixty-four wounded, and one hundred and eighteen missing. There are no reports from the rest of Gregg's command. General McPherson estimated the Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and missing at eight hundred and

forty-five. The armament of the fortifications—thirty-five guns and their ammunition—besides large stores of public property, were captured.

General Grant learned in Jackson that Johnston had sent an order to Pemberton to attack Grant's rear. McPherson was ordered to move early next morning, the 15th, back through Clinton, leaving Sherman in Jackson to destroy public property. McClernand, whose divisions were on the roads converging toward Edwards's Station, was ordered to advance cautiously. Pemberton, who for several days had been making a brilliant display of incapacity, had finally resolved to move to the south and cut Grant's communications, unaware that Grant had cut loose from the Mississippi and had no communications, but fully aware that this movement was in flat disobedience of Johnston's order directing Pemberton to move north and effect a junction with him.

On the morning of the 16th Pemberton, lying on a crossroad just south of Champion's Hill, received from Johnston a reiteration of the order to join him, and proceeded to obey, first sending his wagons by the road over Champion's Hill, and ordering the troops to follow. Champion's Hill is an abrupt elevation in the plain a little to the east of Baker's Creek; it is less than one hundred feet high, is over one mile in length from east to west, terminates in a point toward the west, and has a width of more than half a mile at its eastern face. The road running west from Clinton to Vicksburg, instead of continuing in the lowland around the northern and west slopes of the hill to the bridge over Baker's Creek, turns directly to the south, making a right angle, ascends the northeast corner to the summit, and there, turning again to the west, follows the summit of the ridge and continues west to the bridge.

Hovey, commanding one of McClernand's di-

visions, bivouacked for the night at Bolton, on the Clinton road, about four miles in advance of McPherson. A crossroad led south to Osterhaus and Carr, who were on the Middle road to Edwards's Station. A. J. Smith was more than a mile farther south of them, on the direct road from Raymond to Edwards's Station, and Blair was in their rear in Raymond. Pemberton lay in line facing to the east, his left at the base of the southeast corner of Champion's Hill, where a crossroad ascended that joined the Clinton road on the summit, and his right across the southern or direct Raymond road to Edwards.

Early in the morning Pemberton sent his train to cross Baker's Creek on the way to join Johnston. When his column was about to march, Loring's pickets were attacked by A. J. Smith's skirmishers, and Bowen's by Osterhaus's, and Pemberton found he had a battle on his hands. Hovey's skirmishers met Stevenson's pickets not far from Champion's house about ten o'clock, and pushed them back to the northeast base of the hill. About eleven o'clock McPherson arrived with General Grant. Hovey charged up the long slope, and after a fierce and stubborn fight drove back the right wing of Stevenson's division, carried the summit, and captured eleven guns. Meanwhile two of Logan's brigades, J. E. Smith's and Leggett's, were brought against the steep and rugged northern face of the hill, on Hovey's right, and forced the left of Stevenson's division back up the slopes. Logan brought his Third Brigade up in extension of his right, and by a quick charge broke Stevenson's line and captured a complete battery. Stevenson, finding the National troops were working their way dangerously near the road to Baker's Creek bridge, shifted his line to the left to cover the line of retreat. Pemberton ordered Bowen to close up to connect with Stevenson. Bowen found

Hovey in possession of the summit, and fell upon him with a furious assault. The struggle was severe, but Hovey was forced back and, still fighting, pushed down the hill, losing all the captured guns but two. Crocker soon appearing with his division, joined Hovey's jaded but plucky men; together they surged up the hill with irresistible onset. Bowen was overcome, routed, scattered.

Loring, still in the lowland south of the hill, was hastening to Bowen's relief when the broken division, pouring down the hill, disordered his ranks. The artillery of the pursuers opened upon him, and Osterhaus attacked him in force. Bowen escaped across Baker's Creek by the ford. One brigade of Stevenson's division reached the bridge. Carr's division of McClernand's corps by a rapid movement then seized the bridge, forcing the remainder of Stevenson's command to the ford. Bowen remained at the ford to hold it for Loring till forced by the approach of the National troops to let go. Loring's wagons had gone forward with the train. Wandering in the night to find a lower ford, he lost his battery in a swamp. Late in the night he reached the ford, but there learned that Edwards's Station was already occupied by Grant.

The National loss was four hundred and ten killed, eighteen hundred and forty-four wounded, and one hundred and eighty-seven missing, making a total of twenty-four hundred and forty-one. Of this loss, one hundred and fifty was sustained by the four divisions under McClernand's command, and twenty-two hundred and ninety-one by the divisions under the immediate command of Grant and McPherson. The Confederate loss, according to division and brigade reports, was: Killed, three hundred and eighty; wounded, ten hundred and eighteen; missing, twenty-four hundred and forty-one; total, thirty-eight hundred and thirty-nine. General Pemberton in his report of

casualties omits Loring's division, and differs from Stevenson as to the loss in his division. Where a victory was so vital and so crushing, it seems ungracious to suggest that it might have been more complete. Yet the suggestion forces itself that if the four divisions with McClernand had fought with the same alacrity and ardor as the other three, the result would have been the capture of Pemberton and his entire command, and the immediate completion of the campaign.

Pemberton's shattered legions trudged wearily to the Big Black and crossed through the night. The high bluff which formed the west bank of the river and dominated the plain in front was left vacant, to be occupied by Loring's division in support of the troops holding the bridge head on the lowland east of the river. But Loring was wandering about east of Baker's Creek, and never came. Bowen's division did not cross, but remained to aid Vaughan's brigade, fresh from Vicksburg, in holding the bridge head. The Big Black there forms a deep re-entrant curve. The bridge head was a line of earthwork a mile in length, running north and south, the northern end resting upon the river and the southern end touching a cypress swamp which bordered on the river below. Twenty guns were in position; along the front of the works and parallel to them was a bayou extending from the river above to the swamp below. Trees and boughs had been thrown into the slough, making it at once a ditch and abattis.

Early on the morning of the 17th McClernand moved from Edwards's Station. Osterhaus in front, followed by A. J. Smith, advanced over the rolling, cultivated land along the south side of the road, and deployed when near the Confederate intrenchments. Smith deployed on his left. Artillery opened fire, and skirmishers pushed forward and engaged. While this mild combat was going on,

Carr's division advanced through woods that bordered the north side of the road, extending to the river, near the northern extremity of the intrenchments. While the defenders of the works were engaged with the force in their front, Carr's command, leaping from the woods, rushed over the intervening ground, plunged through the bayou, clambered over the works, and was within them. The Confederate troops were dismayed. The fear of being cut off from retreat made a panic. There was a mad rush for the bridges. Osterhaus and Smith hastened up. Eighteen of the twenty guns, with their ammunition, fourteen hundred muskets, and seventeen hundred and fifty-one prisoners were captured. The bridges prepared for combustion were fired, and the battle was over by nine o'clock. McClernand's loss was thirty-nine killed, two hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and three missing; all but ten killed, twenty-one wounded, and two missing were of Carr's division. Neither Bowen nor Vaughan made reports, and the number of killed, wounded, and drowned is not known.

General Sherman, in Jackson, on the morning of the 16th, received order from General Grant to send forward one division immediately, and to follow with the other as soon as his work of destroying railroad and other public property should be accomplished. In pursuance of this order, Sherman arrived at Bolton after dark, and was there informed by one of General Grant's staff that he was to go to Bridgeport and there cross the Big Black. Sherman reached Bridgeport at noon next day. General Blair, who had arrived with the supply train at Raymond on the 15th, and been attached to McClernand's command on the 16th, arrived at Bridgeport a few hours earlier. Sherman having the only pontoon train in the army, his bridge was laid by night, and two divisions of his corps were over by daybreak of the 18th. Captain

Hickenlooper, chief engineer of the Seventeenth Corps, and Captain Tresilian, chief engineer of Logan's division, constructed a bridge for the Seventeenth Corps. A framework of stout timbers, filled with cotton bales standing on end and tightly compressed, and the whole covered by a flooring, was built on the shore, launched, and held in place by cables. A twenty-pound Parrott gun sank the structure fourteen inches, leaving an excess of buoyancy of sixteen inches.

General Sherman, starting early in the morning of the 18th, approached the northeast corner of the defenses of Vicksburg, and, by order of General Grant, moved into position facing the north front of the works, from the Grave Yard road to the river. Pemberton, finding the line occupied by his command too extended for his force, withdrew his troops, in the night of the 18th, to his inner line, being not only shorter but also much stronger. In the morning of the 19th Sherman occupied the abandoned line, and sent a cavalry regiment out to Haines's Bluff. The works were found abandoned, fourteen heavy guns in position uninjured, and the magazines full of ammunition and stores. The cavalry colonel signaled to a gunboat in the Yazoo River, turned over the place to the commander, and, having opened communication with the fleet, returned to camp.

McClernand and McPherson began to arrive toward evening of the 18th, and were placed facing the east front of the Confederate line, McPherson next to Sherman and McClernand on McPherson's left. The works were attacked the afternoon of the 19th. Assault was made at the Grave Yard road by Blair's division of the Thirteenth Corps. The road was swept by a crossfire of artillery and musketry. Tuttle's brigade was held in reserve by the road, while Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades charged on the right of the road and Kilby Smith's

on the left. The charging lines descended the gul-
lied bank of the ravine, pushed through thickets
and entanglement of felled trees, clambered up the
farther side, and reached the base of the parapet,
but could get no farther. They remained there till
night, and were then withdrawn. The Fifteenth
and Seventeenth Army Corps advanced toward the
works and engaged them with musketry and field
artillery, but did not assault. The loss of the as-
sailants in killed and wounded was nine hundred
and thirty-four. Of these, seven hundred and five
were in Sherman's corps.

The defensive line of Vicksburg was a continu-
ous ridge, forming a natural rampart encircling
the city, resting upon the river above the city, and
three miles below it. The ridge was of uniform
height, making a level summit, narrow except
where projecting spurs added width. General
Pemberton said the length of the line was eight
miles. General Grant's engineers after the siege
estimated it at five and a half miles. Beginning
at Fort Hill, the site of an early Spanish fort, a
high point overlooking the river north of the city,
it ran due east for a mile, then turning abruptly
to the south, and continuing in that direction to
the Jackson Railway, it there began to curve west-
ward, and finally ran west before reaching the river
below the city. The front of the first mile, facing
the north, was precipitous, in places vertical, mak-
ing a wall one hundred feet high, rising from the
sloping bottom of a deep valley. Along the east
front ran a deep ravine, crossed in three places by
ridges forming natural causeways, over which ran
three roads leading out from the city. The Grave
Yard road was a little distance south of the north-
east angle, the Baldwin road was close by the
Jackson Railway, and the Jackson road nearly mid-
way between the other two. Opposed to the north
front was a ridge of very irregular contour, the

summit being from four hundred to six hundred yards from the Confederate works. The land to the east of the city was a labyrinth of ridges and ravines, preventing any movements in line, but protecting the camps of the investing army from the fire of the besieged.

Batteries, mostly open to the rear, but some inclosed, were erected on commanding points, and were connected by massive infantry intrenchments, continuous along the entire line except at one place. Just south of the railroad Waul's Texas Legion occupied a wooded portion of the main ridge, unfortified until after the 22d of May, which was protected by a fortified spur projecting to the east along the railroad and then turning to the south, forming a valley between it and Waul's line. Smith's division held the northern front, and around the angle to and across the Grave Yard road. Forney's division, with the battery of Waul's Legion, and re-enforced in case of attack by Bowen's reserve division, extended from Smith to the railroad. S. D. Lee's brigade of Stevenson's division, with the Texas Legion, filled the line from the railroad to Garrett's Fort, and Stevenson's other three brigades continued from Garrett's Fort to the river. Sherman covered Smith's front, Steele's division beginning at the river, Blair's continuing around across the Grave Yard road, and Tuttle in reserve. McPherson was opposed to Forney. Ransom's brigade, detached from McArthur's division, was next to Blair; Logan's division next to Ransom, crossing the Jackson turnpike road; and Quinby, who had resumed command of his division, temporarily commanded by Crocker, between Logan and McClernand's right. Logan and Quinby held each one brigade in reserve. McClernand had one brigade north of the railroad, in front of Forney's right. The rest of his command was in front of S. D. Lee, extending from

the railroad to Garrett's Fort. From McClernand to the river, a distance of more than two miles, the ground was unoccupied. When casualties and sickness diminished the number of defenders, Forney contracted his division toward the south and Smith his to the west, leaving a vacant space about the Grave Yard road. Green's brigade of Bowen's reserve division filled the vacancy. The day on which General Green moved in he raised his head to look over the parapet and see the ground in front. A rifle ball passed through his head, killing him instantly.

The experience of the 19th showed that the defenses could not be carried by a dash, and that the veteran troops within the works had recovered their accustomed spirit. General Grant ordered a prepared assault to be made at 10 A. M. on the 22d. All the guns in position opened fire in the morning. At ten o'clock the bombardment ceased, and the assaulting parties with their supports leaped forward. A spur with rugged surface, projecting from the north face of the defensive line, gave a possible though hardly practicable approach to the works. Wood's brigade of Steele's division attempted the ascent. As they toiled up, clambering over the rough ascent, exposed to fire from the whole line, the ranks were thinned at every step. A detachment made their way to the base of the works, but finally the rest had to seek shelter in hollows and behind fallen timber. Blair again attacked by the Grave Yard road. A way had been cut down into and across the ravine below the road. The division charged in column of fours. When the troops emerged from the ravine on to open ground, a fire blazed from the parapet of the fort and the infantry intrenchments. A portion of Ewing's brigade rushed on to the right and gained the ditch of the fort, and planted their colors in the face of the parapet. Giles Smith moved his

brigade along the main ravine to the left, and from cover engaged the intrenchments. Kilby Smith found a ridge, from behind which he supported Ewing by firing at the defenders who showed themselves above the parapet.

Ransom, whose brigade formed the right of McPherson's corps, pushed through the tangle which filled the lower part of the main ravine and ascended till they met a fire through which they could not advance. He fell back behind a swell of ground, where the brigade returned the fire of the enemy. Logan assailed the massive work at the Jackson road and the intrenchments to the south of it. The fort stood upon a rising ground, and so dominated the vicinage that the Seventeenth Corps called it Fort Hill, making some confusion in the reports. The hill was too steep to afford room for a ditch. The face was scarped a depth of twenty feet from the summit and surmounted by a rampart ten feet high, presenting a front thirty feet high. A portion of the assaulting force reached the base of the fort; the rest were driven by the murderous fire to halt in sheltered hollows. Stevenson, having more open ground to pass over, was unable to reach the long line of intrenchments in his front, and, placing his command under cover in a ravine, fired at heads that appeared above the works. Of Quinby's division there is but scanty report. He lay in front of a long line of intrenchments, protected by heavy abattis. The slope was open and cut up by ravines. His troops advanced steadily, hewed their way through the abattis, but met a withering fire which prevented their reaching the works. Finding shelter, they maintained their position, returning the fire of the enemy.

Benton's brigade, the right of McClernand's corps, was immediately north of the railroad, facing the right of Forney's division. In their front was a redan, having two heavy guns and manned by

the Second Texas, besides artillerists. One gun was disabled by the bombardment. Benton, supported by Burbridge's brigade, made a vigorous charge and reached the front of the fort. The assailants poured such a fire through the torn and widened embrasures that the Texans lay on the ground, except one rank that stood close against the parapet. Two regiments came to re-enforce the defenders. A fieldpiece was dragged up the hill by the assailants. The Texans drew their gun back into the fort, loaded it, and ran it to an embrasure, but the gunners were killed before they could fire. More re-enforcements came to the fort, and Boomer's brigade of Quinby's division, withdrawn from McPherson's front, arrived to aid Benton and Burbridge. Colonel Boomer was killed while moving into position. The assailants could not be driven away; but the ditch was ten feet deep and the parapet rose ten feet above the escarp, and they could not effect an entrance. So the combat raged till dark, when the assailants withdrew, Boomer's brigade taking down the gun which McClernand's men had left behind.

Lawler's brigade, supported by Landrum's, assaulted the redoubt immediately south of the railroad on the projecting spur, defended by the Twentieth and Thirtieth Alabama. The bombardment had battered away the upper part of an angle of the parapet, making a breach. The Twenty-second Iowa, taking advantage of favorable depressions, gained the front of the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Graham and most of the regiment occupied the ditch, while two sergeants and fifteen men clambered over the breach into an inclosed space formed by the parapets and a traverse. An officer and thirteen men were in this confined space; the rest of the garrison fled, abandoning the adjoining infantry intrenchments as well as the forts. Sergeant Griffith took the captured party to General McCler-

nand, while Sergeant Messenger and the men remained in the fort. General Lee commanded, urged, entreated the two fugitive regiments to repossess the work. But nothing could move them. If Lawler and Landrum could have assembled their brigades just then and pushed forward, nothing could have prevented their piercing the Confederate line. But Colonel Stone, of the Twenty-second Iowa, while standing on the summit, looking across the little valley at the wooded ridge held by Waul's Legion, was wounded and left the field, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap, of the Twenty-first Iowa, standing with him was killed. The assaulting troops were dispersed over the slopes and in the hollows. Two companies of Waul's Legion volunteered to retake the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Pettus, who was in temporary command of the Twentieth Alabama, taking a musket, went with them as a volunteer. After a short conflict, the Iowa men were killed. The redoubt was recaptured at twelve o'clock, an hour after it had been abandoned, and the chance of piercing the line was lost. Lighted shells thrown over the parapet killed many of those who were in the ditch. At nightfall some escaped. The rest, including Colonel Graham, were taken prisoners.

About noon it was manifest that the assault along the line had failed. General McClernand, unaware of the fact that Sherman's men were in the ditch of the fort at Grave Yard road, with their colors planted on the slope of the parapets and McPherson's men at the base of the rampart on the Jackson road, also that Blair, Ransom, and Logan were waging desperate conflict, began at 11.15 A. M., and continued through the day, sending to General Grant sanguine accounts of his success, and urgent appeal to push the attack at other points and send re-enforcements to him. As late as 3.15 P. M. he reported, "My men are in two of

the enemy's forts." Grant directed McPherson to send him two of Quincy's brigades, and, yielding his own judgment, ordered the assault to be renewed at three o'clock. Re-enforcements were sent to the front from the reserves. There was another rush and another repulse; a useless attack, a fruitless slaughter. The troops could not retreat, and lay where shelter could be found till night, and then withdrew. The National loss in the day was five hundred and two killed, twenty-five hundred and fifty wounded, and one hundred and forty-seven captured; total, thirty-one hundred and ninety-nine. The Confederate loss is not reported. In Forney's division it was forty-two killed and one hundred and seventeen wounded. In Cockrell's brigade of Bowen's division, twenty-eight killed and ninety-five wounded. The total probably did not much exceed five hundred.

Sherman and McPherson were sorely aggrieved by the insistence of McClernand in causing the disastrous assault in the afternoon. They, as well as Rawlins and Logan, had frequently before complained to General Grant of his absorption of the achievements of the army and insubordinate conduct. On the 30th of May he made a congratulatory order to his corps, filled with extravagant laudation of his own command, and ungratefully as well as unjustly reflecting on the conduct of the other corps on the 22d. In violation of orders, this was published in the newspapers without being first submitted to headquarters. Grant relieved him of his command, and ordered him to repair to Springfield, Ill., and there report to the adjutant general of the army by letter. McClernand, disregarding party ties, had promptly insisted on the validity of the election of Lincoln as President, and offered his services to the country at the first outbreak of the war. He had been constantly on duty, and was ambitious of distinction. President

Lincoln, grateful for his stand at the beginning, appointed him by a personal order commander of the expedition down the Mississippi River. When General Grant, with the approval of General Halleck, exercising his authority as commander of the military department within which the expedition was to operate, made McClelland's command an integral part of the army which Grant organized against Vicksburg, and McClelland found himself a subordinate instead of a separate commander, and the President refused to interfere further in his behalf, he was exasperated and restive. But, after all, as is manifest from McClelland's reports, the trouble was largely due to his exuberant egotism, which exaggerated his own exploits and belittled the achievements of others.

The night of the 22d was a night of toil along the Confederate lines. The entire force of engineers, with large working parties, strove through the night, repairing the battered works, strengthening weak points, filling up and obliterating the embrasures in the lunette north of the railroad, removing disabled guns, and bringing other pieces in their place. As long as the siege lasted the nights were employed in repairing damage done through the day and constructing new works in rear of exposed points.

The assailants, satisfied that Vicksburg could not be carried by storm, settled down cheerfully to the task of regular siege. Regular approaches by sap, wide enough for the passage of artillery, were begun in front of all the works assaulted on the 22d. The saps by the Grave Yard road and the Jackson road were pushed with special vigor. The besieging batteries bombarded every day. Sharpshooters on both sides watched through loopholes for every head that appeared above the opposing parapets. At times a general fire of musketry sheeted the Confederate parapets with their mis-

siles. Under this continued hail of fire the guns of the Confederates were gradually disabled or silenced, till few continued to reply. The National batteries were advanced from ridge to ridge till they were planted close to the line of defense.

When the saps came near, the Confederates fired turpentine balls, that set fire to the sap rollers and stopped the work till new rollers were constructed so covered as to be protected from fire. When the base of the works was reached, lighted shells were thrown over, killing the men of the working party. John W. Friend, of the Twentieth Ohio, in General Logan's pioneer corps, devised wooden mortars from a section of a tree trunk, bored and strapped with iron. They were easily carried to the front, and, with a small charge of powder, would lift a shell over the enemy's parapet and drop it within the work. Countermines were started, and one was successfully exploded, blowing up the sap by the Grave Yard road.

Meanwhile batteries were established on the peninsula in front of the city. Sharpshooters hidden in the brush fired across the river. Admiral Porter placed a battery of heavy mortars behind the peninsula, which exploded their huge shells over the city. A hundred-pounder gun was planted, which General Pemberton and the commander of the river batteries reported to be "very destructive." Gunboats guarded the river above and below the city. General Lauman's division arrived on the 25th of May and occupied a portion of the space between McClernand and the river. General Herron reported with his division on the 15th of June; Lauman shifted to the right, and connected with McClernand; Herron extended from Lauman to the river. The investment of the city was complete. About the 1st of June the meat ration was reduced one half, and the ration of sugar, rice, and beans was largely increased. About the 1st of

July General Pemberton reports: "Our stock of bacon having been about exhausted, the experiment of eating mule meat as a substitute was tried, it being issued only to those who desired to use it, and I am gratified to say it was found by both officers and men not only nutritious, but very palatable, and every way preferable to poor beef." He states in his report that at the time of the surrender the commissary had in store forty thousand pounds of pork and bacon, fifty-one thousand two hundred and forty-one pounds of rice, five thousand bushels of peas, ninety-two thousand two hundred and thirty-four pounds of sugar. He also says, "There was at no time any absolute suffering for want of food. . . . The question of subsistence, therefore, had nothing whatever to do with the surrender of Vicksburg." But the surrender or capture of Vicksburg was only a question of time, unless some exterior force should compel the raising of the siege.

General Johnston, learning on the night of the 17th of May that Pemberton had fallen back into Vicksburg, immediately sent to him: "If you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both place and troops, we must if possible save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march to the northeast." To this Pemberton replied, with the unanimous concurrence of his general officers, it was impossible to withdraw the army with such *morale* and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy, and that he decided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible. It was impossible, for while the council was considering Grant's army was moving into position around the city.

General Johnston was now confronted with the task of raising the siege or by attack or maneuver

aiding Pemberton to break out and escape. He at once demanded re-enforcements, and the authorities in Richmond promptly sent all troops that could be taken from Bragg's army in Tennessee and from South Carolina and Georgia. There was controversy between him and Richmond as to the numbers under his command. Finally, he reported that from actual returns his effective force was twenty-four thousand and fifty-three. This did not include Jackson's cavalry, which did not reach him till the 4th of June, nor did it include some irregular cavalry, a few hundred in number. His regular field return sent to Richmond on the 25th of June includes the force present on the 2d of June, and also Jackson's command and the irregulars—present for duty, thirty-one thousand two hundred and twenty-six; total present, thirty-six thousand three hundred and fifteen. Deducting Jackson and the irregulars, leaves the force present on the 2d of June: Present for duty, twenty-seven thousand one hundred and eleven; total present, thirty-one thousand three hundred and forty-eight, and at the same time the "effective present" was twenty-four thousand and fifty-three. On the 29th of May Pemberton dispatched to Johnston, "I have eighteen thousand men to man the lines and river front; no reserves," meaning, of course, "effectives." At that time he had over thirty thousand officers and men present. After making the largest allowance for sick, special duty, and detached service, the residue present for duty must have exceeded eighteen thousand by several thousand. When the Confederate reports name the force engaged in a campaign, whether or not expressly stating "effective," it appears that the number intended is the number of muskets present for duty, counting artillerymen as muskets, or the number of armed enlisted men prepared for action, excluding officers. General J. D. Cox and Colonel E. C. Dawes, after a

thorough study of the Atlanta campaign, arrived at the same conclusion.

Earnest as Johnston was to collect a force to raise the siege, Grant was equally diligent in obtaining re-enforcements to resist the attempt. Hurlbut having already sent Lauman's division, now early in June added two divisions, under General Washburne; Burnside sent from Ohio two divisions of the Ninth Corps under General Parke; and Schofield sent Herron's division from Missouri. Johnston having sent a division to Yazoo City, Parke and Washburne were retained at Haines's Bluff. Johnston's accumulation of force becoming formidable, an army of observation was formed under the command of General Sherman, comprising the force at Haines's Bluff and three other divisions, one from the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Corps each.

The Big Black south of the railroad was bordered on both shores from the railroad to the Mississippi by dense forest. There was neither bridge nor ford, and the roads leading to the three ferries, miles apart, were rough and narrow ways through the woods. An army which should lay bridges at the ferries, and cross over into the angle formed by the Mississippi and the Big Black, would have to conquer or be captured. Sherman accordingly traced his line of defense from the railroad crossing of the Big Black to Haines's Bluff, on the Yazoo. Osterhaus with his division at the railroad crossing fortified the high bluff which rises vertically from the shore of the river and dominated the country beyond; very strong and extensive fortification was constructed at Haines's Bluff, and works thrown up at key points along the line. The roads leading from this line to the Big Black ran for the most part upon narrow ridges, separated by valleys filled with impassable thickets. Reconnoitering parties sent up the country between the

Yazoo and the Big Black, and across the Big Black toward Jackson, kept Sherman advised as to the dispositions of Johnston.

During the entire siege Johnston and Pemberton were in constant communication by messengers. On the 29th of May Johnston wrote: "I am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and your garrison." Again on the 14th of June, "All that we can attempt is to save you and your garrison." On the 22d of June he sent word, "If I can do nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the last moment if you and General Taylor communicate."

On the 25th of June the mine under the work on the north side of the Jackson road was exploded, blowing out a portion of the parapet. Six men working in a countermine, besides others in the fort, were buried and killed. Legget's brigade was standing by under cover. The Forty-fifth Illinois rushed into the breach and scrambled upon the loose earth before the smoke cleared away. The garrison retired behind an inner parapet which had been constructed fifteen feet in rear of the salient. The colonel of the Sixth Missouri, bringing his regiment up in re-enforcement, was instantly killed. The Confederates from behind the new line poured down volleys, and threw down lighted shells upon the Illinois men crowded in the cavity. A wooden barricade was erected for their shelter, but was soon shattered by a gun brought into play by the Missourians. After two hours of desperate fighting without gaining the inner defense, the Forty-fifth was relieved by the Twentieth Illinois. Through the night the regiments were relieved every two hours, and at daylight the attempt to scale was given up and the assaulting party withdrawn. The Confederate loss by the explosion and

the subsequent fighting was twenty-one killed and seventy-three wounded.

On the 1st of July a larger mine was sprung under the fort on the south side of the road, making a cavity fifty by thirty feet across and twenty feet deep, almost destroying the redan and badly shattering the inner defense. A large number of the men manning the work were killed or wounded. Immediately after the explosion a heavy fire of artillery and musketry and a mortar was opened upon the breach. Engineer-in-Chief Lockett says that, in the hour that he spent there after the explosion, "at least a dozen of its garrison were killed or wounded by the mortar alone." Seven men were thrown within the National lines. Six were killed, but the seventh, a negro, was only stunned. He went to General Logan's headquarters as a servant, and remained there until the division left Vicksburg.

The same day Pemberton asked the general officers for their opinion as to the practicability of an evacuation. The agreeing response was, the men were so debilitated that there was no chance of an evacuation. Thereupon he wrote to General Grant, proposing surrender, and the garrison stacked arms on the 4th of July.

The National loss in killed and wounded was:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Aggregate.
Assault on 19th of May.....	43	194	
Assault on 22d of May	502	2,550	
May 18th to July 4th	147	613	
	692	3,357	4,047

The loss from the 1st of May to July 4th, including skirmishes by Sherman's force, was: Killed, fifteen hundred and fourteen; wounded, seventy-three hundred and ninety-five; aggregate,

eighty-nine hundred and nine. The surrender comprised twenty-one hundred and sixty-six officers, twenty-seven thousand two hundred and thirty enlisted men, and one hundred and fifteen citizen employees; in all, twenty-nine thousand five hundred and eleven. General Pemberton gives the totals of killed, wounded, and missing during the siege of two divisions, but nothing of the others or the river batteries. The compilers of the war records have made a computation of the loss so far as can be found in the reports that are preserved, making the number of killed eight hundred and five. But the materials are incomplete. The report of Stevenson's division comes down only to the 13th of June, two weeks after Lauman appeared in his front and before Herron arrived. No report is included of two of the brigades in Smith's division or of the river batteries. The number of killed must have been over four hundred, making loss by death over fifteen hundred. The morning report of the medical director for the 4th of July shows under medical treatment that day twenty-one hundred and thirteen wounded and thirty-seven hundred and sixty-five sick; total, fifty-eight hundred and seventy-eight. While the above is the number of killed as calculated from the reports now on file, two observations may fairly be made: One is, the brigade and division reports, supported by regimental returns, have larger numbers reported killed than those which give only lumping sums for a division or brigade. The other is, that General Pemberton during the siege understood his loss to be much greater than what is given above. He dispatched to General Johnston on the 29th of May: "Since investment we have lost about one thousand men—many officers." And he added, June 10th, "We are losing many officers and men."

The report of one hundred and twenty-nine total missing is obviously incorrect. Moore's bri-

gade is reported as losing none, while one of his regiments—Second Texas—reports fifteen. Lee's brigade reports seven up to the 13th of June, while one regiment lost fourteen captured on the 22d of May. Herron's division, in skirmishes after the 13th of June, the date of Stevenson's report, captured thirty-eight from Stevenson's division. The number of deserters was large. Assistant-Secretary-of-War Dana, in his daily reports to Secretary Stanton, continually mentions the arrival of deserters. Sometimes he speaks of a party of them coming, and once he mentions the arrival of two parties. There seems to have been a stream of them along the river bank to the south, until stopped by Colonel Clark, Thirty-fourth Iowa, moving his regiment to the bank of the river. He reports, "Rebel deserters were brought in every day in large numbers by the pickets." General Osterhaus, stationed at the Big Black bridge, says, in his report of the 30th of May, the Eighth Kentucky "left Vicksburg six hundred strong on May 19th, and marched by way of Cayuga and Chrystal Springs to Meridian, where it was mounted and marched back by Jackson." The Eighth Kentucky belonged to Loring's division. At all events, Pemberton must have had about thirty-two thousand officers and men present when Grant undertook to invest the place with about forty thousand.

In compliance with a request from General Johnston, General Taylor, commanding a district in Louisiana, sent a division to attack the National troops encamped on the west bank of the Mississippi, near Vicksburg. The attack was made on the 7th of June, entirely failed, and the defeated assailants were pursued to the interior of the State. Later it was determined to capture Helena and strongly fortify it, with the view of aiding Johnston to prevent the capture of Vicksburg; or, if that failed, to block the navigation of the Missis-

issippi, and so neutralize the loss of Vicksburg. General Price assaulted the defenses of Helena on July 4th, and was repulsed with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and captured. Port Hudson, besieged by General Banks since the 21st of May, capitulated on the 8th of July. General Gardner's return for the 30th of June was: Present for duty, twenty-eight hundred and three; aggregate present, four thousand and ninety-eight; yet upon the surrender fifty-nine hundred and fifty-three officers and men gave individual paroles, each one countersigned by General Gardner, besides several hundred sick in hospital who gave no parole. The Mississippi was regained. Its navigation was free from its source to its mouth. The Confederate armies east of the river could no longer draw re-enforcements or supplies from the region to the west. Lee abandoned the field of Gettysburg and began his retreat to Virginia on the 4th of July. The dawn of final victory illumined the horizon.

Johnston gave orders to his army on the 28th of June to advance and concentrate opposite the fords above the railroad bridge. On the night of the 3d of July he sent a messenger to advise Pemberton that he would make a diversion by attack on the 7th. He learned in the night of the 4th of the surrender, and started forthwith for Jackson. Sherman, advised by Grant on the 3d of the probable surrender next day, put his force in motion on the afternoon of the 4th. Bridges were constructed across the Big Black. Ord with the Thirteenth Corps and Steele with the Fifteenth completed their crossing on the 6th; Parke with the Ninth followed. Johnston reached Jackson on the evening of the 7th. Sherman arrived on the 9th, and made his investment on the 10th.

The fortifications inclosed the city, resting upon the river above and below. Sherman's line was formed with Ord on the right, Steele in the cen-

ter, and Parke on the left, the flanks resting upon the river. Moving into position on the 12th, Lauman incautiously advanced close to the enemy's works, and in such direction as to uncover and expose his flank. A crossfire from the batteries inflicted severe loss before he could extricate his division. General Ord, commanding the Thirteenth Corps, relieved General Lauman from his command next day. General Sherman approved the order relieving him, giving as his reason his policy of sustaining the authority of his corps commanders.

General Sherman was not willing to waste the lives of his men in open assault over level ground upon formidable works, well constructed and well armed. His supply of ammunition was inadequate for a siege, and a train of empty wagons was sent back to Vicksburg for more. Meanwhile the troops were employed in constructing batteries and intrenchments and keeping up a moderate fire. At the same time parties were sent out daily to gather subsistence and forage, and expeditions to thoroughly destroy the railroad as far north as Canton and as far south as Brookhaven. Johnston's batteries returned the fire, and the skirmishers kept up the rattle of small arms. In all this racket the besiegers could not hear the constant rumble of wagons carrying sick and wounded and stores from the beleaguered city across the river to the railway on the farther side. Sherman's ammunition arrived in the night of the 16th. Men with spades and picks could be heard at work strengthening the defenses till midnight. But when morning came it was found that Johnston's army was gone and the bridges destroyed. Sherman's loss during the siege was one hundred and twenty-nine killed, seven hundred and sixty-two wounded, two hundred and thirty-one missing; total, eleven hundred and twenty-two. Of these, five hundred and nineteen were in Lauman's division. Johnston reported

his loss as "estimated at seventy-one killed, five hundred and four wounded, and about twenty-five missing." But Sherman captured and took to Vicksburg seven hundred and sixty-five prisoners. General Steele, having repaired a bridge, crossed, and with three brigades advanced to Brandon, thirteen miles, pushing Jackson's jaded cavalry before him.

Johnston had set fire to a building filled with commissary stores which he could not carry away. The country tramped over by both armies for two months was stripped and desolate. Citizens of Jackson and Canton appealed to General Sherman to afford relief and save the people from famine. He obtained authority from General Grant to give two hundred barrels of flour and one hundred barrels of pork to Jackson, and fifteen thousand rations to Canton. These were delivered at Big Black River to committees, who gave their pledge that the supplies should be distributed equitably to the needy, and that no part of them should be applied to any other purpose. The committees were taken from the best men in the two cities. Among those constituting the Jackson committee were Chief-Justice Sharkey and William Yerger, men of rare excellence.

The railroad running north and south through Jackson was utterly destroyed for a distance of one hundred miles, and Jackson ceased to be a strategic point for the rest of the war. The men, worn out with fatigue, loss of sleep, and nervous strain for two months, now that the campaign was over and the fervid heat of summer had come, lost their strength and yearned for home. Sherman returned across the Big Black by easy marches. Herron's division returned to Missouri, and Parke to General Banks. The Thirteenth Corps was sent to Texas. Grant was made major general, and Sherman and McPherson brigadier generals in the regu-

lar army, and promotions were freely given to officers of the volunteers. Leaves of absence and furloughs thinned the camps. Sherman with the four divisions of his corps occupied the west bank of the Big Black, while Armstrong's division of Confederate cavalry watched on the opposite side.

CHAPTER VII.

CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN.

THE city of Chattanooga lay in a bend of the Tennessee River on its southern bank. The river above the city flows to the west of south, then turning to the north of west, around the city, turns again to the south, continuing beyond the limits of the city, till it strikes the northern point of Lookout Mountain, and again turns sharply to the north. This sharp bend of the river enfolds a long, narrow point, called Moccasin Point. At the neck of this point is Brown's Ferry, nine miles from the city by water, while it is little more than a mile overland from the ferry to the northern bank of the river opposite the city. The river continues to the north till it strikes the base of Walden's Ridge, turns again to the southwest, between Walden's Ridge and Raccoon Mountain, and passes Kelly's Ferry. By land it is nine miles from Kelly's to Brown's Ferry.

Missionary Ridge and the range of Lookout Mountain, running south from the river, about four miles apart, inclose Chattanooga Valley between them. The northern extremity of Missionary Ridge does not strike the river, but, passing by the bend which is immediately above the city, it continues to the north of east, parallel to the river, and about a mile and a half distant from it. The northern end of the ridge is intersected by cuts, making a group of precipitous hills; thence southward it is a continuous ridge, with a narrow crest

rising a little over four hundred feet above the plain. The northern extremity of Lookout Mountain rises steeply from the river five hundred feet to a broad plateau, then occupied as a farm. The plateau extends back to a cliff which rises vertically to the level summit of the range, fifteen hundred feet above the plain. A road scarped along the eastern face of the mountain descended toward the north till it nearly reached the plateau, and there, turning abruptly toward the south, continued to the valley below. Lookout Creek flows north to the river along the western base of Lookout Mountain, making a deep, narrow valley between the mountain and high hills rising from its western bank. Chickamauga River flows to the north, near the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, till, curving around the northern end of the ridge, it flows due west to the river.

When General Rosecrans fell back to Chattanooga after the battle of Chickamauga, he removed the troops posted on Lookout Mountain down into the city, and began at once to fortify. A strongly intrenched line was constructed in the form of an arc of a circle, covering the city, the flanks resting upon the river, and the curved front extending out into the valley. In the eastern portion of the line was a commanding eminence projecting like a great bastion, and crowned by Fort Wood. General Bragg followed closely up and constructed a line of connected batteries along the crest of Missionary Ridge, together with a secondary line of intrenchment along its base. A curved line of works, parallel to the National defense and two miles distant from it, stretched across the valley from Missionary Ridge to Lookout. Opposite to Fort Wood, and about halfway between it and the base of Missionary Ridge, was a high, rocky hill, with a rough ridge extending to the south, called Orchard Knob, and also Indian Hill. This Bragg

occupied and planted a battery upon it. He placed troops, batteries, and a signal station on the summit of Lookout, and constructed a line of intrenchments and rifle-pits along the western face of the mountain, down on the slope below the cliff. The principal camp and important defensive works were upon the plateau at the northern extremity.

The railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga crosses the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, and thence, passing around the southern base of Racoon Mountain and down Lookout Valley, skirts the base of the north extremity of Lookout Mountain, and so enters the city. When Bragg occupied Lookout, he cut Chattanooga off from railroad communication with the north. There was a road along the northern bank of the river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Bragg posted a line of sharpshooters along the southern bank from Lookout Mountain to a point opposite Walden's Ridge, who commanded the road and prevented its use. The only access from Bridgeport to Chattanooga remaining was by wagons over a road up the Sequachie Valley to Anderson's crossroads, thence by an almost impracticable route over the rocks and through the forest of Walden's Ridge, and then down to the city, a distance of sixty miles. Over this route, even if it were unmolested and the weather continued dry, it would be utterly impossible to convey supplies sufficient to subsist Rosecrans's command. Bragg, well aware of the fact, sat in grim quiet within his works, refusing to waste the lives of his men in needless conflict while famine was doing his work for him.

A large amount of supplies in wagon trains accumulated at Anderson's. General Bragg, to hasten the period of starvation, directed General Wheeler to destroy the stores at Anderson's, and then, in conjunction with Roddy and Lee, who were to cross the river at points below Bridgeport,

to destroy thoroughly the railroad from Bridgeport as far toward Nashville as practicable. On the 1st of October General Wheeler crossed the Tennessee below Washington, about fifty miles above Chattanooga, moved rapidly over to Anderson's crossroads, and next day fell upon the parked trains. The little train guard made a gallant defense, but were soon overcome. Wheeler burned three hundred loaded wagons and killed many mules. Leaving a detachment to complete the destruction, he moved up the valley with one division and sent the other to destroy the railroad. Colonel E. M. McCook, leaving Bridgeport early in the morning of the 2d, came upon the burning trains in the afternoon, drove the Confederate force, rescued eight hundred mules, and saved a remnant of the train. Pressing on, he overtook Wheeler's rear guard, and with a saber charge drove them upon the main body. Wheeler, dividing his force into detachments, approached many points at the same time, and succeeded in sacking and burning McMinnville, Shelbyville, and some smaller settlements, and hastily damaging the railroad. Mitchell, Morgan, and Crook, with separate commands, as well as McCook, followed the marauding parties night and day, and gave them no rest. Mitchell severely routed Wheeler near Shelbyville, as Crook did at Farmington, and there were encounters every day. Wheeler lost all his captures, four of his guns, and most of his command. The worn-out remnant escaped across the river, near Rogersville, on the 9th of October. General Roddy crossed the Tennessee near Gunter'sville, but accomplished nothing, and Lee did not cross the river.

The rainy season set in. The diminished supply trains were still diminishing, as the half-fed mules toiled wearily, hauling loaded wagons slowly over the slippery rocks of Walden's Ridge, and died in their traces. Rations in Chattanooga were

cut down till hunger was a pain. But the feeble bodies inclosed stout hearts, and the resolve to hold the place never wavered. General Thomas telegraphed to Grant on the 19th of October that he had two hundred and four thousand rations in store and expected ninety thousand more next day, and to General Halleck on the 22d, "We are getting supplies enough, notwithstanding the bad condition of the roads."

In the Army of the Potomac out in Virginia the Eleventh Corps, commanded by General Howard, lay in camp, and the Twelfth Corps, General Slocum, was out on picket, on the 24th of September, when orders came from Washington that the two corps should be ready to embark on trains of cars next day. On the same day General Hooker was assigned to command the two corps, and dispatches were sent to quartermaster generals, masters of transportation, and railroad presidents from Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia to St. Louis and Nashville for organization, equipment, and movement of trains from Virginia to Bridgeport, on the Tennessee. Over five hundred cars carried the troops to Bellaire, where the soldiers marched over a bridge constructed after they had begun the journey, and found other trains awaiting them on the Ohio shore. At Indianapolis they again disembarked, marched across the city to another relay, and, on reaching the Ohio River, they were ferried over and found the fourth provision of cars ready for them. The Government took possession of the road from Louisville to Bridgeport and the entire equipment, and changed the gauge of the road from Louisville to Nashville, and of all its rolling stock. The Eleventh Corps was at Bridgeport on the 2d of October, and the Twelfth Corps halted at Stevenson immediately after.

On the 16th of October the President made an order combining the Departments of the Cumber-

land and the Tennessee into a military division—the Military Division of the Mississippi—appointing General Grant commander of the division, relieving General Rosecrans from command of the Department of the Cumberland, and appointing General Thomas in his place. On the 19th Grant and Thomas assumed their respective commands.

General Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d of October. At midnight of the 27th the brigades of Generals Hazen and Turchin were roused. General Hazen with eighteen hundred men embarked in sixty boats, thirty in each boat, and at 3 A. M. cast loose and floated down the river, while the rest of the brigade marched across the neck of Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, carrying materials for a bridge. The floating party, keeping close to the right bank of the river, and maintaining absolute silence, escaped notice by the Confederate pickets who lined the left bank. At about 4.30 A. M. the head of the flotilla reached the left bank where the road to Brown's Ferry comes down to the river. The men were fired on by the pickets as they landed, but dashed up the high and steep hills on each side of the road and gained possession. The boats ferried over the other troops. An attack by a force called by the firing was repulsed, and the position fortified. The boats were floated into position, and before noon a bridge was constructed.

General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on the 27th with the Eleventh Corps and part of Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps. Early in the morning of the 28th he marched toward Lookout Valley. The Eleventh Corps halted at 5 P. M. near the mouth of Lookout Creek. Geary, forming the rear of the column, halted at Wauhatchie, three miles up the valley. At midnight Longstreet made a fierce attack upon Geary. The opposing lines fired at the flashes of each other's guns. The

conflict lasted three hours, when the enemy withdrew. A brigade sent by General Howard to Geary's aid came upon another detachment and defeated it. Longstreet recalled his troops across the creek and burned the bridge, leaving Hooker in possession of all west of the creek. Geary reported that his parties buried one hundred and fifty-three Confederates in his front, captured fifty-two wounded and fifty unhurt prisoners, and three hundred and fifty muskets.

A road was constructed from Kelly's Ferry to Brown's, eight or nine miles. The stores accumulated at Stevenson were transported on two steamboats to Kelly's, and carried thence by the short haul to Chattanooga. The blockade was raised. Abundant supplies had easy access to the beleaguered city.

General Sherman, seated with his family in his pleasant quarters on a plantation near the Big Black River, was startled by receiving from General Grant on the 22d of September an order to send a division to Chattanooga immediately. Osterhaus's division broke camp, marched to Vicksburg, arriving the same evening, and embarked for Memphis. Next day Sherman, summoned to Vicksburg, found Grant still in bed ill, and learned from him that on the previous day dispatches had arrived from Washington, and that he had sent orders to Hurlbut at Memphis to organize two divisions from the troops in his district and send them to Rosecrans; had sent an order to General John E. Smith, who with his division of the Seventeenth Corps had gone to Arkansas to aid General Steele, to abandon that design and hasten to Chattanooga; to General Banks, who was importing for re-enforcements, that none could be sent, for he could make no disposition of troops that could endanger the success of Rosecrans; and that he had ordered the seizure of all boats on the

river to facilitate transportation. Finally, Grant told Sherman to go in person, taking his corps, leaving one of his divisions at Vicksburg, and taking in its place John E. Smith's division, which was already on the way. General Sherman returned to camp on the 25th, and selected the divisions of Giles A. Smith and John M. Corse to go and General Tuttle to remain. The last of the command was in Vicksburg for embarkation on the 28th.

The general's daughter Minnie had been very ill, but was convalescent. On the boat his son Willie, the darling of his heart, was seen to be unwell. On the way up the river he grew worse, and the disease was found to be typhoid fever. The best medical aid in Memphis was called, but the boy died soon after landing. When the boat left for Ohio, bearing the dear corpse and the prostrate family, Sherman's grief was agony. But the pressing duty of the hour required instant action. General Halleck dispatched that the road from Nashville must be reserved absolutely to carry supplies to Rosecrans, and Sherman must repair the road from Memphis as he advanced, and rely on it till a rise in the Ohio and Tennessee would allow boats to ascend the river.

The railroad was in good condition as far as Corinth, though ill supplied with rolling stock. When Sherman left Memphis on the 11th of October on a train with his headquarters and a battalion of the Thirteenth regular infantry, Osterhaus and John E. Smith were already at Corinth, Giles Smith well on his way, and General Corse's division had just started on foot. Arriving at Collierville, twenty-six miles from Memphis, about noon, he learned that a large cavalry force with artillery was approaching the post. The clerks and orderlies were armed, and with the Thirteenth Infantry and the garrison manned the works. All preparations were completed before the advance of the enemy

appeared. A brisk skirmish began and lasted through the afternoon, till the approach of Corse's division, hastened by telegrams sent by Sherman on the first news of the danger, caused the enemy to withdraw. The locomotive and train, damaged by artillery fire, were repaired next day, and proceeded to Corinth. Here General Ewing, who accompanied Sherman, superseded Corse in the command of the fourth division.

S. D. Lee, joined by Wheeler, commanded a large cavalry force. Tearing up the railroad and continually skirmishing with the head of the column impeded the advance. Osterhaus and Smith, repairing the road and pushing back the cavalry, continued their slow advance, and reached Tuscumbia on the 27th. Sherman reached Iuka on the 19th, and learned next day of the arrival of two gunboats at Eastport, and a few days later received news of Grant's appointment to command the military division and his own appointment to command the Department and the Army of the Tennessee. General Blair was placed in command of the Fifteenth Corps. General Hurlbut was ordered to select eight thousand men to form two divisions, to be called Sixteenth Corps, to be commanded by Dodge, and to march as far east as Athens.

General Ewing crossed the river by the aid of the gunboats on the 24th, and moved east on the north side of the river. On the 27th Sherman received orders from Grant to drop all work on the railroad and hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport. General Blair, having just reached Tuscumbia on the 27th, began his return to Eastport on the 28th. General Roddy—who had been on the north of the Tennessee unmolested for two weeks, whose locality was a mystery and whose personality almost a myth; who was always in no particular place, but just somewhere else; whom many had heard of, but no one had seen—

finally recrossed the Tennessee in time to join S. D. Lee on the 27th, and worry General Blair's flank on the march on the 28th. The three remaining divisions crossed by boat at Eastport and hastened to overtake Ewing. Sherman crossed on the 1st of November. Elk River being found to be swollen by rain and not fordable, the command marched up stream to the stone bridge at Fayetteville. Here Sherman received another dispatch from Grant to push his advance. Dividing the troops over three roads to expedite the march, he rode to Bridgeport with his staff, arriving on the 13th of November.

At Bridgeport he found an order to leave his troops and report in person immediately at Chattanooga. Taking a little steamboat, he went up the river in the night to Kelly's Ferry, where he found an orderly and horses awaiting him. A ride over the road to Brown's Ferry and to Chattanooga brought him into the city in the morning. He walked out with Grant and Thomas to Fort Wood, and from that commanding height surveyed the situation. Grant told him that he had proposed to assault Missionary Ridge with the force then in hand, but that a thorough reconnoissance showed that to be impracticable. And it appears in the records that General Grant dispatched to General Burnside on the 7th of November, "I have ordered an immediate movement from here to carry Missionary Ridge"; and on the 8th, "Thomas will not be able to make the attack of which I telegraphed you until Sherman gets up."

Sherman went then to the north side of the river to see the part allotted to him. General W. F. Smith, known as Baldy Smith, chief of engineers to the Army of the Cumberland, who had planned the capture of Brown's Ferry, was of the party. He was making a large number of pontoons in Chattanooga, which were to be carried over the

river, and hidden from view by a range of hills, to a creek emptying into the river from the north, four miles above the mouth of the Chickamauga. The boats were to be kept hid some miles up the creek until the time for attack. Sherman's command was to cross by the bridge at Brown's Ferry and bivouac out of view behind the hills. When the attack was to be delivered a detachment would fill the boats and in the night float down the creek and the river and disembark. The boats would then bring the rest of the troops across the river, and be immediately built into a pontoon bridge. The route was explored. The secret harbor in the creek, the points of embarkation, and the site of the bridge were visited, and from cover of shrubbery on the river bank the place of landing on the farther shore and the point proposed for assault were reconnoitered.

General Sherman remounted his horse and rode back to Kelly's Ferry. The steamboat was gone. He took a rough boat with some soldiers to pull the oars. They were unused to the work, and Sherman from time to time relieved one or another of the inexperienced oarsmen by taking a pull himself. Reaching Shellmound at midnight, a good crew was obtained, and Bridgeport was reached by daylight. Ewing's division was immediately put in motion and directed to approach Lookout Mountain by the road leading to Trenton, threatening to gain or cross the mountain far to the rear of the force which held the summit. The movement caused some anxiety to the Confederate commander, and parties were sent out to reconnoiter the country about Trenton after Ewing had passed down Lookout Valley and reached Brown's Ferry. The hastily constructed bridge at Bridgeport gave only impeded passage to the troops, and the worn-out road, encumbered by slow-moving trains, made the march toilsome and difficult. The other three

divisions of the corps were strung along the road from Wauhatchie to Bridgeport. Friday, the 20th, General Grant's order issued Wednesday, the 18th, for a combined attack on Missionary Ridge by Sherman and Thomas early Saturday morning, the 21st, was found to be impossible of execution. Sherman finally had three divisions in place hidden behind the hills on the 23d, and when night came he sent Giles Smith with his brigade (for Morgan L. Smith had reported and taken command of the division) to the secreted pontoon boats. General Osterhaus not being able to cross at Brown's, the bridge being carried away by the freshet, Jeff C. Davis's division of Palmer's corps was temporarily assigned to Sherman's command and Osterhaus's to General Hooker's.

Reports that Bragg was evacuating were so positive and direct that General Grant, early on the 23d, ordered General Thomas to make a demonstration to test the report. Granger's corps, two divisions, formed in line with skirmishers in front, and Howard's two divisions massed in reserve in the rear, stood on the plain as if on parade, while Generals Grant and Thomas, the Assistant-Secretary-of-War Dana, Quartermaster-General Meigs, and a brilliant array of officers viewed the spectacle from Fort Wood, and a more numerous body, the Confederate army, leaned upon their intrenchments and gazed with complacent interest, as if the display were for their entertainment. At command the array moved forward with precision, captured the advanced pickets, and while the enemy, now aroused, poured a fire of artillery and musketry from all the intrenchments, pushed with greater speed and with one great rush surmounted and captured the fortified high rugged hill, Orchard Knob, and the long rocky ridge extending from it to the south, about halfway between Fort Wood and the base of Missionary Ridge. A battery of

six guns was taken to the summit, and the hill and ridge intrenched and occupied by General Granger's corps, the divisions of Thomas J. Wood and Sheridan.

In the morning General Cleburne was at Chickamauga station, getting on to trains his own division and Buckner's division, then commanded by Bushrod Johnson, under orders to proceed to re-enforce General Longstreet in front of Knoxville. All of Johnson's division except Reynolds's brigade had embarked when order was received from General Bragg: "The general commanding desires that you will halt such portions of your command as have not left Chickamauga; such as may have left halt at Charleston." Two of Johnson's brigades had gone; one, Reynolds's, remained with Cleburne. The arrangements had hardly been made and dispatch to Johnson sent before another dispatch came: "Order Johnson's troops at Charleston back here. Move up rapidly to these headquarters." And a few minutes later: "We are heavily engaged. Move rapidly to these headquarters." Reynolds's brigade was put into the intrenchment at the base of Missionary Ridge just south of Bragg's headquarters, and Cleburne's division went into bivouac in rear of the ridge. At dawn of the 24th Cleburne set his division erecting new intrenchments and batteries along the crest of the ridge from Bragg's headquarters toward the south. Before this work was completed he was informed that the national troops had crossed the Tennessee above and below the mouth of the Chickamauga, and was ordered to send a brigade and a battery to the bridge over the Chickamauga.

At midnight of the 23d Giles Smith embarked his brigade, floated silently down the creek and down the river, landed two regiments above the mouth of Chickamauga River to gather up the Confederate pickets, and construct a bridge across

that stream near its mouth, and landed the rest of his brigade below. The boats, aided later in the day by a steamboat, used such expedition under the immediate supervision of General W. F. Smith that by noon General Sherman with the three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps with the batteries were across, and General Jeff C. Davis following close upon them.

The landing was upon a square plain, about a mile and a half to a side. The northern end of Missionary Ridge runs parallel to the Tennessee River, and about a mile and half from it, the course of both being nearly north and south. The Chickamauga, which with many curves has a general course to the north along the eastern base of the ridge, turns sharp to the west around its northern terminus, and continues west to the Tennessee. A short spur extends east from the northern extremity of the ridge to the Chickamauga, its perpendicular face of rock rising sheer from the water of the stream, securing the position from risk of being turned. The railroad turned, pierced the ridge about a mile and a half south of the northern extremity, passing under a depression or valley, and just north of this depression is Tunnel Hill, the highest point in the locality. Standing aloof in front of the main ridge is an isolated hill, long and narrow, parallel to the main ridge and separated from it by a deep hollow. A cleft in the main ridge, wide enough to give passage to a road, gave communication from the exterior to a small valley inclosed by the main ridge and spurs extending from its rear.

General Sherman reports his advance with the three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps: "A light drizzling rain prevailed and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movements from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gained the foothills; our skirmishers crept up the

face of the hills, followed by their supports, and at 2.30 P. M. we had gained, with no loss, the desired point. A brigade of each division was pushed rapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy for the first time seemed to realize the movement, but too late; we were in possession. He opened with artillery, but Ewing soon got some of Captain Richardson's guns up the steep hill and gave back artillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at General Lightburn, who had swept around and got a farther hill, which was the real continuation of the ridge. From studying the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill, but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deep depression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point. The ground we had gained, however, was so important that I could leave nothing to chance, and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's closed up the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in a general line, facing southeast."

General Howard reported to General Sherman in the evening with two brigades, and, leaving one to take part in the assault, and the other to make connection between the armies of Sherman and Thomas, returned to his corps. The brigades of Jeff C. Davis were disposed to protect communication between the assaulting force and the bridge. Word was received from Grant that Sherman was to attack at dawn and Thomas would attack early in the day.

General Bragg had not apprehended attack on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. But perceiving indications of some movement in that

direction, he took General Hardee from Lookout Mountain on the afternoon of the 23d and transferred him to the extreme right of his army, at the same time transferring Walker's division from Lookout with him. In the night Polk's brigade and a battery were detached from Cleburne's division on Missionary Ridge and reported to Hardee. In the morning of the 24th Wright's brigade of Cheatham's division, summoned from Charleston by telegraph, arrived, was sent to the mouth of the Chickamauga to see if any National troops were attempting to cross, and, if so, to prevent them. He found an unexpected number already across and withdrew, retiring to the hills. At 2 P. M. Cleburne's division was taken from Missionary Ridge and hurried to Hardee, and placed on his right, next to the Chickamauga. At midnight Lewis's brigade was taken from Bate's division on Missionary Ridge and sent to report to Cleburne. A little later Stevenson's division, evacuating Lookout Mountain, marched to the right and reported to Hardee, and Cheatham with his three brigades from Lookout Mountain reported to Hardee in the morning of the 25th, and was placed in line between the force engaged about Tunnel Hill and Anderson's division on Missionary Ridge.

While Bragg was hurrying troops to meet Sherman's attack, he was sustaining a sore defeat at the other extremity of his line. Longstreet soon after his night attack on Hooker had been sent by General Bragg up into East Tennessee to capture or defeat General Burnside. General Hardee became commander of the point with three divisions. When General Hardee was transferred to confront Sherman, and took one division with him, the command at Lookout Mountain devolved upon General Stevenson, with his own division and three brigades of Cheatham's division. General Howard having moved by Brown's Ferry over into Chat-

tanooga, General Hooker's command in Lookout Valley consisted of General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, two brigades of General Cruft's division of the Fourth Corps, and Osterhaus's division of two brigades from the Fifteenth Corps.

About dawn Osterhaus, having the extreme left of the command, drove off the Confederate pickets near the partially destroyed bridges across Lookout Creek and repaired them. Cruft with one brigade moved up the stream and built another bridge. His other brigade reported to Geary, who marched some miles up the valley and built bridges there for his crossing. The enemy, occupied with Osterhaus and Cruft, did not perceive the movement of Geary. An observer on the high summit of Lookout heard the sound of Geary's pioneers chopping down trees, but noticed that the pickets paid no attention. Geary's command passed over the completed bridges and formed a line stretching from the palisade, the vertical cliff of rock, down toward the creek. The troops of the extended Confederate line posted along the west slope of the mountain, finding themselves unexpectedly assailed on the flank and in rear, fell back in confusion. The fire of Hooker's batteries planted on the heights west of the creek prevented their attempting to rally. The guns on the summit of the mountain could not be sufficiently depressed to reach the pursuers, and the heavy clouds of mist that settled on the summit prevented the sharpshooters from taking any part. Cruft crossed his bridges as Geary approached, and joined him in gathering up prisoners and pushing back those who were not captured. The guns of the heavy battery on Moccasin Point and a battery near General Hooker's headquarters with their crossfire enfiladed all the works upon the plateau and slopes of the northern point of the mountain, and made them untenable. Osterhaus crossed and mounted

to the plateau in time to join Geary as he arrived. On the plateau opposing lines were formed and the Confederates forced back, till about 2 P. M., when the cloud of mist settling down from the summit, enveloping the combatants, closed the contest. There was some irregular firing into the fog, but the battle was over. Hooker had pushed his way dangerously near to the road which descended from the mountain to the Chattanooga Valley, and Carlin, who with his brigade had crossed Chattanooga Creek near the city, and was engaged with the Confederate troops near the base of the eastern slope of the point, was also approaching the road. General Bragg ordered evacuation. Through the night until after midnight the defenders were descending the winding road to the plain and moving on their way to Bragg's extreme right to oppose the assault of Sherman. The troops in the intrenchments in the valley, the divisions of Stewart and Bate, constituting Breckenridge's corps, moved to Missionary Ridge. A detachment of the Eighth Kentucky climbed to the summit of Lookout Mountain, and at dawn planted their colors in view of the valley below.

At sunrise of the 25th both armies saw the National flag floating over the summit of Lookout, and the long line of Confederate intrenchments traversing the valley and encircling the city abandoned. General Bragg, who five weeks before held Thomas's army in his grip, and grimly refused to waste the lives of his men in useless attack, preferring to let famine surely do the work without loss to him, now saw his grip shaken off, his besieging works captured, his whole force contracted on to Missionary Ridge, and more than one half of it congested on the northern extremity, not to threaten his antagonist, but to defend a vital point from assault.

In the forenoon of the 25th Hardee assembled

and placed his command: Cleburne with his four brigades and Wright's brigade, brought down from Charleston, and Lewis's brigade of Bate's division occupied from the tunnel to the northern extremity of the ridge. Stevenson with his four brigades was on Cleburne's left; next was Walker with three brigades; and finally Cheatham with three brigades, reaching nearly to the right of the line facing Chattanooga. Here Anderson's four brigades occupied all the space north of Bragg's headquarters, except an interval left vacant immediately north of Bragg's headquarters, upon request of General Anderson, in order that Reynolds's brigade, when obliged to leave the works at the base of the ridge, might take position there. Immediately south of Bragg's headquarters was Adams's brigade of Stewart's division temporarily assigned to and constituting part of Anderson's command. Next was General Bate with his own brigade, commanded by Colonel Tyler and two regiments of his Florida brigade, and on his left Stewart with two of his brigades. In the trenches at the base were Reynolds's brigade, one of Stewart's, three regiments of Bate's Florida brigade and details from Anderson's division. General Sherman had eight brigades in his own three divisions—five brigades in General Howard's two divisions and three in General Jeff C. Davis's division. General Thomas had in his line Baird's division, three brigades, and Johnson's division, two brigades of the Fourteenth Corps, and the divisions of T. J. Wood and Sheridan of the Fourth Corps, three brigades each. Hooker was on the way from Lookout Mountain around by the way of Rossville Gap to take the southern extremity of the ridge with the three divisions of Osterhaus, Geary, and Cruft.

Early in the morning of the 25th General Sherman disposed his force. His own three divisions,

Buschbeck's brigade of the Eleventh Corps, and Plant's battery from Jeff C. Davis's division constituted the attacking force; Davis continued protecting communication with the Tennessee River, and General Howard, who arrived in the morning with the rest of his corps, guarded the rear toward the Chickamauga. Batteries were hauled up to the summits of the isolated ridge held by Ewing and the hill held by Lightburn. While these two points were held in force, Colonel Loomis advanced to assault the tunnel gorge, Corse the northern slope of Tunnel Hill, and Morgan L. Smith's division the ridge north of Tunnel Hill.

Corse passed across the deep hollow, carrying a line of intrenchments thrown up by Smith's Texas brigade, climbing the steep hillside, almost gaining the summit. A persistent and obstinate engagement ensued. Corse was wounded and carried off. Walcutt took his place and continued the struggle. He could not get his men over the edge of the crest, and the defenders could not dislodge them from the slope. The National batteries on the two hills played upon Swett's battery on the summit of Tunnel Hill, so that no defensive work could be thrown up for its protection; the officers of the battery were disabled, and command devolved upon a corporal, and so many of the gunners were killed or wounded that infantry had to be detailed to work the guns, and finally the battery was relieved by another and retired. Colonel Loomis, out in the open plain, was ordered to advance and take position in front of the tunnel gorge. Brushing away the hostile skirmishers, he advanced under heavy fire, and taking the position assigned in face of the opposing line, which extended along beyond his right as far as he could discern the ridge, made his command throw up such cover as was practicable, and maintained his position. His left flank being threatened by a force issuing

from the tunnel gorge, he procured re-enforcements from Buschbeck's brigade and drove back the assailants. Being still pressed, General John E. Smith sent two brigades, Mathias and Raum. These joined in the assault upon Tunnel Hill, and, aided by a fire from troops in the works captured from the Texans, succeeded in pressing nearly to the summit of the hill. Hardee sent a brigade in aid, but it retired after an ineffective effort. Colonel McConnell led his Georgia regiment up to take part; McConnell was shot through the head and his regiment withdrew. A brigade from Stevenson's division and from Walker's reported in support. General Cummings with two Georgia regiments made two abortive charges. Finally, a force suddenly appearing upon the flank took the gallant brigades in flank and rear. The surprise broke their order, and they fell back in confusion, pursued by their assailants down into the plain. The Confederates in their ardor followed them past the isolated hill held by Ewing. Being now in turn taken in flank and rear by Ewing and Loomis, they hastily returned to the ridge, followed by the rallied brigades of Mathias and Raum, though Raum was too severely wounded to return with them.

General Sherman had been anxiously waiting for the attack by the Army of the Cumberland, promised by General Grant to be made early in the day. At half past two o'clock he saw, far off down the ridge, puffs of white smoke; then the distant roar of artillery, and he knew that the assault was begun. Grant's order of the 18th for a joint assault on Missionary Ridge on the 23d had not been revoked, but only postponed to the 25th; and on the evening of the 24th General Thomas directed his command to "have everything ready for an offensive movement early to-morrow morning." News coming on the morning of the 25th of the evacuation of Lookout Mountain, leaving Hooker

free, he was ordered to march up the valley, cross Chattanooga Creek, proceed to Rossville Gap, the southern terminus of the ridge, and sweep up the ridge upon Bragg's left flank. The time of Thomas's assault was held for Hooker's co-operation. It was learned that the destruction of the bridge across the creek delayed his march. To build a new one took three hours. Word came that the bridge was finished and Hooker was crossing. His approach was assured, and the time for attack had come.

Grant and Thomas, with a splendid group of generals and dignitaries, were on Orchard Knob, whence a complete survey was enjoyed of the valley, the heights, and of the plain on which Sherman had formed his command. The four divisions, comprising eleven brigades, had been deployed, Baird's division on the left, T. J. Wood on his right, then Sheridan, and Johnson on the extreme right. Each brigade had a front of two to four regiments in line, with skirmishers in front, and the remaining regiments in column in support, making a battle array three miles in front. The magnificent splendor of the spectacle impressed both friend and foe. General Bate says in his report: "The enemy, like a huge serpent, uncoiled his massive folds into shapely lines in our immediate front," and "seemed confidently resting, as a giant in his strength." The eight brigades and two regiments in the works on the summit being deployed in line without reserves, extended on both flanks beyond the line of assault. The order to deliver the assault was verbal. General Grant says in his report that Hooker's "approach was intended as the signal for storming the center in strong columns," and, on being satisfied that Hooker was on his way from Rossville, "Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops . . . and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary

Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle-pits, with a view to carry the top of the ridge." General Thomas says only that as soon as Baird got into position "orders were then given him to move forward on Granger's left and within supporting distance against the enemy's rifle-pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. General Baird says: "A staff officer from General Thomas brought me verbal orders to move forward to the edge of the open ground which bordered the foot of Missionary Ridge, within striking distance of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be ready at a signal, which would be the firing of six guns from Orchard Knob, to dash forward and take those pits. He added: This was intended as preparatory to a general assault on the mountain, and that it was doubtless designed by the major general commanding that I should take part in the movement, so I would be following his wishes were I to push to the summit." The order received by General Johnson was "to form my command in two lines, resting my left on the right of General Sheridan's division, and to conform to his movements." The order reached the Fourth Corps in a different form. General Granger says: "General Sherman was unable to make any progress in moving along the ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front; therefore, in order to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demonstration on the works of the enemy directly in my front, at the base of Missionary Ridge." And being ordered to make a demonstration upon the rifle-pits, "I accordingly directed Major-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General Wood to advance their divisions at a given signal, moving directly forward simultaneously and briskly to attack the enemy, and, driving him from his rifle-pits, to take possession of them."

Upon the signal, the firing of six guns on Or-

chard Knob, the entire line moved forward with precision and brushed away the Confederate skirmishers. The furious fire of all the batteries of the ridge incited the line to a double-quick; as they neared the intrenchments, musketry was added. But the charge continued so solid and balanced that the works were reached by unbroken ranks, that swept as an avalanche over the barriers. A staff officer sent by General Sheridan brought back answer from General Granger that it was the works at the base of the ridge that were to be carried. This answer brought back some who were on their way to the summit. But immediately Captain W. L. Avery, Granger's aid, brought word to Sheridan to carry the works on the summit if he thought he could. Granger sent all his staff to Wood and Sheridan with the same order, fearing some might miscarry.

There was no need to reform. There were no broken ranks; there were no laggards. There was no need of order to advance. Some with order, some without order, some against order, but all in unison, all aflame, in one mighty upheaval surged up the mountain side. The ascent was steep, rugged, and encumbered. The stout color bearers mostly pushed foremost. The stronger gathered about them; the weaker followed as they could, till regiments assumed the form of wedges, apex in front. Clambering up over works and gullies, through the murderous fire from above, they approached the crest, panting and jaded. It seems that the fresh defenders of the ridge might have fixed bayonets, and with an impetuous charge have swept the exhausted assailants down the slope. But dazed by the audacity and unexpectedness of the assault, unnerved by the impressive mass covering the mountain side, depleted by the large detachments sent to re-enforce the right against Sherman's persistent attack, and discouraged by the

sight of Lookout Mountain and the sweep of investment works across the valley, abandoned and captured, they stood irresolute till the bold assailants were in their midst.

Hazen's brigade, or perhaps the two brigades of Hazen and Willich, first climbed over the works in Anderson's division, just north of Dent's battery, and north of Bragg's headquarters. Facing to the right and left, and turning Dent's guns upon their late support, they drove the Confederate troops along and down the eastern slope of the ridge. General Bate, ordered by General Bragg to go to Anderson's aid, gathered up the fragments of Reynolds's brigade, which had streamed up from the captured works at the base, formed them in his rear, led them as far as they could advance north of Bragg's headquarters, and, leaving them, returned to his own hard-pressed command. The line was breaking farther south and farther north, as brigade after brigade impetuously rushed over the works. The end had come. Bragg ordered Bate, who had the only coherent force within reach, to cover the retreat to the bridge over the Chickamauga. General Bragg says in his report: "A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or character. . . . Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them."

General Turchin, commanding the right brigade of Baird's division, reached the summit first in the division. Part of the Confederate troops escaped down the eastern slope, part retired toward the north, over a depression in the ridge, to a fortified position still held in front of Vanderveer's brigade, which was approaching it. There was a short

conflict, another retreat. The forces on both sides continually increased as the Confederates fell back upon supports, and finally Phelps's brigade completed the ascent. Hardee, alarmed at the steady approach toward his position, made Cheatham change front of his division, so as to face to the south, striding the ridge. Brown's brigade and Cummings's were brought up to support Cheatham, and the struggle continued at this point till dark. This line remained in position while Hardee was drawing the rest of his command across the Chickamauga, and then followed.

General Hooker, having constructed his bridge and crossed, Osterhaus in advance, found a considerable force with artillery posted in Rossville Gap, and quickly routed it. Osterhaus was sent through the gap, then north along the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, Cruft north along the crest of the ridge, and Geary by the western base. They encountered and surprised a portion of Stewart's division on its way to escape by Rossville Gap, and captured substantially the whole force.

Sherman's army went into bivouac where they lay, and Thomas on Missionary Ridge, except that Sheridan with a portion of his command followed Bate, who was covering the retreat from Bragg's headquarters, and having combats, when Bate found opportunity to stand, until dark. At midnight he resumed pursuit, and pressed Bate to and across the Chickamauga, saving the bridge and capturing a large quantity of stores. The Confederates trudged wearily through the night, aided by the full light of the moon, dropping, as they trudged, guns, caissons, wagons, small arms, and all the *débris* of a rout.

In the night General Grant ordered pursuit by all the forces of both armies, except the portion detailed to march to the relief of Knoxville. Hooker marched in the morning with Palmer's corps added

to his command, and, delayed by destroyed bridges and occasional skirmishes, halted for the night about five miles from Ringgold. Next day he overtook Cleburne at Ringgold, posted in a very deep and narrow gorge, a cleft in the mountain, and on the heights on each side. He charged, Osterhaus leading, and after a severe engagement, with heavy loss on both sides, Cleburne retired to Dalton. Hooker, in pursuance of orders, remained in observation toward Tunnel Hill till the 30th of November, and then returned to Chattanooga.

General Davis, of Sherman's command, crossed the Chickamauga near its mouth before dawn of the 26th, and was followed by Howard and Blair. Next morning, after a brisk skirmish, a Confederate force that was destroying the stores of the depot at Chickamauga station was driven off and a portion of the stores saved. On the 27th General Sherman sent Howard to Red Clay to destroy the railroad there, and the next day Blair performed the same work on the track from below Graysville north to the State line. On the 29th Howard, Blair, and Davis moved from Graysville by different roads to Cleveland, and there completed the destruction of railroad which had already been extensively wrought by General Long and his cavalry brigade. The trains and artillery having gone direct to Chattanooga, the command reached Charleston, on the Hiawassee, on the 30th, without trains or tents, provisions or baggage. The Confederate troops posted there left too hastily to destroy the bridges completely, and leaving five carloads of subsistence. On the same day Bragg was relieved from command by President Davis upon his own request. The campaign was ended.

The casualties in the five days—23d to the 27th of November, both inclusive—were: In Sherman's force, killed, one hundred and twenty; wounded, eight hundred and fifty-three; missing, one hun-

dred and thirty-nine; total, eleven hundred and twelve. In Thomas's immediate command, killed, five hundred and five; wounded, thirty-one hundred and twenty-three; missing, one hundred and sixty-five; total, thirty-seven hundred and ninety-three. Hooker, killed, one hundred and twenty-eight; wounded, seven hundred and forty-six; missing, forty-five; total, nine hundred and nineteen. Total killed, seven hundred and fifty-three; wounded, forty-seven hundred and twenty-two; missing, three hundred and forty-nine; aggregate, fifty-eight hundred and twenty-four. The Confederate loss reported by General Hardee: Killed, three hundred and sixty-one; wounded, twenty-one hundred and eighty; missing, forty-one hundred and forty-six; total, sixty-six hundred and eighty-seven. But General Grant states in his report the number of prisoners captured was sixty-one hundred and forty-two, of whom two hundred and thirty-nine were officers, and in his indorsement upon General Hooker's report objects to the statement therein that Hooker's command captured sixty-five hundred and forty-seven prisoners. Besides forty pieces of artillery, sixty-nine gun carriages, and seven thousand small arms, wagons, and supplies captured, there was a vast loss by burning, breaking up, and casting away of everything pertaining to the equipment of an army. The camps and all the roads from Missionary Ridge to Ringgold, and as far beyond as reconnoissance was pushed, were a pitiful chaos of wreck.

In one of General Cleburne's reports—the report of his fight with Hooker at Ringgold—is a sentence which throws some light upon what is meant by the statement in Confederate reports of the number of men in a command. The statement is: "I took into the fight in Polk's brigade, five hundred and forty-five; Lowry's brigade, thirteen hundred and thirty; Smith's (Texas) brigade,

twelve hundred and sixty-six; Liddell's brigade, ten hundred and sixteen effective men, making a total of forty-one hundred and fifty-seven bayonets." "Effectives," then, means men who carry bayonets, and, unless the contrary is stated, the number of men given means the number of bayonets. The same appears from abstracts of returns of the army. The abstract of returns of the 31st of October shows sixteen officers and no enlisted men present for duty at army headquarters, and shows no effectives. It is the same for corps headquarters. In the return of effectives, all headquarters report none, there being only officers and detailed men at headquarters. The returns of divisions go further. The first division in the abstract gives, present for duty, four hundred and forty-two officers and forty-six hundred and fifty-three men, and gives effective total present, forty-five hundred and thirty-one. Deducting all the officers and one hundred and twenty-two men from the present for duty, gives the total effective present. The same appears in the other divisions, and in the abstract of returns of the 10th of December. There is no objection to such report; it has some advantages; but as it is different from the mode of stating the numbers used in the National army, it is worth bearing in mind.

From the beginning President Lincoln had been solicitous about East Tennessee, Abdiel of the seceding States. He required military considerations to bend before the sacred duty of guarding the loyal mountaineers from rapine. After the capture of Corinth by Halleck, he insisted that the security of East Tennessee must be a feature of whatever plan of campaign was adopted. When Grant repaired to Chattanooga, he seldom received a telegram from the President or General Halleck which did not contain a reminder of Knoxville and Burnside. Accordingly, when the assault of Mis-

sionary Ridge was about to be delivered, Grant directed General Thomas to send a force, consisting of Granger's corps and enough other troops to make twenty thousand men, to the relief of Burnside, then closely besieged in Knoxville. In the order for the pursuit of Bragg, made in the night of the 25th, this relieving column was excepted from the order to march in the pursuit.

Grant returned to Chattanooga in the night of the 28th, and found that Granger had not started and was not ready. He made an order requiring General Sherman to go with his command, in addition to Granger's column, and take command of the expedition. He sent a copy of Granger's instructions, and also stated that the latest information from Burnside was that his provisions would last only until the 3d of December. General Wilson arrived at Charleston and delivered the papers on the 30th of November. Colonel Orlando Smith, under direction of General Howard, began immediately the repair and reconstruction of the bridges. Before dawn of the 1st of December the troops began to cross, and marched to Athens before halting for the night. Next day Howard pushed for Loudon and its environs by night; Blair marched to Philadelphia.

In the night Sherman ordered General Long to select the best of his cavalry and make all speed to Knoxville, forty miles away, regardless of difficulty or opposition, and reach Knoxville with his command or a fragment of it, and communicate with General Burnside by night. General Howard made a bridge supported by wrecked wagon beds repaired, and General Wilson with General Blair made a bridge some miles farther up. The river was crossed on the 4th, and Granger's force met Sherman's command at Marysville on the 5th. Here an officer of General Burnside's staff appeared and announced that Longstreet had aban-

doned the siege and withdrawn from Knoxville the previous night. He brought an invitation from General Burnside to General Sherman for a personal interview.

General Granger's corps, the original relieving force, was ordered to continue to Knoxville, the rest to remain at Marysville. General Sherman rode to Knoxville on the 6th. General Burnside said he would not require more than Granger's corps to aid him in the pursuit of Longstreet. Sherman marched the rest of his command back to Chattanooga, where the tired men returned to their proper commands, enjoyed with the relish of long abstinence, food, clothing, shelter, and rest.

General Grant established his headquarters at Nashville; General Thomas remained at Chattanooga; General Sherman distributed the Fifteenth Corps, now commanded by General Logan, along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and the portions of the Sixteenth Corps, under the command of General Dodge, from Decatur to Nashville, to prepare the roads for the heavy draught that was to be made upon their capacity. The Seventeenth Corps at Vicksburg, commanded by General McPherson, and the large body of troops in Memphis and West Tennessee, under command of General Hurlbut, called the Sixteenth Corps, were on garrison duty, protecting the navigation of the Mississippi from incursions by the Confederate force in Mississippi. The railroads running east and west through Jackson and Meridian to Mobile, and north and south the length of the State through Jackson and also through Meridian, gave the Confederates facilities for rapid transportation of infantry and supplies, and constituted a continual menace. The destruction of the railroads would be such a relief that a large part of the garrisons of Vicksburg and Memphis could

be removed to fields where they were needed for active operations.

General Sherman went to Nashville to consult with General Grant, and then took a leave to spend Christmas with his family at Lancaster. The visit was as brief as it was happy, and on the 3d of January he was at Cairo on his way down the Mississippi. It was the famous cold January of 1864. As low down the river as Vicksburg ice floated in the river. Many Northern ladies were then visiting their husbands, officers in the army. They received calls on New Year's Day, as was then their usage at home, and one of the *mots* of the day was, "Even the climate is putting on Northern airs." General McArthur and his staff gave a ball New Year's night. The supper was served in a suite of hospital tents adjoining headquarters, and another suite was floored for dancing. The cold was so extreme that guests made brief visits to the supper tents, and the dancers quickly adjourned to the headquarters building.

It was the determined purpose of the Government and General Grant to make the ensuing campaign decisive. But they were confronted by the appalling fact that the term of service of the men who in the first half of 1861 enlisted for three years, and who not only constituted numerically a large proportion of the troops in the field, but were also the seasoned, disciplined *corps d'élite* of the army, would expire in the coming summer, in the middle of the campaign. It was clearly better to have a temporary disbandment of the army before the campaign than risk a total disbandment in the middle of it. Accordingly, the Government offered a furlough of thirty days and a bounty of three hundred dollars to every man who, having enlisted for three years, and having only ten months or less to serve, should re-enlist for the remainder of the war. The mass of those who were entitled re-enlisted,

The main stimulus was a sober, relentless purpose to carry the war to a successful termination ; but the proposed visit home made it easier, and various motives co-operated. A regiment in a brigade encamped on the Big Black River held back. A sergeant, vigorous, handsome, a born leader, but willful, took umbrage at something and refused. The other men generally followed his example. An order was made in the brigade that men who had re-enlisted as veterans might be permitted to shoot at wild ducks on a pond beyond the river, and just outside of the picket line. The sergeant, not knowing the limitation, asked for leave and was refused, and told the reason. He would not submit to seeing others enjoy a privilege from which he was debarred, and at once re-enlisted. The rest of the regiment with great satisfaction did the same.

General Sherman put General William Sooy Smith in command of all the cavalry in the Department of the Tennessee, and directed him with a selected force, which he estimated would be seven thousand men, to start from Memphis the 1st of February, crush Forrest, tear up the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and join Sherman at Meridian about the 10th of February. General Hurlbut was sent to Vicksburg with two divisions. With these, and General McPherson with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps and Winslow's cavalry, Sherman left Vicksburg on the 3d and crossed the Big Black the same day. A brigade of Armstrong's cavalry hovered about the front in observation. On the morning of the 5th a well-served battery posted upon a hill in front fired fatally upon the advance of McPherson's corps as it moved out from bivouac, and falling back, but halting and firing from each successive vantage ground, scarcely impeded the steady march. Hurlbut came up on the flank of the Confederates, and they summarily withdrew. A brigade of the Seventeenth Corps pushed on to

Jackson and occupied it in the night. The roads beyond Jackson were execrable. Swamps, quagmires, holes, gullies, and rocks often kept the rear of the column till after midnight before going into tentless bivouac. The reports of the Confederate cavalry officers especially complain of the difficulty of the roads.

General Sherman was again near being captured. Halting at a house by the wayside at a crossroads as the rear of the Sixteenth Corps was passing, he detached the rear regiment to remain until the Seventeenth Corps should come up. The colonel of the regiment, seeing some of General McPherson's staff coming up the road, took for granted that the corps was at hand, and resumed his march. General Armstrong, who was on the crossroad with part of his force, seeing the opportunity, charged upon the wagons and the mules. The sound of the firing and of bullets startled Sherman and his attendants. They gathered what fire-arms they could find and barricaded themselves in an outbuilding, while an aid-de-camp scurried down the road and brought back the regiment upon a full run.

On the 14th of February there was an interesting encounter between infantry and cavalry. General McPherson on the afternoon of the 13th ordered General Leggett to leave his first brigade at a point four miles in rear of the corps, to proceed at daylight next morning to the railroad crossing over Chunky River, eight miles to the south, and destroy the bridge. At 6 A. M. the brigade, reinforced by two companies of cavalry, began the march. On the way information was received from inhabitants that General S. D. Lee was at the station with the cavalry brigades of Wirt Adams and P. B. Starke. This information is shown by the records to be correct, except that General Lee had left the command about daylight, summoned to a

personal interview with General Polk at Meridian. A mile and a half from the station a heavy, fresh trail came into the road from the west, cut so deep into the earth as to show that a large body of cavalry had passed. There was no chance for any success except by surprise. The command loaded, and were ordered to move with absolute silence. The captain commanding the cavalry reported that his advance had discovered a picket on post without being observed, and stated that his men had no sabers and could not make a charge. Without pausing in their march, the first two regiments of infantry deployed on a double-quick, one on each side of the road, while skirmishers were thrown out to the front on a full run. The line, advancing at double-quick, emerged from the timber and saw the hostile cavalry at hand along the bank of the river. The Confederates, startled at seeing without warning the long ranks, perfectly aligned and rapidly advancing, sounded their bugles; but before they could form the charging line was upon them, and drove them in confusion across the stream. A quick fire scattered them, and then the other two regiments, left behind by the rapid movement of the deployed line, appeared in column of fours debouching from the woods. The enemy, supposing a large force was at hand, withdrew. Starke with his brigade reached the outskirts of Meridian in time to engage Sherman's advance on the eastern environs of the city, his artillery went to the south, toward Enterprise, with the other brigade. Seven loaded baggage wagons, which were not harnessed, were captured, and the railroad bridge was burned.

General Smith, obeying what he says was the express verbal order of General Sherman, waited in Memphis for the brigade of Colonel Waring, which was detained up the Mississippi by ice, and did not reach Memphis till the 11th. The plan of

his campaign was deranged. He did not crush Forrest, did not destroy the railroad, and did not join Sherman at Meridian. He had an unsuccessful engagement with Jackson at West Point, and retreated, followed by Jackson with daily combats, in which both lost men, and Smith lost artillery.

General Polk evacuated Meridian on the morning of the 14th of February. Sherman entered later in the day, and immediately spread his forces out along the railroads in all directions, and prosecuted the work of destruction until the 20th. Tracks, culverts, and bridges were so largely extirpated that to a large extent the roads were not used again for military purposes during the war. Meanwhile nothing was heard of General Smith. After anxious waiting and inquiry, the expedition, having accomplished its purpose, turned homeward, the Seventeenth Corps taking the most direct route to Canton, Hurlbut coming farther to the north, and the cavalry swinging still farther northward, in the hope of joining Smith or getting news of him. All converged at Canton on the 26th, without having gained any information. General Sherman left Canton for Vicksburg on the 27th of February. Hurlbut brought the expedition in on the 3d of March. The re-enlisted veterans left Vicksburg to spend their thirty days' furlough in visiting home, and then go to new fields.

CHAPTER VIII.

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

GENERAL SHERMAN reached Vicksburg at the end of his Meridian campaign on the last day of February, and, finding there letters from Grant directing him to co-operate in an expedition up the Red River, to be conducted by General Banks, in whose Department of the Gulf the theater of operations lay, he took steamer at once for New Orleans. Reaching that city on the 2d of March, he spent a couple of days in consultation with Banks, and, with his usual restless energy, was on his way back to Vicksburg on the 4th, not waiting for the ceremonies which were to inaugurate on that day a loyal State government for Louisiana.

The plan arranged with Banks included a loan for thirty days from the 7th of March of two divisions from the Department of the Tennessee—one, under General Mower, from the Sixteenth Corps, and one from the Seventeenth Corps, under General Kilby Smith, the two constituting a temporary corps, under General A. J. Smith. The expedition was to be a mixed military and naval one, a fleet of gunboats under Admiral Porter co-operating with the land forces, and conveying the numerous transports. It was expected that a column under General Steele, commanding the Department of Arkansas, should meet Banks at Shreveport, some three hundred miles up the Red River, and that this junction of forces should release Smith's corps,

which would then immediately return to Sherman, who was hurrying his preparations to have the Army of the Tennessee in North Alabama ready to open the general campaign under Grant before the 1st of May.

With fullest confidence in the good faith and right purposes of General Banks, Sherman knew so well the difficulty of reclaiming a detachment once committed to a distant expedition, that he sought by most explicit written arrangements with Banks and directions to Smith to secure the prompt return of his two divisions at the appointed time.* But the expedition did not turn out successfully, the junction with Steele at Shreveport was not made, and upon his retreat Banks could not spare Smith's corps until the army reached the Mississippi again. The Atlanta campaign had then opened, and through the whole of it the Army of the Tennessee was weaker by the two divisions than Sherman had meant to have it.

Still greater changes were in store for him. On his way to Memphis he was met, on the 10th of March, by a letter from Grant announcing his own promotion to the rank of lieutenant general. Four days later Grant, on his return from a rapid journey to Washington, summoned Sherman to meet him at Nashville. The visit of the lieutenant general to Washington was followed by his assignment, on March 12th, to the command of the armies of the United States under the President. General Halleck was announced as chief of staff in Washington, Sherman succeeded to the Military Division of the Mississippi, and McPherson to the Department and Army of the Tennessee.† The same day Grant started westward again to meet Sherman at Nashville, and to have his final consultations with his subordinates before taking the field with the

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 494, 514.

† Id., pt. 2, p. 58.

Army of the Potomac, as he had resolved to do. Grant's order assuming command of all the National armies was not issued until the 17th, from Nashville, and Sherman's was dated the 18th, from the same place.*

The possibility of this change had, of course, been known, for the bill to revive the rank of lieutenant general had been introduced by Mr. Washburne on the 14th of December, and passed the House of Representatives on the 1st of February, with a recommendation to the President to give the appointment to Grant. Although it did not pass the Senate and become a law till nearly a month later, it was a foregone conclusion, and General Grant had planned the spring campaign in the West with a view to this contingency. With his habitual reticence, he kept his own counsels as to his personal part in the next year's work, though there is little doubt that his predilection was to remain in the West. The only thing he was fully resolved on was, as he said in his letter of March 4th to Sherman, that he would accept no appointment which would require him to make Washington his own headquarters. He was determined to remain in the field.

During most of the winter the discussion of the organization of the principal Western army and its component parts had gone on, therefore, with a more or less clearly acknowledged reference to what became the actual situation at the beginning of March. At first Grant seems to have thought it possible that he might lead the Western army without any intermediate commander between himself and the three department commanders of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio. While this point of view prevailed, he thought of McPherson for the command of the Army of the Ohio,

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 83, 87.

from which General Foster asked to be relieved on account of his health. He had also thought of General W. F. Smith for the place, and as early as November had asked to have him booked for the first vacancy in the rank of major general.* Toward the end of December Halleck had suggested General John M. Schofield for the Department of the Ohio. Grant reserved his response to this till the middle of January, after a personal visit to Foster at Knoxville, when he renewed the recommendation of General Smith, if the latter might be given the appropriate rank, to date so as to be senior to other major generals in the department. He added that, if it were contemplated to give General Smith a still higher command, he would be content with either of the other general officers named, or with General J. G. Parke, who was with the Ninth Corps in Tennessee.† The reference to a "still higher command" for General Smith is understood to mean that his appointment to command the Army of the Potomac had been under consideration.

To date back a commission so as to give an officer formal seniority over others already in service was several times done, notably in the case of General Rosecrans, who was thus made to outrank Thomas in the Army of the Cumberland, but the irritation it caused did not commend it for repeated use. It shows that Grant shared the current misapprehension among army officers in regard to the effect of the date of a general's commission when the officer was assigned to special duty by the President. It was frequently claimed that such assignment could not override mere seniority in commission, and the question was several times raised before it was officially settled, in accordance with the plain meaning of the statute, that the assign-

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, pp. 122, 277.

† Id., pp. 529, 571.

ment by the President to a department, an army, or a corps gave precedence over all officers of the same grade not themselves thus specially assigned. When once this principle was settled, our army system acquired an admirable flexibility, for it enabled the President to select any major general to command an army, giving to such officer what amounted to a temporary grade so long as his command actually lasted. This was a better system than that of the Confederates, and would have left nothing to desire if the temporary power had been accompanied by the temporary title of lieutenant general or general.

By the end of January Grant found the arrangement as to the commanders of departments and armies easy to settle. A plan was on foot to transfer the Ninth Corps to the East, where Burnside should resume the command of it, and it should be enlarged to a strength of twenty-five or thirty thousand men, with the prospect of becoming a separate army on the Carolina coast, where it had first won renown. General Parke went with it, and resumed his old relations to Burnside as chief of staff. General W. F. Smith was also indicated for transfer to the East. The probability that McPherson would soon be promoted to the head of the Army of the Tennessee was so great that Grant no longer hesitated as to the Army of the Ohio, and on January 27th he telegraphed a request that General Schofield be assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which was promptly done.* Schofield's service had been in Missouri, where he had been upon the staff of General Lyon at the battle of Wilson's Creek, and had been on active duty from the first organization of Union troops in that State. Since May, 1863, he had been in command of that department, and had established a high character for

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 229, 230.

judgment and ability in administering its affairs. His full sympathy with the President's conciliatory policy toward conservative Union men had brought upon him the strenuous opposition of radical leaders in Missouri and Kansas, and these had prevented the confirmation of his promotion to the rank of major general. Mr. Lincoln, well knowing that the contest was rather with himself than with Schofield, had renewed the nomination, but was not unwilling to find a way of conciliating opposition by sending General Rosecrans to Missouri and transferring Schofield to the Department of the Ohio.

The Department and Army of the Cumberland was by far the larger part of the combined forces in the Military Division of the Mississippi. It was reckoned that it would put into the field sixty thousand soldiers of the hundred thousand with which the active campaign would be opened. From a purely military point of view this great disproportion between the three organizations of equal grade in the grand army was very objectionable, but there were other considerations which overrode the objections. Each of the armies had its history and its strong *esprit de corps*. Such pride in its organization is so powerful a stimulus to every soldier, from the ranks upward, that the morale of an army may be seriously impaired by discouraging it. The whole country had glowed in Thomas's stubborn courage at Chickamauga, and in his assurance afterward that he would hold Chattanooga till the army starved. A general public sentiment, which no prudent administration or commander could afford to ignore, demanded that the Army of the Cumberland, with Thomas at its head, should remain intact as the preponderant unit in the Army of the West. With this sentiment Grant was in full accord. His strong, practical sense in military matters made him always averse to meddling uncer-

sarily with existing organizations, and he instinctively felt that the best way to avoid dissensions and remove the jealousies which always spring up when one army is merged in another, is to avoid every change in form which would wound the pride of the soldier. Thomas was a noble and patriotic man, but he felt as keenly as any one his personal dignity, and resented as warmly as any a slight to it. Grant respected and sympathized with this feeling, and does not seem to have debated even the necessity of leaving the organization of the Cumberland army as it was. Sherman fully agreed with him in this, and received the chief command with this question of organization definitively settled.

The War Department at this time made an attempt to relieve the army of a congestion in the upper grades, which gave little hope of promotion to meritorious officers in the field. General officers who for any cause had dropped out of active employment and were awaiting orders were assigned to the different armies, to take any service suitable to their rank. Major generals could claim no command greater than a division, and brigadiers must be content with a brigade if divisions were not vacant. A few resigned rather than take a command of less importance than that which they had last exercised. In the West the most prominent officer in this situation was General Buell, who had been relieved from the command of the Army of the Cumberland at his own request, under a pressure which was much more political than military. A court of inquiry had, in substance, justified his conduct of the campaign of 1862, and, though he had declined some overtures looking to active service, Grant and Sherman were both disposed to find an acceptable position for him. Sherman, with the assent of Thomas, had suggested that he be assigned to the Fourteenth Army Corps in the Cumberland army; but, on hearing the rumor that

Buell was to be employed, Andrew Johnson, as military governor of Tennessee, protested. This, joined with the strong hostility of Governor Morton, of Indiana, made an array of political influence quite strong enough to account for the order of the War Department mustering him out of service a few weeks later.*

The difficulty growing out of the general order assigning officers to active duty was complicated by the fact that a number who had been relieved from duty in the Eastern armies were ordered to the West, and reported to army commanders who had been sifting their own organizations to make them more efficient, and were anything but pleased to assign to brigades and divisions men who were strangers to them, and against whom was the presumption arising out of the fact that they were not retained in the army where they had served and were known. When, therefore, a number of general officers were sent out to Grant, and he asked Thomas whether he wanted any of them, the latter very frankly said he must first know who and what they were—some men he would be very glad to get, others he would not choose to have at all. "The colonels I have in command of brigades," he said, "are all efficient men, and I would not care to exchange them for worthless brigadiers." He afterward emphasized this by giving his reasons for objecting to some who were suggested to him.†

Several changes were made among the corps commanders also. General Hooker was in command of two corps—the Eleventh, under Howard, and the Twelfth, under Slocum—which he had brought to the West from the Army of the Potomac. The anomaly of having an intermediate commander between the army commander and the

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 221, 278, 292, 304, 306, 320, 323.

† Id., pt. 2, pp. 131, 142.

heads of the corps was a fruitful cause of chafing, and, after some correspondence with Washington on the subject, it was finally adjusted by consolidating the two corps into one, commanded by Hooker, and known as the Twentieth. Howard was transferred to the Fourth, which General Gordon Granger vacated, taking a leave of absence, and Slocum was sent to take command at Vicksburg.* Sheridan would have been the natural successor to Granger in the Fourth Corps, where he commanded a division, but Grant had already determined to give him the command of the cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. In the Army of the Tennessee the promotion of McPherson and the wide separation of the column in Georgia from the troops left in the Mississippi Valley led to a partial reorganization, in which General Logan was assigned to the Fifteenth and General Blair to the Seventeenth Corps. In the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield retained the immediate command of the Twenty-third Corps in the field, as well as that of the army, and General Stoneman was transferred to the cavalry corps of that army. These changes completed the larger organization of the forces before Grant went East, or were made in pursuance of arrangements settled with him. Sherman retained the organization as he found it, till the progress of the campaign naturally caused some modifications.

When Sherman met Grant at Nashville on the 17th of March, he learned authoritatively the purpose of the lieutenant general to take the field with the Army of the Potomac, and that the independent command of the western army would fall upon his shoulders. To save time for consultation, he accompanied Grant to Cincinnati, as the latter was

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, p. 397; xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 313-315; Id., pt. 3, p. 258.

in haste to get back to Washington. Far from showing any wish to assume the higher position, Sherman had urged that Grant should stay with the army at Chattanooga and personally lead it. The letters which passed between them when Grant sent the news of his promotion (so often quoted) reveal their close relations of friendship and confidence as nothing else can do.* Grant's departure from his habitual reticence to speak of his indebtedness to Sherman and McPherson was a remarkable exhibition of feeling on his part. The warmth of Sherman's reply does not surprise us or seem so unexpected, but it was no less sincere. He opened a window into the recesses of his heart and mind when he said, "Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point, but that admitted the ray of light which I have followed since." His wishes for the future he puts in frankest and strongest form, and the vehemence of feeling grows as he writes: "Don't stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and the Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. . . . For God's sake and your country's sake, come out of Washington! I foretold to General Halleck before he left Corinth the inevitable result, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the seat of the coming empire, and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic."

Grant's impulses urged him in the same direc-

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 18, 49.

tion, but his visit to Washington had given him conclusive public reasons why he should lead the great army in Virginia. It was the logical result of this that Sherman should command the combined armies of the West. The time had passed when he shrunk from responsibility. A laudable ambition would prompt him to rejoice at the opportunity to conduct the western campaign. But he was not even consulted. Friendship and a high estimate of Sherman's capacity united to fix Grant's choice. There was neither hesitation nor second thought. At his request the appointment was made, and the notice of it was the official order promulgated by the War Department on the 12th of March.

Sherman and General George H. Thomas were old friends and classmates. Thomas's appointment as brigadier general of volunteers had been decided by Sherman's influence. He served in Kentucky, in 1861, under Sherman's command. The fortunes of war reversed the relation, and put Sherman subordinate to Thomas after the battle of Shiloh. They had again been equal department commanders under Grant at Missionary Ridge, and now Sherman was again to become the commanding officer over his friend. Sherman often said that, had such been the order, he would have served with completest content and cheerfulness under Thomas in these final campaigns. In their private intercourse they were the schoolmates of boyhood, and the cadet nicknames were those they used to each other. Their friendship was ended only by death.

There were not wanting to Thomas admiring friends who thought he was "overslaughed" in the new assignments to duty, and these were not always judicious in expressing themselves. They found a mouthpiece in Andrew Johnson, who telegraphed to the President his opinion that Thomas ought to be independent in his command and re-

port direct to Washington.* This would mean, of course, a scheme of separate small campaigns, such as had so often been disastrous in the past, instead of the strong combined effort which Grant had planned. There is no evidence that Thomas favored such folly for a moment.

The two men, both very able, were very unlike in temperament. Sherman was impulsive and demonstrative; Thomas was impassive and phlegmatic. Sherman was lithe and wiry; Thomas was massive and slow of motion. Sherman was restless and aggressive; Thomas was deliberate and inclined to the defensive. Sherman grew more quiet when the excitement of a crisis in battle gave vent to his nervous strain, as escaping steam stops when the engine begins its motion; Thomas was quickened by such a crisis into more active movement of mind and body. They supplemented each other admirably, but there can now be little doubt that Sherman's restless energy, his physical inability to tolerate a standstill, was the quality which made it possible to continue the advance in Georgia, where the army was dependent on a single line of communications reaching to the Ohio River, four hundred miles away. It is not worth while to discuss the possible results of a different choice of commanders. Sherman's selection was justified by the best of all possible military tests—a glorious ending of the campaign and of the war.

The plan of campaign which Grant had outlined for himself before his transfer to the East was communicated to Thomas as early as the 19th of January, in a letter which said, "I look upon the line for this army to secure in its next campaign to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile, Atlanta and Montgomery being the important intermediate

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 105.

points." * This had been fully discussed by Grant and Sherman, and, when the latter succeeded to the command, Atlanta remained the goal to be first reached, though Grant was explicit in saying that, beyond indicating Johnston's army as the true objective, he left his subordinate free to execute his work in his own way.† Sherman had been expected to concentrate the Army of the Tennessee at Huntsville, Ala., Thomas that of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, and Schofield to bring the Army of the Ohio to Cleveland, Tenn., still farther to the east. A converging advance upon Rome, Ga., had been indicated as the opening movement. In writing to General Robert Allen, chief quartermaster at Louisville, Ky., Sherman had said, on March 24th, that his principal depots would be at Nashville, Chattanooga, Huntsville, and Decatur, the first two the principal ones. In the same letter he said, "We are on the offensive, and should not think of any defensive measure;" ‡ an expression very like one which brought upon General Pope unmeasured and unmerited criticism in 1862.

Could the army be supplied by the line of railroad? That was the burning question. From Louisville on the Ohio to Chattanooga through Nashville was three hundred and thirty-seven miles. From Chattanooga to Atlanta would be a hundred and thirty-five more—four hundred and seventy-two in all, a single track, and every mile of it liable to raids by the enemy's cavalry. Of course, Nashville and Chattanooga, the principal depots, must be fortified and garrisoned, so that supplies and munitions could be accumulated there as a reserve in case of any interruption of communication between these places and the base. Colonel D. C. McCallum, the general manager of military rail-

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, p. 143.

† Id., pt. 3, p. 246.

‡ Id., pt. 3, p. 142.

ways, had come West in January to study the situation, and great improvements had been made in the railway management before the military division was turned over to Sherman.* But the best estimates of the number of cars and locomotives lacking were so great that the problem seemed almost insoluble. More than a hundred locomotives and twenty-five hundred cars, in addition to the existing rolling stock, were necessary, the experts said, to insure the delivery at the front of the one hundred and fifty carloads per day, which were the measure of the wants of an army of a hundred thousand men. The purchase or construction of the extra equipment during the winter and spring was out of the question.

Sherman took the matter in hand with characteristic vigor. The management of the railways was connected directly with his own headquarters. He limited the use of the trains to the absolute necessities of the army. Private trade and transportation must find other channels. Passenger traffic was strictly limited. Strangers and visitors were not permitted to come to the front. The full motive power and the car space were devoted to military work. The issue of army rations to citizens at military posts had grown into a great abuse. This was stopped. Colonel Adna Anderson, master of railway transportation, zealously and untiringly enforced Sherman's orders, but it was not yet enough. The general then quietly arranged with Mr. Guthrie, the president of the Louisville and Nashville Railway, to keep on the line south of the Ohio the rolling stock received from Northern railways, and, while the "car accountants" were gradually finding out that their equipment did not come back to their roads, and were fuming over the delay, the depots at Nashville and Chatta-

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, p. 143.

nooga were accumulating rations and ammunition. No one enjoyed the humorous side of a situation more than Sherman, and his eyes twinkled with fun as he reckoned up the profits of his ruse in the growing possibilities of an early opening of the spring campaign.

Of course, there was an outcry. "Imploring appeals" to Mr. Lincoln moved his kind heart to ask Sherman whether he could not modify his order. The latter answered: "It is demonstrated that the railroad can not supply the army and the people too. One or the other must quit, and the army don't intend to unless Joe Johnston makes us." * Sherman was stoutly backed at Washington by General Meigs, the quartermaster general, and was allowed to have his way.† He foresaw, what turned out to be true, that the private business of the country could accommodate itself to the situation with but little individual suffering if his system was firmly and honestly carried out. The supply problem was solved if the army itself could be kept from overburdening itself with *impedimenta*, as every army is prone to do. Writing to General Thomas on this subject, Sherman said: "When we move we will take no tents or baggage, but one change of clothing on our horses or to be carried by the men, and on pack animals by company officers, with five days' bacon, twenty days' bread, and thirty days' salt, sugar, and coffee; nothing else but arms and ammunition proportioned to our ability." ‡ As the campaign lengthened, this scale had to be modified, but it was the standard for use in the frequent instances when the railway had to be left for some turning or flanking movement.

On the Confederate side, General Joseph E. Johnston had been in command since the middle

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 25, 33. † Id., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 434.

‡ Id., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 323.

of December, and his troops were in the strong intrenched camp in front of Dalton, about forty miles from Chattanooga. General Polk had a small army in Alabama and Mississippi, and Longstreet another on the confines of Virginia and East Tennessee. President Davis began urging an aggressive winter campaign as soon as Johnston assumed command, and indicated his preference for a plan by which Johnston should turn Thomas's position at Chattanooga by moving to the eastward of it by way of Cleveland, Tenn., while Longstreet came down the Holston Valley and united with him for a dash through the mountains into middle Tennessee. There were strong reasons in favor of this plan, and it was supported by the authority of General Lee. It was reckoned that by re-enforcements from Polk and from Beauregard's forces on the Atlantic seacoast Johnston's column could start seventy-five thousand strong, and be increased to nearly a hundred thousand by the junction with Longstreet.*

Johnston's real preference was for the defensive policy, tempting Sherman to assault his impregnable position at Dalton, and watching for a favorable opportunity for a decisive return blow when his opponent's impetuosity should have led to some disaster to the National army. He presented with force the objections to the plan proposed to him, the need of assured supplies for the opening steps of such a campaign, and expressed a preference for a line of operations by Rome, Guntersville, and Huntsville, by which he should turn Thomas's position by the south and west, instead of the east and north. His own choice, however, would have been to go still farther west and make northern Mississippi his base of operations if he must aban-

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, pp. 843, 856; xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 592, 594, 614.

don the waiting and defensive strategy which he thought wisest of all.*

The strained relations which notoriously existed between Davis and Johnston gave to this correspondence a very formal air on the part of the general at least, and one is impressed in reading it with the conviction that the latter was willing to gain time by the discussion, and let the delay bring about the adoption of his own plan. Anyhow, this was what happened, and Grant and Sherman were allowed to use the winter for the Meridian expedition and in the preparations for a spring campaign. Johnston remained quietly within his formidable lines at Dalton, only sending Hardee with re-enforcements for Polk when Sherman threatened to march from Meridian into Alabama. As the spring approached, Longstreet was ordered to join Lee in Virginia, and any thought of his again uniting with Johnston was given up. Polk prepared to carry a corps of fourteen thousand men to Johnston as soon as active operations should begin. Regiments and brigades were carefully culled out from garrisons on the Gulf coast, and within the first week from the beginning of Sherman's operations in May, Johnston had in hand the seventy-five thousand men which the Richmond government had calculated upon as the maximum force that could be furnished him.† Sherman had estimated very accurately the numbers under the Confederate colors in April, but was not fully aware of the extent to which re-enforcements were ready to reach his adversary in the first weeks of May. He was entirely free from the too common fault of exaggerating the forces of an opponent. He did not magnify his task for the sake of greater glory in success, nor did he see lions in his path.

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 510, 559, 644.

† Id., pt. 3, p. 866 : xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 670, 737, 740.

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA.

GENERAL GRANT had planned a simultaneous advance of the National armies early in May, and on the 4th of the month, as the Army of the Potomac was crossing the Rapidan, Schofield's Army of the Ohio was crossing the boundary of Georgia, coming out of Tennessee to become, at Red Clay, the left of Sherman's line. Thomas was concentrating the Army of the Cumberland with his center at Ringgold, some twenty miles in front of Chattanooga, his left at Catoosa Springs, and his right feeling its way southward toward Trickum. The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, was moving from Chattanooga by the rear of Thomas's army, to come into position as Sherman's right wing near Villanow.

Several parallel mountain ridges, running from northeast to southwest, lay between Chattanooga and Dalton, a small town in the valley of the Conasauga River, where the Confederate forces under Johnston lay. The last of these ridges, Rocky Face, was an almost perpendicular barrier, cleft by the deep gorge of Mill Creek, down which ran the Atlanta Railroad after piercing the ridge of Tunnel Hill. On the 7th Thomas demonstrated against Tunnel Hill with Palmer's corps (Fourteenth), while his left, under Howard (Fourth Corps), turned the position on the north and forced the enemy to retire within their Rocky Face lines through the crooked and fortified gorge, with the



O. O. Howard. W. B. Hazen. John A. Logan. W. T. Sherman. J. E. C. Davis. Joseph A. Mower. Frank Blair.

GENERAL SHERMAN AND HIS CORPS COMMANDERS.

From a photograph in the possession of P. Tecumseh Sherman, Esq., taken at Washington in May, 1864.

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precipitous heights of Buzzard's Roost looking down upon it.

For two days Sherman tested the strength of his adversary's position from the west and north in sharp combats, in which only small bodies could find foothold. He was convinced that he could not carry Johnston's lines from this side without very great loss of life, and pressed the march of McPherson's army in a flanking movement by his right, according to the general plan which he had announced to Grant on taking the field.* McPherson was sent through Villanow to Snake Creek Gap, an almost unknown pass and ravine turning the south end of Rocky Face ridge, twelve or fifteen miles below Dalton, and leading to the town of Resaca, in the angle at the junction of the Conasauga with the Oostanaula River. Sherman hoped that McPherson would be able to reach and disable the railroad, but Resaca was found intrenched and garrisoned by four thousand men under General Cantey, and, after a strong reconnaissance, McPherson retired and went into position at the eastern mouth of the gap in Sugar Valley.

Without wasting time in regrets, Sherman hastened the transfer of his whole army to McPherson's position, leaving Howard's corps and the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio under Stoneman to cover the communications with Chattanooga. Johnston meanwhile was equally busy in retreating from Dalton on Resaca by the shorter interior route, and in throwing up fieldworks on lines previously marked out by his engineer, extending the Resaca intrenchments northward on the line of hills between the Conasauga River and Camp Creek.

The passage of a large army through a narrow

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, p. 25.

and wild defile, where the road was a mere track in the bed of a mountain stream, was a tedious operation, but by keeping it full night and day the army was able to deploy forward from Sugar Valley on Saturday the 14th. McPherson, who knew the way to the town, was ordered to push forward on the right, the two corps with Thomas to form next in the center, and Schofield to swing two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps by a long half wheel across the rough country into position on the left. Howard had entered Dalton as Johnston withdrew from it, and followed the enemy's rear guard southward. His coming within supporting distance of Schofield's flank was to be the signal for attack from our left, with a view to outflank the Confederates, while the whole line should then advance.

A little before noon on the 14th Howard's skirmish fire was heard approaching, and the signal for attack was given. Stubborn resistance was made by the enemy's outposts, but advantages were gained at points along the line. Schofield's left division carried a line of intrenchments with severe loss, but his right was badly handled, and suffered heavily without compensatory gain.* Howard continued the advance on the extreme left, but was not able to reach beyond the enemy's flank. Thomas and McPherson closely invested Resaca. A pontoon bridge was thrown across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry, and the cavalry, supported by a division from General Dodge's (Sixteenth) corps, was sent by Sherman to threaten Calhoun, the next important village on the railroad south of Resaca.



The next day the engagement was continued. McPherson gained some hills on the right, close to the river, from which he commanded the rail-


* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, p. 243.

MAP No. 1 ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

SCALE OF MILES
0 1 2 3 4 5 10

EXPLANATION:

Union Works 
 Confederate Works 
 LINES OF MARCH PURSUED BY
 THE SEPARATE ARMIES
 Army of the Ohio
 " " Tennessee
 " " Cumberland



road and trestle bridges. Hooker's corps was taken from the center and passed to the extreme left. Howard stretched his line so as to relieve the Twenty-third Corps troops on his right, and these were marched to Hooker's support on the flank, together with Schofield's reserve division. Step by step this flank pushed forward, till near night it gained advantages which threatened the enemy's rear. Threatened now on both flanks, with a river behind him, Johnston was again forced to retreat. He had laid a pontoon bridge in the night of the 14th above the others, and out of McPherson's range. All these were put to use in the night of the 15th, and next morning the National troops entered the place. A thousand prisoners and two batteries of artillery were among the trophies, but the lists of Sherman's killed and wounded approximated four thousand.*

The railway bridge at Resaca had been burned, but the wagon bridge was uninjured, and Sherman had laid two pontoon bridges across the Oostanaula below the mouth of Snake Creek. He pressed the pursuit in several columns, first sending a division of the Fourteenth Corps to support the cavalry far on the right in a direct movement on Rome. He saw with unwillingness his long line of communications growing longer, and ordered his subordinates to attack without delay if Johnston anywhere made a stand, trusting to his ability to concentrate in time to make a success of any battle when once it was opened. The country between the Oostanaula and the Etowah was an open one compared with the mountainous region north of Resaca, and, though Johnston had thought of offering battle at Adairsville, about halfway between the streams, he found on inspection that it was too open a situation, and continued his retreat to

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 201, 202.

Cassville, where he issued formal orders for battle on the 19th.

Sherman's center, under Thomas, had followed the "broad trail" of the enemy along the railroad to Kingston, where it turned sharply to the east. Schofield's line of march, four or five miles eastward, led more nearly in the direction of Cassville, and he was ordered to move straight on that place. McPherson, equally far away on the west, was called in to Kingston, while the center took roads which would meet Schofield in front of the enemy. Johnston's position at Cassville was on a commanding ridge behind the town, but Polk and Hood, who held the center and right of his line, protested so vigorously that the center was enfiladed by the artillery of Sherman's left that Johnston yielded his opinion, and ordered a continuation of the retreat across the Etowah, where the railway passes through the defile of Allatoona. Johnston tells us that he never ceased to regret that he did not give battle as he first intended.* Sherman also regretted it, for his policy was to bring the campaign to a decisive issue as soon as possible.

Sherman followed the enemy through Cartersville with a division of Schofield's corps, and when the railway bridge was found to be burned he quickly turned his columns toward Kingston, and secured crossings of the river above and below that place. The Resaca bridge was already rebuilt, and Kingston was made the field depot of supplies. Twenty days' rations were in the wagons, herds of cattle were driven near the columns, and the army plunged into the wild and tangled country between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee. The gorge of Allatoona, Kennesaw Mountain, and Lost Mountain made a group of strong positions around the town of Marietta, and Johnston planned to

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 3, p. 616.

make of them a new intrenched camp, while he would meet Sherman on advanced lines westward, near Dallas and along Pumpkin Vine Creek.

On the 25th of May the National columns were converging on Dallas, intending to follow the main road from that place to Marietta. Johnston was also in motion for the same place. At the crossing of the Pumpkin Vine near Owen's Mills, Hooker, who had the advance in the center, found the bridge burning, and indications of a strong force on the road to New Hope Church. The fire was put out, the bridge quickly repaired, and his head of column turned in that direction from the Dallas road. It was Hood's corps of the Confederates which was going into position around the church on the heights east of the valley. Hooker made a headlong attack, but was met with a withering fire, which checked his advanced division. The rest of the corps went in to the support of their comrades, but it was already late in the afternoon, a heavy downpour of rain delayed the approaching columns, and the affair was limited to a bloody combat between the two corps.

During the night Sherman hurried forward his troops, while Johnston was doing the same, and the next day found the two armies facing each other across a narrow valley from Dallas northeast in the direction of Ackworth on the railroad. Then began a systematic warfare of intrenched lines, with only occasional serious efforts at direct attack, in which the assailing party pretty uniformly got the worst of it. Sherman steadily pushed forward and extended his left, seeking to renew his connection with the railroad at Ackworth. Each day the cavalry would feel for the end of the enemy's line in the dense forest and thickets, and the infantry would advance to a brisk skirmishing attack, pushing the Confederates back and intrenching every foot that was gained. For six weeks,

amid the constant rains of an unusually wet season, this work continued.

On the 27th of May Howard's corps tried the fortunes of a direct attack upon a projecting angle of the Confederate line near Pickett's Mill, but was repulsed. On the 28th Johnston sought to check the movement toward the left by an attack upon McPherson's right at Dallas, made by Hardee's corps. He in turn suffered a bloody repulse, and Sherman's transfer of troops from right flank to left went steadily on. On June 1st Stoneman's cavalry corps occupied the Allatoona pass, and the rebuilding of the Etowah railway bridge was immediately begun. By the 4th Sherman's lines had advanced so far as to threaten Johnston's connection with Marietta, and the latter retreated to a new line previously laid out within the old, and extending from Kennesaw Mountain west to Pine Mountain, and thence south to Lost Mountain. A strip of country several miles wide was thus given up, but Johnston's new position was wonderfully strong, and admirably covered the railroad from Kennesaw to the Chattahoochee.

Sherman now made Schofield's Army of the Ohio his pivot on the left, and passed around it successively Thomas's and McPherson's armies. McPherson covered the Ackworth station on the railroad on the 7th of June, and the next day General Frank P. Blair joined him with the Seventeenth Corps, coming from the north by the way of Rome, the only considerable re-enforcement Sherman received during the campaign. A new field depot of supplies was soon established on the railroad, McPherson's lines were advanced close to Kennesaw on the north, and a new swinging movement by the right now began, Thomas being the center as usual, but Schofield being the extreme right and traversing the outer arc of the circle.

Day by day the sharp combats went on, mile

by mile the right flank swung southward, till the old Sandtown road was occupied to the crossing of the highway from Marietta to Powder Springs. On the 14th of June Johnston found his position at Pine Mountain untenable, and in the last reconnaissance he made from its summit General Polk was killed at his side by a cannon ball. In him Johnston lost not only a stanch subordinate, but a friend who had been the peacemaker with President Davis. The corps passed for a time to the command of General Stephen D. Lee.

In a day or two Lost Mountain had to be left to the Confederate cavalry to defend it, the infantry line not reaching beyond the Powder Springs road, and the flank being near the upper waters of Olley's Creek, which runs southwestward into the Chattahoochee. These movements had been hastened by the aggressive vigor of Sherman's troops, pushing from hill to hill, fording stream after stream all flooded by the constant rains, getting artillery positions which enfiladed portions of the intrenchments, and making rushes for any point which seemed weakened. Although no general engagement took place, these daily combats often became considerable affairs, in which a division or a corps was involved.

Hardee's corps was the left of Johnston's line till the 21st, when the extension of Sherman's right threatened to outflank the position at the Powder Springs road, and Johnston ordered Hood to march his corps in the night from the extreme right to the left. In the morning of the 22d Hooker's corps was extending the right of Thomas's army southward, and Schofield, passing still farther beyond, planted his right at Cheney's house, where the old Sandtown road crossed that running from Marietta to Powder Springs. In the afternoon, without orders from Johnston, Hood made an impetuous attack with his whole corps upon the right

of Hooker and left of Schofield at Culp's farm, on the ridge between Noyes's (commonly called Nose's) Creek and Olley's. The vigor and persistence of the attack seemed to indicate that Johnston was taking the aggressive with his whole army, but it was not followed up by any other than Hood's troops, which were repulsed with heavy loss.

Sherman had hoped to advance his left wing when his adversary stretched so far in the opposite direction, but the enemy's positions on Kennesaw Mountain and Brush Mountain were so strong that a small force could hold them, and Johnston seemed able to keep pace with the National army in stretching to the southwest. He had received considerable re-enforcements, and the Georgia militia had been called out and were joining him; but Sherman still felt himself superior in force, and sure that the enemy must be drawn out in a very thin line without reserves. The truth was that the least assailable parts of Johnston's fieldworks were held with strong skirmish lines, while reserves were made of the troops thus saved, and these were placed at central positions in support, so that they could be quickly hurried to any point which might be attacked. It had seemed to Sherman, therefore, that by combined attacks along the line he ought to be able to find the weak points and break through. He chafed at the growing unwillingness to assault, knowing that it is when one's adversary is broken that the advantages are obtained which pay for the losses in the attack. He had steadily kept in mind that the Confederate army was his principal objective, and was not content with the prospect of following it up in slow and indefinite retreat. In deference, however, to the opinions of his subordinates, he had arranged to transfer McPherson's army from the left to the extreme right, so as still more to threaten Johnston's connection

with Atlanta and force him to retreat. This involved the accumulation of supplies enough to leave the railroad temporarily, as he had done at Dalton and at the Etowah, but the persistent rains had foundered the whole country, and the wagon trains could hardly supply the troops in their present camps. Such a deadlock was intolerable, and he reverted to the plan of a direct assault of Johnston's lines.

Orders were issued for an attack on points to be selected by army commanders, one from McPherson's front and two from Thomas's. Schofield was to make a demonstration with his left, while his right made an effort to find a way to turn the enemy's extreme flank. The tactics of the assaults were left to the corps commanders. On Monday, June 27th, the advance was made with splendid courage by the brigades detailed for the purpose, who pushed their way through the abattis close to the enemy's parapets, and, though they were not able to break through, they held the ground they gained, and did not allow a head to show itself above the breastworks. Sherman thought that a second line charging over the first would have entered the works, and this was the opinion of some of the best officers who took part in the attack; but it was not done, and the brave men in the advance made cover for themselves where they lay, and their positions were connected with the lines on right and left.

From the right Schofield had advanced one of his divisions over Olley's Creek, had carried an intrenched hill held by the Confederate cavalry, and seized a strong position commanding the Nickajack Valley, where the direct highway from Marietta joins the Sandtown road. From this position the topography showed that Johnston's left could not be easily extended in that direction, and that a promising flanking movement there would

be a much shorter one than had been supposed. Sherman acted upon it at once. Hooker's line was stretched so as to relieve part of Schofield's corps, and the whole of this was used to make strong the new position on the flank. Johnston saw that the time had come to let go his hold on Kennesaw, and had marked out new lines beyond the Nickajack. Into these he marched on the night of the 2d of July, while McPherson was transferring the Army of the Tennessee to Schofield's right. The attack upon Kennesaw had cost Sherman twenty-five hundred casualties, a much larger number than the enemy had suffered, sheltered as they were behind strong works, but the general result had been the retreat of Johnston's army, and the moral effect on the National forces was that of victory. Sherman had shown that he was not discouraged at any obstacles, but that on being checked in one direction he would find a way to his object in another.

On the 4th of July McPherson's advance drove the enemy from a line of rifle pits on the Sandtown road, Thomas's columns pushed through Marietta along the railroad, and Johnston retired within his new line of works, carefully prepared to cover the crossing of the Chattahoochee River. These intrenchments began at the river about a mile above the railway bridge, and followed the trend of the heights bordering the stream, continued about six miles to the southwestward, the lower part being along the Nickajack Creek, which for the last two or three miles of its course is nearly parallel to the Chattahoochee. Within this line was a shorter one, a bridge-head covering the peninsula at the crossing, and protecting the transfer of the army to the south side whenever it should become necessary.

These works were too formidable for a direct assault; their extension along the river toward

Sandtown would make difficult any attempt to turn them on that side, involving the uncovering of the railway line and long journeys of wagon trains. After careful reconnoitering, Sherman decided to make his crossing by his left, but kept up lively cavalry demonstrations on both flanks of his army to hide his purpose. On the 7th of July the railway had been repaired, so that supplies were delivered at the army lines, Schofield's corps was at Smyrna camp ground, and he had selected the mouth of Soap Creek, about six miles above the railway bridge, as a favorable place to force the passage of the river. The next day the enemy's outpost there was surprised, two pontoon bridges were laid before night, and Schofield held the hills beyond in force. In the night of the 9th Johnston retreated across the river and burned the railway bridge, taking up a line along Peach Tree Creek to cover Atlanta.

Some days were now used in getting up supplies and loading wagon trains for another separation from the railway. Schofield was re-enforced by Howard's corps, McPherson took position at Roswell, some ten miles farther up stream, while threats of crossing below, near Sandtown, were also kept up. On the 17th of July everything was ready for the advance by Sherman, when the Confederate commander was more grievously surprised than by the crossing of the Chattahoochee. He received telegraphic orders to turn over the command of his army to General John B. Hood. Dissatisfaction with his defensive policy and continued retreat was the reason assigned. Hood was known as a sharp critic of his commander's methods, and was himself regarded as a type of aggressive generalship. General Cheatham took Hood's corps, and General A. P. Stewart succeeded S. D. Lee in command of Polk's.

Johnston had himself planned to take the ag-

gressive as soon as Sherman should advance south of the river, and gave Hood the benefit of his information and purposes. These were, in substance, adopted by the latter. On the 18th Sherman's columns advanced. Thomas had laid a pontoon bridge at Pace's Ferry, only two or three miles above the railway bridge, and Schofield replaced his canvas pontoons with a wooden trestle. The whole army was to execute a wheel to the right on Palmer's corps of the Cumberland army, Hooker's keeping touch with his right, Howard's marching on Buckhead, Schofield passing through Cross Keys toward Decatur, and McPherson taking the still longer circuit toward Stone Mountain and the Augusta railroad, which he cut before evening.

On the 19th the wheeling movement continued, Thomas getting the heads of each of his three corps across Peach Tree Creek, with a stubborn opposition which indicated that the enemy's position was not far away. The movement had opened a considerable gap between Sherman's wings. Hood ordered Cheatham to hold fast a salient in this interval, near Jones's Mill, on Clear Creek, and his other two corps to attack Thomas's army obliquely on its left flank. Schofield's march that day brought him over the south fork of Peach Tree, about two miles from Decatur, and one of McPherson's corps (Dodge's) connected with his left. Wheeler's cavalry had tried in vain to check their advance.

On the 20th Sherman continued the movement of his left wing, threatening Cheatham's flank, and the whole Confederate army had to take ground to the right. The attack which Hood had ordered for one o'clock was thus delayed, but soon after three it fell with great fury on the left of one of Howard's divisions, and progressed along the front of this and Hooker's divisions in succession. The battle was persistently renewed and stubbornly continued till nightfall, but Thomas's men held

their ground and repulsed Hood with great loss to him. Meanwhile Sherman was hurrying forward Schofield and McPherson, and they were rattling Wheeler's cavalry back beyond Cheatham's flank so fast that, although the latter was stretched almost to the breaking point, he could not reach far enough to check the National troops, and Hood was forced to order away a division from Hardee to support the cavalry and hold the commanding hills at the very gates of Atlanta.

The engagement on the Confederate side was a general one, intended by Hood as a decisive effort to drive Sherman back, and it had failed with a loss to the Confederates of five or six thousand men. As usual, the attacking columns suffered most, and Sherman's casualties did not exceed two thousand, of which by far the greater part was in Hooker's corps.

On the 21st Sherman closed in upon the enemy's positions in front of Thomas and Schofield, while he brought forward McPherson's men on the left. Blair's corps carried a bald hill, which was the extreme right of the Confederate line south of the Augusta Railway, and intrenched it. Garrard's cavalry was sent to destroy this railway more thoroughly for some distance eastward, as there were constant rumors of re-enforcements coming to Hood that way.

Hood retired within the fortifications of Atlanta in the night, sending Hardee's corps through the city and out by roads leading to the southeast to turn and attack McPherson in flank and rear. Cheatham's corps he held ready to attack McPherson from the city side when Hardee's battle should be joined. Stewart's corps, with the Georgia militia, held and strengthened the works on the northeast and north of the place.

In the early morning of the 22d of July the National army advanced in line over the abandoned

trenches and occupied the nearest hills facing the town. Thomas's right reached the Chattanooga Railway, and covered the steps immediately taken to rebuild the great Chattahoochee bridge. Schofield continued the line southward to the Howard house, near the Augusta Railway, and with him was Sherman, who reconnoitered close to the town till he and his staff drew the fire of the place. McPherson put in Logan's corps to extend the investment and to connect with Blair at Bald Hill, and Blair's corps completed the line, recurving it a little where it looked down into the hollow of Entrenchment Creek. Dodge's corps was marching from Decatur.

Hardee made his march as appointed, passed completely behind McPherson's two corps, then faced northwest, and marched to the attack, the temporary absence of our cavalry giving the advantage of a surprise. Dodge's march, however, had brought him opposite Hardee's right, and, facing southward quickly, he met and repulsed that wing of the enemy. McPherson was with him, and, galloping across toward Blair's position, he ran into the enemy's skirmishers pushing into the gap, and was shot down and killed. Hardee's left advanced behind Blair's flank too quickly for any change of position, and our men leaped the breastworks and fought desperately from the other side. For two or three hours, beginning at noon, the fierce conflict continued in the tangled dense forest, but Hardee was held at bay and then repulsed.

The roar of the musketry had hardly told Sherman at the Howard house that his left was assaulted when he got the bad news of McPherson's fall. His remarkable quality of growing more composed in peril now came out in a very marked way. With serenest quietness and clearness he sent his orders and suggestions to Logan, who succeeded next in rank to McPherson, telling him what steps would

100

MAP No. II ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

SCALE OF MILES
0 1 2 3 4 5 10

EXPLANATION:

Union Works

Confederate Works




LINES OF MARCH PURSUED BY
THE SEPARATE ARMIES

Army of the Ohio

" Tennessee

" Cumberland



be taken to support him and of his confidence that he would make the Army of the Tennessee victorious. A division of Schofield's was ordered to reinforce Logan, part of it going to cover and protect the army trains. Schofield's line was thinned out to fill the gaps thus made in it, and Thomas was directed to seize any opportunity to turn the tables on the enemy's left.

About three o'clock Hood sent Cheatham's corps forward to strike Blair's and Logan's corps in rear as they were engaged with Hardee in front. He was a little too late. Hardee had been beaten off, and the invincible troops in the trenches leaped back to the other side and met Cheatham as they had met Hardee. A momentary break occurred at the railroad, but Sherman was looking down upon the spot from the Howard house, and, calling for Schofield's artillery to mass there, he personally directed an overwhelming fire of canister, which drove back the assailants and enabled Logan to restore his line. Before nightfall Hardee retired, and Hood's decimated corps were withdrawn into the city. The second costly effort to take the aggressive had failed. The penalty was a casualty list of ten thousand for Hood, of which over three thousand were killed and two thousand were prisoners. On the National side the loss was thirty-five hundred killed, wounded, and missing.* A great part of the enemy's loss was verified by Logan's formal delivery of the dead under a flag of truce.

As it became evident that Hood meant to hold fast at Atlanta, considerations of protecting the line of communications with the rear, and reaching by shortest direction the railways southwest of the place, determined Sherman to extend his line by the right rather than the left. The Augusta

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 3, p. 21.

Railroad was broken up for thirty miles eastward, and the cavalry on both flanks were set to work to reach the railways beyond the city. General Howard had succeeded McPherson in command of the Army of the Tennessee, and was ordered to transfer it to the extreme right. The three corps passed behind the rest of the army on the 27th, coming successively into line on the extension around the city of the works of the Cumberland army. Schofield was ordered to stretch the Army of the Ohio so as to make a show of holding the ground to the Decatur road and the battlefield of the 22d. Anticipating such a movement, Hood's engineers were already laying out a new defensive line, leaving the old at a salient in the western suburbs of the city on the Licksillet road, and running thence southwest, parallel to the Atlanta and Western Railway, and about a mile from it. The intention of this was, of course, to protect the railroads and prevent the complete investment of the place.

Howard's movement was not completed on the 27th, but next morning it was still in progress, and Logan's corps was just reaching the crossroads at Ezra Church when it was violently attacked. Hood had sent General S. D. Lee (now the commandant of Hood's own corps) with his own and part of Stewart's corps to make another fierce effort to roll back the flank of the National army. The battle lasted through the afternoon, but Logan held his position without difficulty, and Howard's artillery and reserves completed the bloody repulse of the enemy. Toward sunset the discouragement of the Confederate troops was such that regiments doggedly refused to follow their officers in the hopeless and destructive charges. Sherman and Howard were both on the ground, and the commander had planned a return blow on the flanks of the disheartened enemy, but the detached troops

missed the road and did not arrive. Again Hood had lost more than five thousand men, while Howard's casualties were less than six hundred. The Union troops were grimly exultant at the outcome of the change of tactics by the enemy, and proud of the ability shown by Sherman in forcing the abandonment of position after position with losses that had been small in comparison. Jefferson Davis began to doubt the wisdom of his change of Johnston for Hood, and telegraphed, "The loss consequent upon attacking him (Sherman) in his intrenchments requires you to avoid that if practicable." *

The cavalry expeditions had disappointed Sherman, and the infantry operations, patiently and persistently pushed forward, were his sole reliance. Schofield's corps was transferred from left to right, Howard's recurved right flank was swung forward, and on the new line Schofield reached the north fork of Utoy Creek. Sherman thought that two corps operating as a unit might seize the railroad, and directed Palmer to report to Schofield for this purpose. Palmer disputed Schofield's seniority in rank, and, when Sherman decided against him, demanded leave to retire from the army. The attempted movement was balked in consequence, the enemy had time to intrench an advanced line on the Sandtown road, and one of Schofield's brigades lost three hundred men in a forced reconnaissance of the new position on the 6th of August.

Sherman now realized, as at Marietta, that the stretching of his lines had gone about as far as it could. A fortnight was spent in rectifying positions, pushing back Hood's outposts, and bringing our trenches as close as possible to the fortifications of the place. Provisions were accumulated in the camps, and everything indicated prepa-

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 5, p. 946.

ration for some decisive movement. For several days the place was cannonaded with heavy guns. Schofield cautiously but steadily advanced his flanking division to the crossing of the Campbelltown and East Point roads, and on the 18th pushed it three quarters of a mile still farther forward toward East Point, where it intrenched in a half circle, and became, a week later, the pivot on which the army was swung to the south of Atlanta.

Hood's cavalry under Wheeler was operating on Sherman's communications in northern Georgia, annoying small posts and making momentary breaks in the railroad; but Wheeler now marched into East Tennessee, and his absence gave Sherman the desired opportunity to move with some secrecy. Hooker's corps (now under General Slocum) was marched into works covering the Chattahoochee railway bridge on the night of the 25th, and the rest of the army swung in a great wheeling march behind Schofield toward Jonesboro. Hood thought Wheeler had seriously broken our communications, and that want of food was forcing Sherman to retreat by way of Sandtown. He persisted in this illusion till the 30th, when, instead of making an attack on Schofield's corps, which was that day three miles from any supports, he hurried off Hardee with his and Lee's corps to Jonesboro, and ordered an attack there upon the outer flank of Sherman's army.

On that day Howard had got Logan's corps over Flint River after a sharp affair with the Confederate outposts, and it was intrenched on the high ground between the river and the railroad. The other two corps under Howard were in support on right and left, having bridges over the river. On the 31st Hardee's troops had assembled at Jonesboro and marched against Howard. Lee's corps had the brunt of the attack and Logan's of

the defense, and the Confederates were repulsed, leaving four hundred dead upon the field, and having probably two thousand wounded. Sherman was marching with Thomas's columns, and did not get the news of the enemy's being in force at Jonesboro till late in the afternoon.

Schofield had been pushing the left flank of the army forward that day toward Rough and Ready station on the railway by the road through Morrow's Mills, and carried an intrenched position a little south of the station in a sharp combat. Thinking Atlanta was now to be attacked from the south, Hood ordered Lee's corps to march back from Jonesboro that night. As two corps were known to be in Jonesboro at nightfall, the strange recall of Lee was not foreseen, and Sherman bent all his efforts to concentrate upon them. Hood's movements of Lee's and Stewart's corps in the night and next day were thus unknown, and it was not till Sherman joined Howard in the afternoon of the 1st of September that the mysterious disappearance of Lee's corps was learned. Then he pressed everything to envelop and destroy Hardee, who was isolated. Thomas's Fourteenth Corps (now under General J. C. Davis) was first up, and made a brilliant attack about sunset, carrying a salient of the enemy's works, killing over three hundred and capturing nearly two thousand, including the wounded prisoners. The National loss was one thousand.

Getting better knowledge in the course of the day, Hood halted Lee's corps between Jonesboro and Atlanta to cover the evacuation of the city and the concentration at Lovejoy's station on the Macon road, which he had now determined on. His trains of ordnance stores and supplies were destroyed, and, marching hard, he passed to the eastward of Sherman's army in the night and reunited with Hardee at Lovejoy's on the 2d of Septem-

ber. His curious changes of purpose which grew out of his misconception of Sherman's movements had served him better than any ruse, and the time necessarily lost by Sherman in trying to find out what his adversary was about had finally enabled the latter to make his hasty retreat beyond Jonesboro.

The explosions of the ammunition in the night had been heard by Slocum as well as Sherman, and the Twentieth Corps, approaching the city from the north, was met by the mayor, who surrendered Atlanta to him in form. Sherman followed Hood to Lovejoy's station, and reconnoitered the position there. The task which had been definitely allotted him was accomplished by the capture of Atlanta and the disjoining of the Southern system of railway connections, and he felt the need of mature study of a new campaign and of full understanding with General Grant in regard to it. He therefore determined to give his army a little rest, and concentrated his forces about Atlanta—the Cumberland army in the fortifications of the city, that of the Tennessee about East Point, and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur. His success was hailed with popular exultation throughout the North, and Congress vied with the President and the general in chief in thanks and congratulations to Sherman and his army.

Executive Mansion.

Washington, Dec. 26 1864.

My dear General Sherman.

Many, many, thanks for your Christmas gift - the capture of Savannah.

When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast I was anxious of not feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that "nothing risks, nothing gains" I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all gone; for I believe none of us went farther than to acquiesce. Now, taking the work of Gen. Shomo. into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it give force the obvious even immediate military advantage, but, in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole - Hood's army - it brings those who sat in darkness to our great light. But what next? I suppose it will

be safer if I leave Gen. Grant and yourself to
decide.

Please make my grateful acknowledgments
to your whole army, officers and men.

Yours very truly
A. Lincoln.

CHAPTER X.

CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER.—DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

THE undisguised discouragement of the Confederate officers and men was the best evidence of the importance of Sherman's success. Hood telegraphed that his army was no longer equal to offensive operations against his opponent, and that strong re-enforcements were necessary to prevent the country from being overrun. Hardee, temporarily separated from his chief, sent similar ill tidings to the Confederate President, saying, "Never, in my opinion, was our liberty in such danger." * After the first reaction, Hood tried to minimize the results of his own errors, and resorted to his unfortunate habit of seeking scapegoats to bear the blame; but the fact was apparent that a great campaign was lost, and the future was lowering with storm clouds. Davis explained with patient dignity that the resources of the Confederacy offered little prospect of re-enforcement except by stringent measures to bring absentees back to the ranks.† Hardee had for some time been urgent to be relieved from service under Hood, but Davis had begged him to waive his objections. Now, however, the effort of Hood to hold Hardee responsible for defeat forced the issue, and Davis reluctantly assigned the latter to the Department of the Carolina and Georgia Coast.‡

Sherman was no sooner in position at Atlanta

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 5, pp. 1016, 1018.

† Id., p. 1021.

‡ Id., xxxix, pt. 2, pp. 832, 880.

than he opened with General Grant the discussion of the next campaign. At the beginning of the one just closed Grant had sent him a map marked to indicate graphically his plans. On it Atlanta was Sherman's first local objective, and the taking of Wilmington, N. C., Savannah, Ga., and Mobile, Ala., were indicated as the establishment of bases from which operations might be conducted auxiliary to Grant's own when Richmond should be taken, and to Sherman's after he should reach Atlanta. While it was perfectly true that the great Confederate armies were the primary aim and objective, the conditions of an insurrectionary war made territorial occupation of much greater importance than in a war between independent nations. Crushing a rebellion is, in fact, a war of territorial conquest. To separate the rebellious States, to cut their communications, to reduce the limits from which supplies for their armies must be drawn, was upon land quite as important as the blockade by sea. To eliminate Georgia and the Gulf States from the direct rule of the Confederacy and from its sources of supply was to kill the rebellion. The Confederate Government had explicitly recognized this in pointing out to Johnston at the beginning of the year the vital importance of carrying the war into Tennessee. To lose it and Georgia was, Davis said, to lose the fields from which the rations of their armies came.*

Sherman's part in the programme was completed far in advance of any other. Grant had not taken Richmond, and neither Wilmington, Savannah, nor Mobile were in our hands. As Grant wrote to Halleck on October 4th, "When this campaign was commenced nothing else was in contemplation but that Sherman, after capturing Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile."†

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, p. 857.

† Id., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 63.

It had been assumed as a precedent condition of Sherman's further advance that he should have an assured new base of supplies, either upon the Gulf or on the Atlantic. What should be done now that neither was provided?

On the 10th of September Sherman wrote to Grant succinctly analyzing the situation. Forrest's cavalry was breaking the railroad in Tennessee, and Wheeler's cavalry was not yet disposed of. He could not depend on the railroad for operations further in advance. He could march to Milledgeville and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon. But this would be by abandoning his communications. He could live on the country in marching, but when he halted he would starve. If Grant could secure the Savannah River as far up from the ocean as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far from the Gulf as Columbus, he would sweep the whole State of Georgia, but otherwise his whole army would be imperiled for want of food by going far from Atlanta.* The essence of the problem could not be better put.

Grant replied that he saw plainly the difficulty, and the misfortune it was that the collateral parts of his general plan had been unavoidably delayed. He could not see what Sherman was to do, and could only trust to his fertility of resource. He hoped by the 5th of October Mobile or Savannah would afford the necessary new base.† On the 20th of September Sherman restated the problem at greater length, indicating his preference for a march eastward if Savannah were first reduced. "It once in our possession," he said, "and the river open to us, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for the balance. . . . The possession of the Savannah

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, p. 355.

† Id., p. 364.

River is more than fatal to the possibility of a Southern independence: they may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia." * The march to the sea was taking definite shape in his mind, but as yet the reduction of Savannah was a condition precedent. It was assumed by both generals that Hood would be drawn by necessity into an effort to obstruct the movement or to follow it. But the problem was soon to take a new shape, the extreme peril of the Confederacy giving birth to a new and desperate effort. First, however, Sherman had to dispose of some subordinate matters.

In whatever direction he might make his next movement from Atlanta, that place must be made a fortified depot, in which supplies could be accumulated as was done at Nashville and Chattanooga, making the army secure as to its rations in any temporary break the enemy might make in the railroad. This involved two things: First, the extent of the fortifications must be so reduced that a comparatively small garrison would make it safe from a *coup de main*; and, second, that he should not have to feed a resident population who would be shut off from trade and manufactures. The first was put into the hands of Captain Poe, the chief engineer. The second was met by sending the civilians beyond the lines or to the rear, according to their preferences. The stern military necessity for the last was regretted, and the execution of it was made as tolerable for the families as possible. Could Sherman have foreseen that his adversary would soon make it feasible for him to discard any base in northern Georgia, the toil of his troops upon the new intrenchments and the discomfort of the Atlanta people would both have been spared.

The changes which he made a month before in

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, p. 412.

the commanders of the Army of the Tennessee and the Twentieth Corps had not been a pleasant task for him, but they showed his capacity to decide such questions firmly, according to his view of the requirements of the public service, ignoring his own predilections and the personal annoyance which might incidentally come to himself. While he thought that General Logan lacked the intellectual breadth and reliable judgment necessary for an independent command, he fully appreciated the dashing soldierly qualities which had made Logan a brilliant division and corps commander, and was willing to trust him as McPherson's successor. He knew that Logan and Blair were antipathetic in character, and were bad yoke-fellows; but he would still have given Logan the command but for the vehement remonstrance and protest of General Thomas, whom Logan had seriously offended before the opening of the campaign.* Hooker, as the senior corps commander in the whole army, was in the order of rank, but his vanity and querulousness made him a difficult subordinate and a mischief-maker. After canvassing with Thomas the major generals *seriatim*, General Howard was chosen as best combining the experience and ability required, with the personal qualities which make an officer reliable and cheerful in co-operation and subordination.† It was probable that Hooker would ask to be relieved from service in the army, and, when he did so, the appointment of General Slocum, as commandant of the corps, who had violently quarreled with him when formerly his subordinate, was in the nature of a severe retort.

As early as the 6th of September General For-

* See p. 332.

† To understand Hooker's characteristics it is only necessary to read his letters to the War Department and to Senators Wilson, Wade, and Chandler—e. g., O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 467-469; Id., xlv, pt. 2, pp. 109, 112, 246, 283.

rest had offered to make a raid upon Sherman's railways and posts in Middle Tennessee, taking four thousand cavalry and six guns.* His proposal was gladly accepted, but his outfit was not ready till the 20th, by which time Wheeler joined him at Tuscumbia, in northwest Alabama, with a mere remnant of the force with which he had left Atlanta on the expedition which had proved so much more harmful to Hood than to Sherman. Wheeler was ordered back to Georgia, and Hood moved his army across to Palmetto, near the Chattahoochee, about the same distance from Atlanta, but where he hoped to give Sherman cause for uneasiness as to his railway to Chattanooga, while Forrest was making mischief in Middle Tennessee.

Sherman rated the danger from Forrest far above that from other Confederate raiders, and when news came that the daring cavalryman was over the river, he sent a division of the Fourth Corps to Chattanooga and one of the Fifteenth Corps to Rome to co-operate with General Rousseau, who was in command at Nashville. General Thomas himself was sent to Chattanooga on the 29th of September, and two or three days later to Nashville. Forrest was checked by Rousseau at Pulaski after he had burned a number of trestle bridges on the Decatur road, but no damage was done the direct line between Nashville and Chattanooga. General Schofield had gone northward to look after the affairs of his department and take a short leave of absence. For the time, therefore, the Army of the Ohio was in command of Schofield's next in rank, General Cox.

From the 27th onward there had been growing rumors of Hood's crossing the Chattahoochee below Campbelltown, and on the date named Sherman had sent to Washington a Macon newspaper

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, pp. 818, 859.

giving a report of a speech there by Mr. Davis on the 22d. Sherman was now on the alert for a movement toward Tennessee, which was foreshadowed, and on the 30th, in giving Thomas information of Hood's crossing the Chattahoochee, he added that if the latter moved his whole force to Blue Mountain, Ala., "I will take advantage of his opening to me all of Georgia." * His mind reverted to the march to the sea as if drawn to it by a lodestone. He instinctively felt that great results lay that way. The next day, in giving to Generals Howard and Cox intimations of the work before them, in confidential notes he said that, while he should turn upon Hood if he aimed at the railroad south of Kingston, on the other hand, if Hood tried to get into Tennessee through Alabama, he might send back Thomas's men from Kingston and above, destroy Atlanta, and make for Savannah or Charleston. "We could make Georgia a break in the Confederacy by ruining both east and west roads, and not run against a single fort till we got to the seashore and in communication with our ships." † The prior reduction of Savannah no longer seemed to him absolutely necessary. A few hours before he had given one of these subordinates warning to be ready for "some quick countermoves east and southeast," adding that these would "make Hood recall the whole or part of his army." ‡

The plan needed the assent of General Grant, and Sherman briefly laid it before him on the 1st of October, urging that "we can not remain on the defensive." To Thomas he repeated the substance of this, with his belief that "Hood would be puzzled and would follow me, or, if he entered Tennessee, he could make no permanent stay." *

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, p. 532.

† Id., pt. 2, p. 540.

‡ Id., pt. 3, p. 6.

* Id., pt. 3, pp. 1, 13.

Halleck discussed the subject in a long letter to Grant on the 2d, strongly urging the movement toward southern Alabama instead of Savannah. It was to this that Grant answered, in the words already quoted, that Mobile had been assumed to be the ultimate aim after Atlanta should be taken; but he now saw very strong reasons for thinking Sherman's plan the better one, as it certainly was the bolder, and he thought Savannah might be taken by troops under General Foster on the South Carolina coast, re-enforced by a corps from the Potomac army, but he reserved decision till he could visit Washington for consultation. He thought that "whichever way Sherman moves he will undoubtedly encounter Hood's army."* The discussion is a fine example of clear thinking and of noble, patriotic aims.

But Hood interrupted the discussion. At the visit of President Davis to the camp at Palmetto on the 25th and 26th of September, Hood's plan of crossing the Chattahoochee and operating against Sherman's communications had been approved, but it was followed by an order making both his and General Taylor's department in Alabama and Mississippi subordinate to General Beauregard. In his outline of plan Hood provided for the contingency of Sherman's marching in the other direction by saying that in that case "I shall follow upon his rear."† He crossed the river on the 1st of October, was at Flint Hill Church, five or six miles west of Powder Springs, the next night, and on the 3d sent forward Stewart's corps with the cavalry toward Ackworth, on the railroad. After making a temporary break in the railroad and capturing a few prisoners, Stewart on the 5th rejoined Hood near Lost Mountain.

Sherman had warned his garrisons at Alla-



* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 63. † Advance and Retreat, p. 253.

MAP No. III




ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

SCALE OF MILES
0 1 2 3 4 5 10

EXPLANATION:

Union Works 
Confederate Works 

LINES OF MARCH PURSUED BY
THE SEPARATE ARMIES

Army of the Ohio 
Tennessee 
Cumberland 



toona and Rome of Hood's being in motion, and had instructed them to concentrate if either position were attacked. On the 3d the Twentieth Corps was made the garrison of Atlanta and of the fortifications at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the rest of the forces in hand were directed to march northward, provided with ten days' rations. A severe storm had set in, and the streams were up, the Chattahoochee swelling with a freshet. This retarded movements, and Sherman directed the Army of the Ohio not to break camp till the 4th, and then to unite with the rest of the forces at Kennesaw Mountain on the following evening. He was himself at Kennesaw early in the afternoon of the 5th, and was witness of the distant battle at Allatoona, where French's division was attacking the fort. General Corse had followed his instructions by going in person from Rome with one of his brigades by rail to the assistance of Colonel Tourtelotte, another being ordered to follow. The re-enforced garrison beat off the Confederates after a brilliant and stubborn fight, and Hood reassembled his army on the 6th near Dallas. The combat at Allatoona had cost him over two hundred and thirty in killed, four hundred prisoners, and a large proportionate list of wounded. The casualties of the defenders were seven hundred and five in killed and wounded.

On the 6th Sherman sent the Twenty-third Corps on a reconnoissance in force to the westward, and learned from it the actual position of Hood's army. He watched the movement and its signals of smoke from the top of Pine Mountain, and realized how perfectly Johnston had watched him from that station four months before. Strong details of woodsmen got out ties for the railway repairs. Hood was moving westward, and Sherman sent Corse back with his division to hold Rome, and waited, intensely observant, and in-

wardly wishing that his opponent would commit himself to the movement which he had said would leave him free to put into execution his own far-reaching plan. The writer recalls with keen pleasure a visit from the commander at Allatoona, when, in conversation before the evening camp fire, the general, with open heart and genial frankness, talked of the great prospects of gain to the country's cause the situation was opening.

Hood had not accomplished what he had hoped for, since Sherman held fast to Atlanta, and was now at Allatoona ready to meet him either at Rome or elsewhere. The freshets had done more damage to the railway than the Confederates, for the bridge at Resaca was partly carried away, that at the Chattahoochee was damaged, and half a dozen smaller ones were washed out. Colonel Wright with his construction corps were busy as nailers mending the breaks. Sherman saw that Hood did not want a battle, and the wide scattering of annoying raids looked like resort to guerrilla warfare, without fixed bases anywhere. As he telegraphed Grant, "The whole batch of devils are turned loose, without home or habitation," and he renewed his proposal to strike out for the sea.* On the 10th of October he heard from Rome that Hood was preparing to cross the Coosa a dozen miles below, and, while waiting for Grant's decision, he pushed his whole army in that direction.

Hood tells us himself that the rest of his campaign was an afterthought, into which he was led by the apparent opportunities. His professed intention had been to offer a decisive battle to Sherman when, as he hoped, the latter's forces would be scattered by the necessities of covering the railway lines. Thus the raid on Allatoona led to one on Resaca, and disappointment in this led to the

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 162.

final and fatal move westward to the border of Mississippi, hopelessly abandoning his original purpose of keeping where he could hang on Sherman's rear if he turned toward the coast.* The unfitness of his army to cope with Sherman was acknowledged, and he was simply leading a dance that looked merry enough for the moment, but in which Sherman was to give new point to the proverb that "He laughs best who laughs last."

A strong reconnoissance on the 13th from Rome down the Coosa had proved that Hood had gone north in the narrow Chattooga Valley west of the Oostanaula River, which was also on the rampage, and Sherman, sticking to his interior line of railway communication, sped the bulk of his force toward Chattanooga. On the 12th Hood in person with Lee's corps had appeared before Resaca and demanded its surrender; but when Colonel Weaver defied him, he did not assault, but moved on to Dalton, where he scared a small garrison into surrender, while at Tilton, Colonel Archer, with two hundred men in a blockhouse, resisted and delayed him for several hours, till the wooden fort was knocked to pieces by a cannonade. But Sherman was now upon his heels, and Schofield, on his way back to the army, was at Chattanooga, where, at Thomas's request, he took command of the troops in that vicinity and blocked Hood's further progress northward. The latter now doubled the range of Taylor's ridge by the north end, and hurried back to Gaylesville, Ala., and thence to Gadsden, where he had left his wagons and most of his artillery in the last rapid expedition. Sherman cut out the timber blockade which Hood had left in Snake Creek Gap, followed through that defile, and pursued in two columns, one by the Chattooga Valley, in which Hood had marched, and

* Advance and Retreat, pp. 253, 258.

the other in the valley next east of it. On the 20th Hood was at Gadsden consulting with Beauregard, and Sherman at Gaylesville, eagerly trying to determine whether the time had fully come for him to put his plan in execution.

In Hood's conference with Beauregard at Gadsden it was arranged that Forrest, who was in West Tennessee gathering supplies and conscripts, should, after completing that task, cross the Tennessee, join Hood in the middle part of the State, and then come under the orders of the latter. Hood was to cross the Tennessee River at Gunter'sville and carry the war northward. It was assumed that this would be followed by the evacuation of Decatur by the National troops, and Tusculumbia would become Hood's depot of supplies, using the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Decatur or beyond.* But before leaving Gadsden on the 22d of October, Hood made out his orders for his troops to march by Blountsville to Oleander on the way to Decatur, leaving the Gunter'sville road at Bennettsville, a day's march out.† He thus deliberately gave Beauregard the slip, and, when the latter hurried after him to Decatur, it was too late to resume the original plan. Beauregard swallowed his wrath as best he could. Hood was rebuffed by a stubborn garrison at Decatur, and marched away to Tusculumbia, where the railroad approaches the Tennessee River below Muscle Shoals. Reaching there on the 30th, he promptly laid a pontoon bridge at Florence, and gave orders to cross the river and begin the advance on the 5th of November.‡ But the news he got before that day seems to have paralyzed him for nearly three weeks.

Sherman was resolved that if Hood crossed at Gunter'sville he would follow, and, by concen-

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 810, 815, 837, 845, 853.

† Id., p. 841.

‡ Id., pp. 880, 881.

trating Thomas's forces on the north, inclose and destroy his adversary. To do this would leave fewest contingencies in his subsequent campaign, and he strongly expressed his wish that Hood would enter Tennessee by this route. He jocularly told his subordinates to "invite him in." * Hood instinctively shunned the danger, even at the cost of breaking up without permission a plan deliberately arranged with Beauregard. On the day that the Confederate generals were in consultation at Gadsden Thomas telegraphed to Halleck, "I feel confident that I can defend the line of the Tennessee with the force General Sherman proposes to leave with me." † This included the Fourth Corps, besides the troops already in the State, with about five thousand of Sherman's convalescents, the recruits arriving, and two divisions under A. J. Smith coming from Missouri. A few days later Sherman determined to send back the Twenty-third Corps also, and Thomas then felt that he had "men enough to ruin" his adversary. ‡

Grant had consistently supported Sherman's plan, but on the 11th of October he was obliged to inform Sherman that an expedition by sea to take Savannah could not be organized. The difficulties seemed to multiply, and he found doubts recurring as to Thomas's ability to prevent Hood from going north.* Sherman's courage rose with the danger, and he strongly reviewed the situation. He still thought Hood would have to follow him, and with characteristic point said: "Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent." Grant yielded, saying, "If you are satisfied the trip to the seacoast can be made, holding the line of the

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 311, 333.

† Id., p. 756.

‡ Id., p. 389.

* Id., p. 202.

Tennessee firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga as you may think best." * As he thought upon it, Grant's strong military judgment went more decidedly with Sherman. On the 12th he telegraphed: "On reflection, I think better of your proposition. It would be much better to go south than to be forced to come north." The President and Mr. Stanton felt "much solicitude," and that "a misstep by General Sherman might be fatal to his army." But Grant replied to them, "On mature reflection, I believe Sherman's proposition is the best that can be adopted," and the same day he directed Halleck to provide vessels and supplies to meet Sherman on the Georgia coast.†

For a few days after the 22d of October Sherman was uncertain whether Hood would cross the Tennessee at Guntersville, but his quartermaster, Colonel Easton, was crowding the capacity of the railroad to get affairs ready for either contingency. Sherman got from Thomas detailed statements of the force he had, of the new troops arriving, and of his estimated wants. In the evening of the 25th Thomas, in sending a long and very detailed statement, added: "With Fourth Corps and enough of the new regiments to make up an active force of twenty-five thousand infantry, I will undertake to clear the rebels out of West Tennessee, and draw off enough of Hood's army from you to enable you to move anywhere in Georgia or Alabama you may wish without difficulty."‡

With Thomas thus confident of his ability to bear his end of the burden, Sherman felt that his way was clear, though he still reminded Thomas that defending the line of the Tennessee was Grant's condition in assenting. Telegraphing to Halleck on the 27th, he said he would wait yet a

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 202.

† Id., pp. 222, 239.

‡ Id., p. 433.

few days to hear what head Hood might make about Decatur, "and may yet turn to Tennessee; but it would be a great pity to take a step backward. I think it would be better even to let him ravage the State of Tennessee, provided he does not gobble up too many of our troops. General Thomas is well alive to the occasion, and better suited to the emergency than any man I have. He should be strengthened as much as possible, as the successful defense of Tennessee should not be left to chance." *

In the anxiety to give Thomas even more than the latter thought necessary Sherman now determined to send back the Twenty-third Corps also; but this was done upon considerations presented by Schofield, and not by Thomas, though the latter was very glad of the increase of force, especially after he learned that there must be some delay in the arrival of the re-enforcement under A. J. Smith. Sherman now confidentially informed Colonel Beckwith,† his commissary, that he might reduce his

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 448, 461.

† Sherman to Beckwith, id., p. 477. Before deciding to send Schofield back, the computation by which Sherman expected to make up his army was the following, as shown by the official returns for the last of October. (Id., pp. 555, 563, 569, 573):

From Army of the Cumberland	{ Fourteenth Corps, 11,953 Twentieth Corps, 13,843	25,796
From Army of the Tennessee	{ Fifteenth Corps, 15,721 Seventeenth Corps, 9,138	24,859
From Army of the Ohio (Cooper's and Cox's divisions),		10,788
Total infantry and artillery		61,443
Cavalry (Kilpatrick's division).....		3,928
Total		65,371
Deduct those sent back, fit for garrison duty (O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 408).....		5,000
Leaving the marching column.....		60,371

But when Schofield's 10,788 (infantry and artillery) were taken out, the aggregate was a little under 50,000, as Sherman said to

estimates for supplies to enough for fifty thousand men, though the unexpectedly rapid return of furloughed men crowding forward enthusiastically on the rumor of great things to happen raised the force again nearly to the former point. He reiterated to Thomas the strong advice to abandon minor points, concentrate his troops about Columbia, get together the largest possible army from his department, and take the field in person.* Once more for a moment Grant hesitated to say the word "Go," but, upon Sherman giving him another succinct analysis of the situation, he came back to his original sound judgment and said, "Go as you propose."†

Finally, on the 12th of November, the wires were cut, and the march to the sea was begun beyond the possibility of a recall. The conception of the plan was hardly grander than the faith which had clung to it for two months in the face of opposition, of doubt, and of discouragement from quarters worthy of respect. In arguing the matter with the authorities, civil and military, he carefully confined himself to the first part of his task—that of reaching the Atlantic and establishing a base upon the coast. To his immediate subordinates, however, he opened also the final campaign of the march northward upon Columbia and Raleigh, and the decisive results which it involved. Military history is full of proofs that the responsi-

Colonel Beckwith. The fine eagerness of men absent on their "veteran furlough" to join their regiments is shown by the returns, which were, for November 10th, 59,545; for November 30th, 62,204; for December 20th, 60,598. (O. R., xlv, p. 16.) As communications were cut on November 12th, the increase in the three days from the 10th to the 12th inclusive was that which appears in the return for the 30th. Comparing the aggregates of infantry and artillery, in which alone the reduction was made by sending back Schofield's divisions, the totals were, for November 10th, 54,584, and for November 30th, 57,141.

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 468, 476, 497, 498.

† Id., pp. 576, 594.

ble commander in the field sees more clearly than any spectator the difficulties of his enterprise and the obstacles to be overcome. Nothing is more common than to have daring plans thus "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." The rare thing, the signal proof of highest soldierly quality, is the steadfast resolution which, weighing all the risks, still sees the prize worth the venture, and goes forward without swerving.

Sherman had based his purpose on sound and broad military principles. He must retain the aggressive. He must not allow his adversary to lead him back to Tennessee and begin over again the work of the past year. If possible, he must find a more decisive return blow for the audacity of Hood, providing reasonably for hindering the latter from doing fatal mischief meanwhile. All these are strictly military considerations, and placing himself on the line of communications of Lee's army was, by common assent of military experts the world over, a masterpiece of strategy. As a subordinate consideration, he added to all this what he rightly called "statesmanship"—the moral effect to be produced upon the Confederacy by the demonstration of the resistless power of the National Government.*

Leading Southern officers saw clearly that a mortal blow had been struck when, with the railways of Georgia destroyed behind him, Sherman, two months later, was preparing to resume his march northward from Savannah, and there was no army that could cope with him between Georgia and Virginia. General Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor, and brother-in-law of Davis, thought "the game was over."† General Johnston says that "the Southern cause must have appeared hopeless then to all intelligent and dis-

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 659, 660.

† Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 218.


passionate Southern men."* General Lee, speaking of his own judgment at the time, said of Sherman's movements, "It was easy to see that unless they were interrupted I should be compelled to abandon the defense of Richmond."† The view of competent critics across the ocean was embodied in the editorial statement of the London Times, on getting the first news of his start from Atlanta: "That it is a most momentous enterprise can not be denied. . . . It may either make Sherman the most famous general of the North, or it may prove the ruin of his reputation, his army, and even his cause together."‡

* Narrative, p. 372.

† Letter of July 27, 1868, quoted in Sherman's *Memoirs*, 2d ed., ii, p. 467.

‡ London Times, December 3, 1864.

1000



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CHAPTER XI.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

THE Twentieth Corps being still at Atlanta and the Fourteenth about Kingston, the Fifteenth Corps began march from Gaylesville for Kingston, the Seventeenth leaving the same day for the railroad about Marietta. The march was deliberate and easy. The Confederate cavalry hovered about the flanks, picking up many foragers and making an occasional dash at some unguarded wagon. There was nothing to call for more than ordinary discipline. There was an incident which is worth mentioning only as bearing on the remark that used to be made. "The western army can march and fight, but has no discipline." Every night an order was sent from division to brigade headquarters prescribing the order of march next day. On the morning of the 2d of November the advance brigade of Leggett's division moved out on time, but the brigade which was to follow next was not ready. An aid-de-camp notified the commander to move in five minutes or fall to the rear; at the expiration of five minutes the tardy brigade was still not ready, and the one which was to have formed the rear took its place. On reaching camp in the evening, an order was issued relieving the commander and returning him to his regiment, disbanding the brigade, and assigning the regiments to one of the other brigades, and directing the headquarters' records and furniture to be packed in a wagon in the division train.

By the 2d of November Colonel Wright with fifteen hundred men had repaired the break of fifteen miles extending north from Dalton, and the road was open for trains from Atlanta to Chattanooga. On that day Sherman received the telegram from Grant which closed with "I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose." Immediately the work began of dismantling Atlanta and all posts to the north of it, and shipping to Chattanooga garrisons and all munitions and property that were not to be carried along in the proposed campaign.

The soldiers now became aware that they were about to go upon an expedition, away from all support and to an unknown destination. Pay was many months in arrears. Men were harrowed by letters from their wives, who were without means of support in the approaching winter. The paymasters who arrived on the 6th of November were welcomed with extravagant joy. The work of paying was continued day and night, and was barely finished when the last train left for the North. The Methodist chaplain of the Thirty-first Illinois and the Roman Catholic chaplain of the Seventeenth Wisconsin undertook to carry home the pay of their men, and many others availed themselves of the opportunity. They carried a very large sum of money in multitudinous small packages, and all reached their destination, bringing unimagined relief to households in every corner of the two States. The presidential election was held in camp on the 8th, under provision made for it by the States, and was regular and orderly as those held at home. The paymasters with all their diligence had not yet paid all. Some few of the disappointed ones imputed their ill fortune to the Government, and in despite voted against Mr. Lin-

coln. They were paid in time, and repented sorely their impatience.

The following order was issued to corps and division headquarters on the 8th of November, but was not published till the 10th:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GA., *Nov. 8, 1864.*

The general commanding deems it proper, at this time, to inform the officers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps that he has organized them into an army for a special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General Grant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to a new one. All the chances of war have been considered and provided for, as far as human agency can. All he asks of you is to maintain that discipline, patience, and courage that has characterized you in the past; and he hopes, and through you, to strike a blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producing what we all so much desire—his overthrow. Of all things, the most important is that the men, during marches and in camp, keep their places, and do not scatter about as stragglers and foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It is also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loaded with anything but provisions and ammunition. All surplus servants, noncombatants, and refugees should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those of the past.

By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.
L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-camp.*

On the 10th General Corse, who still commanded the post at Rome, evacuated and moved to his position on the railroad. He destroyed all foundries, machine shops, depots, and such, and ordered the provost marshal and officers of the rear guard to exercise the severest and most summary means to prevent disorder, and not hesitate

to shoot any one caught firing private houses or pillaging helpless and inoffensive families. General Thomas sent a dispatch on the 12th, in which he said: "I have no fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and believe I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." Sherman answered, "Dispatch received; all right," and then the telegraph wire was severed. All communication between him and the North ceased utterly. No Southern newspaper that went North made mention of him. He was not heard of again for a month. He was as if the earth had opened and swallowed his command.

The four corps strung along the railroad began at once the work of destruction. The bridge at Allatoona was taken apart in sections and shipped North; the road from the Etowah to Allatoona was thoroughly wrecked. Road ties were piled up and burned; rails laid across the burning piles were heated in the middle, were seized at both ends, and bent till the ends lapped; some, instead, were bent spirally. By the 14th the work was done, and the general and his army were assembled at Allatoona.

The army comprised four corps—the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth, commanded by Generals Osterhaus and Blair, constituted the Army of the Tennessee, or the right wing, which was commanded by General O. O. Howard. The Fourteenth (General Jeff C. Davis) and Twentieth (General Williams) formed the Army of Georgia, or the left wing, commanded by General H. W. Slocum. All invalids, all superfluous employees, all personal baggage, and all artillery except one battery to each division, had been sent to the rear.

The vacancy left by the invalids was fully made up by men returning from furlough and by recruits. The cavalry, one division, comprising two brigades, was commanded by General Judson Kilpatrick. He was daring, enterprising, untiring; but he was a man of questionable personal habits, and his recklessness or negligence brought upon him some disastrous surprises. The Northern army was an athlete stripped for contest.

Before starting on the march, General Sherman published the following order. In connection with it are given here two letters: one the well-known letter to the mayor of Atlanta, the other to a lady whom Sherman knew when, as a young lieutenant, he was on duty at Charleston, S. C. The three together present a full explanation of his conception of the mode of carrying on war and concluding peace:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GA., *Nov. 9, 1864.*

1. For the purpose of military operations the army is divided into two wings, viz:

The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.

2. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereinafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander in chief.

3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition train and provision train, distributed habitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger each corps commander should change his order of march by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A. M., and make about fifteen miles per day unless otherwise fixed in orders.

4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route of travel, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass, but during the halt or camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the roads traveled.

5. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down. In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges or obstruct roads or otherwise manifest local hostility, the army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.

6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts, and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

8. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance guard, repair roads, and double them, if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places.

Also, army commanders should practice the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on the side, and instruct their troops to assist the wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon train, fully equipped and organized, and the commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at all times.

By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

L. M. DAYTON, *Aid-de-camp.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, *Sept. 12, 1864.*

JAMES M. CALHOUN, *Mayor*, E. E. RAWSON, and S. C. WELLS, *representing City Council of Atlanta.*

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions, of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only in Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for a warlike purpose is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and, sooner or later, want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I can not discuss this subject with you fairly, because I can not impart to you what I propose to do; but I assert that

my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You can not qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you can not refine it, and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know that I will make more sacrifices than any of you to-day to secure peace. But you can not have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the National feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army at once become your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals can not resist a torrent of error and passion such as swept the South into rebellion, but you can point out, so we may know, those who desire a government and those who insist on war and its desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunderstorms as against the terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your land, or anything you have; but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we can not help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek the truth in other quarters the better for you.

I repeat, then, that by the original compact of Government the United States held certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mis-

Mississippi hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi we fed thousands upon thousands of families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different; you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent carloads of soldiers and ammunition and molded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.

But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then I will share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR MARIETTA, GA., *June 30 1864.*

Mrs. ANNIE GILMAN BOWER, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MADAM: Your welcome letter of June 18th came to me amid the sound of battle, and, as you say, little did I dream when I knew you, playing as a schoolgirl on Sullivan's Island beach, that I should control a vast army pointing, like the swarm of Alaric, toward the plains of the South. Why, oh why, is this? If I know my own heart, it beats as warmly as ever toward those kind and generous families that greeted us with such warm hospitality in days long past but still present in memory; and to-day were Frank and Mrs. Porcher, or Eliza Gilman, or Mary Lamb, or Margaret Blake, the Barksdales, the Quarles, the Poyas, indeed, any and all our cherished circle, their children, or even their children's children, to come to me as of old, the stern feelings of duty would melt as snow before a genial sun, and I believe I would strip my own children that they might be sheltered. And yet they call me barbarian, vandal, a monster,

and all the epithets that language can invent that are significant of malignity and hate! All I pretend to say, on earth as in heaven, man must submit to some arbiter. He must not throw off his allegiance to his Government or his God without just reason or cause. The South has no cause, not even a pretext. Indeed, by her unjustifiable course she has thrown away the proud history of the past, and laid open her fair country to the tread of devastating war. She has bantered and bullied us to the conflict. Had we declined battle America would have sunk back coward and craven, meriting the contempt of all mankind. As a nation we were forced to accept battle, and that once begun it has gone on till the war has assumed proportions at which we, in the hurly-burly, sometimes stand aghast. I would not subjugate the South in the sense so offensively assumed, but I would make every citizen of the land obey the common law, submit to the same that we do—no more, no less—our equals and not our superiors. I know and you know that there were young men in our day, men no longer young but who control their fellows, who assumed to the gentlemen of the South a superiority of courage, and boastingly defied us of Northern birth to arms. God only knows how reluctantly we accepted the issue, but once the issue joined, like in other ages, the Northern races, though slow to anger, once aroused are more terrible than the more inflammable of the South. Even yet my heart bleeds when I see the carnage of battle, the desolation of homes, the bitter anguish of families; but the very moment the men of the South say that instead of appealing to war they should have appealed to reason, to our Congress, to our courts, to religion, and to the experience of history, then will I say peace, peace. Go back to your points of error and resume your places as American citizens, with all their proud heritages. Whether I shall live to see this period is problematical, but you may, and may tell your mother and sisters that I never forget one kind look or greeting, or ever wished to efface its remembrance, but putting on the armor of war I did it that our common country should not perish in infamy and disgrace. I am married—have a wife and six children living in Lancaster, Ohio. My career has been an eventful one, but I hope when the clouds of anger and passion are dispersed, and truth emerges bright and clear, you and all who knew me in early years will not blush that we were once close friends. Tell Eliza for me that I hope she will live to realize that the doctrine of secession is as monstrous in our civil code as disobedience was in the divine law. And should the fortunes of war ever bring your mother or sisters

or any of the old clique under the shelter of my authority, I do not believe they will have cause to regret it.

Give my love to your children, and the assurance of my respect to your honored husband. Truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General*.

These together repeat the ancient maxim, *Debellare superbos, parcere victis*—relentless war was against the armed foe, grace and mercy to the conquered who submit.

On the 14th Colonel Poe, with a working party, destroyed the railroad depot, machine shops, and other structures that would aid the operations of war, leaving untouched dwellings, stores, churches, municipal buildings. Next day the army moved. The number of men in the command, commissioned officers and enlisted, on detail or present for duty was: In the Army of the Tennessee, 28,365; in the Army of Georgia, 28,708; in Kilpatrick's command, including a four-gun battery, 5,130; total, 62,204. These numbers are taken from the report of the 30th of November.

The troops took the road, ignorant whither they were going, but buoyant, confident, expecting to reach the sea at some point, sure of diminishing the territory from which Lee could draw recruits and supplies, and some sanguine of reaching Richmond in time to take part in an engagement which would end the war. The Army of Georgia moved to the east, apparently striking for Augusta; the Army of the Tennessee to the south, in the direction of Macon, with its right flank covered by Kilpatrick.

The Fourteenth Corps thoroughly destroyed the railroad at Madison, and a division was sent beyond to the Oconee to destroy the railroad bridge there. Turning south, all reached Milledgeville on the 23d. The Fourteenth Corps moved eastward as far as Covington, and thence south-east to Milledgeville, arriving there on the 23d.

The Seventeenth Corps marched southeast by Jonesboro and McDonough to the crossing of the Ockmulgee, at Planter's Factory, and the Fifteenth, taking at first a more southerly course, changed direction so as to join the Seventeenth at the crossing. Kilpatrick, covering the right flank of the army, continued south to Lovejoy's, where a portion of Wheeler's command held the old works. Dividing his force into two columns, one dismounted, charged upon and carried the works, while the other pursued the artillery and captured two guns. He then turned and reached Planter's Factory, while the infantry were still crossing. The farther bank of the river was high, steep, and of clay, made slippery by rain. The troops had to help the mules to get wagons up the ascent. The Seventeenth Corps reached Gordon, on the Macon and Savannah Railroad, twelve miles south of Milledgeville. Part of the Fifteenth Corps was guarding and aiding trains over the impassable road, while C. R. Woods's division moved to guard the rear toward Macon. Hardee had been relieved of the command of a corps in Hood's army and appointed to command a department comprising Savannah and adjacent territory in Georgia and South Carolina. When Sherman left Atlanta the whole field of operations in Georgia was added to the department. Hardee was in Macon on the 21st with Governor Brown, of Georgia, and learned that the only force in his department besides McLaw's division, which was the garrison of Savannah, was Wheeler's cavalry and Smith's division of Georgia militia. Feeling sure that Macon was not threatened, he ordered Smith to Augusta, and at once returned to Savannah.

On the 22d Kilpatrick made a dash upon the railroad near Macon. Wolcutt's brigade, sent out by General Woods to reconnoiter toward Macon, pushed back a detachment of Wheeler's cavalry,

and fell back to Griswold. Wolcutt placed his command in the edge of the timber, with swampy land on each flank, and awaited the advance of Smith's division, which approached supported by Wheeler's cavalry. The Confederate infantry advanced in three lines, and reached with little loss a ravine or depression parallel with Wolcutt's line, and only seventy-five yards from it. When the Confederate lines appeared emerging from the hollow, so deadly a fire at short range met them that they fell back in disorder to shelter. Three times the assault was made, and every time with disastrous loss. They withdrew, leaving, the reports say, three hundred dead on the field.

Detailed foraging parties brought in abundant supplies of corn and fodder for the animals, and sweet potatoes, corn meal, bacon, and poultry for the men. Fine mules took the place of the jaded animals in the teams, and horses were found to replenish the cavalry and artillery. Napoleon says, in his maxims, there are two ways of maintaining an army in the enemy's country—one, by requisition on municipal authorities; the other, by direct seizure. In Georgia there was no choice; direct seizure was the only resource. But pillaging from dwellings was prohibited, and an order prescribed death as the penalty for any one convicted by court-martial of such offense. A soldier of the first division of the Seventeenth Corps was charged with stealing a quilt from a dwelling near Gordon. The court-martial found him guilty, and sentenced him "to be shot to death by musketry, at such time and place as the commanding general may direct." The proceedings and findings were approved, but General Howard commuted the sentence to imprisonment during the war at Dry Tortugas, Fla. The prisoner was taken by guards to Tortugas, and remained imprisoned there until released by order of the adjutant general of the army, dated May 27, 1865.

The army assembled at Milledgeville and Gordon on the 23d, and resumed the march on the 24th. The right wing followed the Savannah Railroad, destroying it on the way. The left wing moved by roads north of the railroad, and generally parallel to it. The Oconee was swollen, and with a rapid current. General H. C. Wayne with a small force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery held the railroad crossing of the Oconee and fortified it. But General Howard succeeded in laying two pontoon bridges, one four miles above and the other below, while engaging Wayne in his works, and crossed one corps on each bridge. Kilpatrick was sent to destroy the important railroad bridge over Brier Creek, on the branch road to Augusta. Wheeler, with the Confederate cavalry, a large body, started in pursuit, overtook in the night Kilpatrick's rear guard of two regiments, ran over them, and drove them on to the main body. Kilpatrick was so pushed that he barely set fire to the bridge, and had to turn to the south. He was reckless enough to sleep one night in a house distant from his camp, having one regiment for guard. Wheeler, learning the fact, dashed in the night upon the little camp so suddenly that commander and men rushed from their sleep, and ran to the woods in rout. After this Kilpatrick brought his men, jaded and thinned by loss, to the lines of the army. General Sherman ordered captured horses to be turned over to him. After a few days' rest, the cavalry set out again to burn the bridge and to fight Wheeler. Coming upon him near Waynesboro, Kilpatrick broke his line, put him to retreat, and drove him through Waynesboro. Wheeler took position beyond and awaited attack. Kilpatrick, coming up on the 5th of December, finding that Wheeler's line outreached his on both flanks, massed, and with a rush broke through Wheeler's center, and forced him to retreat. Kilpatrick this time de-

stroyed the railroad bridge and smaller bridge over Brier Creek. He returned to the route of the army, and there was no more fighting till Savannah was reached. Kilpatrick had been expected to reach Millen in time to release the prisoners of war confined there. But his protracted engagements with Wheeler gave opportunity to the Confederate authorities to remove the ten thousand National soldiers confined there to Florence, in South Carolina, and when the Seventeenth Corps reached Millen, on the 3d of December, the prison was empty.

Up to this date the Confederate authorities were uncertain as to Sherman's destination. When Augusta seemed to be his objective point, President Davis sent Bragg thither, and gave him command to the coast, including Savannah and Hood. When the probability inclined to Savannah, Beauregard's jurisdiction was extended to the Atlantic, embracing Bragg and Hood, so that his authority extended from the coast of Georgia to the western boundary of Texas. Beauregard insisted that Sherman's ultimate design was to re-enforce Grant before Richmond. He ordered Hood to move into Tennessee to make a diversion in relief of Lee, and when he learned that A. J. Smith was leaving Missouri to report to Thomas, he ordered Kirby Smith, who was in command west of the Mississippi, to send two divisions to the aid of Hood, or else to invade Missouri himself and compel the return of A. J. Smith in Missouri.

The four corps were abreast at Millen, the Fifteenth Corps south of the Ogeechee, the Seventeenth north of and near to the river, and the Twentieth and Fourteenth four and ten miles to the north, presenting a front of twenty miles. From Millen onward the two rivers Savannah and Ogeechee approach each other, restricting the field for foraging, and the substitution of rice fields in place of

corn and potatoes very largely cut off the supply of subsistence. The roads passed at times through fragrant pine forest, whose tall trunks stood far apart, though the dense foliage far overhead interlaced and shut out the sun. At other times the struggle to wade through and get the trains through deep and tangled swamps kept weary columns on the march till late in the night. On the 5th of December the Seventeenth Corps came upon some fieldworks thrown up by McLaws's division, but abandoned. On the 7th and 8th the roads were found obstructed by felled trees. The men who did the work were ascertained, and their houses were burned by order. On the 8th a newspaper was found which gave in one paragraph a brief account of Hood's bloody repulse at Franklin, and of the loss of thirteen of his general officers killed or wounded. With the rejoicing over the victory was regret at the death of some familiar names, especially General Cleburne, commander of "Cleburne's Fighting Division."

On the 9th a torpedo exploded in the road, killing a staff officer and his horse. General Sherman sent the prisoners to the front with spades to dig up any more that might be found. But there were no more. In the afternoon, the head of the column having advanced into a swamp, found that a battery at the exit on the other side commanded the road. The troops, diverging from the road to right and left, protected from view by the dense growth, emerged on the flanks of the works, and found them abandoned. Warned by the plashing and crackling, the defenders had evacuated and taken a waiting train for Savannah. On the 10th the army was deployed in front of the defenses of the city, and on the 12th was in position.

The sources of a small creek which, flowing north, emptied into the Savannah River about three miles above the city, interlaced the head of a still

smaller stream, which, flowing south through a swamp, formed the Little Ogeechee. The low flat of land on each side had been turned into rice fields, and a system of embankments kept the water in the creek about seven feet, and on the submerged land about four feet deep. The water surface varied from two hundred to five hundred yards in width, and was crossed only by a few roads, each built upon an embankment, and having a bridge over the channel of the creek. The shore toward Savannah was lined with infantry intrenchments, and batteries crowning every rising ground and every jutting point swept with cross fire the roads and the water surface. The batteries were armed with eighty-one siege guns and forty-eight field-pieces, and the force that defended this line numbered something over twelve thousand officers and men. The besiegers were not in a continuous line, but encamped in groves of timber adjoining the water, out of view, and with trenches for shelter during cannonade. Batteries mounting fifty-six guns were placed at convenient points to engage the batteries across the water. The Twentieth Corps, on the extreme left, threw some troops upon the islands in the river. On its right was the Fourteenth, then the Seventeenth and Fifteenth, which stretched to Kings Bridge over the Ogeechee, twelve miles from Savannah.

Subsistence was nearly exhausted, animals were living partly and men almost wholly upon rice. The first necessity was to open communication with the fleet, which had already been advised of Sherman's arrival, and which was supposed to be in Ossabaw Sound, the mouth of the Ogeechee. The passage down the river was obstructed by Fort McAllister on its bank, just below the great bend. General Sherman promptly on arriving directed General Howard to repair Kings Bridge, which had been partially destroyed, and send a division to

capture the fort. The repairs were finished by the night of the 12th, and General Hazen's division marched over at sunrise on the 13th to the right bank of the river.

The fort was an irregular quadrilateral, standing upon the river bank. The front and the flanks were solid ramparts, armed with heavy guns. The gorge was closed by lighter intrenchment, with fieldpieces in barbette. The armament was eleven siege guns, one ten-inch mortar, and twelve fieldpieces. The work was surrounded by a ditch, with a stout palisade along the middle. The adjoining ground had been covered by a forest of live oaks. The branches of those near the fort had been cut and used in constructing a heavy abattis, while the stumps were left standing. The ground was thickly planted with torpedoes. The garrison comprised over two hundred men, commanded by Major Anderson.

Hazen formed his three brigades in three separate lines, facing respectively the rear and the flanks of the fort. General Sherman, who had ridden in the saddle down the left bank of the river and taken a position upon a lookout on the Cheves plantation, across the big bend, getting anxious when the sun had declined till it was only an hour high, signaled to Hazen to attack at once. The three lines issued simultaneously from the surrounding woods, each preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, and advanced rapidly, converging upon the fort. Artillery and musketry fire poured from the ramparts, and as the assailants approached torpedoes exploded beneath their tread. The skirmishers, taking shelter behind the standing trunks, drove the artillerists from their guns and silenced the musketry. The lines rushed into the ditch, tore down the palisades, and clambered over the walls.

Anderson refused to surrender, and the fighting continued till the defenders separately surren-

dered. Hazen lost twenty-four killed and one hundred and ten wounded; the loss of the garrison was forty-eight. General Sherman found a row-boat and was rowed down to General Hazen's temporary headquarters, then walked to the fort, and was rowed six miles down the windings of the river until he came upon a small steamer, the *Dandelion*, which had been sent up from the fleet for news. After writing hasty dispatches to the Secretary of War, General Grant, Admiral Dahlgren, and General Foster, he returned to the fort and to General Hazen's headquarters. He took his place on the floor, where Hazen and his staff were lying asleep, but before long was roused by a messenger from General Foster, who was an invalid on a steamer below, and begged an interview. While hearing Foster's report, he continued the voyage till Admiral Dahlgren was found on his flagship in Wassabaw Sound. Arrangements were made by General Foster to forward the supplies accumulated at Port Royal in anticipation of Sherman's arrival, and adding to them some siege guns. The admiral undertook to provide light-draught steamers for their transport, and Sherman returned, arriving at the lines by noon of the 15th.

On the 16th steamboats began to arrive with supplies. One of them brought mail. Colonel Markland, special mail agent for Sherman's army, had been at Baltimore gathering in mail matter for all members of the army, and took the accumulation to Port Royal on the first intimation of Sherman's approach to the coast. Ambulances carried the assorted mails to every brigade headquarters. Few men received nothing. Over fifty thousand sat by the evening camp fires poring over their letters, transported for the time to their homes and families. Sherman received two letters from General Grant, one dated the 3d, the other the 6th of December. In the latter Grant said: "My idea

now is that you establish a base on the seacoast, fortify and leave it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten their interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person unless you see objections to this plan which I can not see. Use every vessel going to you for the purpose of transportation." This letter was a crushing disappointment to Sherman. He felt that the march to Savannah was only the preliminary step to his plan. The main achievement was to be a march across the Carolinas, abbreviating day by day, by every day's march, the field of supplies for Lee, gradually isolating him from support, and bringing in re-enforcement to Grant an army complete, compact, inured to fatigue, and exultant. To give up this, to dismember his command, and take a fragment, jaded by a sea voyage, to join the disciplined and equipped Army of the Potomac, seemed a poor exchange.

But a soldier has only to obey. Immediately on reading Grant's letter, Sherman began to carry out its directions. Before the day was over he had selected Fort McAllister as the site of his fortified base, determined its general design, and ordered Colonel Poe, his chief engineer, to reconnoiter the ground for the purpose. On the same day he wrote to General Grant a report in brief of his march, with a full statement of his present situation and the steps he had already taken to carry out the plan of operations as indicated by General Grant. Of the campaign of which he had proposed for himself, he said: "Indeed, with my present command I had expected, after reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, S. C., thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume,

it may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea I can probably meet you with my men and arms before the middle of January."

Meanwhile there was no relaxation in the siege. He distributed and mounted siege guns that he obtained from General Foster, and made incessant reconnoissance to find some practicable passage over to the enemy's lines. On the morning of the 17th, he sent by flag of truce to General Hardee a summons to surrender. Next morning came the answer, a refusal.

An assault must be made. But first he determined that a road by which Hardee could escape should be occupied. Hardee could lay a pontoon bridge from the city across the river, and by a mud road for twelve miles gain the railroad. General Slocum desired to take from his army sufficient force—an entire corps, if needed—cross the river, and seize the road. He had captured two of the gunboats which Hardee had in the river, one of which was burned and the other disabled, had occupied the islands opposite his flank, and planted a brigade on the farther shore. But the enemy still had four gunboats, and Sherman preferred to get General Foster to land a force from seaward and occupy the road. On the evening of the 18th he left for Hilton Head, when General Foster heartily promised to give the co-operation desired. Late in the evening of the 20th the pickets of Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps and of Leggett's division of the Seventeenth Corps heard sounds of evacuation, and the two divisions, starting at daylight, found the city abandoned by Hardee, who had left with his garrison and light artillery. Geary having but three miles to march, while Leggett had six, entered first. General Sherman, returning in the evening of the 21st, was met on the way by a messenger with the news of the occupation of the Southern city.

To the damage done in the march by the destruction of two hundred miles of railway, with bridges, trestles, depots, and auxiliary structures, and the capture of thousands of horses, mules, and cattle, as well as enormous quantities of subsistence, was now added in the capture of Savannah the capture of two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, with large stores of ammunition and locomotives and cars, and four steamboats, besides the destruction of an ironclad gunboat and a ram, destroyed by Hardee to prevent their capture. General Sherman's dispatch to the President, "I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton," reached Mr. Lincoln Christmas Day, and spread joy through the land.

Savannah was under military laws. General Geary was the first commander. Subject to military law, the mayor and council resumed their functions, the municipal courts were opened, schools and churches were filled, customers thronged the shops, and the streets, enlivened by soldiers in uniform, had the appearance of a holiday. All was peace, harmony, and ease. General Sherman published an order prescribing the limits of privilege, and the city resumed a share of prosperity. On the 11th of January the Secretary of War arrived, accompanied by the quartermaster general and the adjutant general of the army, and by a retinue of civilians, who came to take possession of the captured property and to administer the affairs of the Confederate city.

CHAPTER XII.

THE CAROLINAS.

GENERAL GRANT's letter to Sherman, notifying him to bring his army by sea to Richmond, was written on the 6th of December, four days before Sherman reached the defenses of Savannah. On the 18th he wrote that it would take too long to move the army by sea by obtainable transportation, and it seemed better that Sherman should, after capturing Savannah and its garrison, operate in South Carolina. Receiving Sherman's suggestion of a march across the Carolinas, he at once, on the 27th of December, wrote in hearty concurrence, and on the 21st of January advised Sherman of his co-operation, ordering General Schofield's entire corps to the East, to advance up the Neuse River by Newbern to Goldsboro, and General Alfred H. Terry, who had already captured Fort Fisher, to take Wilmington, and to proceed thence to the same rendezvous.

Recruits came from the North, and men returning from furlough and from hospitals. The morning report of the 1st of February showed in the command fifty-eight thousand nine hundred and twenty-three infantry, forty-four hundred and thirty-eight cavalry, and seventeen hundred and eighteen artillery; total, sixty thousand and seventy-nine. The six-mule wagons numbered about twenty-five hundred; there were six hundred two-mule ambulances, sixty-eight guns, with six horses to each, and sixty-eight four-horse caissons. No tents were carried but one office tent to each head-

quarters. On the march each corps was to move by a separate road, and only artillery, ambulances, and wagons were to use roads; troops were to make their way alongside. Each division had its own supply train. As nearly as practicable, twenty days' rations of bread and about twenty days' of coffee, sugar, and salt were taken. But little meat was carried in the wagons; some divisions carried none. Reliance was placed on cattle driven and on foraging. The wagons were loaded very light, the strongest carrying little more than a ton. The roads in lower South Carolina were known to be miserable, but it was impossible to form a conception of their indescribable execrableness without actual experience.

The advance of the Seventeenth Corps left Savannah on the 4th of January, 1865, embarked in the night at Thunderbolt, and reached Beaufort next evening. The whole of the corps was on the island by the evening of the 6th. On the 14th the corps crossed by a pontoon bridge from the northern end of the island, and pushed out toward Pocotaligo. The Confederate cavalry made a gallant resistance, and were aided by defensive works strongly placed, as well as by the natural difficulties of morass and lagoons. By sunset the enemy was pushed into a strong work with massive ramparts, armed with seventeen guns, some of them of heavy caliber, and protected by a very wide and deep wet ditch. The work was evacuated after midnight and the armament carried off. Next morning the corps occupied Pocotaligo station on the railroad.

General Logan returned from leave and resumed command of the Fifteenth Corps. This corps proposed to join the Seventeenth by marching from the bank of the river opposite Savannah over a strip of ground bordered by swamp on both sides. John E. Smith had hardly started when a continu-

ous deluging rain turned the soil to ooze. The rising water broke the dikes, flooded the road near the river, and threatened to sweep away the division; they barely succeeded in struggling to solid ground. Corse's division marched up the bank of the Savannah to Sisterville with the left wing and Kilpatrick. The other two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps proceeded by boat to Beaufort, and joined General J. E. Smith at Coosawhatchie, near Pocotaligo.

General Blair, while filling his trains and constructing fortifications and intrenchments to be occupied by General Foster's troops, made demonstrations from time to time at points on the Salkiehatchie River, to keep up the impression that Charleston was the point aimed at. Meanwhile General Jeff C. Davis was toiling at the task of building a pontoon bridge over the Savannah, a large river, whose banks were several feet deep under the overflow, and, after the flood subsided, clearing out miles of road filled with a mass of drift, compacted with artificial obstructions and planted with torpedoes.

Part of the left wing was across the river by the 4th of February, and ready to march on the 5th. Order to move on the 5th of February was issued, and the campaign for Columbia was begun while the Confederates were speculating whether Augusta or Charleston was the objective point. Blair marched northwest along the swamp of the Salkiehatchie, while Logan, with three divisions of his corps, moved by parallel courses, about fifteen miles away, along the swamp of the Coosawhatchie. The troops plunged and staggered through the mud, pausing to remove the felled trees that obstructed the way, and skirmishing all the while with the cavalry that pertinaciously opposed their progress. Blair reached Whippy Swamp where it joins the Salkiehatchie at 8 P. M.

Next morning the first and fourth divisions crossed Whippy Swamp and proceeded to Rivers's Bridge over the Salkiehatchie. The third division continued along the outer border of Whippy Swamp, with directions to cross at Anglesea Post Office, and hold the bridge at that point till the Fifteenth Corps should arrive on its way to Buford's Bridge. At Rivers's Bridge the Salkiehatchie spreads in winter into a number of streams, winding between bars of mud, supporting a thick growth of trees, making a tangle of swamp and water a mile and a half across. The only passage was a straight causeway, with bridges over the streams, which was commanded its whole length by a battery erected on the farther bank.

The cavalry which had doggedly contested Blair's progress was so closely followed by Blair's advance that all the bridges, except the main one close under the battery, were saved. The guns of the battery opened fire, and killed and wounded some of the pursuers before they could leap from the causeway down into the swamp. Colonel Wager Swayne, a most valuable officer and most estimable man, was severely wounded. Mower's division above the bridge and Giles A. Smith's below, by wading, cutting ways through the woods, and building bridges, forced their way over on the 3d of February, and emerged on dry land. The works, being entirely open at the rear, were flanked and abandoned. The forces holding works defending Buford's Bridge above and Broxton's Bridge below at the same time evacuated and withdrew. General Howard reports the loss, all of which was in Mower's division, as ten or twelve killed and about seventy wounded. Colonel Harrison, who commanded the Confederate troops, reported his loss as eight killed, forty-four wounded, and fifteen missing.

General Logan, reaching the bridge over Whip-

py Swamp held by the third division, passed on to Buford's Bridge over the Salkiehatchie, and found it destroyed and the works guarding it abandoned. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps moved on the 6th, through rain and mud and swamp, to the crossings of the Little Salkiehatchie. Both corps found the bridges destroyed. Logan pushed his troops through the streams and swamp, and, emerging from them in front of a long line of intrenchment, charged upon the works and carried them. The Seventeenth Corps found the bridge in its front destroyed and abandoned. On the 7th both corps reached the railroad running from Branchville to Augusta, making the connection between Charleston and Augusta. General Corse, who had left the Savannah River in rear of the Twentieth Corps, and for part of the way had dragged through swampy road, made deep quagmire by the heavy rains and the passage of two army corps, did not overtake Logan until the 11th. The Twentieth Corps, diverging to the left from the Fifteenth at Buford's Bridge, struck the railroad at Blackville on the 9th; Kilpatrick reached it at Barnwell on the same day. The Fourteenth Corps, after crossing the Savannah at Sister's Ferry, and moving out to solid ground, marched up the river, approaching Augusta, reached the railroad at Williston on the 12th. The railroad was thoroughly destroyed for a distance of forty miles. It was apprehended that this important road might not be yielded without a battle. General Howard, when he had approached within five miles of it, began to deploy. Just then a horseman in tattered clothing, one of the foragers, came galloping from the front and called to him: "Hurry up, general; we have got the railroad."

It had been learned that rails merely bent could be put through a rolling mill and straightened, while if they were given a spiral twist they would have to

be melted and run out again. Accordingly, in this campaign the twist was required. In one case a brigade failed to observe the order, and was required to return and do the work over. To collect fuel to straighten the rails after heating them, and then give them the required twist, was a very difficult task. The engineer regiment had implements made for the purpose. The soldiers fastened railroad chairs with telegraph wire to poles; clamping one to each end of a heated rail, and pulling them around in opposite directions, gave the required twist.

While Sherman's army was at work destroying the communications of the State as it advanced, the Confederate commanders were taking account of their resources. Generals Beauregard, Hardee, and D. H. Hill held a conference in Georgia, near Augusta, on the 2d of February. They estimated Hardee's available "effective" in South Carolina at fourteen thousand five hundred; Georgia militia, fourteen hundred and fifty; the Army of the Tennessee, ten thousand eight hundred; and Wheeler's cavalry, sixty-seven hundred; aggregate, thirty-three thousand four hundred and fifty. But the wreckage of Hood's army was drifting across northern Georgia, to be finally stranded in North Carolina. Each corps commander still bore his flag, and, gathering his remaining followers under it, maintained the name and organization of a corps. At the time of the conference only Lee's corps had arrived. Generals Cheatham's and Stewart's came in detachments from time to time, the last reporting at Bentonville.

Having completed the destruction of the road, and impressed the defenders of Augusta that they were Sherman's aim, he set out definitely for Columbia. Kilpatrick, to continue the impression, was sent to Aiken, close to Augusta, and General Howard turned eastward to Orangeburg, also to

break up the railroad at that point, and destroy the communication between Columbia and Charleston. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps resumed the march on the 9th. They found the bridges over the south fork of the Edisto destroyed, and troops in intrenchments defending the crossings. Logan's men waded the streams; Blair found a place where solid land extended to the river confined to one stream. Mower laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed after nightfall. On the farther side the land was covered with thick timber and flooded with the overflow. The division marched through icy water, waist deep, and the darkness till solid ground was reached. The gleam of moonlight upon their rifles disclosed their presence, and while they plodded on with frozen clothing the enemy withdrew.

Both corps started for the north fork of the Edisto on the morning of the 11th, the Seventeenth Corps taking the direct road to Orangeburg. The foragers in advance came soon upon the enemy's mounted scouts, forced them back upon the main body of cavalry, and sent back for re-enforcements. The Ninth Illinois mounted infantry went to the front and pushed the cavalry to the shelter of a light intrenchment. The infantry column then coming up, the cavalry broke into retreat. The Twentieth Ohio infantry was detached, and, pursuing at a double quick, saved the small bridges over the smaller currents of the river till, coming to a bend in the road, the men found themselves near to the main stream and its bridge, with a battery on rising ground beyond. A skirmish line was pushed forward in the overflowed forest to the edge of the main stream, and, standing in the cold water, skirmished with the Confederate line across the river, and prevented parties from approaching the bridge to burn it. General Giles A. Smith coming up with his division, placed a battery in a field where it could command the bridge and reach the

Confederate works. But after dark a small party made a hasty dash to the bridge and lighted a fire, which burned some of the planking, but did not injure the timbers.

An exploring party from the third division found, less than a mile below the bridge, a place where solid ground extended to the river, while a swamp covered the farther shore. A road was made in the night to the spot. Next morning the third division crossed by pontoons, and waded through the swamp to a great field which extended to the high ground near the bridge. A squad with one gun was firing across the bridge at Smith's division. One brigade was sent by a crossroad directly to the railroad and began its destruction. The first brigade in column of regiments marched to the heights. The gun squad then, perceiving the approaching column, fired a few wild shots at it, and quickly withdrew. Colonel Proudfit, of the Twelfth Wisconsin, was appointed provost marshal, and his regiment detailed as police, and the rest of the brigade proceeded to destroy the railroad. Smith quickly repaired the bridge, and the rest of the corps and the trains passed over it by evening. The force defending Orangeburg comprised Johnson's (formerly Stowall's), Palmer's, and Pettus's brigade of Lee's corps, and a portion of Young's cavalry. The loss of the third division was two wounded; the known loss of the Confederates was six killed, fourteen wounded, and twenty-six taken prisoners.

At the same time General Logan forced a crossing a few miles farther up the river. The bridge being destroyed, one division forced its way across above the bridgeway and the other below. The Confederates were driven from their works at 2.30 P. M., many throwing their arms away in their haste. General Logan's loss was one man killed and five wounded; the Confederates, three killed,

wounded unknown, and eighty prisoners. About two hundred stand of arms were taken.

General Howard marched easily on the 13th and 14th, destroying the railroad between Orangeburg and Columbia. On the 15th General Logan, having the advance, found his progress stoutly contested, but pushed his opponents steadily back to Congaree Creek, which empties into Congaree River, about six miles below Columbia. Hampton's cavalry crossed the creek, destroyed the bridge over it, and took post behind a line of intrenchment, with artillery. Logan sent a brigade up the creek far enough to cross beyond the extremity of the intrenchment, and when the enemy withdrew to another line nearer the city the Fifteenth followed, and drew up before it by nightfall. The Confederates abandoned this line in the night, crossed the river, and burned the bridges. Next morning an artillery fire, ineffective, opened from the city across the river. A few responsive guns replied. Soldiers could be seen loitering by the river bank, and smoke rising in portions of the city. The Congaree was quite too wide and rapid to be bridged by resources within reach of the army. The Fifteenth Corps moved up above the junction of the Saluda and Broad, the confluents of the Congaree, built with ease a bridge across the Saluda, and afterward constructed another over the Broad with great difficulty and under sharp opposition. The troops on the way to the crossing passed by Camp Sorghum, where twelve hundred officers, prisoners of war, had marched to an open field, and then, without shelter, lay on the ground, under the burning sun and dews of night, and rain and wind, except a few who were able to scratch holes in the ground and cover them with brush. The bridge over the Broad was completed in the night of the 16th, and early next morning the troops began to cross, Stone's brigade of Woods's division leading.

The mayor of Columbia met General Woods and surrendered the city to him; Stone's brigade was put on duty to preserve order. Cotton was burning in piles in the streets. A violent wind-storm whirled flaming bunches through the air. People to ingratiate the guards supplied them with whisky. Houses caught fire. Undoubtedly men who had been prisoners of war and escaped aided the spread of the flames. It is not unlikely that in Sherman's army there were some soldiers who did the same. Stone's brigade was relieved; the rest of Woods's division and Hazen's finely disciplined division were brought into the city. General Sherman, General Howard, General Logan, and his division commanders personally directed and superintended the efforts to stay the spread of the conflagration and to remove furniture from houses. But all efforts were futile against the great sheets of flame driven by the blast, until after midnight the windstorm lulled. The greater part of the city was a mass of cinder.

General Sherman gave up his own quarters to homeless families, and divided his own provisions with them and others. A preposterous story was started that General Sherman ordered the burning of the city; the order that he made is the following:

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 26.

1. General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near their mouth as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad properties, manufacturing and machine shops, but will spare libraries and asylums and private dwellings. He will then move to Winnsboro, destroying *en route* utterly that section of the railroad. He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water tanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to accomplish consistent with the proper celerity. For movements of his army, he will select roads that cross the Wateree to the south of Lancaster.

General Slocum with the head of the left wing reached the Saluda a few miles higher up. He crossed the Saluda and the Broad on the 20th, and destroyed the railroad down nearly to Columbia. He moved next day to Winnsboro, and destroyed thence northward the Charlotte and South Carolina Railroad, and on the 22d began crossing the Catawba at Rock Mount Ferry. The river was swollen and rapid and filled with drift, and when the Twentieth Corps, the cavalry, and one division of the Fourteenth Corps had crossed, the bridge gave way, and much of it was swept off by the current. General Williams, commanding the Twentieth Corps, continued on his route, and, being obliged to corduroy the impassable road most of the way, made only sixteen miles by the 26th. General Slocum, learning here of the detention of the Fourteenth Corps, halted the Twentieth and returned to the river. Fortunately the river fell, the bridge was repaired, and the water-bound divisions crossed. The two corps, Fourteenth and Twentieth, marching by different roads over oozy soil, saturated by continuous rain, impeded by creeks swollen to torrents, with banks submerged, reached Sneedsboro on the Great Pedee, above Cheraw, on the 4th of March. One day the Twentieth Corps advanced only five miles, being obliged to corduroy the entire distance.

The Seventeenth Corps left Columbia on the 18th and reached Winnsboro on the 22d, having destroyed the railroad the entire distance, and on the 23d reached the Wateree. The progress to Winnsboro was stubbornly contested by Wade Hampton's cavalry and Lee's corps. Most of the prisoners taken belonged to Lee's corps. The Fifteenth Corps, leaving Columbia, proceeded down the river, destroying the railroad for twenty miles, then turning to the north, joined the Seventeenth Corps, on the river called there the Wateree, but

named the Catawba farther up. The river was swollen by heavy rains; the pontoons of both corps were required to bridge it. The troops began to cross before noon, and the rear was over by nine o'clock next morning. The third division of the Seventeenth Corps waited till the pontoons were taken up and packed, and camped at night at Russell Corner, eight miles in rear of corps headquarters, and the bridge train three miles in rear of the division. Next day the road was worse. One brigade was ordered to give aid where wagons were mired beyond the power of the teams to pull them out; the other brigade was required to repair impassable places in the road. Four miles of corduroy were made. The division camped at night ten miles in rear of corps headquarters, and the bridge train five miles in rear of the division. The division went into camp next night at Little Lynch's Creek, and was there overtaken by the bridge train. The men worked until 1.30 A.M. constructing causeway and bridge, and resumed march before daylight, having made fires to light the wagons over the narrow track in the dark and fog, and overtook the corps at Lynch's Creek in the afternoon.

General Giles A. Smith with the advance of the corps reached Lynch's Creek by noon of the 26th of February, and found the bridge standing in the middle of a great expanse of water a mile wide. A regiment waded over the submerged roadway to solid ground. The First Michigan engineer regiment, working all night, constructed a footway for troops by next morning, and Mower's division crossed. Working from both shores during the whole of the 27th, about twenty-five hundred officers and men, standing in water waist deep in places, completed by 5 P.M. eight hundred and fifty feet of bridging and seven thousand feet of corduroy road laid on stringers. Next day, the

28th, the remainder of the corps crossed, and, after marching nineteen miles, the corps went into camp thirteen miles from Cheraw.

Tidings came that Hardee evacuated Charleston when he learned of Sherman's entry into Columbia, and was now in Cheraw with his whole command. General Sherman was with Slocum and the left wing. General Howard was with Logan, whose corps was struggling to effect a crossing over Lynch's Creek farther down. Blair intrenched, reconnoitered, and waited; Logan crossed on the 2d of March, and Blair moved on the 3d. The rear of Hardee's command crossed the Pedee and set fire to the bridge saturated with combustibles as the head of Blair's column drew near.

The railroad from Charleston ended at Cheraw, and, as it was impossible to move stores by wagon as fast as they were brought by rail, a great amount accumulated. The capture included twenty-five pieces of artillery, five thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, twenty thousand rounds of infantry ammunition, two thousand stand of small arms, one thousand sabers, thirty-six hundred barrels of powder, and a great store of C. S. A. cotton. All was destroyed except three guns carried off as trophies.

The Fourteenth Corps constructed a bridge ten miles above Cheraw, and crossed on the 7th of March. The Twentieth Corps moved down to Cheraw, and crossed on the bridge of the right wing. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth crossed in detachments, and, moving a few miles each day, assembled about Bennettsville on the 6th. The country between Columbia and Cheraw was scantily supplied with subsistence, and the foragers gathered little. The supplies in the wagons were nearly exhausted. Coffee and sugar remained, and a small amount of bread reserved for emergency. The men were hungry. The country from Cheraw to

Bennettsville and a day's march beyond abounded with subsistence. It was a feast at the end of each day's march.

The foragers consisted regularly of parties of an officer and a dozen men or less from each regiment, who reported to the provost marshal of the division before setting out in the morning. At first they were on foot, and visited only plantations near the road. But soon they all had horses, and their explorations extended ten miles off from the flanks. They brought in ham, bacon, and poultry, sweet potatoes and corn meal, horses and mules, and sometimes impressed vehicles to convey their captures to camp. Occasionally a grist-mill was found. The party would proceed to grind corn and send to camp for wagons to take the meal. They seemed to have instinctive perception of the selection of camping ground, and never failed to report with their spoils. Sometimes they reached the ground along with the staff officers, who rode in advance to select the ground and assign place to the divisions. When ground was designated for each brigade, the forage parties, knowing the relative position of the regiments in the brigade, would repair each to the line of its own regiment. The weary troops, dragging in through the night, would find fires glowing with cheer, and piles of food giving welcome.

The foragers often came upon parties of Confederate cavalry miles away from the line of march. Whether it was a solitary forager or a party, every one fired at the enemy before falling back. Every forager within hearing of the report galloped to reinforce. As the noise of the skirmish grew, the number of combatants increased, and so increased that the Confederate cavalry was never able to penetrate within sight of Sherman's column.

Taking articles not needed for the subsistence of the army was prohibited. There were, of course,

violations of this order, but violations when reported were punished. A man who was convicted of taking a watch from the person of a citizen was drummed out of the army. In another case, where a man was court-martialed for stealing some article from a house, his captain was put in arrest for having failed to report the case promptly.

The irregularity in reaching camp all through the night gave rise to a practice that was adopted in some divisions. Before breaking camp in the morning, the detail for picket for the ensuing night was made, and marched at the head of the division for the day. There it was ready to serve as a skirmish detail if needed. In the afternoon, when the staff officers rode forward to select ground for camp, the picket detail followed them and went on post by daylight, while the troops arriving late had no concern about being called for duty.

A few days through a series of swamps in constant rain brought the army to Fayetteville, N. C., on the Cape Fear River. The foragers entered first, but were driven back by Wade Hampton and his cavalry rear guard. Hampton crossed the bridge and burned it just before the Fourteenth Corps arrived. The other corps followed, coming in by different roads; finally Kilpatrick appeared, and General Sherman's army was assembled on the 11th of March.

Kilpatrick had not been in view on the march, but had rendered important service. His persistent advance and attacks close to Augusta kept troops held there under apprehension that Sherman was behind him advancing upon the city. During the march to Columbia, and thence to the crossing of the Catawba, he interposed between the left wing and the cavalry of Butler and Hampton, covering the rear as well as the flank. The encounters were daily, and serious engagements not infrequent. His impetuosity seemed reckless, but was always

carefully calculated. His men caught his spirit, and were always ready to charge upon any force, no matter what the disparity in numbers might be. On the night of the 10th Kilpatrick again slept in a house away from his camp. Hampton broke into his camp after midnight, captured his artillery and headquarters, and swept in many prisoners. Kilpatrick escaped into the swamp. Many of his men did the same, taking their arms with them. The men rallied, formed, and charged upon the Confederates, who were busy gathering horses and other booty. Taken by surprise, the Confederates gave way. The recaptured battery was turned upon them at close quarters. Hampton withdrew, carrying one hundred and three prisoners and a number of horses. He left behind eighty killed, a considerable number wounded, and thirty men captured. Kilpatrick lost nineteen killed, sixty-eight severely wounded.

A party from the third division of Blair's corps captured a small steamboat a few miles below the city. The value of the capture dropped next day, the 12th, just after noon, when a steamboat arrived bearing dispatches from General Terry, at Wilmington, in response to notice sent to him by Sherman by courier. The words "News from home" ran like wild fire through the camp. Men who had opportunity to see a newspaper were oracles of intelligence to the rest. The boat was sent back at six o'clock with dispatches from General Sherman. He wrote to the Secretary of War, General Grant, and General Halleck, and also to General Schofield in North Carolina, and General Foster in South Carolina, now department commanders under him; and also to his quartermaster and commissary officers. There was need of clothing, as well as of rations. The men, marching outside of the road and late into the night, lost their shoes in the mire, their hats were brushed off and lost in

the thickets, and their clothing tattered. They were a sorry sight. On the 14th a tug boat came up with a supply of oats, a little coffee and sugar, no bread, an inadequate supply of shoes, and no clothing, there being none in Wilmington. One division received and issued four hundred and ninety-four pairs of shoes, leaving still one hundred and seventy-two men barefoot.

[Four hundred and fifty refugees having been sent down the river on boats on the 13th, the remaining multitude, comprising the army of colored people who had accumulated on the march, went down to Wilmington by land with a cavalry escort. On the 15th the advance was resumed.] It became known that General Joseph E. Johnston was now in command of the entire force in front. There was a visible bracing up, a watchful readiness in the troops, in recognition of the ability of their antagonist in the Atlanta campaign. General Sherman took notice also of the fact that General Bragg had reported to Johnston with the army that had contested Schofield's advance from the coast, and sent an order to Schofield to meet him at Goldsboro on the 20th.

Each corps being on a separate road, the Twentieth was on the left and the Seventeenth on the right. The enemy encountered by the Seventeenth was bad roads. This may be appreciated by taking a few extracts from a pocket diary kept at the time:

15th of March, marched via Blockersville to South River. Thunderstorms at noon killed one and hurt two men of the Seventy-eighth Ohio. Rained after that all day and night. Soil melted like sugar. Laid three miles of corduroy, and repaired much. Wagons kept sticking. Men toiled terribly. I came to camp and went to bed at 2 A. M. None of the second brigade or of their section of the train in yet.

16th. At 5 A. M. I sent two regiments, that had had some sleep, to help the second brigade. All in by 9 A. M. Then sent Twelfth Wisconsin to help pontoon train in. Rained

all day. Train packed and awaiting completion of a bridge. Pulled into road at 2 P. M. Bridge extended. Crossed at 7 P. M. Marched six miles. Crossed a creek, bridge not burned. Went to bed at 3 A. M.; half of the section of train guarded by first brigade not in.

17th. Rear of train and Twelfth Wisconsin in camp at 6 A. M. Marched at 7 A. M. via Owenville, crossed Cohena on a bridge built by fourth division. Marched within five miles of Clinton and turned to Beaman's Crossroads. Marched nineteen miles. Last part of train now coming in — 2.30 A. M.

18th. Last wagon of supply train came in just as head of column moved. Fine weather. Organized two large brigade pioneer parties. They with the division pioneers, colored pioneer battalion, and from two to four regiments at work; got along very well.

Expecting to find resistance on his left, General Sherman directed General Slocum to put four divisions, two from each corps, on the outer road, the extreme left, and the rest of the troops, as well as the trains, on a road to the right. On the 16th the advance met the Confederates where North River approaches to the Cape Fear. With a somewhat stubborn resistance they fell back fighting till they reached a line of intrenchment. Here they made a stand. Slocum brought up his artillery, and a brisk combat ensued. Upon the suggestion of General Sherman, a brigade was moved to the left to look for Hardee's flank. It was found that the intrenchment did not extend to the river. The brigade passed to the rear, and Hardee fell back to another fortified line. Slocum followed, but did not press the attack that night. Next morning the works were found evacuated. The National loss was ninety-five killed, five hundred and thirty-three wounded, and fifty-four missing. Of the Confederates, one hundred and twenty-eight dead were buried on the battlefield, one hundred and seventy-five prisoners were taken, and three guns captured. General Hardee's report is: "My loss is between four hundred and five hundred. Among the miss-

ing is Colonel Rhett, commanding brigade, and among the killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert de Treville. Two pieces of artillery were abandoned."

The march of the 18th brought the head of Slocum's column so near to Bentonville that General Sherman, satisfied that there would be no serious opposition, crossed over at night to the other wing and joined General Howard. Next day the resistance to the advance was so obstinate that General Slocum was ready to believe the statement of a captured Confederate that Johnston was present with his entire army concentrated. In fact, Johnston at Raleigh was kept advised every day of the position of every part of Sherman's army, and had recalled Bragg, who was opposing the advance of Schofield up the Cape Fear and the Neuse Rivers. He resolved to strike while Sherman's corps were apart on different roads, and crush them separately before they could concentrate. At the rate at which Slocum was advancing, he should make a junction with Howard in the neighborhood of Cox's bridge over the Neuse by the night of the 19th. Johnston moved rapidly south from Smithfield, crossed the Neuse, and took the road which crossed Mill Creek at Bentonville, and, continuing south, crossed the Averysboro road nearly at a right angle. He had Bragg, Hardee, and Stuart, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand "effectives," besides the cavalry of Hampton and Wheeler. On the 19th, in the forenoon, General Bragg took position across the Averysboro road at right angles with it, about half a mile west of the Bentonville road, interposing between it and the advancing National columns. General Stewart formed on Bragg's right, along the north side of Cole's farm. Hardee, who did not get into position till 3 P. M., joined his left to Stewart's right. The general formation was a re-entrant angle, Stewart at the apex, Bragg and Hardee along the sides, and the

extreme flanks refused. Except the road and Cole's farm, the ground was mostly covered by forest and dense thickets of scrub oak, very difficult to move through.

General Sherman, satisfied that the danger point was passed, left Slocum early in the morning of the 19th, and rode across the country to join General Howard. The Confederate cavalry disputed even more obstinately than on the preceding day the advance of the two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps. A strong skirmish line pushed them steadily back, though slowly. Toward noon Hobart's brigade of Carlin's division was deployed and came upon a line of intrenchment across the road. The line could be seen extended along the farther boundary of Cole's farm toward the north and west, while Hobart's skirmishers found it in the woods, reaching to the south. Carlin, still satisfied it was only cavalry in his front, deployed his division and charged. He was met by volleys immediately from infantry rifles.

Buell's brigade, sent to find and turn the flank of the works on the farther side of Cole's farm, was charged by the Confederate force and driven across the field. Stewart suffered severely from the fire of a battery as he crossed the field, but prevailed in pushing Hobart back nearly a mile, and captured the battery on the way. Davis called on Fearing's brigade, and Fearing, by an impetuous charge, rolled up General Stewart's left and pressed him into the swamp.

There was a lull on the field. A brigade of Jackson's division of the Twentieth Corps (Robinson's) took position on the Morris farm about a mile south and west from the Cole house, on rising ground covered with pines, and with a marsh in front. The batteries of the corps joined the brigade. Carlin's brigades—Buel, Hobart, and Miles—asssembled on the left, and Fearing, of Morgan's

division, on the right, and all intrenched. Morgan drew back his two remaining brigades and intrenched, leaving a gap between the left of this line and the right of Fearing. Two brigades of Jackson's division—Hawley and Selfridge—coming up later, were posted in rear and to the left of Robinson, and Cogswell's brigade of Ward's division was added to the right of Morgan's line, but did not suffice to fill the gap between it and Fearing. Johnston ordered attack along the whole line. Bragg, getting partially into the rear of Morgan, compelled successive regiments to refuse, until the whole line was gradually wheeled to the rear. Hardee gained temporary advantage, but was repelled in repeated assaults by the well-posted and well-served artillery of the Twentieth Corps. It was dark when assaults ceased. In the night Johnston fell back to a new line. The apex was north of Cole's house, and the flanks, curving back, were continued nearly to Mill Creek. Slocum adjusted his line.

Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee heard the sound of Slocum's guns. But he had heard much the same when only cavalry with their artillery had doggedly attempted to delay the left wing. So late as 5 P. M. he received a dispatch from Slocum stating that only cavalry with their artillery was in his front. He received in the night a second dispatch, announcing that Johnston with his whole army had been encountered. Hazen's division was nearest to Slocum. Sherman's order to march at once in relief reached him on the road about midnight. He reported to Slocum at dawn, having marched twenty miles since sunset, and took position on Slocum's right. General Sherman joined Logan, and the Fifteenth Corps arrived on the ground in the morning and connected with Hazen. Later in the day General Howard brought up the Seventeenth, the most remote of the corps,

placed the fourth division on Logan's right, and put the first and third in camp in reserve. The Army of the Tennessee and Johnston's left wing, facing each other, occupied with their works the bluff banks of a marshy valley, along which flowed to the north a brook that joined Mill Creek near Bentonville.

General Blair, about noon of the 21st, directed the first and third divisions to form on the right of his fourth division. General Mower, commanding the first division, always eager for fight, and seeing a chance for turning Johnston's flank, pushed on. The marsh was impassable for horses; officers dismounted, and all waded through. Ascending the bluff, and taking a line of rifle pits, he was, without knowing it, in rear of the Confederate line, about two hundred yards from Johnston's headquarters, and within musket shot of the bridge over Mill Creek, which constituted the only line of retreat. The sound of a skirmish in that quarter created a panic among the teamsters, and the wagons dashed pell-mell for the bridge. Johnston gathered up his reserves and cavalry and attacked. Just at that moment General Cheatham, with two divisions which had left Meridian, Miss., on the 24th of January, and had been striving to make a junction, arrived and reported at Johnston's headquarters. Sherman, hearing of Mower's peril, and having given notice that he would not have an engagement, but would only force Johnston across the Neuse, and not aware of Mower's actual situation, sent orders of recall, opened fire along his whole line, and pushed his skirmishers close up to the enemy's works to make a diversion in Mower's favor. Fighting with a bold front, and at the same time moving by the left flank, brigades passing alternately in rear of those at halt and engaged, he reached his assigned position without disaster.

Johnston withdrew in the night, and crossed the Neuse to Smithfield. The reported National loss in the three days was: Killed, one hundred and ninety-four; wounded, eleven hundred and twelve; missing, two hundred and twenty-one; total, fifteen hundred and twenty-seven. The reported Confederate loss was: Killed, two hundred and thirty-nine; wounded, sixteen hundred and ninety-four; missing, six hundred and seventy-three; total, twenty-six hundred and six.

The Confederate reports state that nine hundred and three prisoners were captured. The National reports do not give the number of Confederates captured. While the National reports of casualties were, as a rule, certainly made out with greater care and accuracy than the Confederate, they were by no means infallible. General Sherman in his report says that General Howard reported twelve hundred and eighty-seven prisoners captured by his command at Bentonville. General Howard's report gives twelve hundred and eighty-seven as the number captured by his command from Savannah to Goldsboro, while Logan and Blair, the corps commanders, give the number of prisoners taken by their respective corps as: By Logan, six hundred and forty; by Blair, three hundred and eighty, in the entire campaign.

Easy marches brought the army to Goldsboro on the 24th, where General Schofield had just arrived with Generals J. D. Cox and Terry, commanding the Twenty-third and the Tenth Corps. When the Army of the Tennessee approached the city, General Sherman sent an order for trains to move aside and troops to close up, and stood by the roadside, accompanied by Schofield, Cox, and Terry. As the troops passed in columns of fours, an embryo review, General Howard and the corps and division commanders took their places as their commands passed. Many being barefoot, some

with bare legs, most with clothes torn, and heads covered with a grotesque variety of gear, they made a sorry array of apparel, but they marched jubilant, stalwart, masterful.

The Tenth and Twenty-third Corps were in Goldsboro as a part of General Grant's co-operation with Sherman's plans. He sent General Terry with a land force to capture Fort Fisher, a strong fortress commanding the mouth of Cape Fear River. Admiral Porter, with a fleet of sixty vessels, assisted. On the 15th of January a terrific bombardment by the fleet, followed by a rushing charge by the troops and a fierce fight within the fortress, captured the works with the garrison and armament. The other forts about the mouth of the river were evacuated, and the river was open to the National fleet.

General Schofield in Tennessee received orders to repair to the east to proceed against Wilmington and Newbern, and effect a junction with Sherman. He was with his corps in Washington and Alexandria on the 1st of February ready to embark, but detained by ice in the river and lack of transportation. He embarked on the 4th with Cox's division, leaving the rest to follow, and landed at Fort Fisher on the 9th. Terry was in front of General Hoke, whose intrenchments extended from the east or left bank of the Cape Fear River to a large lagoon. After ineffectual efforts to reach Hoke's rear, Schofield took Cox to the west or right bank, to proceed against a force posted farther up the river. Placing part of his command in front of the works, which extended from the river to a large pond, he made a detour of fifteen miles around the pond. The Confederate commander, finding his rear threatened, abandoned the fort, leaving the armament, and retreated eight miles up the river to a position behind Town Creek. Hoke at the same time retreated to a new position on a line

with Town Creek, on the opposite side of the river, having his front protected by a creek, his right by the river, and his left by a swamp. Terry followed and intrenched.

Colonel Simonson, who in the absence of General Hagood commanded the Confederate force on the right bank of the river, took position on the north bank of Town Creek, a few miles from the river, upon a bluff, where he had a battery with artillery. A bridge crossed the creek at this point, approached by a causeway through a swamp. Cox posted his artillery on the nearest firm ground in front of the Confederate works, and, leaving Colonel Henderson with a brigade at this point, led his other three brigades lower down the stream. Early in the morning of the 20th Henderson opened fire with his guns upon Simonson's battery, and advanced a heavy line of skirmishers wading through the swamp to the shore of the creek, disabling Simonson's heaviest gun, and compelled his men to keep covered behind the shelter of his works. Cox meanwhile, with a flatboat able to carry fifty men at a load, was diligently passing his command over, without exciting alarm or suspicion. By the middle of the afternoon the three brigades were over. Cox pushed through the swamp to Simonson's rear and captured him, three hundred and seventy-five of his men, and his guns.

Next day Cox marched up the river, and, reconstructing a partially destroyed pontoon bridge, occupied the marshy island in the river in front of Wilmington. Soon heavy columns of smoke were seen rising, indicating preparations for evacuation. Next morning, the 22d of February, General Cox completed the crossing and entered the abandoned city.

The next step was to capture Kinston, a point accessible both by water and rail from the sea, lying farther inland, and nearer than Wilmington to

Goldsboro. Three divisions were added to the force under Schofield, and Cox was called from Wilmington to take immediate command of the expedition. The railroad from Newbern to Kinston ran from Newbern to Southwest Creek, three miles from Kinston, through a continuous swamp. West of Southwest Creek was solid ground. About two miles east of the creek, and parallel to it, a ridge of firm ground extended into the swamp from the bank of Neuse River. Halfway between the creek and this ridge a dirt road, called the British road, ran across the swamp from north to south.

On the 7th Cox rapidly moved the divisions of Carter and Palmer out to the ridge, where they threw up works facing west about a mile apart, Palmer at the north covering the railroad, and Carter at the south, crossing and covering the Dover road. This road leaving Kinston ran east, crossing Southwest Creek on a bridge, and crossing British road, continued through the swamp toward Newbern. Colonel Upham was posted with two regiments at the crossing of the Dover and British roads, and a regiment of New York cavalry was detached to watch the crossings of Southwest Creek, which was not fordable. General Ruger with his division was stationed about three miles in rear of Palmer, where he could protect the working party repairing the railroad, and also be in readiness to go to the support of Palmer or Carter if needed.

On the morning of the 8th Bragg crossed Southwest Creek with Hoke's division and the fragment of Hood's army, still styled the Army of the Tennessee. The cavalry disappeared without giving warning. Bragg fell upon Upham's two regiments of fresh recruits. Upham got away with his own regiment; the other was almost wholly captured. Bragg then advanced against Carter, who, being intrenched, made defense. Cox, who

was at the time in consultation with General Schofield, sent Ruger forward in support. Palmer was ordered to send one brigade rapidly to aid Carter, and with the rest of his division to make a demonstration toward Southwest Creek. Ruger filled the space between Palmer and Carter, and quickly threw up defensive works of logs. Bragg reformed his lines, made assault, and was repulsed. There was skirmishing on the 9th, and extension and strengthening of the National lines. Bragg made repeated assaults on the 10th, and was repulsed at every attempt. Colonel McQuiston made a sally from General Cox's left, fell upon Bragg's right, routed it, and returned with two hundred and sixty-six prisoners captured, in time to aid in repelling an assault upon the center and right. Bragg found it was impracticable to advance through the swamp and thickets and attack intrenchments with success. The re-enforcements sent by Johnston had come with orders to hold the railroad trains ready to bring them back immediately after the fighting was over to participate in his concentration before Sherman. Bragg withdrew in the night with the entire force, and joined Johnston in time to take part in the battle at Bentonville.

The casualties on the National side, as shown by the revised consolidation of the returns, were: Killed, sixty-five; wounded, three hundred and nineteen; missing, nine hundred and fifty-three; total, thirteen hundred and thirty-seven. The Confederate reports consist of a few brief telegrams from Bragg to Johnston, which give no information as to casualties, and the report of D. H. Hill, temporary commander of Lee's corps, which is too spiteful to be quite trustworthy. He reports that the corps, comprising five brigades, numbered thirteen hundred and twenty-eight "effectives," and that the casualties were eleven killed, one hundred and seven wounded, and sixteen missing. In

his report of the battle of Bentonville, he states that the corps went into battle on the 19th numbering twenty-six hundred and eighty-seven "effectives." Johnston, in a report to General Lee, dated 11th of March, said that General Bragg's loss in the recent engagement was about five hundred. Hoke's command was larger than Hill's. Its return for the 17th of March, after the battles of Wilmington, Kinston, and the first day of Bentonville, was: "Effectives," forty-seven hundred and seventy-five infantry; artillery, seven hundred and eighty-two; total, fifty-five hundred and fifty-seven.


Schofield repaired the railroad to Kinston. He ordered Terry to advance from Wilmington by the railroad to Goldsboro, to which point he proceeded in person with Cox's command, arriving there on the 21st. The campaign of the Carolinas was definitely concluded on the 24th of March, when the six corps—the Tenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third—were assembled there about their leader.

CHAPTER XIII.


THE END OF THE WAR.

AT Goldsboro Sherman came into full communication with the world. He found there General Grant's aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Dunn, with letters. In one Grant, mentioning the co-operative movement on foot, said: "Wilson started on Monday with twelve thousand cavalry from Eastport. Stoneman started on the same day from East Tennessee toward Lynchburg. Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior of Alabama. I ordered Gillmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, to hold all important posts on the seacoast, and to send to Wilmington all surplus forces. Thomas was also directed to forward to Newbern all troops belonging to the corps with you. I understand this will give you about five thousand men, besides those brought East with Meagher. I have been telegraphing Meigs to hasten up locomotives and cars for you."

General Sherman determined to have personal consultation with General Grant while his army grouped around Goldsboro was getting supplied. As soon as the last rail was laid in repairs, leaving General Schofield in command, he started on the evening of the 25th on a locomotive for Newbern. At Moorhead City he took boat to General Grant's headquarters at City Point. When he entered Grant's quarters, they grasped hands and



The second interview on the River Queen is represented in the accompanying vignette copy of a painting by G. P. A. Healy entitled *The Peacemakers*, the fourth member of the group being Admiral Porter. General Sherman is shown at the moment that he said to Mr. Lincoln, "If Lee will only remain in Richmond till I can reach Burkeville we will have him between our thumb and fingers," suiting the action to the word.—EDITOR.



stood in silence, eye to eye, soul to soul, in closer communion than words could utter.

Sherman had two long interviews with President Lincoln on his boat. Admiral Porter was present at one. Both Sherman and Porter have made record of the conversation. Both mention the tender earnestness with which the President pressed and repeated his hope that there would be no more slaughter, his wish that the war might close without another battle, and the disbanded soldiers return home to their farms and workshops. General Sherman also relates that the President, by telling a story, intimated that he would be glad if Jefferson Davis should get away, provided he escaped "unbeknownst." Arrangements being made for the organization and supply of his army, Sherman undertook to be ready to move on the 10th of April, and returned to Goldsboro, arriving there on the 30th of March.

The army, as in the Atlanta campaign, comprised a center and right and left wings. General Schofield commanded the center, or the Army of the Ohio; General Howard, the right wing, or the Army of the Tennessee; and General Slocum, the left wing, which had heretofore been called, but was now regularly constituted, the Army of Georgia, a separate army in the field. The Army of the Tennessee comprised the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by General Logan, and the Seventeenth, commanded by General Blair, and numbered twenty-eight thousand one hundred and seventeen infantry, fifty-three cavalry, and six hundred and sixty-four artillery. The Army of the Ohio comprised the Tenth Corps, commanded by General Terry, and the Twenty-third, commanded by General Cox, and numbered twenty-five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven infantry and six hundred and sixty-five artillery. The Army of Georgia comprised the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by

General Davis, and the Twentieth, commanded by General Mower, and numbered twenty-seven thousand one hundred and twenty-four infantry and nine hundred and thirty-nine artillery. In addition, General Kilpatrick's cavalry division contained fifty-four hundred and eighty-four cavalry and one hundred and seventy-five artillery. The aggregate was, on the 10th of April: Infantry, eighty thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight; cavalry, fifty-five hundred and thirty-seven; artillery, twenty-four hundred and forty-three; aggregate, eighty-eight thousand nine hundred and forty-eight. The artillery had ninety-one guns.

News came to Goldsboro on the 6th of April that Lee had evacuated Richmond and was hurrying away with his army and the Confederate Government. A dispatch was received from Grant on the 8th, ending, "Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at." Throwing up the plan of campaign published in field orders on the 5th, he started on the 10th direct for Johnston in his camp at Smithfield, which was found the next day abandoned, and the bridge across the Neuse burned. In the night Sherman received news of the surrender of Lee. On the march next day the tidings was given to the columns on the march. The men were wild with joy. The universal shout was, "Lee has surrendered, and we are going home!" An ambitious desire to have one fight with Lee's army had been quite generally felt, but it was agreed about the camp fires that night that it was better that the Army of the Potomac should have achieved its final victory without extraneous aid.

On the 14th a flag of truce came from General Johnston proposing a suppression of hostilities, and that General Grant be requested to "take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the

needful arrangement to terminate the existing war." Sherman replied: "That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Courthouse on the 9th instant relative to our two armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend any movement of our troops in the direction of Virginia."

On the morning of the 17th, as General Sherman was entering the car to go out and meet General Johnston, the telegraph operator asked him to wait till he received an important cipher dispatch from Mr. Stanton. It was the announcement of the murder of Lincoln. When the two generals met and withdrew to a little farmhouse which was vacated for them, Sherman showed the dispatch; Johnston was shocked, and did not attempt to conceal his distress, and denounced the act as a disgrace to the age. There was much serious conversation upon the horrible deed before the business of the interview was reached. Then Sherman urged that Johnston could with propriety do what Lee had already done; Johnston agreed to this, but thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, terms might be arranged which would embrace all the Confederate armies, and, upon his undertaking to procure authority from Jefferson Davis, the conference was adjudged till noon next day.

Next morning the tidings of the murder of the President was promulgated in orders. The men sat all day, each in front of his shelter tent, somber, brooding, silent. The stillness was appalling. A word would have sent eighty thousand furious men, a whirling tornado, desolating the land. Sherman, accompanied by a party of officers, went on his errand of peace to negotiate the surrender of the Confederate armies. When the two generals met, Johnston proposed that General Breckinridge

should be admitted to the conference, not as a member of the Confederate Government, but as an officer in the Confederate army. Breckinridge was an adroit politician, and as he presented the proposition of making terms of an immediate termination of the war and the spread of universal peace, General Sherman's imagination so took fire at the prospect of such a boon to the weary nation that he drafted the following articles to be submitted to the Government at Washington. They were at once accepted :

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *statu quo* until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say, forty-eight hours—allowed.

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal, and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington city, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State governments on their officers and legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

4. The re-establishment of all the Federal courts of the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

5. The people and the inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain

from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

7. In general terms—the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing the armies.

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

General Sherman was at fault; of course he, only the commander of one of the armies in the field, had no authority to make any such an arrangement or enter into any such negotiation, and the terms were not such as should have been made. But it was in accord with his uniform declarations through the war. While prosecuting war with rigor, he said on every occasion that he was ready to give fullest amnesty to all who should surrender and submit to the National Government. He was confident that he was only carrying out the earnest wish and purpose of President Lincoln as expressed in the conversation at City Point. He had received no such warning as was sent to Grant—to restrict his action to the surrender of Lee's army, and to leave all other matters to the Executive. He knew that after Lee's surrender General Weitzel had convened the Confederate Legislature in Richmond, and had not heard that Weitzel's order had been disapproved and rescinded. And, finally, he acted the more freely because his action was only provisional, and without effect unless ratified.

But he was sure that he was right, and elated that he was the instrument of bringing such a boon to the country. He sent Major Hitchcock with the articles of agreement to General Grant on the 20th. When Grant read them he sent the paper with his disapproval to the Secretary of War, with

recommendation to submit it at once to President Johnson and the whole Cabinet. Grant was ordered to proceed at once to Sherman's headquarters, terminate the truce, and direct the movements of the army.

Early in the morning of the 24th Major Hitchcock appeared on his return, and with him was General Grant. The general directed General Sherman to give at once notice to terminate the truce at the end of forty-eight hours, and then resume hostilities and press pursuit. The notice was immediately sent, and at the same time a demand for surrender of Johnston's army on the same terms as were given to General Lee at Appomattox. At the same time orders were issued to be ready to move on the expiration of forty-eight hours. Message was sent to the same effect to General Gillmore in South Carolina, with instructions to send the same to General Wilson in Georgia. On the 25th word came from Johnston requesting another interview next day. On the 26th Johnston surrendered the troops under his command upon the terms granted by Grant to Lee. General Grant approved, and took the agreement of capitulation with him to Washington on the 27th. Sherman made the necessary orders to carry out the terms of the capitulation, appointed General Schofield to superintend the details, and started for Savannah to insure communication with General Wilson. The incident was closed.

The murder of Lincoln, the attempted assassination of Seward, and the purposed murder of other high officials horrified the people and unnerved the Cabinet. Vice-President Johnson, who succeeded to the presidency, was known to be loyal to the Union, but otherwise was, to the people, an unknown quantity. Doubt and distrust and vague apprehension prevailed. Stanton, with his intense loyalty to the nation, could be arbitrary and cruel,

and could trample on plans and persons whom he deemed inimical to the nation. He seems, all at once, to have lost faith in Sherman's loyalty, as well as his discretion. He immediately dispatched to General Dix, who gave it to the New York papers, the following communication :

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been entered into on the 18th inst. by General Sherman, with the rebel General Johnston. Brigadier-General Breckinridge was present at the conference.

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every member of the Cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructions given by the late President in the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself at the Capitol on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his Cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had requested an interview or conference to make an arrangement for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a letter to Davis and to the rebel Congress. General Grant's telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretary of War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant :

WASHINGTON, *March 3, 1865*—12 P. M.

Lieutenant-General GRANT :

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conven-

tions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman, to withdraw from Salisbury and join him, will probably open the way for Davis to escape to New Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations.

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It is stated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specie taken South by Jeff Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with General Sherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston's negotiations looked to this end."

After the Cabinet meeting last night General Grant started for North Carolina to direct operations against Johnston's army. The reasons for disapproval were:

1. It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and on its face shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrangement.

2. It was a practical acknowledgment of the rebel government.

3. It undertook to re-establish the rebel State government that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousand loyal lives and an immense treasury, and placed the arms and munitions of war in the hands of the rebels at their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue the loyal States.

4. By the restoration of the rebel authority in their respective States, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery.

5. It might furnish a ground of responsibility for the Federal Government to pay the rebel debts, and certainly subject the loyal citizens of rebel States to debts contracted by rebels in the States.

6. It would put in dispute the existence of loyal State governments and the new State of West Virginia, which had been recognized by every department of the United States Government.

7. It practically abolished the confiscation laws and re-

lieved the rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

8. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly refused by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous conditions.

9. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but relieved the rebels from the presence of our victories, and left them in condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the United States Government, and subdue the loyal States whenever their strength was recruited and any opportunity was offered.

General Halleck was relieved from his position as chief of staff and appointed commander of the Military Division of the James, comprising the State of Virginia and so much of North Carolina as was not occupied by Sherman. Generals Meade and Sheridan came under his command. General Grant dispatched to Halleck on the 22d of April from Fortress Monroe: "The truce entered into by General Sherman will be ended as soon as I can reach Raleigh. Move Sheridan with his cavalry toward Greensboro as soon as possible. I think it will be well to send one corps of infantry with the cavalry. The infantry need not go farther than Danville unless they receive orders hereafter." Johnston was at Greensboro and Sherman at Raleigh, with their respective commands disposed in front of each.

General Halleck on the same day ordered Sheridan: "You will move with your cavalry immediately on Greensboro. You will then act as circumstances seem to require, unless you receive instructions from General Grant, who is on his way to Raleigh. General Meade has been directed to place an infantry corps under your direction. It is said here that there is a large amount of specie on the road between here and Charlotte. It is supposed to have been taken at different points from the railroad. . . . While pushing south with all possible

dispatch, look into these things." Sheridan promised to be ready to move on the 25th.

On the 23d Halleck dispatched to Sheridan: "Pay no attention to the Sherman and Johnston truce. It has been disapproved by the President. Try to cut off Jeff Davis's specie." Halleck being advised that General Meade had received notice from the Confederate commander that a second truce had been arranged between Johnston and Sherman, dispatched to him on the 26th: "To avoid all misunderstanding, telegraph again to General Wright to observe no truce not made by General Grant, but do all in his power to cut off the enemy's retreat. General Grant has reached Raleigh, and ordered an immediate resumption of hostilities. The enemy's object now is to permit the leaders to escape South by their dilatory negotiations." On the 27th Meade telegraphed to General Wright that he was not to pay any attention to dispatches concerning truces without official instruction from General Grant or General Sherman, and informed General Halleck that he had sent such instructions. Halleck replied to Meade the same day: "Impress upon General Wright and General Sheridan that they are not to regard any dispatches from General Sherman, direct or through rebel authorities. They will obey only the orders from General Grant or myself. They will push on with all possible dispatch and carry out their original orders without regard to General Sherman's arrangements." General Sheridan found obstacles which prevented his reaching Danville, and Wright claimed that if he was to advance against Johnston at Greensboro he should do so only in connection with a simultaneous movement by Sherman. In the night of the same day Meade sent Halleck's last dispatch to Wright, and next morning, the 28th, Halleck notified Meade of the surrender, recalled Sheridan, and stayed Wright at Danville.

On the 27th Secretary Stanton sent a second letter to General Dix, which was also published in the papers. It reads:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-General Halleck, commanding the Military Division of the James. Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago that Sherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by the President; and they were ordered to disregard it, and push the enemy in every direction:

RICHMOND, VA., *April 26—9.30 P. M.*

Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright are acting under orders to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respecting hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his command only, and no other.

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any one except from General Grant, and cut off General Johnston's retreat.

Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new arrangement has been made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps was to be suspended until further orders.

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to push forward as rapidly as possible.

The bankers have information to-day that Jeff Davis's specie is moving south from Goldsboro in wagons as fast as possible.

I suggest that orders be telegraphed through General Thomas that Wilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures to intercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder. The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to thirteen million dollars.

General Sherman on the 28th appointed General Schofield, with the aid of General Cox, to take charge of paroling the surrendered troops and make arrangements for their departure, and directed General Howard to take the right and left wings by easy marches to Richmond, where he could rejoin them on his return from the South. Next day he left for Charleston and Savannah. He

read in the newspapers with amazement the communications of Stanton and Halleck, and the inflammatory editorials in the newspapers. He did not heed the shameful insinuation of personal interest in the phantom treasure of the fleeing President, but to be denounced by authority and vilified by the press as a military outcast, incapacitated to make a valid order, stung him to the quick.

The paroling of Johnston's army and detachments occasioned some relaxation of the terms of the surrender. Enlisted men, as well as officers, were allowed by General Schofield to take home horses and other property belonging to them. The total number of paroles, as ascertained by revision of the rolls, is thirty-nine thousand and twelve.

The march from Petersburg, beginning on the 1st and arriving on the 7th of May, was a contrast with the march across South Carolina. Good roads and fine weather made easy marching and early camps. There was absolutely no foraging, either authorized or illicit. There was no straggling. At every halt the men stacked arms and remained by their stacks. They had marched far and toiled and suffered much to reach Richmond, and at last they were to meet their comrades of the Army of the Potomac. General Howard, on reaching Petersburg, reported his arrival to General Halleck. Halleck's greeting came promptly: "Your command will be encamped at or near Manchester, and not be permitted to enter Richmond until prepared to march through the city." The command went into camp about Manchester, across the river from Richmond, and found guards posted across every road to prevent any member of Sherman's army from going into the city.

When General Sherman returned from the South, he was met by a note from General Halleck professing friendship, and asking him to be his guest while in Richmond. Sherman declined both

the invitation and the friendship. On the 11th, General Logan having been appointed commander of the Army of the Tennessee in place of General Howard, who had been called to Washington to organize the Freedman's Bureau, the army passed through Richmond on its way to Washington, with colors furled, equipped for march, at route step, and with trains in the column.

The army reached the neighborhood of Alexandria on the 19th of May, and went into camp. Orders had been sent from Raleigh for uniforms, hats, equipment, headquarter colors, and everything required to make the troops presentable for the final review. The supplies were arriving, and all was busy preparation. General Sherman was invited to the city by many friends. General Grant met him. The President and members of the Cabinet received him cordially, and voluntarily assured him that they knew nothing of Stanton's memoranda before they were seen in the newspapers. On the 23d, the day of the review of the Army of the Potomac, Sherman's army moved nearer to the city, and went into bivouac between Four Mile Run and the Long Bridge.

Early the next morning the troops crossed the bridge and massed in open ground north and east of the Capitol. At nine o'clock General Sherman, accompanied by General Howard and followed by his staff, moved, leading the column of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Corps, marching division front, two companies abreast. As they turned the Capitol grounds into Pennsylvania Avenue a thrilling spectacle came into view. As far as the eye could reach toward the Treasury Building the sidewalks were packed with a dense multitude, which the lines of cavalry stationed along the sides to keep the roadway clear could hardly prevent from bulging into the street. Every step and porch and doorway, every balcony

and window, the roofs where parapets made it practicable, were mosaic of human heads.

The men were inspired by the view. Elate, erect, eyes steady to the front, they moved with alert and vigorous step, lines dressed with absolute precision, and intervals perfectly preserved. The reviewing stand was in front of the White House, where the President stood with his Cabinet and other high officials, and Mrs. Sherman and other ladies. Facing this, on the other side of the avenue, were long ranks of seats, filled with the diplomatic corps and other notabilities, and thousands of others. The steady tide passed between for six hours and a half without a flaw. When General Sherman took his place the President, the members of the Cabinet, and others pressed forward to welcome him. He had hearty greeting from all, till Mr. Stanton approached with outstretched hand. Sherman declined and refused to recognize him. The army passed by. Armies, corps, and divisions filed off as guided to designated camp grounds in the outskirts of the city. General Sherman's "bummers" reposed in the grounds and groves of the country seats surrounding the Capitol, and there read the farewell address of their great commander:

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and Georgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to your homes, and others will be retained in military service till further orders. And now that we are about to separate, to mingle with the civil world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of National affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty.

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate histories, yet bound by one common cause—the union of our country and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. There is no need to recall to your

memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky Face Mountain and Buzzard Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind. We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but dashed through Snake Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on the Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home and dependent on a single road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christmas found us at Savannah.

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a march which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with any ever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks of the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles of Averysboro and Bentonville, we once more came out of the wilderness to meet our friends at Goldsboro. Even then we paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, again pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing for peace instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold had checked us; but when he who had fought us hard and persistently offered submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in his surrender.

How far the operations of this army contributed to the final overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done all that men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and we have a right to join in the universal joy that fills our land because the war is *over*, and our Government stands vindicated before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies and navies of the United States.

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind you that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and that the same work and discipline are

equally important in the future. To such as go home, he will only say that our favored country is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil, and productions, that every man may find a home and occupation suited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatience sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. You will be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to the temptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment.

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good citizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our country, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its old armor, and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of our inheritance.

By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

L. M. DAYTON, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

CHAPTER XIV.

POST BELLUM.

THE great review at Washington was hardly over when Sherman took advantage of the opportunity to throw off the harness and enjoy the "twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks," which, in September of the preceding year, he had jocularly written to Grant they might hope for after the one had received Lee's surrender and the other had marched to the Atlantic. It was barely more than twenty days, for on the 27th of June the peace establishment of departments was announced, and under the same title as his last glorious war command, the West and Northwest, to the Rocky Mountains, was organized as the Military Division of the Mississippi, and assigned to him, with his headquarters at St. Louis.

He settled his family there, with bright hopes of happiness in the home life which would be permitted him by the routine duties of a time of peace. His house was a solid square mansion, with its pleasant garden, and in a bright working room with cheerful outlook, with books, maps, and papers about him, he was soon making his leisure hours profitable by systematizing the files of his private papers, and arranging the material out of which afterward came his *Memoirs*.

The inspection of the frontier posts, visits to the Indian tribes under his care, and to the Union Pacific Railway, as its construction was vigorously pushed toward the mountains, gave him enough

outdoor work to satisfy his active habit of body, and left him still time "to rest, study, and make the acquaintance of my family," which he naively told the President he really wanted. A year of thorough enjoyment of this uneventful though quietly busy life passed, when he found himself involuntarily drawn into the vortex of turbulent political conflict which marked the administration of President Johnson. In September, 1866, he was summoned in haste from the mountains of New Mexico to Washington for the purpose, as it turned out, of being put in command of the whole army for a time, while General Grant should go upon a special mission to escort the minister (Mr. Campbell) accredited to President Juarez, of Mexico, who was keeping up a show of resistance to the French occupation and the rule of Maximilian. The grade of general had been conferred on Grant by law, and Sherman had succeeded to that of lieutenant general, and, had the temporary change been made with Grant's consent, there would have been nothing noteworthy in the matter.

But Sherman found Grant full of the conviction that some sinister purpose was at the bottom of what he considered an improper effort to send him out of the country. Supposed intrigues with regard to the next term of the presidency were more or less involved, and Grant was resolved that he would take the consequences of a refusal to obey the President's order, on the ostensible ground that such a personal escort, without troops, was not a military duty of the general in chief. While Sherman thought it a mistake on Grant's part to entertain the idea of being a presidential candidate, their friendship was such that he placed himself by Grant's side the moment an issue was joined. He went to the President, and so strongly opposed the idea of forcing upon the general an unwelcome duty of questionable legality that Johnson yielded on

condition that Sherman himself would go with Mr. Campbell. The result was an official promenade to Cuba, and thence to Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Brazos Santiago, without finding the Mexican President. The demonstration was part of the diplomatic pressure upon Louis Napoleon which constrained him to withdraw his army and caused Maximilian's downfall.

Grant and Sherman had both been regarded as friendly to President Johnson's theory of restoration of the rebellious States, and in the first stages of the quarrel between the President and Secretary Stanton both sided with the President. They strongly resented Stanton's concentration of all military power in the War Office, and his habit of ignoring the general in the peace administration of army affairs. Both were strong advocates of the plan of having all staff bureaus report through the general, so that he might not only have knowledge of whatever affected the army, but might be regularly heard upon all important matters of administration before they were decided upon. Every officer in turn who has commanded the army, from General Scott downward, has protested against a system which has practically resulted in making the staff bureaus independent of the military head of the army, and in allowing an adjutant general, who might have the ambition to do so, to use the whole power of the Secretary and reduce the general in chief to a nullity.* The antagonism between Grant and Stanton was such that when the latter abandoned the President's policy and went into opposition but still refused to resign his place in the Cabinet, Grant was quite willing to assist Mr. Johnson in testing the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act in the courts. He accepted the position

* For a full discussion of this subject, see General Schofield's *Forty-six Years in the Army*, chapters xxii and xxvi.

of Secretary of War in the interim when the President removed Mr. Stanton, but, on more carefully studying the law when the Senate refused to consent to the removal, he declined to carry resistance to Stanton's return as far as Mr. Johnson thought he had agreed to do. Differences between him and the President began here, which grew rapidly larger as events more and more indicated Grant to be the almost inevitable candidate of the Republican party for the presidency if he avoided open quarrel with the party leaders in Congress. He believed the Tenure of Office Act to be impolitic, if not unconstitutional, and when he became President he was not long in compassing its repeal; but he saw no reason for making himself a champion of opposition to it in the peculiar condition of affairs which then existed. He believed that Stanton was under moral, if not legal, obligation to relieve the President of the embarrassment of his presence in the Cabinet after the rupture between them, but he declined to defy the law and make himself liable to its penalties. He and his advisers thought there was the same kind of political *finesse* in this matter that they had seen in the plan of sending him to Mexico, and their distrust of Johnson soon overshadowed that which they had felt toward Stanton.

Many circumstances tended to make General Sherman influential with President Johnson and a useful peacemaker. Their opinions on the solution of the great political problem of the day were not far apart. The President had assured the general that he had known nothing of Mr. Stanton's published strictures on the Johnston convention till he saw them in print.* Sherman had as early as November, 1865, called his brother's attention to the drift of Mr. Johnson toward the basis of settlement indicated in the terms he offered to the Confederate general.† He had, with characteristic point, put

* Memoirs, ii, 375.

† Sherman Letters, p. 257.

the situation tersely in the same correspondence. "We can not keep the South out long," he had said, "and it is a physical impossibility for us to guard the entire South by armies; nor can we change opinions by force, . . . and for some time the marching of State governments must be controlled by the same class of whites as went into the rebellion against us." * "It is surely unfortunate," he said again, "that the President is thus thrown seemingly on the old mischievous anti-war Democrats, but from his standpoint he had no alternative. To outsiders it looks as though he was purposely forced into that category." †

When, therefore, President Johnson found himself in strained relations to Grant, it was almost inevitable that he should turn to General Sherman for aid in breaking the deadlock in the War Department. The resolution of the Senate refusing consent to Johnson's removal of Stanton was passed on January 13, 1868. Sherman, who was in Washington attending meetings of his commission to revise the army regulations, had known of Grant's opinion that he must not be put in antagonism to Congress by continuing to exercise the office of Secretary, had prompted Grant to have an understanding with the President on the subject, and was present at a subsequent interview between them when their conversation indicated a fair mutual understanding. Grant had expected that Stanton would notify him a couple of days in advance of his demand for restoration to his office, according to the precedent Stanton himself had set in yielding the office to Grant, *ad interim*, in the previous August. This would have allowed time for the attorney general to take the case into court upon application for an injunction, or, if that could have been arranged, for Mr. Stanton to apply for a man-

* Sherman Letters, p. 254.

† Id., p. 264.

damus. But the course actually taken was to serve upon General Grant a copy of the resolution of the Senate as soon as passed; and he, having been persuaded that he should incur the penalties of a law-breaker if he delayed acquiescence, turned over the keys of the office to the adjutant general at once.*

Sherman was strong in the conviction that only mischief to the country and to the army could result from the effort to nullify the authority of the President over the army or to force into intimate Cabinet relations to him one who was personally hostile. He was earnestly active in trying to find some solution of the difficulty. His own relations to Stanton had become pleasant, they having tacitly agreed to ignore the incidents attending the convention with Johnston, and he offered to go to Stanton, either with Grant or alone, and to say to him that he ought to resign. He suggested to Grant, and they both urged upon the President, that he should send to the Senate the name of a person to be Secretary of War who, as they thought, would be acceptable, and whose confirmation would effect a change without the rougher form of removal. They did not know that the person they named had been engaged in a friendly correspondence with Mr. Johnson, urging him to find some reasonable method of avoiding sharp antagonism with Congress, and had perhaps given offense in that way. That they did not know this was good evidence of their avoidance of even usual personal conferences, as was also the fact that he they named never knew of it till their correspondence found its way into print nearly twenty years afterward.†

The well-meant effort at conciliation failed, and affairs drifted on to the attempted impeachment of Mr. Johnson—to intelligent lovers of their coun-

* General E. D. Townsend's *Anecdotes of the Civil War*, p. 124.

† *North American Review*, July, 1886, p. 83.

try the nightmare period of our politics. Sherman found it hard to overcome his aversion to meddling with politics at all; but the army was so directly involved in the controversy that he thought it a sort of official duty to do what he could to make decent administration possible, and this, with his friendship for Grant, overcame his scruples. He wrote to the latter: "I'm afraid that acting as a go-between for three persons I may share the usual fate of meddlers, and at last get kicks from all. We ought not to be involved in politics, but for the sake of the army we are justified in trying at least to cut this Gordian knot."* The efforts were not wholly without fruit. A little later Mr. Evarts renewed them, and a compromise was arranged by which General Schofield became Secretary of War and Mr. Stanton retired.†

One phase of the estrangement between the President and General Grant disturbed him more than all the rest. In his irritation at finding the War Department and the army taken practically out of his executive control, Mr. Johnson conceived the idea of making Sherman brevet general, and assigning to him the duties of general in chief. Sherman met this with the refusal of the promotion, and even wrote to his brother, the Senator, asking him earnestly to oppose the confirmation if his name should be sent to the Senate. He was resolved not to suffer himself to be put in antagonism or rivalry to Grant, and declared with resolute purpose that he would resign his commission in the army and retire to a life of poverty rather than allow himself to be made use of to humiliate his friend.‡ He had taken this position early, for no sooner had he completed his march to the sea

* Memoirs, ii, 424.

† Schofield, *Forty-six Years in the Army*, p. 413.

‡ Sherman Letters, pp. 282, 297, 303.

than suggestions were made of giving him additional rank as evidence of popular appreciation. He wrote to John Sherman from Savannah, in January, 1865: "I deem it unwise to make another lieutenant general, or to create the rank of general. I will accept no commission that would tend to create a rivalry with Grant. I want him to hold what he has earned and got. I have all the rank I want. . . . Of military titles I have now the maximum, and it makes no difference whether that be major general or marshal. It means the same thing. I have commanded a hundred thousand men in battle and on the march, successfully, and that is enough for reputation."* As to political offices, he desired it to be known that he would be offended by any mootings of his name in connection with them.

General Sherman had been summoned to Washington when he was at a council with the chiefs of the tribes of Indians who had been making desultory war on the frontier, but who had been induced to meet the peace commission of the United States, at the head of which the general was. The meeting was at North Platte, in Nebraska, and the leading men of the Ogallala, Brulé Sioux, and the Cheyennes met there. The great and burning question was the demand of the Indians that the construction of the Powder River and Smoky Hill Railroads be abandoned because they broke up and frightened away the buffalo herds. The meeting was a noteworthy one for the importance of the personages, red and white; for Spotted Tail, Man-afraid-of-his-horses, Swift Bear, Big Mouth, Pawnee-killer, and others represented the Indians, while Generals Sherman, Harney, Terry, and Augur of the army were there, with Senator Henderson, Commissioner Taylor, and other noted civilians.

* Sherman Letters, p. 245.

Henry M. Stanley was there, beginning his travels and adventures, and giving us a picture of the negotiations, which is one of the best extant representations of an Indian council.*

There was plain talk on both sides. The Indians seemed to realize that the time had come when they must perish along with the wild game unless they could stop the progress of the whites. Their first speaker said: "Ever since I've been born I have eaten wild meat. My father and grandfather ate wild meat before me. We can not give up quickly the customs of our fathers." This was the keynote. The conditions of Indian life could not be preserved unless the building of railroads was stopped.

Sherman told them frankly that it was vain to hope to stop the spread of the white people. They should be paid damages for the loss to them, but the only hope for their future was in learning to till the earth and to raise cattle. He pointed to the increased travel across the country which they themselves had seen, and told them they could see for themselves that "the slow ox wagon will not answer the white man. We build iron roads, and you can not stop the locomotive any more than you can stop the sun or moon." He urged them to agree upon reservations of good land at once. "You see for yourselves that the white men are collecting in all directions in spite of all you can do. The white men are taking all the good land. If you don't choose your homes now, it will be too late next year." It was a pathetic, hopeless sort of discussion, in which these children of wild Nature and of the boundless prairies argued for their right to remain what they were, and to bid a resistless tide of change to stand still.

* My Early Travels and Adventures. By Henry M. Stanley, vol. i, p. 197, etc.

The characteristics of the general were never more clearly shown. His honest, square dealing sought no subterfuge. He tried to make them realize the truth, unwelcome as it might be, that their only salvation was in getting into some sort of harmony with the civilization of the white men. Stanley has gone back with evident interest to this his first close contact with uncivilized man, after his romantic explorations of darkest Africa had opened the way for still more vast experiments in the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest between the progressive and the unprogressive races. It is safe to say that in all his wanderings he nowhere saw franker dealing with the weaker peoples or heard more sincere warning of the destruction which must inevitably follow their brave but hopeless efforts to stop the progress of a world.

The summer of 1868 brought the nomination of Grant for the presidency, and his election in the autumn was a notice to Sherman that his quiet home life in St. Louis must soon be broken up. He had been kept busy with the perplexing strife at the National capital, and had not had the full measure of rest which he had wished for; but it was always a relief to him to feel that when the duty that summoned him to Washington was done he could get away from the intrigue and turmoil of the capital to the peace of his family circle, and to the healthful ranging of the great plains, visiting his military posts, where the moral tone was the wholesome one begot by plain living and the honest performance of the soldier's duty. The thing which most chafed him at Washington was the constant urgency of selfish personal reasons to override the discipline, system, and order which are the essence of good military administration.

The social life of the place was attractive to him, and intercourse with statesmen and diplomats gave delightful stimulus to his own powers

of thought and conversation, especially as he could not be insensible to the fact that his society was eagerly sought by the ablest and most brilliant people. His unreserved freedom of expression and his racy way of hitting off the point of discussion had a never-failing charm and freshness. It was the same originality of view and power of reaching the heart of things by a happy phrase which is found abundantly in his familiar correspondence, as when he said, *apropos* to the notion that legislation accomplishes everything, that "as long as cases have to be tried by juries, all laws counter to the prejudices of the whole people are waste paper"; or, again, when speaking of conflicts between principle and prejudice, he said, "A voter has as much right to his prejudices as to his vote." *

In Washington, however, he found it impossible to apply his working hours to the efficient performance of duty. He was constantly besieged by all sorts of people to let some pressure of personal favor overcome his ideas of right system. The resistance to importunity vexed him, and left his mind too much disturbed to resume the calm consideration of large questions. He was very loath, therefore, to consider the necessity of making his residence in Washington when General Grant should become president, as it was evident he would have to do.

Shortly after the November election a meeting of soldiers of the Western volunteer armies was held at Chicago, which was the most notable reunion of the sort ever held. It was, in fact, a great celebration of the elevation to the presidency of the general who had built up his renown in leading them to victories from Donelson to Missionary Ridge, and yet everything which could be called politics was carefully excluded. Sherman himself

* Sherman Letters, pp. 288, 298.

had originated the plan, and had fixed the joint anniversary of the battle of Nashville and the occupation of Savannah as the time for the renewal of comradeship, while Grant was still the general of the army. The invited guests included the army and corps commanders of the Eastern armies, the general officers of the regular army, and civil officials of the nation and of the States which had given their quotas to the National defense. General Thomas was made the chairman of the public meeting, and was supported by Grant on his right and Sherman on his left. The latter presided at the banquet. Nearly every soldier of distinction in the rosters of the civil war was there. Sherman's address of welcome struck nobly the keynote of patriotic devotion, of the citizenship of the American soldier, and the perpetuation of the National union. It was a great love-feast of the men who had saved the country, and most of whom had put off the uniform and resumed the industries of civil life. They now met again to hail with boundless enthusiasm the great commanders who had led them to victory.

In the moments of private conversation which Grant and Sherman could snatch from the festivities of the occasion, the President-elect outlined his purpose as to army organization, and informed Sherman that he would be called to Washington to succeed to the office of general, and to carry into effect changes which Grant had urged since 1866 affecting the scope of the general's authority. He also indicated his purpose to give Sheridan the position of lieutenant general, to become vacant by Sherman's promotion. This last was a matter fruitful in heartburnings. Halleck and Meade were Sheridan's seniors as major generals in the regular army, and Thomas had many friends who claimed that injustice had been done him when Sheridan had been promoted first to this rank. They urged

that the appointment of Thomas as lieutenant general would be but the correction of an old injustice. In this matter Thomas had the sympathies and good wishes of most of the officers and men who had served under Sherman; but Grant seems to have decided the question according to his candid judgment as to the power of prompt initiative and vigorous aggressive action which the general in chief ought to have. He had reached the settled conviction that, next to Sherman, Sheridan of all the generals, tested by large responsibilities, had shown the highest qualities for supreme command. There was room for honest difference of opinion among those competent to judge, but Grant can not be blamed for acting on his own judgment, the law having cast on him the responsibility.

In the organization of his Cabinet, President Grant retained General Schofield for a time in the War Department, where he was serving under the arrangement negotiated for Mr. Johnson by Mr. Evarts. This was for the purpose of getting fairly launched the plan for rearranging the relations of the general of the army with the Secretary of War, which Schofield thoroughly approved. On the day after the President's inauguration an order was prepared and issued under his instructions by General Schofield, which briefly and comprehensively gave to Sherman "command of the army of the United States," and directed the chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus to report to and act under his orders; business requiring the action of the President or Secretary would be submitted by the general to the Secretary, and all orders from them would be transmitted through the general.*

Sherman, of course, issued his own formal order assuming the command and directing the method

* Schofield's *Forty-six Years in the Army*, p. 421. Sherman's *Memoirs*, ii, 441.

of action under the presidential order. As the plan was Grant's own, the result of his experience both as general and as acting Secretary—a plan he had for years wished to see in operation, and believed to be necessary for the public interests, as well as those of the army—it certainly looked as if a reform in administration had never been introduced with a better prospect of permanence. Eight years of Grant's incumbency would smooth difficulties, remove obstacles, educate a class of staff and bureau officers, who would be habituated to the system and know its value. Sherman settled himself to his work with the feeling that his strong desire to make our little army a model of efficiency and intelligent organization was in the way of speedy accomplishment.

The reform lasted just three weeks. Within that time General Rawlins, Grant's confidential staff officer through the whole war, was appointed to the Cabinet place, and was at once surrounded by interested persons, military and civil, in Congress and in the army, who dinned into his ears the assertion that his office had been emasculated, and that the War Department had lost all its power and dignity. No one knew better than Rawlins the intolerable position in which Grant had found himself under the peace establishment as a general without real command, but he was a sick man, soon to drop into his grave, and did not meet the insidious suggestions as he would have done when in healthy vigor.

On the 27th of March another order was issued from the War Department, made like that of the 5th, "by direction of the President," rescinding the whole of the earlier one except the personal assignment of Sherman to the command of the army, and restoring the old system of independent staff bureaus dealing directly with the Secretary of War. It need not be said that Sherman was as-

tounded and distressed beyond expression. The sudden wreck of his hopes of improvement of the army was accompanied by a wound to his personal feelings which seemed incredible. To the country he seemed to be exhibited as a man who had by some indirect means grasped a power which the President never intended to confer, and who was so quickly made to lay it down again with utter humiliation.

A painful interview with the President followed. It began as an informal conversational discussion between intimate friends. The President repeated the familiar complaints of congressmen, that their personal requests and desires could not be presented to a military officer guided by military rules as they were to civil heads of departments, and that doubts might exist as to the legal right thus to control the bureaus. Sherman reminded him that all those things had been considered and disposed of long ago—as early, indeed, as January, 1866, when Grant had written a clear and strong communication to Mr. Stanton on the subject. The points had been talked over many times since then, and always with the strong reiteration of Grant's conviction that what he had now done on the 5th of March ought to be done. This was indisputable, and brought out other reasons. "Rawlins," said Grant, "feels badly about it; it worries him, and he is not well." "But, Grant," replied Sherman, "ought a public measure that you have advocated for years, and which he has known you were determined upon, to be set aside for such a reason? Ought he not to acquiesce in what he knew was your fixed purpose, and what was done before he entered the War Department?" "Yes," said Grant, "it would ordinarily be so, but I don't like to give him pain now; so, Sherman, you'll have to publish the rescinding order." "But, Grant, it's your own order that you revoke, not mine, and

think how it will look to the whole world!" In the dire strait between judgment and feeling, Grant became a little testy, and replied, "Well, if it's my own order, I can rescind it, can't I?" Sadly, Sherman dropped the familiarity of comradeship, and, rising, bowed formally, saying: "Yes, Mr. President, you have the power to revoke your own order; you shall be obeyed. Good morning, sir." Such was the interview as Sherman told it to a friend within a few hours, while he was still deeply agitated by it.

During the few weeks that Rawlins was able to attend to business, he strove to make Sherman's position more tolerable by voluntarily sending through army headquarters the orders and communications which affected discipline and organization, and, no doubt, Grant urged this mode of softening the effect of what had been done; but Rawlins died early in September. General Belknap, his successor, had commanded a brigade in the Army of the Tennessee, and had been distinguished for bravery in the field, but it must be said that he was spoiled by his elevation to the War Department. The old method of ignoring the general in chief and consulting only with bureau subordinates was soon in vogue again, and Sherman found himself in the humiliating position of learning from the newspapers of orders and decisions relating to the discipline of the army issued without his knowledge, though sometimes in his name.

After less formal protests had failed, Sherman put the whole subject before the Secretary of War in a formal communication on the 7th of August, 1870, and transmitted a copy to the President. The latter replied, promising to bring the Secretary and general together, and at least to define clearly the duties of each. Admitting that his views as general had been essentially the same as Sherman's, he still urged that it was supposed that some recent

acts of Congress were partially inconsistent with these, and must control, even if they were wrong.* But such recent acts had been made at the instance of the Secretary, and with the presumed assent of the President. Nothing was, in fact, done to meet the general's views, and matters went from bad to worse, till near the close of Grant's second term, in 1876, when the country was shocked by General Belknap's downfall and his confession of malversation in office.

In July, 1871, Sherman wrote to his brother: "My office has been by law stripped of all the influence and prestige it possessed under Grant, and even in matters of discipline and army control I am neglected, overlooked, or snubbed."† Later, he wrote to another friend: "There is, in fact, no use for a general now, provided the law and custom sanction the issuance of orders direct by the adjutant general in the name of the Secretary of War, and, should a fair opportunity offer, I would save Congress the trouble of abolishing my office." Vexatious as all this was personally, the real grief to him, as his whole correspondence shows, was that all his hopes of improving the army itself in the ways Grant and he had so often discussed and so thoroughly agreed upon, were dashed to the ground. He resolved that he would ask leave to remove his personal headquarters again to St. Louis, unless the coming year should show a marked change for the better.

An opportunity to visit Europe under attractive circumstances offered in the fall of 1871, and he took a leave of absence for a year, making the tour of the Continent. His reception was so cordial and appreciative that the journey was every way most enjoyable. He returned in September,

* Sherman's Memoirs, ii, 446, 450.

† Sherman Letters, p. 331.

1872, refreshed and invigorated, and hopeful that in the second term of his administration President Grant would revert to the good principles of army organization which he really believed in. When he had heard abroad of the curious turn of events in the candidacy of Greeley, he had, in a letter to Senator Sherman, hit off the situation with characteristic wit and penetration. "Grant, who never was a Republican," he said, "is your candidate, and Greeley, who never was a Democrat, but quite the reverse, is the Democratic candidate."*

Finding even less prospect of satisfactory definition of his duties than when he went away, his purpose took shape to cut loose, as far as possible, from apparent responsibility for what he condemned and could not control. He arranged to dispose of his Washington house, and in the summer of 1874 applied for leave to remove his headquarters to St. Louis, which was granted.

The first months of Sherman's return to the quiet life of his St. Louis home gave him the opportunity for a final revision of his Memoirs, and at the beginning of 1875 he yielded to a very general wish that its publication might not be delayed. He wrote to his brother on the 23d of January, "You will be surprised, and maybe alarmed, that I have at last agreed to publish in book form my Memoirs." His career had given rise to so much discussion, and his breach with the Secretary of War and a knot of officers who affected to represent the President was so pronounced, that it would not have been strange if the Senator had been alarmed at the inevitable storm of criticism and controversy which would follow the printing. In the same letter the general said that he had "carefully eliminated everything calculated to raise controversy, except where sustained by documents em-

* Sherman Letters, p. 337.

braced in the work itself, and then only with minor parties." * Reading this in the light of the fuller knowledge we now have, we can see that it showed the rule which he had sincerely followed. He meant to be frank in his judgments and honest in his revelations of his own heart and intellect in his great career, but he aimed at waiving discussion over all matters in which he could not produce written evidence for his conclusions.

The book was originally written for posthumous publication, and was designed, as it should be, to give that intimate view of his career and of the events in which he had an important part, which he wished to leave behind him as the authoritative exposition of his own actions, purposes, and motives. Had it been written with a view to present publication, it would naturally have been more guarded in its trenchant passages, and therefore less valuable as a revelation of his own opinions, though it would have avoided much controversy. Speaking of this in a letter to a friend, written in the height of the din of criticism, he adhered to his judgment that a true history of the war must needs cause some chafing. He illustrated it by a reference to Van Horne's *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, then just published, saying: "Van Horne has done well, but his universal praise and evident partiality for the Army of the Cumberland makes too smooth a tale for one of war and conflict; still, for his comfort it was the best course."

The class of criticisms which stung him most were those which seemed ingeniously contrived to put him in antagonism to Grant and Thomas, and he was fully convinced that there was something very like a conspiracy in the circle already mentioned to estrange the President from him by insinuations that he had arrogated to himself credit

* *Sherman Letters*, p. 343.

which had belonged to the general in chief. Such efforts, however, failed, and General Grant was frankly explicit in praise of the candor and accuracy of the Memoirs. Sherman did not allow himself to be seriously disturbed by criticism which he knew to be unfair, saying that the common sense of the people would dispose of that. He brushed it aside with a humorous contempt, as when he said of one of the most persistent assailants, "—— is a most pestiferous newspaper bee, and has the perseverance of the ant." Candid efforts to correct him he took with perfect kindness, and soon announced that he should revise the work in a second edition and add an appendix, in which he would give opportunity for explanation to some whom he had been obliged to blame, and supply some omissions which had been inadvertently left in the first writing. "In the text," he said, "I would omit some personal expressions which I ought not to have used, but would leave the narrative substantially unchanged, save where manifest errors have been proved." In the unpublished letter from which this is quoted, he explained the general purpose of his appendix by a reference to the 1823 edition of Napoleon's Memoirs, of which "several volumes contain letters of parties who took issue with him on certain points, written subsequent to the publication, and simply embodied for what they are worth. It occurred to me," he added, "that forty to sixty pages of fine print might be added which would satisfy parties."

It will give unity to the effort to understand his character to pass on to some of his latest expressions of his judgment in regard to men and events which had been brought into controversy after the publication of the Memoirs, and his frankness in discussing his own qualities. In 1882 the volume *Atlanta*, in the Scribners' series of Campaign Histories, appeared, and led to renewed correspondence

between him and its author. "As to your personal description of myself," * he said, "it is sufficiently flattering to gratify a reasonable pride, but I would prefer to go down in history not as irritable, but impatient of restraint or contradiction. After I have laid awake all night thinking of something to be done, and have resolved 'on the steps, I admit that it ruffles me to have suggestions sometimes from parties not in possession of all the facts." In the description referred to he had not been called irritable, but a nervous temperament, with a tendency to irritability, had been ascribed to him, and used to heighten the effect of his calm and equable self-control in the crisis of really great events.† Few, if any, great soldiers could be named whose bearing toward subordinates was more truly considerate and personally kind.

In the same volume the statement of his action in supplying the vacancy made by McPherson's death,‡ had suggested to those who could read between the lines that the whole story of that change had not been told, and this drew out from Sherman an explanation more full than he has elsewhere given: "I don't know that I ever revealed to you what transpired at the time I recommended that Howard should succeed McPherson. When I succeeded Grant at Nashville, I found that considerable feeling existed between the Armies of the Tennessee and Cumberland—an old feud, probably beginning at Shiloh, when the Cumberland claimed to have saved us from destruction, and did not give us credit for the hard fighting of that first day.

* Atlanta, p. 21.

† The suggestion quoted from his letter was simply a bit of candid introspection on his part, and not a complaint at impartial judgment by another. In the same letter he said: "As a matter of course I had to be a central figure, and you have drawn a portrait more to my liking than others I have seen."

‡ Id., p. 178.

While I was down the Mississippi (Meridian expedition), and before McPherson had joined at Huntsville, Logan was in command of that part of the Army of the Tennessee which was posted along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, about Pulas-ki, Huntsville, etc., and claimed with a show of justice that in the matter of supplies and railroad facilities his men and officers were discriminated against in favor of the Cumberland, who claimed to own the Nashville road. That was the reason of my order assuming to myself absolute control of railroads, and putting all army and corps commanders on a perfect equality in the matter of passes or orders for supplies. Thomas was very angry with Logan, accused him of meddling and of bitter jealousy. When McPherson was dead, and another commander was indispensable, I was disposed to leave Logan in command of the Army of the Tennessee, and called Thomas and Schofield for consultation to Thomas J. Wood's camp, near the left of Thomas's army. When I told Thomas, he was unusually emphatic that he never could or would act in unison with Logan; indeed, that he would not stay if he was to be brought in contact with him as an equal. Thomas, instead of being so equable as his reputation makes him, had a good many crotchets, and his army was so large, so compact, and had in him justly such faith that I could not risk his displeasure. The result was as you know, and I had to stand the brunt of Logan's anger and hatred, which has been constant, and may be eternal. I first thought of calling on the President for a successor, leaving him to act; but there was no time for delay, and, as Howard fell under my personal observation on the Knoxville march and afterward, I knew that he was skillful, and would obey orders as to the nice marches which I knew lay before us, so I recommended him. On this point, however, I am well satisfied with your text."

The bill for retiring army officers was then before Congress, and so evident was the advantage to the country to be found in the tested abilities of the general, his great prestige with the whole civilized world, and his hold upon the nation's confidence, that there was a widespread feeling that an ordinary rule for retiring officers should not apply to him. It was for the public advantage that his genius should continue to direct the army if we should be again involved in war. Especially did this seem true in view of the recent example of Moltke, past seventy, conducting the great Franco-German campaign. Physical strength and activity were doubtless needed in subordinate places, but wisdom and experience combined with such force of will as Sherman's was of inestimable value at the head of the army. In these circumstances he was urged to allow the truth to be made known to Logan, whose influence in the Senate on military matters was properly large, so that he might not be affected by old irritations.

In his very prompt reply he said: "I have never told Logan about Thomas, for when an order is made I assume all the responsibility, and have too much pride to explain the reasons to one who feels aggrieved. The order was made by President Lincoln as the consequence of a telegraphic dispatch from me, simply advising that Howard should succeed McPherson; and I hold, as Howard fulfilled well my purpose, and my purpose worked great good, that I am bound to apologize to no man on earth. . . . I have not asked a favor of a man in Congress, and scorn to do it, for I believe they should make just and fair laws for all alike."

The final form of the law was one in which Sherman acquiesced, and it should also be said that when the collisions and cross-purposes of active public life were over, his genial and placable

spirit found satisfaction in burying differences, and his last years witnessed a cordial understanding with General Logan and a renewal of their early friendship.

The correspondence of the same season drew from him some emphatic statements of his object and aim in his march to the sea, which ought to be preserved in his own words, though they are in accord with the account given in an earlier chapter. "Howard can tell you," he wrote, "that I informed him long before we left Atlanta that if I could place our army at Columbia, S. C., the war would be substantially concluded, because Lee could not remain longer in Richmond, and preceding events had demonstrated that the Southern Army of Virginia had lost confidence in its ability to fight the Army of the Potomac outside of intrenchments, in the same ratio that the latter had gained confidence. Therefore I believe that morally the war *was* over when I reached Columbia free to follow up to Virginia Lee's only line of supply. This was my firm belief from the day Hood began his desperate attempt to force me to retreat from Atlanta by getting on our railroad. Having this grand purpose in mind, the details are as you know them. I did not and could not foresee the thousand things that might happen, but I did tenaciously hold fast to the purpose to reach Lee's line of supply and follow it up to a conclusion. Halleck may, in his mind, have contemplated such a possibility, so may Buell, so may Rosecrans, so may Grant, but I did it, and chose the time, place, and manner. This is all I claim as to the origin of the march to the sea. . . . The process of condensing history has begun, and will proceed even further, till chapters become paragraphs, and paragraphs mere sentences. The results clearly stated, with the causes which produced those results, will be all the next generation will ask. The fame or gen-

eral reputation of the leaders will not be much changed."

The same season witnessed the publication of the second volume of Badeau's Military History of Grant and Van Horne's Life of Thomas, and, as these were nearly coincident with the appearance of another volume in the Scribners' series of campaigns narrating his March to the Sea, it very naturally drew from Sherman a letter commenting on the claims made by the several writers for the subjects of their memoirs. He had expressed his gratification that his actions, fully explained as to motives, had been allowed to speak for themselves, without adulation, and the letter is so sincere a bit of autobiography that its value will warrant its quotation at length:

"In Washington the wise men say, 'Don't hurry, let your letters remain a week, and they answer themselves.' But for better or worse, my habits are fixed, and I find that when I enact my own part it harmonizes with the past and connects the future. . . . With emphasis and without qualification I re-echo your sentiment that both Grant and Thomas will be damaged by the fulsome flattery of their eulogists and historians Badeau and Van Horne. Man is mortal and full of infirmity. To paint him as unerring, as perfect in judgment, temper, and action, at all times and under all circumstances, must with the wise raise doubts. Such a man is too good for this world, and the reader gets palled with adulation and flattery. Many a good man felt a sense of relief when he learned that Washington swore at Lee at Monmouth, and I have been more moved to attempt great things by drop expressions of a common soldier, 'I'll be glad to live on rice chaff if Uncle Billy can only take Savannah,' than by the declaration of the London Times, 'The act, if a failure, will be adjudged the act of a madman; if successful, it will take rank with the deeds of

- great men'—this before the event of my coming out of the wilderness at Savannah.* I know how I felt in October, 1864, when I pleaded for the privilege

* The editorial of the Times which Sherman briefly paraphrases was in the issue of December 3, 1864, upon the report of his cutting loose from Atlanta. It has been already referred to (*vide* p. 242), and began with a statement of the fact. "It is commonly believed that Sherman has plunged either into Alabama or Georgia, and that he will appear on the coast of one of those States in due time. In this case, however, how will it fare with him? . . . He would be throwing himself headlong into a hostile country of immense extent without any line of communications. He has cut himself off from his base so completely and deliberately that he can not even send intelligence of his movements. He has converted his entire army into a flying column for an expedition involving most formidable distances. . . . The roads may be broken up, bridges destroyed, and provisions carried away, while it is certain that even if the Federal commander should ultimately appear before Charleston, a hard siege would still await him at the end of his unparalleled march. Nevertheless, he is beyond doubt both an able and a resolute soldier, and he may know better than any of his countrymen what are the real chances of his enterprise. That it is a most momentous enterprise can not be denied; but it is exactly one of those enterprises which are judged by the event. It may either make Sherman the most famous general of the North or it may prove the ruin of his reputation, his army, and even his cause together."

When the news came that he had reached the sea, the Times of January 5, 1865, said: "General Sherman's campaign in Georgia will undoubtedly rank hereafter with the most memorable operations of modern war. . . . It speaks well for Sherman's discernment and resolution that he could plunge into such a region with unwavering confidence. . . . Still, the great fact that after marching nearly a hundred miles—from Chattanooga to Atlanta—he should then have marched two hundred and fifty more, and brought his army, after all, in good condition and efficiency to the seacoast, is a testimonial to professional qualities of no common order."

Returning to the subject on January 9th, the Times said: "The capture of Savannah completes the history of Sherman's march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of the most singular, military achievements of the war. . . . The march through the whole of Georgia, ending in the capture of the chief city of the State, is an exception to nearly all the events of the previous campaigns that keep any place in the memory. . . . The most remarkable exploit during four years of conflict has been achieved by a comparatively small army with a loss of only a fiftieth part of its numbers."

of marching a thousand miles through an enemy's country to help the Army of the Potomac, then checkmated at Petersburg, and I know how I felt when Badeau demonstrated long afterward that I was only doing what I was bid to do at the divine inspiration of a superior. Grant says nothing; there is wisdom in this. I spoke out and recorded my thoughts over my own signature. This may have been impolitic, but a hundred years hence it will seem very different. The truth is mighty and will prevail. Your two books are links in the chain which will be strengthened by every line and paragraph written at that day. I thank you for not indulging in flattery, for that is not only obnoxious to me, but must be to all thoughtful men.

"Grant had his qualities; Thomas had his. Each is entitled to high honor for their deeds in aiding to put down a rebellion which, if successful, would have been horrible in its after results. But when the historian comes to paint the portraits of the general actors, he errs quite as much in overcoloring as in neglecting important incidents.

"I knew Thomas as a boy at West Point. We recited together four years in the same section, served as lieutenants in the same regiment ten years, and for Van Horne to paint him *for me* seems an arrant piece of presumption. I am glad of the fame and hold his memory has on the public, for this is a bond of union, a piece of valuable property to every American; but when Van H. intimates that Grant and I did not do him full justice, he simply is ridiculous. Thomas leaned on me, and never to the hour of his death did he have reason to believe that his memory was less precious to me than my own. Never since the world began did such absolute confidence exist between commander and commanded, and among the many mistakes I made I trace some to his earnest, vehement advice. . . . Those who attributed to Thomas that calm,

gentle, yet forcible character, entirely misconceived the man. No man in my army had more little causes of grievance; none chafed more over little things. When Sheridan was made lieutenant general, I was the peacemaker between him and Grant. Thomas was vehement, abusive, and violent. Grant was kind, firm, and conciliatory. But I am sure in your studies you have hit on episodes which prove what I write. Thomas was too slow in his combinations at Nashville, and the impatience of Grant, Lincoln, and all in the East was natural. The glorious result at Nashville was partly the result of accident and partly of design—a truth that may be said of all collisions. But Nashville was not as conclusive as Van Horne thinks he has proved. The final result was Richmond, and there I think Grant is entitled to all honor. Whether Appomattox would have been had I stayed at Atlanta or followed Hood westward, I do not believe; but I leave that to those who study cause and effect. I think you have given a clear, impartial narrative of events, and those who come after us and reap the fruits of our labors must in time settle the relative merits of each. I know that Thomas had he been in my place would never have gone beyond Atlanta, had he gone that far. I know that Grant had no faith that I could reach Goldsboro in time to co-operate with his spring campaign. What influence my personal action had on the grand final result I have my own thoughts and convictions, but I do not ask anybody to adopt them. The deeds are in the past, the record is sufficiently clear, and I am willing to abide the final judgment of mankind."

General Sherman's quiet life in St. Louis was rudely interrupted by the impeachment and resignation of the Secretary of War in March, 1876, as Grant's administration was entering upon the last year of his second term. As a matter of politics,

the embarrassment of the situation was complicated with the approach of the presidential election, preceded by nominating conventions. It was not only known that a third term was desired by the President, but it was matter of common fame that members of the "whisky ring" excused their frauds on the plea that they were expending much money to organize the movement for a renomination. The embezzlements involved the reputation of more than one in close relations to the President besides Secretary Belknap. So far as the War Office was concerned, the opportunity for wrongdoing had grown directly out of legislation obtained by administrative influence, which had taken from the general of the army the right to be the medium of the transmission of orders to the army, and the appointment of post traders. The sale of these traderships had been the particular crime which ruined the Secretary of War.

The air was full of rumors that Congress would pass some act or resolution compelling Sherman's return to Washington. Had this been done as part of a policy of correcting the blunder that had been committed, and of returning to the general by law the rights and responsibilities that had been taken from him, it would have been right. He, however, very naturally demurred to being called to a position where the public would assume that he was a check upon actions over which he had no control and of which he was not even informed. He wrote to his brother: "I will not go to Washington unless ordered, and it would be an outrage if Congress, under a temporary excitement, should compel my removal back. I came out at my own expense, and never charged a cent for transportation, which I could have done. I can better command the army from here than from there. The causes that made a Belknap remain and will remain." *

* Sherman Letters, p. 349.

The appointment of Judge Taft, of Ohio, to fill the vacancy in the War Department, however, did everything which personal selection could do to smooth the relations between the Secretary and the general. Mr. Taft was a gentleman of large mind and scholarly training, an able jurist, and a broad, judicial character, with the highest standards of public integrity and disinterestedness. He was, besides, fully appreciative of the great qualities of General Sherman, and sincerely desirous of having the benefit of his advice in performing the duties of his office. When such a man, with characteristic suavity and sincerity, asked Sherman to come back and try what mutual efforts to promote the public interests could do to remove the reproach from army administration, the general yielded at once to the appeal. A conference secured a cordial good understanding, and on the 6th of April Secretary Taft published a presidential order re-establishing the headquarters of the army at Washington, and directing that all orders and instructions relative to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the army should be promulgated through the general, while the departments of the adjutant general and the inspector general should also report to him and be under his control in all matters relating thereto.

This order included all that General Sherman desired, and put his personal and official relations to the War Department on a footing of unbroken cordiality during the whole of his service on the active list. But it must not be forgotten that, as the order was a voluntary concession of the President and Secretary, it could be modified or revoked, openly or tacitly. Sherman's successors found that the tendency to ignore it and to return under one pretext or another to the former methods was too strong for them, so that the old troubles became

perennial for lack of legislative definition of authority.*

In the unpublished private correspondence before quoted Sherman spoke out his heartfelt satisfaction at the prospect of reform. Writing on April 15th, he said: "I hope in recent events you will derive consolation and assurance that a better era is dawning on the country. If I can, you may be assured that everything like corruption and the false glitter given by wealth basely acquired shall be punished in the army. Now the tongue of scandal is so loose that there is danger of even the best reputations suffering. Babcock is still so far detached from the army, being on civil duty, responsible only to the President and Congress, that I could not if I would cause his arraignment and trial by a court-martial. A court of inquiry can only be ordered by the President, or by a department or army commander on the demand of the accused. . . . We are all pleased with Judge Taft, who is a man of probity and learning. It is a pleasure to confer with such a man, who does not fear to seek advice of others in a sphere where he has had no experience. Schofield's going to West Point will elevate the academy, and silence the little jealousies that have endangered its safety."

The last sentence refers to the general's almost parental interest in the young men entering the army. His sympathy also with the junior grades of officers was of the same spirit, and his pride in them and faith in their patriotism and high ideal was very great. Returning to the subject on October 24th, he wrote: "Our friend General Schofield has laid hold of his new charge, the Military Academy, with his usual force, and I doubt not that institution will receive a new impulse from his practical sense and knowledge of the wants of our pro-

* See Schofield's *Forty-six Years in the Army*, chapter xxii.

fession. I also believe the army, especially in the junior branches, is as pure and honorable, as zealous to do right, as in the brightest days of the republic. Surely it can not be, it must not be, that our young republic is declining in morals. Still, we are incident to human infirmities, and it may be that since the war our public men have not risen to the occasion or been equal to the emergency."

It was, of course, inevitable that General Sherman should be often approached with the suggestion that he should consent to be a candidate for the presidency. His real unwillingness to accept any political office was known to his close friends, but most people were disposed to think it might be overcome, or that, like the proverbial *nolo episcopari*, it might even cover a disposition to coquet with the idea. The better acquainted one becomes with his character, the more certain it is that his strong expressions on this subject were, without exaggeration, the index of his inmost feelings and most fixed rule of life.

As early as January, 1865, when his march to the sea was just completed, the quidnuncs began to talk of a political career for him when the war should be ended. "If you ever hear anybody use my name in connection with a political office," he wrote to John Sherman, "tell them you know me well enough to assure them that I would be offended by any such association." * Again, in November, 1866, he said, "I am determined to keep out of political or even quasi-political office." † When the end of Grant's first term approached, the question of his renomination was warmly discussed, and General Sherman, far out on the frontier of Texas, got copies of the New York Herald strongly advocating his own nomination. Once more he wrote to his brother (May 18, 1871), "You may say for

* Sherman Letters, p. 245.

† Id., p. 282.

me, and publish it too, that in no event and under no circumstances will I ever be a candidate for President or any other political office, and I mean every word of it." * Similar statements which were published were interpreted by many to mean only that he would not allow himself to be used in rivalry to Grant, and the persistent recurrence of the effort to bring him forward as a candidate drew from him, in 1874, the emphatic repetition of his decision that "no matter what the temptation, I will never allow my name to be used by any party." † He coupled this with the opinion that the obligation of the country to the army had been sufficiently recognized, "and the time has come to return to the civil list." ‡

The topic came up with a sort of periodicity, drawing out from him always the same blunt, decisive negative, but in 1884 circumstances combined to make the effort to change his resolution a stronger and much more determined one than ever before. Though he had always refused to be regarded as a party man, his strong sympathy with all who had been most active in carrying the country through the civil war made him feel drawn toward the public men of the Republican party. The great prominence of his brother the Senator naturally counted for much in such circumstances. Without departing from the habitual rule of refusing to meddle in politics, he would have been glad, no doubt, to see the highest civil honors fall to his brother, as he himself had reaped the military ones. But though this impulse would strengthen his fixed decision to refuse political office, that decision was based on other reasons, and the event showed that it was set beyond reconsideration.

As the time approached when nominations must be made, the fact that the general was now on the retired list of the army, while his mental and phys-

* Sherman Letters, p. 330.

† Id., p. 340.

‡ Id., p. 341.

ical vigor was unimpaired, led to a widespread disposition to call upon him to complete the series of public stations in which he had, one by one, succeeded to Grant. Mr. Blaine had the largest following, but he was not certain of nomination, and frankly preferred General Sherman if he were himself to be disappointed in the nomination. By the beginning of May matters had so far taken shape that Senator Sherman wrote to his brother: "It is certain that if Blaine is not nominated in the early ballots a movement will be made for your nomination, and if entered upon will go like wild fire. . . . My own opinion is still that, while you ought not to seek, or even beforehand consent to accept a nomination, yet if it comes unsought and with cordial unanimity you ought to acquiesce. . . . I see no prospect or possibility of my nomination, and not much of my election if nominated, but yours is easy. Blaine could readily turn his strength to you if he can not get a majority, and I think means to do so." The general replied: "The more I reflect, the more convinced I am that I was wise and prudent in taking the exact course I have, and that it would be the height of folly to yield to any false ambition to allow the use of my name for any political office. . . . If you count yourself out, I will be absolutely neutral, and honestly believe we are approaching that epoch in our history when King Log is about as good as King Stork."*

The general was at this time in possession of a confidential letter from Mr. Blaine (afterward published by the consent of the latter) saying that, in the event of a break in the nominating convention, it was inevitable that his name would be used, and that he ought to regard a nomination in such a case as he would a soldier's detail to duty, which he must not decline. But General Sherman had taken

* Sherman Letters, pp. 359, 360.

the most effective mode to prevent the offer, in declaring that he would respectfully refuse it if made. As soon as the nomination of Blaine and Logan was announced, he wrote, "I feel such a sense of relief that I would approve of anything." Telling his brother the steps he had taken, and his forecast of what might happen, he added with unmistakable emphasis, "Anyhow, I escaped, and that to me was salvation." * He recognized the distinction between his own position and that of Mr. Blaine and his brother, who had been long trained in political life, and said that their ambition to reach the highest round of the ladder in their chosen career was legitimate and right. His decision of character was never better shown than in the unwavering confidence with which he adhered to a line of action he had resolved upon long years before. His bearing and action in the final decisive moment were equally characteristic. The convention was in session, and he was in his study at St. Louis, smoking and chatting with his son Thomas. A telegraph messenger came in with a dispatch from the friend (Senator Henderson) who was his authorized representative in the convention. It was the announcement that the critical moment had come when his nomination would be carried by storm unless he peremptorily forbade. Without a change of countenance, he dashed off the prompt reply that if in spite of his declination he should be nominated, he would decline with an emphasis which might be construed as disrespectful. He passed the dispatch and his answer to his son to read, and without a comment resumed his cigar and the conversation, as if it were a matter of no consequence.

Such was his final leave-taking of the fretting cares of public life. Some six years of retirement followed, in which he found enjoyment in the re-

* Sherman Letters, p. 361.

unions of his old comrades and in the public anniversaries and functions for which he was always in great demand. His racy and trenchant style of extemporaneous discussion of every subject suggested by the occasion, or which was of current popular interest, offered a remarkable example of unreserved disclosure of a great man's heart and motives, and it became plainly apparent that the whole country felt honored at being thus taken into his confidence. In his most unguarded words his principles were always clear, noble, intensely patriotic, and his careless colloquial expressions often covered a practical wisdom and insight of a most striking kind. Every year added to the proof of his having chosen the better part in avoiding the conflicts of partisan politics, for he was right in his judgment that it mattered little whether King Log or King Stork were on the throne. The exuberant manifestations of popular good will were always grateful to him, if sometimes a little fatiguing, and he could not be insensible to the proofs that his place was a warm and a safe one in the hearts of his countrymen.

He had moved his home from St. Louis to New York in 1886, and gave a great deal of labor to the systematic filing and labeling of his voluminous papers and correspondence. He used to tell his friends that everything was there in order, every letter he had received and its answer, and every document that had any historical value. The same system and thrift marked all his private business. He enjoyed with his family and friends the full social advantages that his means allowed, but he was one who had a horror of debt and of laxity in meeting business obligations, and was never tempted into pecuniary embarrassments or dangerous risks.

Mrs. Sherman died in 1888, and though he had fully expected to precede her to the grave, and the loss of the good woman who had been the faithful companion of his whole career from the day when



Tomb of General Sherman in St. Louis cemetery.

his father's death left him an orphaned child, whom she at first welcomed as a brother in the Ewing home, was a loss that sadly bereaved him, yet he received the blow with patience, finding content, as he said, in the knowledge that "no mortal was ever better prepared to put on immortality," and that in due time he would resume his place by her side.

Through the closing years he kept up his philosophic cheerfulness, often at the dinner table of devoted friends, and cordially welcoming all who knew him to his own home. Only a week before his last illness he wrote to John Sherman, "I am drifting along in the old rut, in good strength, attending about four dinners a week at public or private houses, and generally wind up for gossip at the Union League Club."* The members of the club still love to point out his favorite corner where he sat nearly every evening in witty chat or wise discussion of things past and present, surrounded by an eager group of younger men, learning devotion to country by the best of all instruction, in word and in illustrious example.

Returning home in the evening of February 4, 1891, from a dramatic performance, he caught cold, and in a day or two erysipelas of the face and throat appeared, and he rapidly became very ill, his age, of course, telling against him. His seventieth birthday came on the 8th, and, after several days of partial or complete unconsciousness, he died on the 14th, having fully and greatly rounded out the normal allotment of the years of man's life. He was modestly laid in the grave beside his wife's resting place at St. Louis, according to the directions he had minutely given, and the mourning of the whole land was heartfelt and deep.

* Sherman Letters, p. 381.

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INDEX.

- Adams, John Quincy, 3.
 Adams, General Wirt, 184.
 Allatoona, battle of, 233.
 Allatoona Pass, 210.
 Allen, General Robert, 199.
 Anderson, Lars, 29.
 Anderson, General Patton, 49, 53, 57.
 Anderson, General Robert, 27, 29, 31.
 Appomattox, surrender at, 296.
 Arkansas Post, 102.
 Armstrong, General, 150.
 Army of the Cumberland, 329, 331, 332.
 Army of the Potomac, 307.
 Army of the Tennessee, 105, 219, 285-287, 331, 332.
 Atlanta campaign, 204, 330.
 Atlanta captured, 224.
 Augusta captured, 269.
 Baird, General Absalom, 169.
 Banks, General N. P., 147, 157, 187, 188.
 Bate, General W. B., 169, 172.
 Baton Rouge arsenal, 19.
 Baxter, Captain A. S., 73.
 Beauregard, General, 20, 22, 24, 40, 51, 52, 59, 64, 66, 99, 232, 270.
 Belknap, General, 326, 327, 339.
 Benton, Thomas H., 3, 9.
 Bentonville, battle of, 283.
 Biddle, Commodore, 9, 10.
 Blaine, James G., 344, 345.
 Blair, General F. P., 100, 159, 195, 267.
 Bowen, General, 45.
 Bowling Green, Ky., 30, 36.
 Bragg, General Braxton, 14, 20, 40, 62, 64, 75, 153, 163, 175.
 Breckenridge, General, 44, 59, 60, 297.
 Buckland, General, 42, 43, 48, 49, 54, 65.
 Buckner, Simon B., 29, 30.
 Buell, General Don Carlos, 14, 18, 32, 37, 40, 65, 68, 80, 193.
 Bull Run, battle of, 24, 25.
 Burnside, General, 160, 166, 179, 180.
 Calhoun, John C., 3.
 Cameron, Simon, 31, 32.
 Camp Dick Robinson, 29.
 Chalmers, General, 43, 47, 58, 59, 64, 65.
 Champion's Hill, 125, 126.
 Charleston evacuated, 277.
 Chattanooga, victory of, 175.
 Cheatham, General, 41, 45, 59, 60, 176, 215, 216.
 Chickasaw Bayou, 99, 100.
 Churchill, General T. J., 102, 103.
 Clark, General, 45.
 Clay, Henry, 3, 13, 27.
 Cleburne, General, 41, 44, 49, 54, 163, 166, 178, 258.
 Columbia captured, 273.
 Corinth, capture of, 81.
 Corse, General, 158, 170, 233, 245.
 Corwin, Thomas, 13.

- Cox, General J. D., 287, 289, 290-292, 305.
 Crittenden, General, 65, 67, 69.
 Crittenden, John J., 27.
 Crump's Landing, 37, 50, 73.
 Curtis, General, 36.

 Dahlgren, Admiral, 261.
 Dana, Charles A., 162.
 Davies, General Thomas A., 88.
 Davis, Jefferson, 30, 95, 164, 221, 223, 267, 295, 297.
 Dix, General John A., 301, 305.
 Dodge, General G. M., 181, 206.

 Edwards Station, 128, 129.
 Everts, William M., 1, 317.
 Ewing, General Hugh, 105, 159, 161.
 Ewing, Miss Ellen B., 6, 13.
 Ewing, Thomas, 2, 3, 13, 17.
 Ezra Church, battle of, 220.

 Farragut, Admiral, 98, 99.
 Fayetteville falls, 279.
 Floyd, John B., 18.
 Foote, Admiral, 36.
 Forrest, General, 95, 183.
 Fort Donelson, 36, 38.
 Fort Fisher, 288.
 Fort Henry, 37, 38.
 Fort Hindman, 102.
 Fort McAllister, 262.
 Fort Moultrie, 6.
 Fort Pickering, 89.
 Fort Robinet, 88.
 Foster, General John G., 190, 261, 263, 280.
 Frémont, General John C., 8, 29, 30.

 Gardner, General Frank, 147.
 Geary, General, 157, 167, 264.
 Gettysburg, battle of, 147.
 Gibson, General R. L., 50, 62.
 Gladden, General, 64.
 Grand Gulf, 120.
 Granger, General Gordon, 163, 195.

 Grant, General U. S., 30, 36-39, 41-44, 60-62, 72, 73, 76, 77, 94, 96-98, 104, 105, 115, 143, 156, 160, 162, 171-173, 181, 188, 189, 195, 196, 231, 240, 261, 280, 293, 294, 299, 300, 312, 313, 315, 316, 320, 322, 324-326, 328, 335, 337.
 Grierson, General, 119.
 Guthrie, James, 30, 32, 200.

 Haines's Bluff, 101, 129.
 Halleck, General Henry W., 32-37, 39-41, 43, 79, 179, 232, 280, 303, 322.
 Hamilton, General C. S., 94.
 Hampton, General Wade, 275, 279, 283.
 Hancock, General Winfield S., 14.
 Hankinson's Ferry, 121.
 Hardee, General, 45, 57, 63, 166, 176, 218, 223, 263, 270, 277, 282.
 Harper's Ferry seized, 22.
 Harrison, General William H., 2, 5.
 Harvard graduates, 12.
 Havre de Grace, 4.
 Hazen, General W. B., 156, 260, 261.
 Henderson, Senator, 345.
 Herron, General, 142, 146.
 Hickenlooper, Capt. A., 61, 130.
 Hildebrand, 42, 53, 54, 65.
 Hill, General D. H., 270, 291.
 Hilton Head, 262.
 Hindman, General, 44, 62.
 Hoke, General, 290, 292.
 Holly Springs, 87, 89, 96.
 Hood, General, 209, 211, 215, 216, 219, 221, 223, 224, 232.
 Hooker, General Joseph, 11, 156, 167, 195, 207.
 Howard, General O. O., 155, 170, 195, 206, 268, 269.
 Hunter, Hocking, 3.
 Hurlbut, General S., 38, 50, 59-61, 183, 185.

- Jackson captured, 125.
 Jackson, General Andrew, 3, 59.
 Johnson, Andrew, 194, 197, 300, 308, 312, 313, 315, 316.
 Johnson, General Bushrod, 50, 52, 59, 163.
 Johnston, General Albert Sidney, 5, 36, 40, 44, 46, 48, 60.
 Johnston, General Joseph E., 24, 94, 95, 118, 140, 143, 201, 211, 212, 281, 297.
 Kearny, General, 8, 9.
 Kilpatrick, General, 269, 270, 279, 296.
 King, James, 15.
 Knox, Thomas W., 113.
 Lancaster, Ohio, 2, 6.
 Lauman, General, 50, 77.
 Lee, General Robert E., 147, 242, 292, 296, 297.
 Lee, General Stephen D., 159, 160, 184, 211, 220.
 Leggett, General, 263.
 Lightburn, General, 165.
 Lincoln, Abraham, 22, 28, 114, 179, 192, 294, 295, 299, 303.
 Little Ogeechee, 259.
 Logan, General, 83, 181, 195, 218, 266, 332, 345.
 Long, General, 180.
 Longstreet, General, 157, 166.
 Lookout Mountain taken, 168.
 Lovejoy's station, 224.
 Mangum, Willie P., 3.
 March to the sea, 334.
 Mason, Colonel R. B., 9, 10, 11.
 McArthur, General, 50, 60, 182.
 McClellan, General George B., 29, 32.
 McClelland, General John A., 38, 49-52, 55, 67, 102-104.
 McCook, General Alexander McD., 31, 67-69.
 McDowell, General Irwin, 24, 25, 55.
 McGoffin, Beriah, 27, 28.
 McLaws, General, 258.
 McPherson, General James B., 35, 41, 83, 181, 191, 205, 212, 218, 331.
 Meade, General, 303, 322.
 Medill, Governor, 3.
 Meigs, General M., 14, 15, 162, 201.
 Mexican War, 26.
 Milliken's Bend, 98.
 Missionary Ridge, 168.
 Mitchell, General, 83.
 Monterey, Cal., 8.
 Morgan, General C. W., 98, 154.
 Morton, Oliver P., 29.
 Mower, General, 187, 268.
 Napoleon, Louis, 313.
 Nelson, General William, 29, 31, 56, 65, 66, 69.
 New Hope Church, 209.
 Ord, General, 89.
 Osterhaus, General, 157, 159, 167.
 Palmer, General John M., 205, 221, 290, 291.
 Parke, General J. G., 142, 190, 191.
 Patterson, General Robert, 24.
 Pemberton, General, 89, 118, 125, 140, 143.
 Pillow, General Gideon J., 30.
 Pittsburg Landing, 39, 76.
 Polk, General L., 40, 48, 60, 63, 185, 211.
 Pope, General John, 33, 34, 36, 79, 199.
 Port Gibson, 120.
 Port Hudson, 147.
 Porter, Admiral, 103, 108, 109, 110, 118, 187, 288, 294, 295.
 Prentiss, General B. M., 39, 41, 50, 58-60.
 Price, General, 86, 87.
 Queen of the West, 117.
 Quimby, General, 105, 108.

Rawlins, General, 324, 326.
 Roddy, General, 153.
 Rosecrans, General, 83, 86, 151, 190-192.
 Rousseau, General Lovell A., 29.
 Ruger, General, 290, 291.
 Ruggles, General, 45, 62.
 Savannah captured, 263.
 Schofield, General, 190, 191, 195, 206, 265, 280, 281, 292, 317, 341.
 Scott, General Winfield, 8, 12, 23, 24, 313.
 Seminole Indians, 5.
 Seward, William H., 300.
 Sheridan, General, 172, 173, 303, 304, 322.
 Sherman, Charles R., 1, 3.
 Sherman, Edmund, 1.
 Sherman, John, 22, 24, 318, 327, 328, 342, 343, 347.
 Sherman, Mrs. W. T., 33, 308, 346.
 Sherman, Roger, 1.
 Sherman, Taylor, 1.
 Sherman, William Tecumseh, ancestors, 1; birth, 2; appointed a cadet, 3; appears at West Point, 4; graduates, 5; appointed lieutenant, 5; engaged, 6; at Fort Moultrie, 6; at Marietta, Ga., 7; sails for California, 8; adjutant general, 9; arrests Nash, 10; sails for New York, 12; marriage, 13; appointed captain, 14; sails for California, 14; returns to the East, 17; superintendent of military school, 18; resignation, 19; appointed colonel, 23; Bull Run, 24; brigadier general, 27; in Kentucky, 30; takes command, 31; relieved, 32; in Missouri, 32; at Paducah, 35; at Pittsburg Landing, 39; at Shiloh, 41; his position, 42; engaged, 51; falls back, 55;

meets Grant, 62; new position, 65; moves forward, 68; new command, 79; advises Grant, 83; at Memphis, 85; letter to mayor, 90; to Secretary Chase, 92; to the Yazoo 98; defeated, 101; falls back, 102; commands Fifteenth Corps, 105; aids Porter, 110; writes to Rawlins, 112; in trouble with Knox, 113; writes to Grant, 115; moves on Jackson, 123; destroys public property, 125; moves against Vicksburg, 131; moves on Jackson, 147; promoted, 149; ordered to Chattanooga, 158; sent to relieve Burnside, 180; at home, 182; nearly captured, 184; in Vicksburg, 187; goes to New Orleans, 187; promotion, 188; at Nashville, 195; writes to Grant, 196; his character, 198; prepares for spring campaign, 200; Atlanta campaign, 204; Kennesaw, 213; Peach Tree Creek, 216; defeats Hood, 217; Atlanta captured, 224; congratulations, 224; march to the sea, 231; his order, 245; letter to mayor, 249; letter to Mrs. Bower, 251; arrives near Savannah, 261; captures the city, 263; Christmas gift, 264; through the Carolinas, 265; capturing Columbia, 273; Fayetteville taken, 279; news from home, 280; battle of Bentonville, 283; meets Grant, 293; Healy's picture of, 294; learns of Lee's surrender, 296; hears of Lincoln's death, 297; Sherman's mistake, 299; treaty revoked, 300; marches to Virginia, 305; review of his army, 307; address to his troops, 308; a new command, 311;

- visits Mexico, 312; as a peace-maker, 314; Indian treaty, 318; at Chicago meeting, 322; becomes general, 323; painful interview, 325; visits Europe, 327; removes to St. Louis, 328; publishes memoirs, 329; returns to Washington, 340; declines civil office, 342; retirement, 346; New York home, 346; his death and burial, 347.
- Sloat, Commodore, 8.
- Slocum, General, 155, 195.
- Smith, General A. J., 14, 98, 187.
- Smith, General Charles F., 37-40, 77.
- Smith, General Giles A., 271.
- Smith, General John E., 158, 266.
- Smith, General Kilby, 187.
- Smith, General Morgan L., 170.
- Smith, General P. F., 11.
- Stanbery, Henry, 3.
- Stanley, Henry M., 319.
- Stanton, Edwin M., 297, 301, 302, 308, 313, 314, 315.
- Steele, General, 157, 187.
- Steele's Bayou, 109.
- Stevenson, General, 166.
- Stewart, General A. P., 57, 62, 169, 176, 215, 270.
- Stockton, Commodore, 8.
- Stoneman, General, 293.
- Stuart, Colonel David, 5, 42, 58, 60.
- Sutter, Captain, 10, 12.
- Taft, Judge, 340, 341.
- Taylor, General Richard, 146, 241.
- Taylor, General Zachary, 2, 7, 8, 13, 241.
- Tenure of Office Act, 314.
- Terry, General, 265, 280, 287.
- Thirteenth Army Corps, 94.
- Thomas, General George H., 24, 27, 31, 80, 155, 162, 192-194, 197, 198, 201, 207, 322, 332, 337, 338.
- Thomas, General Lorenzo, 31.
- Turchin, General, 156, 175.
- Tuttle, General, 157.
- Twiggs, General David E., 20.
- Tyler, General Robert O., 23, 25.
- Union League Club, 347.
- United States Military Academy, 341.
- Van Buren, Martin, 3.
- Van Dorn, General Earl, 85, 87, 96.
- Van Vliet, General Stewart, 14.
- Veatch, General, 50, 57.
- Vicksburg assaulted, 131.
- Vicksburg besieged, 138.
- Vicksburg campaign, 117.
- Vigilance Committee, 15, 16.
- Von Moltke, Marshal, 333.
- Wallace, General Lewis, 38, 72, 73.
- Wallace, W. H. L., 38, 56, 63.
- Webster, Daniel, 2, 3, 13.
- Weitzel, General, 299.
- Wheeler, General Joseph, 153, 154, 216, 217, 222, 270, 283.
- Williams, General, 98, 99, 275.
- Wilson, General J. G., 294.
- Wilson's Creek, 191.
- Winslow, General, 184.
- Withers, General, 45, 60, 64.
- Wood, General Thomas J., 31, 32, 70, 163.
- Wood, John E., 16.
- Wright, Silas, 8, 304.
- Yerba Buena, 11.
- Zollicoffer, Felix K., 29, 30.

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